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In this thesis, aspects of the South African law of multi-party enrichment are compared 
with the equivalent rules of German law. Against the background of a general 
comparison of the German and South African law of unjustified enrichment, the 
following sets of factual circumstances are examined in detail: performance of the 
obligation of another; performance in accordance with an instruction; and performance 
in response to a cession. Rather than following a conventional comparative approach 
(viz where a chapter is devoted to each of the legal systems under consideration, and 
then comparisons are made in a final, analytical chapter), this thesis is structured as 
follows: each chapter begins with a comparative treatment of the legal context in which 
such situations arise. Then various factual permutations are treated, taking into account 
the German and South African approaches to such practical situations and the 
underlying policy factors that influence the law. On the basis of this critical evaluation, 
recommendations are made for the development of South African law. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION AND BASIC CONCEPTS 
Anyone embarking on an exploration of the South African law of enrichment might be 
forgiven for feeling' lost in a maze of sluggish and devious waters'. 1 The whole area is 
bedevilled by uncertainty, confusion and unknown dangers, which deter potential 
plaintiffs from bringing enrichment claims to court. The consequent paucity of new 
cases in turn means that there are few opportunities for judges to develop the law of 
unjustified emichment into a coherent and workable branch of our law which is suited to 
modern conditions, and to bring about much-needed certainty. 
This rather primitive area of our legal system looks strange even to South 
African lawyers, who are used to tripping over the old authorities from time to time. 
Here one fmds all sorts of strange old relics such as the Roman condictiones,2 patched 
up with ad hoc extensions, with which the courts attempt to hobble through the modern 
commercial world. Side by side with these Roman survivors one finds a set of general 
principles that were distilled from the case law by De Vos nearly half a century ago,3 but 
which have not proved to be the catalyst for development4 that one might have hoped, 
2 
4 
From 'Evangeline' by H W Longfellow. 
See D P Visser 'The role of judicial policy in setting the limits of a general enrichment action' in 
Ellison Kahn (ed) The Quest for Justice: Essays in Honour of Michael McGregor Corbett, Chief 
Justice of the Supreme Court of South Africa (1995) 342 at 348: 'In South Africa the Roman 
condictiones still rule us, and not even from their graves, for they have never been properly 
interred. ' 
See review by C P Joubert (1959) 76 SAlJ 471 and Nortje en 'n Ander v Pool NO 1966 (3) SA 
96 (A) at l14C. 
See Reinhard Zimmermann' A road through the enrichment-forest? Experiences with a general 
enrichment action' (1985) 18 CILSA 1 at 1 ff and 19 regarding the law-generating function of 
such general principles in, for example, German and American law. 
2 
and which have until recently been given scant judicial recognition.5 On the contrary, 
they seem to have added to the general uncertainty because nobody knows whether the 
judge in a particular case will choose to confine himself to the tried and tested specific 
actions,6 or to go to the other extreme and apply the general principles, deciding that, 
finally, the 'time is right' for the recognition of general liability for unjustified 
enrichment. 7 Even now that the Supreme Court of Appeal seems more ready than ever 
to take that step, we must still wait for what it deems to be an appropriate opportunity to 
do so.s Within the context of the specific actions there is also uncertainty: whether or 
not a judge will allow another ad hoc extension seems rather unpredictable;9 the scope 
of the action would presumably only be extended where the circumstances made it fair 
to do so; and it thus amounts to merely a question of equity. Ironically, therefore, the 
fear of uncertainty and indeterminate liabilityJO which led to the court's rejection of a 
general basis for enrichment liability nearly forty years ago seems to have led to a 







The newer approach is reflected in McCarthy Retail Ltd v Shortdistance Carriers CC 200 I (3) 
SA 482 (SCA), where the court expressed some confidence in the general principles. While the 
courts have generally continued to apply the specific remedies, many academics who write about 
unjustified enrichment tend to write about the general principles rather than the old remedies. So, 
instead of working in tandem, the two branches of the profession seem, to a certain extent, to be 
following separate paths. (An exception is Mr Justice D H van Zyl- see, for example, 'The 
general enrichment action is alive and well' in D P Visser (ed conSUltant), T W Bennett, D J 
Devine, D B Hutchison, I Leeman, C M Murray and D van Zyl Smit (eds) Unjustified 
Enrichment: Essays in Honour ofWouter de Vos 1992 (First published - and subsequently 
referred to - as Acta Juridica 1992) 115 and ABSA Bank Ltd TIA Bankfin v C B Stander t/a CAW 
Paneelkloppers 1998 (1) SA 939 (C». CfReinhard Zimmermann 'Savigny's legacy: legal 
history, comparative law, and the emergence ofa European legal science' (1996) 112 LQR 576 at 
584: 'A legal practice informed and sustained by legal scholarship, and an approach to legal 
scholarship that is always mindful of the fact that, ultimately, law serves an eminently practical 
function: that is what Savigny was aiming for.' 
Cf, e g, Kommissaris van Binnelandse Inkomste en 'n Ander v Willers en Andere 1994 (3) SA 
283 (A). 
See, for example, Blesbok Eiendomsagentskap v Cantamessa 1991 (2) SA 712 (T). 
See McCarthy Retail Ltdv Shortdistance Carriers CC supra at 489A. 
CfZimmermann Law of Obligations 887n336: ' ... Nortje v Pool ... provides the helpful comment 
that they are admissible "[onder] bepaalde omstandighede".' Also see the De Vos 
Verrykingsaanspreeklikheid 327 -8. 
Nortje en 'n Ander v Pool NO supra at 139-140. See Zimmermann (1985) 18 CILSA I at 2: 
'The underlying policy consideration was that such [a general enrichment] action would open the 
floodgates for judicial intervention whenever the distribution of property does not seem to be in 
accordance with equity.' Similarly, D P Visser 'Searches for silver bullets: enrichment in tbree-
party situations' in D Johnston and R Zimmermann (eds) Unjustified Enrichment: Key Issues in 
Comparative Perspective (2002) 526; idem (n 2) 350. Cfsimilar fears expressed in the context of 
delictual liability for negligent misstatements causing pure economic loss: see M M Corbett 
'Aspects of the role of policy in the evolution of our common law' (1987) 104 SAU 52 at 58. 
3 
indetenninate. 
Multi-party enricbment: the problem 
Some areas of the South African law of enrichment remain almost completely uncharted. 
One area of difficulty and uncertainty which has hitherto received very little attention is 
that of 'multi-party enrichment' .11 Casting the net widely, this may be taken to refer to 
situations where three or more parties l2 are linked to the fact of enrichment by virtue of 
connecting legal acts I3 or by certain other legal facts. 14 This tenn is to be preferred to 
'three-party enrichment' 15 because more than three parties may be drawn into the 
enrichment relationship.16 For the same reason, and because identifying someone as a 
'third party' is often just a matter of perspective, 17 the tenn 'third-party enrichment' 










Cfthe German 'Mehrpersonenverhtiltnisse'. The expression was used by Schutz JA in McCarthy 
Retail Ltdv Shortdistance Carriers CC supra at 493I. 
It is not intended to include cases of bilateral enrichment, in which only two parties are involved. 
For instance, a payment or other transfer, theft, the acquisition of possession, or a contract. 
Examples might be: A owes B a debt in terms of a contract. C pays A's debt to B. Here the 
parties are linked by the contract A-B and by the payment C-B. Or A purports to conclude a 
contract of sale with Band B likewise with C and the object of the sales is transferred from A to 
B to C. While both contracts are void, both transfers are valid. Here the parties are linked, not so 
much by their' contracts' , as they obviously do not exist, but by the transfers A-B and B--C. A 
party could be linked with each of the others, or with only one of them. 
For example, a duty which derives ex lege ega duty of a parent to maintain a child: A owes a 
duty of maintenance to B. C buys necessaries and/or other things for B and then wants to claim 
the cost thereof from A. See Daniel Visser 'Das Recht der ungerechtfertigten Bereicherung' in 
Robert Feenstra and Reinhard Zimmermann (eds) Das romisch-holliindische Recht: Fortschritte 
des Zivilrechts im 17. und 18. lahrhundert (1992) 374 at 379. 
See, e g, Visser (n 10). 
For example, in the so-called 'performance chains', there could be more than two successive 
transfers i e A transfers something to B, who transfers the same object to C, who in turn transfers 
it to D, and so on. 
See J P Dawson 'Indirect Enrichment' in Ernst von Caemmerer, Sonia Mentschikoff and Konrad 
Zweigert (eds) Ius Privatum Gentium: Festschriftfur Max Rheinstein vol2 (1969) 789 at 795 
(regarding banking transactions): 'How such transactions should be analyzed depended in part 
on one's angle of vision. For the person who complied with such a request the payment was 
made to a third person. For the person who gave the request (the debtor or other obligor) and 
also for the receiver the payment or transfer was made through a third person..' 
An additional reason for rejecting this term is that it was used by A M Honore to refer to two 
extremely narrowly-defined situations: where' A transfers money or property to B, which B 
applies so as to benefit C' and where 'A, at the instance ofB, performs a service for C': Third 
party enrichment' 1960 Acta luridica 236. CfD H van Zyl who uses 'indirect' and 'third party 
enrichment' interchangeably: ABSA Bank Ltd tla Bankjin v C B Stander t/a CAW Paneelkloppers 
supra at 948. 
See, for example, Hutchison (ed) Wille's Principles 634; Visser (n 2) at 358; F R Malan and J T 
Pretorius 'Enrichment in triangular situations, interest and the in duplum rule, and personal 
4 
has a specific, limited meaning in terms of German la~o and should therefore also be 
rejected as a general 'umbrella-term'. Similarly, 'indirect enrichment' is unsatisfactory 
as a general term; it has been used in South Africa sometimes to refer to two specific 
categories of cases, and sometimes to cover a broader range of circumstances?l 
Even though it is within this area that many of the most fundamental problems 
besetting South African enrichment law come to the fore,22 apart from a few articles and 
essays dealing with limited aspects ofthe topic,23 several case notes24 and short 
discussions in a couple oftextbooks,25 the subject has not been tackled by South African 
academics. To read the leading textbook, De Vos's seminal work, 
Verrykingsaanspreeklikheid in dieSuid-Afrikaanse Reg, for example, one would not 
think that multi-party enrichment is regarded as the 'most notoriously difficult of all 
enrichment constellations,;26 he either deftly sweeps it under the carpet by reference to 
the paritas creditorum rule,27 or throws it out the back door altogether by defining it out 
of existence: where an enrichment is 'passed on' from the party who was originally 










liability and company names' (1996) 8 South African Mercantile Law Journal 399. 
See, for example, Medicus Schuldrecht II marg notes 727 ff; Loewenheim Bereicherungsrecht 30· 
ff. 
See, e g, Van Zyl Negotiorum Gestio at 113 ff; Visser (n 2) at 358; Daniel Visser and Saul Miller 
'Between principle and policy: indirect enrichment in subcontractor and 'garage repair' cases' 
(2000) 117 SAL] 594; McCarthy Retail Ltd v Shortdistance Carriers CC supra at 492A. 
For example, problems of definition and lack of conceptual clarity (e g what exactly is meant by 
'enrichment' in our law?) and problems of policy (e g how far down the 'causal chain' should 
one allow a plaintiff to sue?). 
See Honore 1960 Acta Juridica 236. Recently D P Visser has made contributions in this area: 
see references in notes 15 and 21 above. Also see J C Sonnekus 'Ongeregverdigde verryldng en 
ongeregverdigde verarming vir kondikering in drieparty-verhoudings' 1996 TSA R I. 
See, for example, J E Scholtens 'Enrichment at whose expense?' (1968) 85 SALJ369; W de Vos 
'Enrichment at whose expense? A reply' (1969) 86 SALJ227. 
See, for example, De Vos Verrykingsaanspreekiikheid, especially at 339 ff; Van Zyl Negotiorum 
Gestio at 113 ff; and Eiselen and Pienaar Unjustified Enrichment 77-8, 210-15,218-9. 
Zimmermann Law o/Obligations 874. Also see R Zimmermann and J du Plessis 'Basic features 
of the German law of unjustified enrichment' [1994] Restitution Law Review 14 at 31 n32. 
See, e g, p 342. 
See, e g, pp 89 ff and 340. See review of the first edition by C P Joubert (1959) 76 SAL! 471 
where, interestingly, the only specific topic singled out for criticism is De Vos's treatment of 'die 
tussenpersoon oftussenvermoe se rol by verrykiugsaanspreeklikheid' which Joubert describes as 
'hoog kontensieus en aanvegbaar' (at 475). 
5 
The relatively fe~9 cases which deal with the question have been characterised 
by confusion and a lack of consistency. For example, one can think of the line of cases 
which held that, in circumstances where the main contractor had disappeared or become 
insolvent, subcontractor who improved someone's property would have an enrichment 
lien yet he would not be allowed to bring an enrichment action against the owner of the 
property on which he had worked. 3D Or the cases dealing with the situation where, 
contrary to a countermand by its client, a bank honours a cheque and then tries to 
recover the payment from the payee with an enrichment action. Before the Appellate 
Division fmally settled the matter in B & H Engineering v First National Bank of SA 
Ltd,3! there were three decisions emanating from provincial divisions of the Supreme 
Court: one from the Cape, disallowing such an action,32 and two from the Transvaal, 
allowing the bank a claim based on enrichment.33 
The kind of difficulties - and resultant confusion - encountered in the area of 
multi-party enrichment can be illustrated by the old case of Turkstra v Massyn?4 
Massyn purchased a piece ofland from a Mr Sofer for £1 485. He was given an 
extension of time to pay the purchase price, on condition that he paid interest and 
furnished the seller with a building society guarantee. He did not furnish the seller with 
the guarantee. Turkstra then undertook to pay the purchase price to the seller, in order to 
save Massyn from 'serious fmancialloss', as he had already almost completed building 
a house on the property and stood to lose it if he did not receive transfer of the property. 
This loss would also have affected Turkstra, who was one of Massyn's creditors (as 







See, for example, the comment of Preiss J in First National Bank of SA Ltdv B & H Engineering 
1993 (2) SA 41 (T) at 44C: 'I would have thought that the issues in the stated case would have 
been dealt with in numerous reported decisions. To my surprise I have ascertained ... that there 
are only two cases in which this specific issue has arisen for decision.' There was, incidentally, 
an 81-year interval between the two cases mentioned. 
Although there have been more recent developments which have attempted to remedy the 
situation; for example, Buzzard Electrical (Pty) Ltd v I58 Jan Smuts Avenue Investments (Pty) 
Ltd and Another 1996 (4) SA 19 (A), which did away with the long-standing illogical distinction 
between the availability of enrichment actions and enrichment liens in such cases. 
1995 (2) SA 279 (A). 
Govender v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 1984 (4) SA 392 (C). 
Natal Bank Ltd v Roorda 1903 TH 298; First National Bank of SA Ltd v B & H Engineering 1993 
(2) SA 41 (T). 
1959 (1) SA 40 (n. 
terms ofTurkstra's undertaking to pay Sofer, Massyn was to remain liable in terms of 
the contract of sale. Turkstra gave Sofer a guarantee by the Netherlands Bank for the 
payment of the amount owed by Massyn. Turkstra then paid Sofer by means of a bank 
draft drawn on the Netherlands Bank and the land was transferred to Massyn. 
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Turkstra then sued Massyn, basing his claim on four alternative arguments: first, 
he argued that he had acted as the defendant's surety and thus 'was ipso Jacto subrogated 
to all the rights which the creditor had against the defendant';35 secondly, in the absence 
of a suretyship agreement, that he had acted as negotiorum gestor vis-a-vis the 
defendant;36 thirdly, that, by receiving transfer of the land, the defendant had been 
enriched at his expense;37 and lastly, that he had acted as the defendant's agent.38 
The judge was apparently perplexed by the declaration and particulars, which he 
characterised as a 'hopeless jumble'. He held that the section of the declaration dealing 
with the argument based on suretyship was vague and embarrassing.39 He held that the 
claim based on negotiorum gestio was 'bad in law' because the plaintiff had not alleged 
that the defendant was absent.40 The claim based on agency met with the same fate: he 
held that the plaintiff had not alleged that he had 'advised the defendant that he had 
undertaken to pay as his agent' and that '[i]fthis claim is not bad in law it seems to me 
at least to be vague and embarrassing' .41 His most scornful dismissal, however, relates 
to the claim based on enrichment: 'it is quite impossible to understand this part of the 
declaration and the defendant is obviously embarrassed by the vague and embarrassing 
nature of it' .42 
The fundamental problem in the area of multi-party enrichment, as in the whole 


















by.43 It is in this respect unlike other areas of our law, which were once 'rather less than 
transparent, [but which] were transformed into systematized, coherent systems - one 
thinks immediately of the areas of contract, delict and criminal law, where the theories 
of J C de Wet, W A Joubert, N J J van der Merweand others were transformed into 
judgments by judges such as Lucas Steyn and Frans Rumpff.'44 Nobody could, by any 
stretch of the imagination, think of the South African law of enrichment as a 
'systematized, coherent system'. Even calling it 'the law of enrichment' is a something 
of a misnomer, as our collection of old remedies seems almost to be 'tied [b]y a chance 
bond together. ,45 
Specific enrichment remedies in South African law 
1 The condictiones 
(a) Condictio indebitt~6 
The requirements for the condictio indebiti are that there must have been a datio (a 






See Zimmennann (1996) 112 LQR 576 at 585: 'European legal science, in turn, is based on the 
belief that the legal material does not constitute an indigestible and arbitrary mass of individual 
rules and cases, but can be reduced to a rational and organised system. It aims at presenting law 
as a logically consistent whole. And it attempts to demonstrate how individual rules and the 
decisions of individual cases can be derived from general propositions, and how they can be 
understood and related to each other.' Also see Patrick O'Brien' A generally applicable 
condictio sine causa for South African law' 2000 TSAR 752 at 753. The most significant attempt 
to set the South African law of enrichment on a more scientific footing was that of De Vos: see p 
13 below. 
D P Visser 'Placing the civilian influence in Scotland' in D L Carey Miller and R Zimmennann 
(eds) The Civilian Tradition and Scots Law: Aberdeen Quincentenary Essays (1997) 239 at 251. 
Also see O'Brien 2000 TSAR 752 at 753. 
From 'I am a Parcel of Vain Strivings Tied' by Henry David Thoreau. 
See De Vos Venykingsaanspreeklikheid 23-9, 69-71, 171-209; Eiselen and Pienaar Unjustified 
Enrichment 1 06 ff; Hutchison (ed) Wille's Principles 636-8; J G Lotz 'Enrichment' LAWSA vol 9 
(revised by A de W Horak), First reissue (1996) paras 78-81. This is the most common 
enrichment remedy and numerous cases could be cited as examples. Important cases include 
Willis Faber Enthoven (Pty) Ltd v Receiver of Revenue and Another 1992 (4) SA 202 (A) and 
Bowman, De Wet and Du Plessis NNO and Others v Fidelity Bank Ltd 1997 (2) SA 35 (A). 
There are exceptions to this rule e g the condictio indebiti will lie where there was a transfer of 
possession rather than ownership, or where the thing transferred was res incorporalis: see Lotz 
(46) para 79. Thus far, our courts have not been prepared to accept that any of the condictjones 
would be available where the enrichment took place by way of afactum. For criticism, see 
Eiselen and Pienaar Unjustified Enrichment 108. 
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requiring such transfer. In addition, the plaintiff must show that, as a result of an 
excusable error,49 he made the transfer in the belief that it was due; or that he made the 
transfer under duress;5o or that he had limited capacity to act when he made the transfer. 
The condictio will lie for the recovery of the thing which was transferred, or an 
equivalent amount of res fungibiles, or, where the recipient has parted with possession of 
what he received, its surrogate or value to the extent that the recipient remains 
enriched. 51 In addition, the plaintiff will be entitled to the fruits52 and accessions. 
(b) Condictio ob turpem vel iniustam causam53 
In order to succeed with a condictio ob turpem vel iniustam causam, one must again 
prove that there was a datio but this time that it was made in terms of an agreement that 
was void for illegality. In terms of the par delictum rule, the claim is unavailable to 
anyone who was himself in delicto except where the demands of public policy and 
justice dictate otherwise. 54 The measure of liability is the same as that under the 
condictio indebiti. 
(c) Condictio causa data causa non secuta55 
The first requirement for a condictio causa data causa non secuta is again a datio but it 
must have been made on the basis of an assumption relating to a future event which did 
not materialise,56 or subject to a modal clause which was not complied with or was 










Except where the natural obligation arose from the unassisted contract of a minor. 
Whether of fact or law. Regarding the nature of the error, see Willis Faber Enthoven (Pty) Ltd v 
Receiver oj Revenue and Another supra at 224; Bowman, De Wet and Du Plessis NNO and 
Others v Fidelity Bank Ltd 1997 (2) SA 35 (A); D P Visser 'Die grondslag van die condictio 
indebiti' (1988) 51 THRHR 492; idem Die Rol van Dwaling by die Condictio Indebiti 
(unpublished thesis, 1985). 
Provided that he can show that he protested or reserved his rights at the time when he made the 
transfer. 
De Vos Verrykingsaanspreeklikheid 364 ff. 
The duty to restore the fruits of an enrichment denotes fruits less the cost of producing them. In 
the law of enrichment, interest on money is not regarded as a fruit: see Lotz (n 46) para 86n 1. 
See De Vos Verrykingsaanspreeklikheid 20-23, 66-8, 160-7; Eiselen and Pienaar Unjustified 
Enrichment 89 ff; Hutchison (ed) Wille's Principles 636; Lotz (0 46) paras 82-4. 
Jajbhay v Cassim 1939 AD 537 and Visser v Rousseau 1990 (1) SA 139 (A). 
See De Vos Verrykingsaanspreeklikheid 10-20, 62-6, 154-60; Eiseleo and Pienaar Unjustified 
Enrichment 157 ff; Hutchison (ed) Wille's Principles 635; Lotz (n 46) paras 85-6. 
Which is surely a 'condition', rather than an 'assumption' or 'supposition' : see O'Brien 2000 
TSAR 752 at 754 and the sources cited there. 
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(d) Condictio sine causa specialis57 
The condictio sine causa specialis58 is available in several sets of circumstances. First 
of all, it will lie against someone who has received possession of the property of another 
and who has subsequently bonafide disposed of or consumed the property. Secondly, it 
will lie against someone who has received money ex causa lucrativa59 or on the basis of 
a negotium,60 who has subsequently bonafide disposed of or consumed the money.61 
Thirdly, this condictio (in this context sometimes also called the condictio ob causam 
finitam) is used to claim money or other property transferred to someone in terms of a 
causa which later falls away (e g where the transfer took place in terms of a reciprocal 
contract and supervening objective impossibility of performance extinguishes the other 
obligation).62 Finally, the condictio sine causa specialis can apparently be used to 
reclaim money or other property transferred to another sine causa, in circumstances 
where none of the other condictiones would be applicable.63 While Roman law 
generally required the existence of a negotium64 - an antecedent legal relation or 










In general, see De Vos Verrykingsaanspreeklikheid 29-36, 71-83, 209-\3; Eiselen and Pienaar 
Unjustified Enrichment 170 ff; Hutchison (ed) Wille's PrinCiples 638-9; Lotz (n 46) paras 87-9; 
Rulten NO v Herald Industries (Pty) Ltd 1982 (3) SA 600 (D); First National Bank o/Southern 
Africa Ltd v East Coast Design CC and Others 2000 (4) SA 137 (D); ABSA Bank Ltd v Standard 
Bank o/SA Ltd 1998 (1) SA 242 (SCA). 
Which goes by this name in order to distinguish it from the condictio sine causa generalis, which 
will be granted in circumstances where any of the above condictiones would be available. 
It has been argued that this action should also lie where property other than money has been 
received ex causa lucrativa: see De Vos Verrykingsaanspreeklikheid211-12. 
See Hutchison (ed) Wille's Principles 638. Regarding the question of a negotium in the context 
of payment by cheque see Chapter Three below. 
See, e g, First National Bank o/Southern Africa Ltd v East Coast Design CC and Other supra; 
ABSA Bank Ltd v Standard Bank o/SA Ltd supra. 
The condictio is excluded where a contractual remedy would be available e g where there was 
cancellation of a contract in terms of which a transfer took place: see, e g, Hutchison (ed) Wille's 
PrinCiples 638; De Vos Verrykingsaanspreeklikheid 158-9. 
Lotz (n 46) para 73; Zimmermann Law o/Obligations 871; Grotius 3.30.18; D P Visser 
'Unjustified enrichment' ASSAL 273 at 276. 
See De Vos Verrykingsaanspreeklikheid 34-5,54 and 84. De Vos says that there had to be a 
'negotium which went hand in hand with the transfer of ownership or possession' and interprets 
this as meaning that ownership or possession had to be directly transferred by the owner or his 
agent to the defendant: see, e g, op cit at 77. 
Gouws v Jester Pools (Pty) Ltd 1968 (3) SA 563 (T) at 573F; Eiselen and Pienaar Unjustified 
Enrichment at 76, quoting Lee Introduction to Roman Law at 347-8. Eiselen and Pienaar are 
critical of this; they say that it had already fallen away in Roman-Dutch law 'and it should not be 
resurrected in South African enrichment law. The causality and enrichment requirements provide 
10 
writers suggest that this is not required in modem South African law. 66 This remedy 
entitles the plaintiff to recover the property itself together with its fruits and accessions, 
if the defendant received ownership and still has possession of the property. lfthe 
defendant only received possession of the property, the plaintiff may claim its value. He 
may also recover the value of the property if the defendant received ownership but is no 
longer in possession of the property. 67 
2 Extended actio negotiorum gestorum68 
This remedy will be discussed in detail in the next chapter. At this stage, it should 
suffice to say that an enrichment remedy is afforded to anyone who administers the 
affairs of another in the bona fide belief that he is administering his own affairs;69 or 
who administers another's affairs for his own benefit, knowing that the affairs are those 
of another/o or who administers the affairs of another despite his protest; 71 or who 
administers the affairs of a minor. 72 
3 The possessor's action for improvements73 









adequate limitations to prevent unwarranted enrichment liability.' In the next paragraph, 
however, they say that the causa!jty requirement 'presents considerable difficulties in cases of 
indirect enrichment, that is where there is no negotium or antecedent legal relationship between 
the parties.' (They use the tenn 'indirect enrichment' in this context to refer to the so-called 
'sub-contractor situations' .) 
See e g De Vos Verrykingsaanspreeklikheid 75-7,84-5, 106, III (who says that the requirement 
had already been abandoned in Roman-Dutch law); Eiselen and Pienaar Unjustified Enrichment 
76-8,218-19. 
See Lotz (n 46) para 89. 
10 general, see Van Zyl Negotiorum Gestio; Niall R Whitty and Deon van Zyl 'Unauthorized 
management of affairs' in Reinhard Zimmennann, Daniel Visser and Kenneth Reid (eds) Mixed 
Legal Systems in Comparative Perspective: Property and Obligations in Scotland and South 
Africa (2004) 366 ff. 
The bonafide gestor: see Van Zyl Negotiorum Gestio 100 ff and Chapter Two below. 
The malafide gestor: see Van Zyl Negotiorum Gestio 90 ffand Chapter Two below. 
The situation of a protesting dominus: see Van Zyl Negotiorum Gestio 105 ff and Chapter Two 
below. 
Or someone else with limited capacity to act: see Van Zyl Negotiorum Gestio 87 ff and Chapter 
Two below. 
See, in general, De Vos Verrykingsaanspreeklikheid 48-59, 96-110, 224 ff; Eiselen and Pienaar 
Unjustified Enrichment 241 ff; Hutchison (ed) Wille's Principles 639-42; Lotz (n 46) paras 95 ff; 
Nortje en 'n Ander v Pool NO supra; Wynland Construction (Pty) Ltd v Ashley-Smith en Andere 
1985 (3) SA 798 (A); Buzzard Electrical (Pty) Ltd v 158 Jan Smuts Investments (Pty) Ltd and 
Another 1996 (4) SA 19 (A); Hubby's Investments (Pty) Ltd v Lifetime Properties (Pty) Ltd 1998 
(1) SA 295 (W). 
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owner's consent may sue the owner for enrichment. The owner will only be liable for 
expenditure that is necessary and useful, and therefore not luxurious. The possessor may 
sue for all necessary expenses, as the owner has been enriched by not having to pay 
these sums for the preservation of his property. Where the expenses are merely useful,75 
on the other hand, the claim will lie for the amount by which the value of the property 
has been increased76 or the amount of the expenditure, whichever is the lesser. 
Regarding useful expenses, the court may allow the owner to waive his right to the 
improvement and to allow the possessor to remove it, or it may allow the owner to keep 
the improvement and to pay the value which it would have upon separation. Any right 
of action will be reinforced by a right of retention until the claim is satisfied.77 
The legal position of a lawful occupier78 is similar to that of a bona fide 
possessor, except that an amount may be subtracted from his claim in respect of his use 
of the property. Bonafide occupiers i e those who believe themselves to be lawful 
occupiers) are treated in exactly the same way as lawful occupiers. Malafide 
possessors 79 and occupiers8o are probably also treated like bona fide possessors, except 
that thieves (i e mala fide possessors of movable property) cannot sue for enrichment. 
4 The statutory enrichment action that arises in the context of an informal 
contract for the alienation of land 
A party who performs in terms of an agreement for the alienation of land, 








I e a possessor who believes that he is the owner of the property in question: see De Vos 
Verrykingsaanspreeklikheid 245-7 and Hutchison (ed) Wille's PrinCiples 640n65 for this 
defmition and those of occupiers and mala fide possessors. 
The majority of writers agree that expenses are useful where they enhance the market value of the 
property and are generally regarded as useful according to the social and economic values of the 
community: see, e g, Lotz (n 46) para 9702. 
Provided that the improvements are tangible: see Nortje en 'n Ander v Pool NO supra; 
Hutchison (ed) Wille's PrinCiples 640n68. 
See, e g, Hutchison (ed) Wille's Principles 641. 
I e those who do not believe that they are owners but who have a right to occupy the property. 
This does not include fiduciaries, usufructuaries and lessees. 
I e those who know that they are not owners but act as if they are. 
I e those who know that they are not lawful occupiers but act as if they are. 
by the Alienation of Land Act,8l is entitled to recover his performance.82 If the 
performing party was the 'alienator' (e g the seller), he is entitled to 'reasonable 
compensation for the occupation, use or enjoyment' of the land and for any damage 
inflicted on the property by the other party. If the performing party was the 'alienee' 
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(e g the purchaser), he may claim interest on any swn he paid for the property, for the 
period between payment and recovery. He is also entitled to 'reasonable compensation' 
for any necessary expenses incurred in maintaining or improving the property, and for 
any improvements (made with the consent of the alienator) that increase the market 
value of the land. 83 
5 Claim for value of an inadequate performance 
A party might make such a defective performance in terms of a reciprocal contract that it 
entitles the other party to cancel the contract. If the cancelling party cannot return the 
defecti ve performance, as required in terms of the law of contract,84 the breaching party 
may sue him for enrichment.85 The claim will lie for the amount by which the 
cancelling party has been enriched by the other party's inadequate performance. 86 
6 Claim against a minor 
Persons who have limited capacity to act (such as minors) are not liable in terms of an 
agreement which they conclude without the assistance of a parent or legal guardian. The 








Act 68 of 198 I. These formalities, if not complied with, render the contract at least unenforceable 
(s 2(1)) ifnot void (s 24(1)(c)). 
Whether it was full or partial. 
For further details, see Hutchison (ed) Wille's PrinCiples 643-4. 
In accordance with restitutio in integrum. 
See, generally, Hutchison (ed) Wille's Principles 639; Eiselen and Pienaar Unjustified 
Enrichment 373 ff; Lotz (n 46) paras 98-10l. 
The background to this is that inadequate performance or non-performance by a party to a 
reciprocal contract entitles the other party to withhold his own performance. This, the exceptio 
non adimpleti contractus, is aimed at compelling the fIrst party to make full and proper 
performance. In such circumstances, however, the court the discretion to allow the 
malperforming party to sue the (withholding) party for a reduced counter-performance. This 
claim was previously known as a claim quantum meruit, and it was previously thOUght to be an 
enrichment remedy. It is now clear that this action arises from the law of contract, and not the 
law of enrichment: see B K Tooling (Edms) Bpk v Scope Precision Engineering (Edms) Bpk 
1979 (I) SA 391 (A); Thompson v Scholtz 1999 (1) SA 232 (SeA). 
Provided that he has full capacity. 
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own performance in terms of the contract, or the amount by which the minor is enriched 
by the performance.88 
A general basis for enrichment liability in South Africa 
The most notable attempt to analyse this legal 'patchwork,89 and to reformulate the law 
of enrichment on a more scientific basis90 was the thesis of Wouter de Vos, which was 
fust published in 1957. After describing the historical development of the common-law 
remedies, he argued that, while no general action existed in Roman-Dutch law,91 such a 
general, subsidiary action had come into being via the South African case law. He then 
outlined the general requirements of such an action: enrichment92 at the expense of 
another93 (which implies impoverishment, and a causal link between the enrichment of 
one party and the impoverishment of the other) without justification,94 in circwnstances 
where none of the traditional remedies will be available.95 
While De Vos's work was generally welcomed, one drawback was that the 
general requirements were not described in sufficient detail and when the matter came 
before the Appellate Division in the much-discussed case of Nortje v Pool,96 the 
response was a call for greater clarity and definition: 'Before the scope of such a 
general enrichment action is clearly delineated and the requirements thereof are clearly 










See De Vos Verrykingsaanspreeklikheid 46,95-6,219-224; Eiselen and Pienaar Unjustified 
Enrichment 187 If; Lotz (n 46) paras 93-4; Hutchison (ed) Wille's Principles 643; Edelstein v 
Edelstein NO and Others 1952 (3) SA 1 (A). 
McCarthy Retail Ltd v Shortdistance Carriers CC supra at 487G. 
See De Vos Verrykingsaanspreeklikheid 328. 
Cf J E Scholtens 'The general enrichment action that was' (1966) 83 SAL.] 391; Zimmennann 
Law of Obligations 886; Visser (n 2) at 351; McCarthy Retail Ltd v Shortdistance Carriers CC 
supra at 488. 
Verrykingsaanspreeklikheid 329 ff. 
Verrykingsaanspreeklikheid 339 fT. De Vos was apparently influenced in this regard by Gennan 
law: op cit 339nl. In this regard, see Reinhard Zimmermann 'Unjustified enrichment: the 
modem civilian approach' (1995) 15 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 403 at 404: 'Apart from 
conjuring up the - mistaken - idea that the enrichment must intrinsically be related to a loss, it 
does not take us any further, as far as the first problem [identifying the plaintiff] is concerned.' 
Verrykingsaanspreeklikheid 353 fT. 
Verrykingsaanspreeklikheid 358 fT. 
Nortje en 'n Ander v Pool NO supra. 
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merely discretionary legal remedy which wouldjust create uncertainty,.97 Despite more 
recent efforts by South African academics, one caill10t really say that this call has been 
answered. De Vos's work has therefore not really been translated into law by the 
courts98 and, as a South African judge once remarked, ~justified enrichment is 'about 
the last arrow in the quiver of remedies. ,99 
Even though it was subsequently convincingly proven that Roman-Dutch law 
had recognised a general enrichment action and therefore that Nortje v Pool NO had 
been incorrectly decided,loo the courts still fairly consistently refused to recognise the 
existence of a general enrichment action or to apply De Vas's general requirements. IOI 
This must, at least in part, be attributed to the fact that academics had not taken De 
Vas's analysis very much further. 102 The approach of the courts over the last four 
decades, under the stultifying influence of Nortje v Pool, has thus merely been to apply 








More recently, however, there have been signs that, when an appropriate case 
Translated from Norlje en 'n Ander v Pool NO supra at 140: 'Voordat die omvang van so 'n 
algemene verrykingsaksie duidelik omlyn en die vereistes daarvan duidelik omskryf is, iets wat 
klaarblyklik nog ontbreek, sou dit [the recognition of such a general action] 'n blote diskresionere 
regsmiddel wees was slegs onsekerheid sal skep.' See also the judgment of Rumpff J A at 117, 
where he says that he will not decide the question of a general enrichment action partly because it 
had not been argued thoroughly enough. Cfthe comment by Visser (n 44) at 250: 'for the innate 
conservative approach of lawyers means that judges have to be specifically motivated to embark 
on a large scale revision of the law.' 
Except where his general requirements are 'dressed up' as the requirements of the condictio sine 
causa (see Chapter Three), and a few cases where they have been overtly applied (e g Gouws v 
Jester Pools (Pty) Ltd 1968 (3) SA 563 (T). 
Per Schutz JA in Trojan Exploration Co (Pty) Ltd and Another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 
and Others 1996 (4) SA 499 (A) at 527. 
Scholtens (1966) 83 SAU 391. 
With a few exceptions, e g Gouws v Jester Pools (Pty) Ltd supra. 
Although certain writers, such as De Vos himself, Scholtens, Visser, Eiselen and Pienaar, Van 
Zyl, Sonnekus and Du Plessis, have made significant contributions to the development of this 
area of law, the volume written on unjustified enrichment, and the depth and breadth of analysis 
do not compare favourably with other areas of private law, such as contract and delict. There is 
something of a vicious circle: because there are not many cases, there is less academic attention; 
because not much is written (relatively speaking), lawyers are less likely to take cases to court. 
On the extension of old remedies to accommodate new circumstances, see, e g, Kommissaris van 
Binnelandse Inkomste en 'n Ander v Willers en Andere supra; Willis Faber Enthoven (Pty) Ltd v 
Receiver of Revenue and Another supra. A fairly recent example of a case where the court 
granted an enrichment claim although the case did not clearly fit into one of the traditional 
remedies is Besselaar v Registrar, Durban and Coast Local Division and Others 2002 (1) SA 
191 (D). 
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arises, the Supreme Court of Appeal will be prepared finally to recognise a general basis 
for enrichment liability.104 Thus, in an obiter dictum in McCarthy Retail Ltd v 
Shortdistance Carriers CC,105 the late Schutz JA confinned that Nortje v Pool NO had 
been incorrectly decided l06 and suggested that the court might 'adopt a general action 
into modem law ... [when] that rare case ... arise[s] which cannot be accommodated 
within the existing framework and which compels such recognition: 107 Although the 
court expressed some confidence in the general principles of enrichment liability, it also 
voiced its preference for the adoption of a subsidiary general action. lOS It seems, 
therefore, that even when the court does recognise a general enrichment action, the old 
remedies will not immediately lose their significance. 
The recognition of a general enrichment action will create new opportunities and 
new challenges for enrichment lawyers. According to Zimmermann,109 '[t]he 
recognition of a general enrichment action can only be a transitional stage: it provides 
the basis for a rational reorganisation of rules and precedents.' We do not have to wait 
for the recognition of the general enrichment action to start this 'rational reorganisation'. 
Academics, particularly, need to take a step beyond De Vos's identification of the 
general principles of enrichment liability; to flesh out these somewhat skeletal principles 
and to give the law of enrichment a more scientific basis. llo In order to do this, '[ s ]ome 









And it seems that, while the courts have shied against it, they will have to shoulder the 
responsibility for the recognition or creation of such a general source of liability; the Law 
Commission, which began the task of formulating a statutory basis for general enrichment 
liability, abandoned the project. 
2001 (3) SA 482 (SCA). 
At 488. 
At 489A. 
See the judgment of Schutz JA at 488D; Niall R Whitty and Daniel Visser 'Unjustified 
enrichment' in Zimmermann, Visser and Reid (n 68) 399. 
(1985) 18 CILSA 1 at 20. 
Rather than facilitating judicial recognition of a general basis for liability, this process could 
make it unnecessary. It is interesting to note that, historically, the tools used to forge a general 
enrichment action have been the contentious boundary cases of multi-party enrichment 
encountered in the texts on the actio de in rem verso and negotiorum gestio. It seems that, once 
they have served this function, they are cast aside as no longer useful. 
Regarding the importance of the development of a typological framework. see B Dickson 'The 
Law of Restitution in the Federal Republic of Germany: A Comparison with English Law' 
[1987] 36lCLQ 751, quoting Ernst von Caemmerer, at 779nI29: '[N]ur mit einer. .. Typologie 
[der Bereicherungsansprtiche], nicht mit einer Aufstellung allgemeiner Kritierien, lasst sich dem 
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conceptual tools have to be developed and a stable pattern of analysis be agreed upon, an 
indispensable harness preventing Pomponi us' "natural justice" running wild. ' 112 
Analysis of one's own legal system is facilitated by a comparative approach: a 
comparative perspective is a more objective perspective. Thus' [Bacon] stated that the 
lawyer must free himself from the 'vincula' of his national system before he can 
estimate its true worth': the object of judgment (the national law) cannot be the standard 
of judgment. This perception, as valid now as ever, justifies all comparative 
researches.,I13 The process of comparison not only sheds light on one's own legal 
system, but it can also 'provide a much richer range of model solutions than a legal 
science devoted to a single nation .... ,114 That said, which legal system or systems 
would provide the most help in the context of multi-party enrichment? 
Choice of legal system for comparison 
Of the legal systems which have experience with general enrichment actions, 
comparison with German law may be most fruitful. 115 Apart from its appeal due to our 
shared historical background 116 and its sophistication and its rich literature, 117 the 
German law of enrichment particularly lends itself to comparison with South African 








Bereicherungsanssspruch Form und Grenze geben.' 
Zimmermann Law of Obligations 892. 
See K Zweigert and H Katz Introduction to Comparative Law 3 ed (1998) (translated by T Weir) 
50. 
See Zweigert and Katz (n 113) 15. Also see op cit at 11: 'comparative law can also aim to 
provide advice on legal policy. In its applied version, comparative law suggests how a specific 
problem can most appropriately be solved under the given social and economic circumstances.' 
I have chosen to compare South African law only with German law, and not with numerous other 
systems, bearing in mind the warning issued by Zweigert and Katz (n 113) at 41: 'Here sober 
self-restraint is in order, not so much because it is hard to take account of everthing as because 
experience shows that as soon as one tries to cover a wide range of legal systems the law of 
diminishing returns operates.' 
One of the factors contributing to the 'style' of a legal system: see Zweigert and Katz (n 113) 
68-9. Another is its 'especially distinctive institutions' op cit 68, 71; we share some of these with 
German law e g what we would call negotiorum gestio, and the abstract real agreement: see 
below. 
Particularly regarding three-cornered situations: see Medicus Schuldrecht Jl marg note 723, and 
see the text to note 179 below. 
See Zimmermann (1985) 18 CILSA 1 at 3. It should be borne in mind, however, that according 
to the principle of abstraction, property law and the law of obligations are distinct from each 
other: see, e g, Folke Schmidt 'The German abstract approach to law' (1965) 9 Scandinavian 
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the law of property, which in most cases determines whether an 'enrichment' has taken 
place, 119 and the law of contract, which is often relevant in determining whether this 
enrichment was unjustified or not. 120 
Most notably, within the context of property law, South African law121 and 
German law have in common the abstract principle of transfer of ownership, 122 in 
accordance with which the validity of a transfer of property is independent of the 
validity of any underlying contract. 123 Thus, for example, if X transfers 124 a movable 
object to Y in accordance with a contract of sale, and it transpires that the contract of 
sale is invalid due to an error, this invalidity will not affect the validity of the transfer. 125 








Studies in Law 133 at 144 ff. This distinction is apparent when one reads private law textbooks; 
it is relatively unusual to discover anything concerning property law in a contract text book, for 
example. Thus, to find out whether property transferred by a promisor to a third party pursuant 
to a stipulatio alteri would be transferred directly or 'via' the promisee, it is necessary to consult 
a property law textbook. 
Paragraphs of the BGB that are relevant for this thesis include §§ 925-8 (which deal with 
acquisition and loss of ownership of land); §§ 929 ff (which deal with acquisition and loss of 
ownership of movable property). 
The similarities between the South African and German law of contract are important in that the 
edges of enrichment liability are, in a sense, determined by the edges of contractual liability . 
Thus the law of contract can be said to determine the scope of the law of enrichment. It is 
important to defIne these boundaries clearly, because of the different aims of contract law and 
enrichment law. The law of contract is aimed at effecting a change in the status quo in 
accordance with the wishes of the parties: when a contract comes into being, it must be fulfIlled 
otherwise the contractual remedies aimed at the fulfilment (or its economic result e g where the 
contract is cancelled and damages are paid) thereof become available. The law of enrichment is 
aimed at reversing enrichment, and thus reverting to the status quo ante; where one party is 
enriched at the expense of another, he must return that enrichment, otherwise the enrichment 
remedies become available. In this regard, see Zimmermann (1995) 15 Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 403. 
Trust Bank van Afrika Bpk v Western Bank Bpk en Andere NNO 1978 (4) SA 281 (A); Air-Kel 
(Edms) Bpk h/a Merkel Motors v Bodenstein en 'n Ander 1980 (3) SA 917 (A). 
See § 929 BGB, which stipulates that a 'real agreement' and delivery are necessary to effect 
transfer of ownership of movable property, unless the recipient is already in possession of the 
property, in which case the 'real agreement' alone will suffice. On the principle of abstraction in 
this context, see, e g, Schmidt (1965) 9 Scandinavian Studies in Law 133 at 145 ff; Norbert Hom, 
Hein Kotz and Hans G Leser German Private Law and Commercial Law: An Introduction 
(transl Tony Weir) (1982) 83-4; Loewenheim Bereicherungsrecht 10; Palandt vor § 104 marg 
note 19. 
Logical1y, this also requires acceptance of the Trennungsprinzip ('separation principle'), 
according to which the act of transfer and the underlying contract, or other source of obligation, 
are seen as conceptually distinct. 
By means of delivery and conclusion of a 'real agreement'. 
See, e g, Horn et al (n 122) 83. 
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'corrective' to this principle. 126 In our example, therefore, X would be able sue Y for 
unjustified enrichment in terms of both German and South African law. The 
fundamentals of the German law of contract are also immediately recognisable to South 
African lawyers and, unlike Anglo-American law, we make a similar distinction 
between remedies for breach of contract and for unjustified enrichment. 127 At a more 
fundamental level, our doctrines of sUbjective rights are apparently identical. 128 
Of course, one should not be blind to the fact that, although there are similarities 
as far as the basic principles are concerned, there are also many differences in detail. 
Some of these differences are significant. A few instances drawn from the law of 
property that have important consequences within the law of enrichment are the 
relatively stronger position of the bonajide purchaser in German law, the existence of 
the so-called Geheisserwerb, and the scope of application of the abstract principle of 
transfer of ownership. 
These may be illustrated with examples. Imagine that B borrows a specific 
object from its owner A and then sells it to C. The basic principle in South African law 
being nemo plus iuris trans/erre pot est quod ipse habet, ownership would remain with 
A, regardless of the bona jides of C. German law, on the other hand, would allow the 
ultimate recipient to become owner provided that he was bonajide. 129 South African 





Zimmermann Law of Obligations (1990) 867: ' ... in the words of the great pandectist Heinrich 
Demburg, it is by means of an enrichment action that the law attempts to heal the wounds that it 
itself inflicts (by virtue of the abstract transfer of ownership).' Also see idem (1995) 15 Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 403 at 408; Hom et al (n 122) 69, 84; Loewenheim Bereicherungsrecht 
11; Palandt vor § 104 marg note 19. The importance of the role of the abstract principle in 
delimiting the scope of the law of enrichment may be seen by the dramatic increase in cases of 
the condictio indebiti in South Africa upon recognition that the principle of abstraction was part 
of our law. 
See, for example, Dickson [1987] 36 ICLQ 751 at 762 ff. Marked similarities may be found in 
the law of suretyship, cession, etc in the two systems. Regarding cession, see Chapter Four 
below. For detailed discussions of the relationship between the law of contract and the law of 
unjustified enrichment in South Africa., see D P Visser 'Rethinking unjustified enrichment: A 
perspective of the competition between contractual and enrichment remedies' 1992 Acta Juridica 
203; S Hutton 'Restitution after breach of contract: Rethinking the conventional jurisprudence' 
1997 Acta Juridica 201; Saul Miller 'Unjustified enrichment and failed contracts' in 
Zimmermann, Visser and Reid (n 68). 
See Hom et al (n 122) 68 ff. 
§ 932 ff BGB. See Dickson [1987] 36 ICLQ 751 at 777. 
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(A would have a rei vindicatio), whereas it would be seen as an enrichment problem in 
Germany. 
The Geheisserwerb is a form of constructive delivery for which we have no exact 
equivalent. If A sells a movable thing to B, who, before he has received delivery of the 
object, in turn sells it to C, and B instructs A to deliver the thing directly to C, South 
African law would have no problem in saying that, provided that A intended to transfer 
ownership to C and C intended to receive ownership (i e provided that there was a real 
agreement between A and C), ownership would pass directly from A to C. J3O In terms of 
German law, however, ownership would pass from A to B to C. m 
It appears that the abstract principle of ownership in South African law goes 
further than that of German law in one respect. Thus, in South African law, it appears 
that ownership will always be transferred if the 'real agreement' of transfer is valid; 132 
the reason for the defectiveness of any underlying obligationary contract is irrelevant. 133 
In German law, on the other hand, the principle of abstraction is usually of no 
consequence in cases where the underlying contract involved fraud. 134 
In the law of contract, too, there are differences in detail which can affect the 






This would probably not occur with the transfer of immovable property, as the payment of 
transfer duty would necessitate a double transfer i e from A to B to C: see, by way of analogy, 
e g, s 14 of the Deeds Registries Act 47 of 1937 and Hutchison (ed) Wille's Principles 495: 'As 
a result of legislation th~ cessionary of a deed of sale of irrunovable property cannot claim 
transfer from the seller direct to himself; transfer must fIrst be passed to the cedent and from him 
to the cessionary and two payments of transfer duty are necessary.' 
See Med icus Burgerliches Recht marg note 671. The relevance of this will become apparent later 
in this thesis, particularly in Chapter Three. The consequence of this difference is tllat whereas 
this situation would be 'triangular' in tenus of South African law, German law sees it as yet 
another 'performance chain': see pp 28 and 57 ffbelow. 
Provided, of course, delivery - whether actual or constructive - also takes place. 
For example, in Preller and Others v Jordaan 1956 (1) SA 483 (A), the undue influence that led 
to the voidability of the doctor's {;ontracts did not affect the validity of the conveyance of his 
farms. 
Horn et al (n 122) (1982) 84: 'In cases of deceit the principle of abstraction is not applied so 
sternly. Here there is an increasing tendency to allow rescission of the conveyance as well, even 
if the declaration induced by the deceit was in the obligational contract. If both the obligational 
and real transactions are rescinded, both of them, contract and conveyance, fall away. The 
transferor can then claim the property back just like any other owner (§ 985 BGB).' 
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enrichment remedy would be used to reclaim something transferred in terms of a void 
contract, the restitutionary remedy used in the context of a voidable contract is 
considered to be contractual (viz restitutio in integrum).135 In German law, on the other 
hand, a plaintiff who wished to recover something transferred in terms of a voidable 
contract would have first to avoid it and then to bring an enrichment action, just as he 
would if the contract were void. 136 
It should also be noted that the circumstances in which a contract will be void are 
more limited in German than in South African law. We would say that a material 
mistake leads to a contract being void, and therefore that any property transferred 'in 
terms of this void contract could only be claimed back with an enrichment action, if at 
all. German law, on the other hand, would regard this purported contract as being 
voidable. 137 The practical result is the same, however, as German law regards avoided 
contracts as falling into the province of the law of enrichment, as explained above. 
The significance of some of these points of distinction may be illustrated by 
example. If someone transfers movable property to another in terms of a contract that is 
voidable for misrepresentation, South African law would hold that the recipient would 
acquire ownership (provided that the requirements for transfer were met) and, upon 
rescission ofthe contract, the transferor would be able to recover the thing as a 
consequence of restitutio in integrum. In the same circumstances in Germany, however, 




In other words, although our law says that when a party avoids a voidable contract, the contract is 
extinguished with retroactive effect, some 'remnant' of that contract must remain - namely the 
obligation to effect restitutio in integrum. This is apparently sufficient to exclude avoided 
contracts from the domain of enrichment law. If one takes into account the differing functions 
fulfilled by the law of contract and the law of enrichment (see n 120 above), this does not make 
sense - enrichment law is aimed at 'undoing' enrichment, whereas contract is aimed at achieving 
the result intended by the parties. Restitutio in integrum would thus be more at home in the 
domain of enrichment law. See, e g, Visser 1992 Acta Juridica 203. 
See, e g, § 142 BGB regarding the retroactive effect of rescission. Note that this statement by 
Dickson [1987] 36 ICLQ 751 at 761 is misleading: 'Ifit is void or voidable, the remedy is to be 
found in the Code's paragraphs on unjustified enrichment'; one cannot bring an enrichment claim 
in the context of a voidable contract, but only where the contract has already been avoided i e 
made void with retrospective effect. Then it would be treated in the same way as another void 
contract. The quotation should therefore read 'Ifit is void or avoided ... '. 
§ 119BGB. 
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apply in cases of deceit), and the fust party would thus be able to vindicate his property. 
If, on the other hand, the contract between the parties was defective as it was 
based upon a material mistake, ownership would nevertheless be transferred according 
to both South African and German law. In both legal systems, the thing could be 
reclaimed by means of an enrichment remedy; in South African law, this remedy would 
be available without further ado because the contract would be void ab initio; in German 
law, because the contract would be voidable, it would have to be avoided before an 
enrichment remedy could be brought. 
We should proceed warily, therefore, remaining aware of the differences as well 
as the remarkable similarities between our legal systems. We should also not be so 
over-awed by the refinement of German law, particularly when seen from our relatively 
unsophisticated perspective, that we are tempted to follow its lead indiscriminately. 138 
Regarding multi-party enrichment, in particular, we should remember that German 
lawyers themselves regard it as 'an almost impenetrable jungle of dispute and 
uncertainty,.139 Its difficulties, however, are in themselves instructive, and we can gain 
much from its wealth of experience. 140 





See, for example, Visser (n 2) at 354n50, where the author specifically rejects the adoption of the 
German Saldotheorie into South African law. CfDe Vos's apparent adoption of the 'at the 
expense or requirement from German law: see Verrykingsaanspreeklikheid 339n1. 
Zimmermann and Du Plessis [1994] Restitution Law Review 14 at 31. 
See, e g, Zweigert and Kotz (n 113) at 36: 'RABEL once said that in their explorations on 
foreign territory comparatists may come upon "natives lying in wait with spears" ... ; but let his 
wit not frighten us out of ours.' 
See, in general, (in English) B Markesinis, W Lorenz and G Dannemann The German Law of 
Obligations vol 1 The Law of Contracts and Restitution (1997); Zimmermann and Du Plessis 
[1994] Restitution Law Review 14; Dickson [1987] 36 ICLQ 751; Zimmermann (1985) 18 CILSA 
1; and (in German) Medicus Burgerliches Recht marg note 660 ff; Claus-Wilhelm Canaris 'Der 
Bereicherungsausgleich im Dreipersonenverhaltnis' in Gotthard Paulus, Uwe Diederichsen and 
Claus-Wilhelrh Canaris (eds) Festschrift Karl Larenz zum 70. Geburtstag (1973) 799; 
Munchener KommentarfLieb § 812 ff; Reuter and Martinek Bereicherung (1983); Medicus 
Schuldrecht J/ marg note 632 ff; Loewenheim Bereicherungsrecht (1997); Koppensteiner and 
Kramer Bereicherung; Larenz and Canaris Lehrbuch des Schuldrechls /l12. 
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Tbe German law of enricbment in general 142 
The cornerstone of the German law of enrichment is the general enrichment remedy 
contained in § 812 (1) BG B to the effect that' a person who has acquired something 
through the performance of another or in any other way, without legal ground, at the 
expense of that other person, is obliged to restore it to him.' 143 The sections which 
follow serve to delimit more precisely the circumstances in which this action willlie. l44 
For the purposes of this thesis the most important of these is probably § 822, which 
provides that 
[i]fthe recipient transfers the thing acquired gratuitously to a third 
party, and if in consequence of this the obligation of the recipient for 
return of the enrichment is excluded, the third party is bound to return 
the enrichment as if he had received it from the creditor without legal 
ground. 145 
To look at only the code, however, is obviously to gain an incomplete picture of 
the modem German law of enrichment. The code has served as a catalyst for the 
development of a set of detailed and sophisticated rules by writers and the courts. 
Whereas the general action contained in the code is the culmination of a movement 
towards abstraction and generalisation,146 the subsequent development has been in the 
direction of specificity. 147 Unlike South African law, however, this specificity is based, 
not on the collection of remedies which came from Roman law via the ius commune,148 








See Zimmermann (1995) 15 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 403. 
§ 812 (1) 'Wer durch die Leistung eines anderen oder in sonstiger Weise auf des sen Kostten 
etwas ohne rechtlichen Grund erlant, is ihm zur Herausgabe verpflichtet. Diese Verpflichtung 
besteht auch dann, wenn der rechtlichte Grund spater wegflillt oder mit der mit einer Leistung 
nach dem Inbalte des Rechtsgeschafts bezweckte Erfolg nicht eintritt.' (The second sentence 
may be translated thus: 'this obligation also comes into existence when the legal ground later 
falls away or when the intended result of performance, according to the content of the legal 
transaction, does not materialise. ') 
F or the full text of all of these paragraphs, together with a translation, see Appendix A. 
Translation taken from I S Forrester, S L Goren, and H M lIgen The German Civil Code (1975). 
Led by von Savigny: see Zimmermann (1985) 18 ClLSA 1 at 7 ff. The Einheitslehre espoused 
by, for example, Fritz Schulz, was also an attempt to find a general basis for enrichment liability: 
see Zimmermann and Du Plessis [1994] Restitution Law Review 14 at 24. 
Cf the same process of distinction in the Roman law with regard to the condictio: see 
Zimmermallll (1985) 18 ClLSA 1 at 5. 
Whose outlines are still discernible in the BGB but which seem to be used as a kind of shorthand 
to refer to the situations in which they would lie, and to assist in marking out the application of 
the limiting sections of the code which follow § 812 BGB: see Zimmermann and Du Plessis 
[1994] Restitution Law Review 14 at 18 ff. 
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inspiration, therefore, not so much from the 'somewhat ramshackle structure,149 ofthe 
Burgerliches Gesetzbuch, but from the 'imposing edifice' 150 created around it by the 
courts and commentators of the last hundred and five years. 
The pioneer in recasting the Gennan law of enrichment was Wilburg l51 who 
freed it from its somewhat mystical associations l52 and who, inspired by the wording of 
§ 812 BGB, recognised that cases of enrichment fall into one of two broad categories: 
those which result from a perfonnance l53 (Leistung) and those which do not. In other 
words, one must distinguish cases where a shift of assets was brought about by an act of 
will of the parties from those where it was not. 154 The remedy by which one reclaims 
enrichment resulting from 'perfonnance' is thus called a Leistingskondiktionl55 and the 
remedy for reclaiming enrichment arising 'in any other way' is called a 
Nichtleistungskondiktion. 156 Although there was some opposition to the notion of 
dividing the law of enrichment, this distinctionl57 was accepted by the courts and the 
most important writers I 58 and has had a profound influence on the subsequent 
development of Gennan enrichment law. 
Central to this distinction is obviously the concept of Leistung. As interpreted by 
the Gennan courts in the context of enrichment, it denotes something more general than 
merely a 'transfer' (which, on its own, to South African lawyers seems to denote a 











Dawson (n 17) 789. Also see Zimmermann (1985) 18 ClLSA 1 at 8 ff: 'Neither this rule which 
came to be § 812 I BGB, nor the title on unjustified enrichment as a whole, can be called a 
legislative masterpiece.' 
Dickson [1987] 36 ICLQ 751 at 772. 
Dickson [1987] 36 lCLQ 751 at 771. 
Dawson (n 17) at 796. 
As translated by, for example, Dawson (n 17) 797 ff. But cf Zimmennann and Du Plessis [1994] 
Restitution Law Review 14 at 25 ff; Zimmermann (1995) 15 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 403 
at 405 ff and Zimmermann Law of Obligations 889, where Leistung is translated as 'transfer'. 
For further discussion of this concept, see p 38 ffbelow. 
See, e g, Loewenheirn Bereicherungsrecht 10. 
I e, very literally, a 'performance-condictio'. 
A 'non-performance-condictio.' Regarding the Nichtleistungskondiktionen, see Zimmermann 
(1995) 15 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 403 at 417 ff. 
Trennungslehre, or 'theory of distinction/separation'. 
Zimmermann and Du Plessis [1994] Restitution Law Review 14 at 25; Zimmermann (1985) 18 
CILSA 1 at 14. See Medicus Biirgerliches Recht marg note 665 for criticism. 
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lawyers would understand it. 159 It is, in essence, the 'enlargement of another's estate 
which is brought about by the transferor consciously and with a specific purpose in 
mind.,16o 
Following Wilburg's lead, other commentators have since carried the process of 
distinction further. 161 For example, most influentially, von Caemmerer l62 divided the 
Nichtleistung ('non-performance') cases into the: 
Eingriffslwndiktion,163 where the enrichment resulted from encroachment or 
interference (EingrifJ). It is available where, in the absence of fault on his part, 
the defendant used or consumed another's property (Sachverbrauch)/64 or 
disposed of it to a third party,165 or where he managed the affairs of another as if 
they were his own, while knowing that they were not. 
2 Ruckgriffskondiktion or 'recourse action' 166 where the plaintiff has performed in 
terms of the obligation of another. 
3 Aufwendungskondiktion (also called a Verwendungslwndiktion) or 'expenditure 
actiond67 where the plaintiff has incurred expenses (or performed services) in 
regard to the property of another. 
The common denominator of the Nichtleistung ('non-performance') cases is that they 










South African lawyers would understand 'transfer' on its own to refer to a transfer of ownership 
or, if specifically stated, of possession or some other benefit but not ofafactum. CfDetlefLiebs 
'The history of the Roman condictio up to Justinian' in The Legal Mind: Essaysfor Torry 
Honore (1986) 163 at 167023, where he translates the word datio as 'Leistung'. 'Performance', 
on the other hand, is usually used in the law of contract, where its content depends on what was 
agreed by the parties. Dickson [1987] 36/CLQ 751 at 773n102 suggests 'conferment of a 
benefit' . 
Zimmermann and Du Plessis [1994] Restitution Law Review 14 at 25. CfDickson [1987] 36 
ICLQ 751 at 773nI02. 
Dickson [1987] 36/CLQ 751 at 779 ff. 
Zimmermann and Du Plessis [1994] Restitution Law Review 14 at 25; Dickson [1987] 36/CLQ 
751 at 77l. 
Zimmermann and Du Plessis [1994] Restitution Law Review 14 at 27 -29; Dickson [1987] 36 
ICLQ 751 at 771; Zimmermann (1995) 15 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 403 at 418 ff. 
§ 812 (1) sent I A1t 2: Dickson [1987] 36 ICLQ 751 at 776. 
§ 816 (1) sent I: Dickson [1987] 36 ICLQ 751 at 777. 
Dickson [1987] 36 ICLQ 751 at 771 and 779; Zimmermann and Du Plessis [1994] Restitution 
Law Review 14 at 29-30; Zimmermann (1995) 15 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 403 at423. 
Dickson [1987] 36/CLQ 751 at 771 and 779; Zimmermann and Du Plessis [1994] Restitution 
Law Review 14 at 30; Zimmermann (1995) 15 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 403 at 421. 
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the conveyance of property, or shifting of assets. 168 This subdivision, too, has gained 
general acceptance and forms an integral part of the modem German law of 
enrichment. 169 
The law of enrichment, generally, has always been regarded as an area of 
difficulty.17o This is also true within German law. Thus we find uncharacteristically 
impassioned calls for its clarification: 'While private law in general demonstrates 
fundamental clarity, the law of enrichment has always remained in a certain chiaroscuro, 
for whose elimination we yeam.,l7l Not only its basic principles but also its details are 
known for being exceptionally controversial. 172 In some respects, its inherent problems 
are compounded, rather than cured, by the multitude of opinions found in a 'vast flood 
ofiiterature and judgments.' 173 Thus a famous professor has complained that '[e]ven 
regarding simple cases, students entangle themselves in a host of theories and then can 
no longer achieve any reasonable and logically consistent solution.' 174 
Multi-party enrichment in German law 
The most notorious difficulties in enrichment law arise in what has proved to be its main 
battleground: the area of multi-party enrichment. 175 Some of these difficulties arise 
from the nature of the legal problems that they expose. Thus the so-called three-









See Loewenheim Bereicherungsrecht 10. 
On the views of Wilburg and von Caemmerer, see Loewenheim Bereicherungsrecht 10. 
See, for example, the exclamations ofDuarenus (Com. De condictione indebiti, cap I) quoted by 
Walther Hadding Der Bereicherungsausgleich beim Verlrag zu Rechten Driller (1970) in his 
foreword: 'inter condictiones ... haec insignis et praecipua est nec ullus locus est in iure civili 
aut memorabilior aut obscurior et difficilior.' 
'Wahrend das Privatrecht ... im Allgemeinen grundsatzliche KJarheit zeigt, ... ist das 
Bereicherungsrecht von jeher in einem gewissen Helldtmkel geblieben, nach dessen Beseitigung 
wir verlangen.': A Hartmann ArchB 21 , 224. 
Koppensteiner and Kramer Bereicherung, foreword. 
Wieling Bereicherungsrecht, foreword, p VII: 'unubersehbare ... Flut der Literature und 
Rechtsprechung'. Also see Koppensteiner and Kramer who refer to a 'literature that has in recent 
years 'exploded into infmity'. 
Medicus Burgerliches Recht marg note 665: 'daB Studenten sich selbst bei einfachen 
Bereicherungsfallen in eine Fulle von Theorien verstricken und dann zu keiner vemunftigen und 
konsequenten Losung mehr gelangen'. 
See, e g, Loewenheim Bereicherungsrecht 30, where he says that 'the real difficulties begin when 
three or more parties are involved.' 
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difficult of all problematic areas of private law,I76 and 'an inexhaustible source of 
lawsuits and problems.'177 In short, it is regarded by many as the 'nightmare of 
enrichment law'. 178 As with the rest of enridunent law, in attempting to solve these 
problems, the lawyers have created another: a literature that is so voluminous that it is 
unmanageable. Thus Wieling says that' [t]he number of different opinions voiced on 
these [issues] is legion ... ' .179 It has even been rumoured that, in view of its difficulty, 
students should not be examined on the subject. 180 
It has already been mentioned that mUlti-party enriclunent is important in 
practice, as is demonstrated by the number of cases in this field. 181 Mow then, have the 
courts approached the matter? Many judgments dealing with such cases begin with a 
kind of disclaimer that is so often repeated that it is almost like a mantra. 182 The judges 
say that, in enrichment cases involving more than two parties, 'any schematic solution is 
forbidden.,183 Thus each case must be decided on its owri merits, rather than on the 
basis of general principles. The judges then typically go on to discuss similar decisions 
and the views of writers before coming to a conclusion. 
At first sight, this sort of incremental approach and apparent aversion to abstract 
legal principles seem 'un-German,' and rather surprising to an outsider in the light of the 










Larenz and Canaris Schuldrecht il12 at 199. 
Karsten Schmidt 'Bereicherungsausgleich bei Geschaftsunflihigkeit des Anweisenden' 1991 JuS 
75: 'iinerschOpfliCher Quell von ProZessen iind Probleriien'. 
'Albtrfuim des BereiCheiilhgsredits': Peter Schleclitriem Schuldrecht Besonderer Teil4 ed 
(1995) marg note 685. 
Wieliilg Bereicherungsrecht 87: 'Die zahl der hierili geliuf3erten verscruedenen AnsiChteti ist 
Legion ... ' . 
Horst Heinrich Jakobs 'Die Riickkem del' Praxis fui: RegelanWeIi.dung Wid der Bernf def The6j-ie 
im Recht der Leistungskondiktion' 1992 NJW 2524. Cf Claus-Wilhelm Canaris 'Uberforderte 
PrOfessorei1?!' 1992 NJW 3134 and Michael Martinek 'Die veranlaJ3te Drittleisfulig Mer "Haare 
in der Suppe'" 1992 NJW 3141 . 
See Loeweri.heifu Bereicherungsrecht 30. 
Cfthe comments of Lorenz, who describes it as a 'sattsam bekannte salvatorishe K1ausel': W 
Lorenz 'Abtrefung emer Forderiliig luis fuangelliafterti KilusalVerhMtriis: VoIi. wem kondizierl 
der Schuldner?' (1991) 191 AcP 279 at 280). 
See, e g, BGHZ 105, 365 at 369; BGHZ 50, 227 at 229; BGHZ 58, 184 at 187; BGHZ 61,289 at 
292; BGHZ 72, 246 at 250; BGHZ 87,393 at 396; BGHZ 88, 232 at 235; BGH WM 1984,423; 
BGHZ 122,46 at 53. 
See Zweigert and Kotz (Ii. 113) 69 regarding the differences Of style betweeIi. coi1tmeIi.tal systems 
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notwithstanding their caveat that there is no 'schematic solution' for such cases the , 
rt . ~ .. I 185 d h . cou s seem to stnve lor pnncip es, an t e VIews of academics are given more weight 
than they would be in most common-law jurisdictions. 186 
The response of the writers to the mass of reported cases has also been similar to 
what one would expect in a common-law, or case-based, system. Rather than 
proceeding from the statute and general rules, the approach of the writers has been to 
group cases into 'factual constellations'. In other words, like common lawyers, they 
identify clusters of cases with similar facts, and then try to work out sets of rules for 
each of them. The similarity of approach between German lawyers and common-law or 
South African lawyers in this regard should not be overstated, however. For example, 
the sets of facts which the Germans use to slot a case into a particular pigeonhole are 
still fairly abstract. A comparison with South African law makes this clear. In South 
Africa, for instance, some writers identify a group of enrichment cases as being 'the 
garage repair cases,.187 A German lawyer would rather look at the fundamental legal 
relationships that characterise such cases and would therefore identify them as cases of 
'Verwendungen in Eigentiimer-Besitzer-Verhaltnisse' 188 i e 'expenditure in owner-






and English common law. They refer to the Geritiaruc 'tendency to use abstract legal noms, to 
have a well-articulated system containing well-defmed areas of law, and to think up and to think 
ili jUristic constrUctions.' This is coritrasted with the English approach of' gradual development 
from decision to decision ... .' They add that '[o]n the Continent lawyers think abstractly, in 
germs Of itiStiti.itions~ ill England, concretely, ill terms Of cases, the relationship Of the parties, 
"rights and duties". On the Continent, the system is conceived as being complete and free from 
gaps, ill England lawyers feel their way gradually froIh case to case. On the Contilient lawyers 
delight in systematics, ill England they are sceptical of every generalization.' But also see their 
coilili:ieritS at 37: 'But we must not too readily irifer that it is owy the Continental systems, with 
their tendency to abstraction and generalization, which develop the grand comprehensive 
concepts, While the COnimon laW, With itS illductive and makeshift habitS, produces loW-level 
legal institutions specially adapted to solve particular concrete problems. Things may be the 
other Way arolind.' This seems to be one Of those illstances. 
In this regard, see Werner Flume 'Der Bereicherungsausgleich in Mehrpersonenverhaltnissen' 
(1999) 199 AcP 1. 
See, for example, Zweigert and Kotz (n 113) 69 on the relative importance of professors rather 
than judges in Gerfuan law. 
See, e g, Visser and Miller (2000) 117 SAL! 594. 
See Dirk A Verse Verwendungen im Eigentii.mer-Besilzer-Verhiiltnis (I 999). 
Cf the coIiiIIientS of ZWeigert and KofZ (Ii 113) Cited in note 184 abOve. 
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Other clusters of cases identified by German writers include the following: 
Situations where A concludes a contract with B in terms of which he transfers something 
to B, and B transfers it to C (in terms of another contract), but one of the contracts is 
invalid. Then there are situations where B owes money to C and instructs A (who may 
in tum owes him money) to pay C on his behalf; A pays C but one of the legal links is 
legally defective. 190 Or B might owe C something other than money, and instruct A 
(who in turn owes him this thing, which he, A, still owns) to deliver it to C on his 
behalf. 191 Again A makes the transfer to C, but one of the obligationary relationships is 
defective. Another category includes cases where A and B conclude an agreement in 
tenns of which A will perfonn to C on B's behalf (i e, in our tenns, a stipulatio alteri), 
A makes the perfonnance but the contract between A and B (or one between B and C) is 
void. Or A might perform to C because he is ostensibly obliged to do so in tenns of a 
suretyship agreement between himself and C, to secure a debt owed by B to C, but, 
again one of the legal relationships is defective. Many other examples could be cited; 
one commentator has, for example, identified thirteen factual constellations within one 
category of multi-party enrichment. 192 
Most writers do not organise these clusters of case into a rational framework. 
One distinction that is accepted by many writers, however, is that cases of multi-party 
enrichment resulting from Leistungen ('perfonnances') can be divided into two 
categories namely 'enrichment chains' (Leistungsketten) and 'triangular relationships' 
(Dreiecksverhtiltnisse). Cases categorised as 'enrichment chains' are those where there 
are two or more successive transfers or other perfonnances. For example, A transfers 
movable property to B in terms of a contract of sale, and B transfers the same property 
to C in tenus of another contract of sale, and either one (or both) of the contracts is void. 
In 'triangular situations', A also concludes a contract with B, and B concludes a contract 
with C and one of the contracts is defective. The difference is that A does not hand 




The cases Of a so-called 'order', or 'msthiction'. See Chapter Three iii. this regard. 
Some writers would include this under the heading of an Anweisung; others separate out such 
cases ui.to a category 6ftlieii own vii iliat Ofille Gehidsserwerb. 
Miinchener K6mmentaffLieb § 812 - withili the category Of 'triangi.ilar relationships'. 
29 
a triangular situation, B is 'leapfrogged'. 193 Thus, for example, if the contracts between 
A and B, and B and C, were contracts of sale of movable property, A would hand the 
thing directly to C in a triangular situation, rather than via B, as would happen in the 
linear situation typified by 'enrichment chains'. 
The focus of attention in German law falls on the triangular situations, which are 
seen as the most problematic of all multi-party cases. The majority of case-clusters 
mentioned above fall into this category. 194 Beyond the identification of sets of typically-
occurring facts, it is difficult to find any sort of rational organisation within this 
category. 195 With a few exceptions,196 the writers usually just list the case-clusters in 
any arbitrary order. It is quite common to start with the set of facts that arises most often 
in practice (the cases where B instructs A to perform to his (C's) creditor) and then to 
use this as a springboard for a discussion of the less common situations. Even the 
defining characteristics (and hence the boundaries) of the various constellations vary 
from author to author. It is therefore strange to see that writers spend a great deal of 
time arguing whether a particular case falls into one or other constellation, in a manner 
reminiscent of our contortions to squeeze a case into the ambit of one or other of our 
traditional enrichment remedies. 197 
As mentioned above, the triangular situations lie on the Leistung side of the 
Wilburg-divide. Some cases of multi-party enrichment involve Nichtleistungen, 
however/ 98 and these will be considered briefly, before the notion of 'performance' is 
explored in more detail. Most of these cases are covered by their own specific 








See Medicus Schuldrecht II marg note 727. 
And the qualms expressed by the writers quoted above also refer to this category of cases. 
Cf the coriuheritS Of Zi.mri1errtifuiri quoted at p 15 above. 
E g Wieling Bereicherungsrecht 87 ff. 
For an example Of a coUrt concernirlg itself with llie question of the categorisation Mthe case 
before it , see First National Bank of SA Ltd vB & H Engineering 1993 (2) SA 41 (T). But cf, 
e g, Pahad v Director of Food Supplies and Distribution 1949 (3) SA (A) at 712. 
See Mediclls Schuldrecht II marg note 732. 
Mediclls SchiJldrecht II marg note 723. This sUrelY means that the scope Of application Of the 'at 
the expense or requirement is extremely narrow. CfDe Vos Verrykingsaanspreeklikheidwho 
was apparently influenced by Gehhan laW iIi this regard (see 339n1) bi.it he makes it apply across 
the bOard. See alSo C P Joi.ibert (1959) SALJ 471 at 475-476. Generally speaking, Iiii.ilti-party 
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The first of these paragraphs is § 816 BGB, which deals with a disposition by a 
party who was not entitled to make it. It would be applicable in the following sort of 
situation: someone who has no title (B) disposes of an object to a third party (C), either 
for value or gratuitously, where this transaction is effective as against the (former) title-
holder (A). If the disposition was made for value, the person who previously held the 
title (A) can bring an enrichment action, not against the ultimate recipient of the 
disposition (C), but against the person who made it without being entitled (B). If the 
disposition was gratuitous, on the other hand, the previously-entitled party (A) can sue 
the third party (C) directly. 200 The Nichtleistungskondiktion available in such cases is 
an EingrifJskondiktion. 
2 One of the Eingriffskondiktionen not dealt with in its own special paragraph of 
the BGB but which is covered by § 812 BGB is that used in the case of Sachverbrauch 
i e 'unauthorised consumption of another's property,.201 
3 § 951 (1) sent 1 BGB allows someone who has lost a right, for example by 
accessio, confusio, commixtio, or specijicatio to claim monetary compensation for that 
loss.202 
4 Finally, the RuckgrifJskondiktion is available where a third party (A) performs to 
another (B) in terms of an obligation owed by B's debtor (C). In such a situation, A may 





cases mvolving Nichtleistung(m are regarded as being less problematic than other cases Of multi-
party enrichment (the specific provisions of the BGB mentioned in the text identify the parties to 
the action); most Mthe comments quoted at the beginriilig ofthis section were directed at the 
notorious 'triangular relationships'. An exception is the case where liability arises in terms of § 
951 BGB: see Visser and Miller (2000) 117 SAL] 594 ill this regard. 
Medicus Schuldrecht 1I 9698 ff, 723 and 732; Zimmermann and Du Plessis [1994] Restitution 
Law Review 14 at 27-28. 
Zimmermann and Du Plessis [1994] Restitution Law Review 14 at 29. For details, see Medicus 
SChuldrecht 11 marg Iiote 733 . 
Zimmermann and Du Plessis [1994] Restitution Law Review 14 at 29. In this regard, also see 
Visser arid Miller (2000) 117 SAlJ 594 . 
Medicus Schuldrecht II marg notes 719 fr. 
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It must also be remembered that if someone has been unjustifiably enriched 
(whether by a Leistung or a Nichtleistung), and he gratuitously transfers the enrichment 
to a third party, the original owner can always sue the third party directly for the return 
of the enrichment.204 
Now the concept of a Leistung ('performance'), one of the most important 
theoretical concepts in the modem German law of enrichment, must be examined in 
closer detail because it runs through this thesis (and the German law of multi -party 
enrichment) like a golden thread. 
'Performance' in generaeos 
The concept of 'performance' is, in some ways, the pivot upon which the German law of 
unjustified enrichment turns. It is easier to understand if it is seen against the 
background of the rules relating to performance in the law of obligations in general. 
Certain of these rules are also important for an understanding of subsequent chapters of 
this thesis. 
A performance may be made in fulfilment of an obligation or it may be made 
where no obligation exists. Where a performance has been made in order to fulfil an 
obligation, it mayor may not correspond exactly with the terms of that obligation. 
Where the performance corresponds to an obligation 
First I will consider the rules relating to performance that corresponds exactly with the 
terms of the relevant obligation. The first question that comes to mind is: what exactly 
is a 'performance'? In other words, when can one say that performance has been 
effected? In this regard, a tenninological issue must be addressed. In English, it is 
sometimes said that an obligation is 'performed'. It would be more correct to say that 
the obligation is 'fulfilled' or 'discharged' by the performance in question. In other 
204 
205 
In tenns of § 822 BGB. See Medicus Schuldrecht 11 marg notes 690-1; Zimmennann and Du 
PJessis [1994] Restitution Law Review 14 at 28. 
For an evaluation of the South African notion of' perfonnance', see J E du Plessis 'Die Regsaard 
van Prestasie' (2002) 65 THRHR 59. 
words, the word 'performance' is sometimes used to refer to both the performance and 
to its effect on the obligation. This confusion does not generally arise in German 
because the word 'Leistung' is used for the performance made by the performing party, 
and the words' Erfiillung ,206 or 'Erloschen ,207 for the effect of that performance upon the 
obligation (i e fulfilment or discharge). In this thesis, I will try to use the words 
'perform' or 'performance' in such a way as to avoid this type of confusion?08 
Performance usually entails acting or refraining from acting. Thus a seller 
performs in terms of his contractual obligation by delivering goods. Various theories 
have been developed to deal with the question whether the performance necessary for 
fulfilment of an obligation also has a subjective component. 
The oldest theory is the Vertragstheorie (the 'contract theory') which required, 
for fulfilment of an obligation, not only factual performance but also a 'contract for 
fulfilment'. In other words, the parties had to conclude an agreement that the 
performance in question took place as fulfilment of a particular obligation?09 
Performance was thus necessarily bilateral.21o In other words, for example, if X 
concluded a contract in terms of which he was to mow Y's lawn, he and Y would have 
to conclude another agreement when X actually mowed the lawn, to the effect that the 
mowing amounted to the performance required by their contract, and that it therefore 
discharged his obligation. One of the disadvantages of this theory is that, as consensus 
is required, the parties must both have legal capacity to act. 21 1 This is unproblematic 







See, for example, § 364 BGB 
See, for example, § 362 BGB. 
I e I will Use these words to rerer to the act (or omission), together with aiiy oilier requirements 
for performance, by which the perfonning party seeks to discharge his obligation, and not to the 
result of that performance. 
See, e g, Medicus Schuldrecht I marg note 237. 
Cfthe South African approach reflected in cases such as, recently, Vereins-und Westbank AG v 
Veren Investments and Others 2002 (4) SA 421 (SCA). CfJ E dU Plessis 'Die regsaard van 
prestasie' (2002) 65 THRHR 57. 
Logically, this woUld Usually oll1y arise ill the context 6fa conti'acfualobligation where someone 
had contractual capacity at the time of conclusion of the contract, but lost it before performance 
i e befure the 'contract for fulfilment' was pi.iiportedly coiidUded. or it coUld arise ill the colitext 
Of obligations whicli are cohferred by the law i e where no capacity to act is required. 
but it is difficult to see why it should be required where the performance takes the form 
of not doing something, for example, or of doing something that does not amount to a 
legal act. 
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This was superseded by what is now the prevailing doctrine:212 the theory of the 
reale Leistungsbewirkung (the theory of the 'real effecting of performance'). In terms of 
this theory, all that is required is the effecting of the Leistungserfolg (literally, a 
'performance-result') through an act of performance that corresponds recognisably to 
what is owed. To put it simply, in a contractual context this means that an obligation 
will be discharged if one does exactly what one has promised to do. This approach 
reflects common sense and conforms mOre closely than the Vertragstheorie to the 
wording of the BGB' s main provision on discharge of an obligation by performance,213 
which does not explicitly require a meeting of minds. 214 It also has the advantage of not 
requiring the capacity of the debtor as is logically required in terms of the 
Vertragstheorie. Thus it is only necessary for the performing party to have the capacity 
to act where the performance takes the form of a legal act, and parties without legal 
capacity can fulfil obligations to make purely factual performances, or to refrain from 
acting. 
A third theory has been developed by Gemhuber and Billow: the theory of the 
finale Leistungsbewirkung (the theory of 'purposive effecting of performance'). They 
argue that a reale Leistungsbewirkung is not enough; the performing party must also 
direct his performance towards a particular debt by determining his purpose 
(Zweckbestimmung).215 In other words, he must not only perform the required act, but 





See Medicus SChuldrecht I ItHirg note 237; Miinchener KommentarlHeii1richS § 362 marg noles 5 
ff. 
§ 362 (I) BGB whiCh reads: '[Erloschen dilrch LeisttiIig] (1) Das Schi.Jldverhliltnis eilischt, 
wenn die geschuldete Leistung an den Glliubiger bewirkt wird.' (The debt is discharged when 
the oWed performance is effected to the creditor.) 
It should be borne in mind, as Medicus points out (Schuldrecht I marg note 237), that while 
iigreements are sOrrietiIiies riecessary for peifohiiance e g where ownership Of movable property 
is transferred (i e the 'real agreement' in tenns of § 929 BGB) or where a claim is ceded (in 
terms Of § 398 BGB), rio additioniil agreement is reqUired for extinction Of aii oBligation. 
Medicus SChuldrecht J miifg iiote 237. 
this theory and the theory of the reale Leistungsbewirkung (i e the theory supported by 
the majority) is that a sUbjective component is required; the difference between this 
theory and the Vertragstheorie is that the subjective component is unilateral and not 
bilateral. 
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It seems that the main reason for requiring this determination of performance, or 
Zweckbestimmung, is that it plays an important role in the law of unjustified 
enrichment216 i e it is necessary for reasons of coherence. It also has the advantage that 
the debtor can thus eliminate any doubt as to the purpose of the performance. This 
theory has, however, not met with general acceptance. Brox, for example, argues that 
while the debtor can determine the purpose of the performance, fulfilment can happen 
even in the absence of such a Zweckbestimmung; thus if a debtor owes mUltiple 
performances and makes a performance without determining which debt should be 
settled first, the debts will be extinguished in an order determined by the BGB.217 
Medicus, on the other hand, argues that this theory merely expresses the majority view 
(the theory of the reale Leistungsbewirkung) in a different way, in that the performance 
is usually linked to a particular debt by the will of the performing party or via the rules 
determining the order of performance.2lS 
The theory ofthejinale Leistungsbewirkung has thus not convinced the majority, 
which still holds the view that all that is required for fulfilment is an actual performance 
corresponding to whatever is owed i e there is no subjective component to performance 
or fulfilment. 
An exception to this general rule, however, arises in cases where the debtor is 
obliged, in terms of several different obligations, to make various performances of the 
same kind to the same creditor and he makes a performance which is not sufficient to 




See, e g, Medicus Schuldrecht J marg note 237. 
m § 366 (2). 
I e § 366 (2) BGB; Medicus Schuldrecht 1 marg note 237. 
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debtls is/are settled.219 The consent of the creditor is not necessary. Thus the debtor can 
unilaterally determine which debtls he wishes to settle by means of this performance. 
As mentioned above, ifhe makes no such detennination (Tilgungsbestimmung, or 
'determination of settlement'), the debts will be settled according to an order of 
precedence set out in the 13GB: thus debts that are due will be discharged first; then 
debts that are less secured; then debts that are mbre onerous; and so on.220 Even here, 
the intention ofthe debtor is indirectly relevant in that this order of precedence is based 
on the legislature'S assumption that this is what the parties would reasonably intend. If, 
therefore, it is clear from the facts that the order of precedence is not in accordance with 
the will of the debtor, then it will not apply. The intention of the debtor is totally 
irrelevant, however, where there is only one claim that consists of the main performance, 
interest and costs. In such a case, the 13GB says that the costs will be settled first, then 
interest and then the main claim.221 
The next question that may be asked is: who must perform to whom? The 13GB 
does not specify who must make the performance in question. Thus it need not be made 
by the debtor himself, unless the contract is such that personal performance is 
necessary.222 In other words, a third party may perform in terms of the debtor's 
obligation, and thereby discharge it, unless the contract requires personal performance. 
The consent of the debtor is not required223 but, ifthe debtor objects to the performance, 
the creditor may refuse to accept it.224 A third party who performs in terms of another's 
obligation must intend to do so. His intention is not determined subjectively, however; 
it will suffice ifthe creditor would think that he intended to perform in terms of that 
debt. In other words, it is not his actual will that is important, but how it is understood 








§ 366 (1) BGB. Uiiless it is Clear froJb the nafure 6fthe perfoifuance which obligation is to be 
settled: see Medicus Schuldrecht I marg note 231. 
§ 366 (2) BGB. AlSo see Mediclis Schuldrecht I fuarg note 234. 
§ 367 (I) BGB. 
§ 267 BGB. This question will be considered iii more detail in Chapter Two of this thesis. 
§ 267 (1) BGB. 
§ 267 (2) BGB 
See KiophOller BGB § 267 matg note 2; Palandt § 267 fuatg note 4 and Chapter Two below. 
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Sometimes the performance is made, not by the debtor himself, but by an 
Erfii1lungsgehilfe, namely a 'person employed in perfonning an obligation for whom the 
principal is vicariously liable,226 or an agent. Thus the obligations of a business may be 
fulfilled by its employees. An Erfullungsgehilfe is not regarded as a third party for the 
purposes of performance;227 he acts more like a conduit for the debtor's performance. 
The performance must generally be made to the creditor. As a general rule, 
therefore, performance to a third party will not extinguish the obligation.228 By way of 
exception, however, it may do so in certain circumstances. Thus the obligation will be 
discharged where the creditor has given his prior consent to performance to a third 
party;229 or where he has ratified performance to a third party.230 The law which protects 
a party's reliance will sometimes lead to discharge of a debt by performance to someone 
other than the creditor. 231 If a debtor performs to the cedent of a claim against him, this 
performance will discharge the claim now held by the cessionary.232 Similarly, 
performance to a third party may discharge a debt if someone performs in good faith to 
the holder of a Wertpapier (e g a cheque) in terms of the law of negotiable 
instruments.233 
In certain circumstances, even performance to the creditor will not have the 
effect of extinguishing the obligation. For example, performance to an insolvent 
creditor will not discharge a debt.234 
Should a performance comply with the rules explained above, the effect will be 










AlfrM Rofuam Worterbuch der Rechts- und Wirtschaftssprache Teil II 3 ed (1994) q v. For 
details, see Medicus Schuldrecht I marg notes 318 ff See § 278 BGB in this regard. 
I e liis perfOriilahce will hot be made ill terms of § 267 BGB; alSo see KfopliOller BGB § 267 
marg note 1. 
MedicUs Schuldrecht I ibarg Iiote 225. 
§ 185 (1) BGB. 
§ 185 (2) BGB. 
See Medicus Schuldrecht I marg note 227. 
See § 407 (1) BGB. Also see § 408 BGB, and Chapter Foi.ii below. 
For these examples, see Medicus Schuldrecht I marg note 227. 
See MMicUs Schuldrecht I hiarg note 228, wnere lie alSo discUsses me qUestion wlieilier 
pei"foiib.aiice to a illiiior will be effective. 
2 Where the performance does not correspond to the obligation 
What if the performance in question is not exactly what was envisaged in the contract? 
Such cases can either be Leistungen an Erfullungs Staff or Leistungen 
erfullungshalber?35 These terms can perhaps best be translated as 'alternative 
performances' (Leistungen an Erfollungs Statt) and 'provisional perfonnances' 
(Leistungen erfullungshalber) and the main distinction between the two categories is that 
only performances an Erfullungs Staff will extinguish the original obligation.236 Which 
category a particular performance will fall into is a question of interpretation?3? 
(a) Leistungen an Erfullungs Staff 
The obligation will be extinguished by a performance other than that agreed upon by the 
parties provided that the creditor accepts this performance in fulfilment of the 
obligation.238 Thus, for example, X owes Y €500 in terms of a loan agreement. Instead 
of handing over the money, however, X gives Y a television set. IfY accepts this as 
performance, the original debt will be discharged. If Y does not accept this as 
performance, X will have breached the loan agreement. 
(b) Le istungen erfullungshalber 
In a case of 'provisional performance', on the other hand, the obligation will not be 
extinguished by the performance alone?39 The creditor has to try to get satisfaction by 
using the object that is given to him in performance of the obligation?40 Only if his 







See Medicus Schuldrecht / marg notes 241 ff. Or it couJd be made for purposes of security egA 
tarm6t pay rus debt s6 hands over one Of hiS assetS as securitY; iii stich cases the origii:ial debt Will 
stand. In this regard, see Medicus op cit marg note 241. 
See Meditlis SChuldrecht / marg notes 242-3; 245 and 247. 
Medicus Schuldrecht / marg note 244. 
§§ 364 ffBGB; Medielis Schuldrecht / matg notes 243 and 247. See § 364 (I) BGB: 'Das 
Schu1dverhaltnis erlischt, wenn der Glaubiger eine andere als die geschuJdete Leistung an 
ErtUlltiligs Statt aiiliii:iifut.' (The debt is discharged When the creditor accepts a penoi1l1arice 
other than the owed performance as alternative discharge.) If the object handed over as an 
alternatiVe performance is defective or blitdened With a thiid party's rights, there may be 
problems. For a discussion thereof, see Medicus Schuldrecht / marg note 248. 
See Medicus Schuldrecht / marg notes 242 and 245. 
Medicus Schuldrecht / marg note 242, where he points out that this type of performance is only 
hinted at ill §§ 364 ffBGB. AlSo see op cit marg note 245. 
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more sense when we apply it to the most common example of a Leistung 
erfollungshalber, namely payment by means of a cheque.24I Mere handing over of a 
cheque as payment will not discharge the debt in question. The creditor must do 
something more than accept the cheque; he must present it to a bank. If the bank 
honours the cheque, the debt on the cheque and the original debt will both be settled and 
the debtor will be freed. 242 If the bank does not honour the cheque, the debtor will still 
be obliged in terms of the cheque and the creditor can also fall back on his original 
claim.243 
So far, we have been dealing with performance aimed at fulfilment of an existing 
obligation (whether or not the perfonnance corresponds to the terms of the obligation). 
Now we must consider what happens when someone makes a performance in the 
absence of an obligation, or when a performance fails to extinguish an existent 
obligation. 
'Performance' in the context of the law of enrichment: the Leistungsbegrifl44 
Definition and requirements 
Within the law of enrichment, as mentioned above, the word 'Leistung,245 has a very 
specific meaning. It is generally defined as the 'conscious and purpose-directed increase 
of the assets of another' ('bewu13te und zweckgerichtete Mehrung fremden 
Verm6gens,).246 In other words, in this context, the concept of a Leistung implies not 
only the act of performing but also that it is conscious, directed at a particular purpose, 







Oli cheqUe payments, see Chapler Three. 
Medicus Schuldrechtl marg note 245 . 
Medicus Schuldrechll marg nole 245. On the creditor's tights and duties regardiiig the object 
which has been given to him as provisional performance, see Medicus Schuldrecht I roarg Dote 
246. 
An excellent summary of the main rules may be found in W Stolte 'Der Leistungsbegriff: Ein 
Gespetist des Bereicherungsrechts?' 1990 JZ 220 at 221. 
As used in § 812 BGB. 
See, e g, BGHZ 58, 184; BGH N]W 1999, 1393~ Esser, Schuldrecht (2ed, 1960) § 189 Nt 6, 7; 
Lorenz (1991) 191 AcP 279 at 280; Medicus Burgerliches Recht marg note 666; idem 
SChuldrechlll marg note 634; Stolte 1990 ]Z 220 at 221. 
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A Leistung is therefore something more than the mere act of performance. This 
can cause terminological difficulties, particularly in English. Mow can one distinguish 
between the Leistung, loaded with meaning, and the act of performing itself (e g by 
transferring property, or perfonning a service)?247 The Germans do so by using the 
word 'Zuwendung' - a word that roughly means 'giving' or 'handing over' - to express 
the latter meaning. Similarly, how can one distinguish, in English, between the notion 
of 'performance' in the law of contract, for example, and the more expansive meaning 
attached to the word Leistung in the context of enrichment law? In this thesis, I have 
tried to avoid these difficulties by using the English word 'performance' when referring 
to a Leistung in a more general sense, and by using the German word to denote the 
narrower meaning given to the concept in the German law of enrichment. 
Let us now consider the requirements of a Leistung in more detail. The 
requirement of awareness is fairly self-explanatory. The perfonning party must thus be 
conscious that he is increasing the property of another by his performance.248 Property, 
in this context, has a very broad meaning, including, for example, things which have 
only a sentimental value and even the mere possession of things; in short, it includes 
'anything' that has been received.249 
The requirement that has attracted the most attention is that the party who 
performs must do so in order to achieve a purpose.250 By performing, a party most often 
intends to fulfil an obligation arising from a legal relationship between himself and the 






Ie Wnat the Romans Would naVe called a daiio or afaeturn. 
For further detail, see Medicus Sehuldreeht II marg note 635. 
Medicus Sehuldreeht II marg note 634. 
See, e g, Medicus Burgerliehes Recht marg note 686. As Medicus points out (Sehuldreeht II 
marg note 636), where someone bands something over, he is usually trying to achieve something 
oy his sacrifice. 
See, e g, Loewenheim Bereieherungsreeht 25; Larenz and Canaris Sehuldreeht I112 132. This 
situation illustrates the link between the Leistungskondiktion and the conVeyance Of property 
referred to above: see Loewenheim op cit 26. Where someone's purpose is to settle a debt, the 
defermmatioti Of this purpose is sometiliies referred to as a Tilgungsbestirnrnung: see Medicus 
Schuldrecht liilarg hote 237 and the maex ililaer Tilgungsbestirnrnung. 
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purchaser in order to discharge his obligation in terms of their contract of sale?52 This 
underlying obligation, if valid, provides the causa for the performance, and the 
obligationary legal relationship between the parties is therefore called the 
Kausalverhaltnis ('causal relationship'). If the causal relationship is invalid, the 
performing party's performance will not achieve its purpose and there will be no causa. 
In other words, the shift of assets will have occurred without legal ground. 
A performance need not only be made in order to discharge a debt (i e solvendi 
causa), however, in order to qualify as a Leistung?53 Thus, for example, someone might 
shift an asset to another as a donation (donandi causa), or to acquire a claim against 
him,254 or to induce him to behave in a particular way?55 As Loewenheim emphasises, 
this is not a closed list; a performance will qualify as a Leistung if made for any legal 
purpose?56 If the performing party seeks to fulfil several purposes, it is his primary 
h· h· d .. 257 purpose w IC IS eCIsIve. 
In certain cases at least, the purpose of the performing party is determined 
objectively,258 in accordance with the doctrine of the objektivierte Emp!angerhorizont?59 











Loewenheim Bereicherungsrecht 26. 
For example, a Claim ansilig from Geschaftsfohrung ohne Auftrag, the Gertiian eqmValent Of our 
negotiorum gestio. 
Ie Leisturig causa data non secuta, ob rein: see Loeweiilieiih Bereicherimgsrecht 26. For 
example, no contractual obligation arise from a contract of sale of land that does not comply with 
the necessary fOrmalities, but the purchase might pay the purchase price ili order to ihduce the 
seller to transfer the property and to allow registration thereof. For this example, see 
LOeweiilieiiii Bereicherungsrechi 26. 
Bereicherungsrecht 26. 
Medicus SChu/drecht II marg note 640. 
Pa/andt § 133 marg note 9. 
On the relevance ofthe Emp/dngerhorizom in cases Of enriChment, see KoppeIisteiner and 
Kramer Bereicherung 33 ff, 36 ff, 43; Loewenheim Bereicherungsrecht 44. See Medicus 
Biirgerliches Recht marg hote 687 fOr a discussion ofthe background. 
Pa/andt § 133 marg note 9; Kropholler BGB § 133 marg note 4: those declarations of intent 
which need to be received. This category would thus inClude deClarations made with a View to 
contracting. According to the herrschende Meinung, the doctrine of the objectivierte 
Emp/dngerhorizont is alSo used to detertiiilie wnether a valid deClaration Of intent eXistS at ali, 
where a party makes a declaration unaware that he is making a legally relevant act. (See 
KrophOller BGB § 133 iiiarg nole 4, read with § 119 iiiarg nole 7 and § 116 iiiarg note 3) lli other 
words, it is relevant to the law relating to error (§ 119 BGB). ThOse deClarations of intent whicn 
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interpreted as they must have been understood by the recipient acting in good faith and 
taking into account common usage.261 The law is generally concerned, not with the 
recipient's actual interpretation of the performing party's purpose, but with the view of a 
third person in the position of the recipient.262 The performing party (i e the one who 
makes the Leistung) will accordingly be the party whom a reasonable person in the 
position of the recipient would regard as having performed.263 This applies unless the 
recipient was aware of the declaring party's actual intention, in which case the real 
intention will be decisive.264 
2 Implications of the Leistungsbegriff 
The purposive element of a Leistung is important in various ways. Before the modern 
Leistungsbegriffrose to prominence, the 'legal ground' referred to in § 812 BGB was 
understood only to be the 'causal relationship' (Kausalverhaltnis) between the parties in 
terms of which the shift of assets took place?65 The introduction of the requirement of 
purpose widened the notion of a legal ground?66 The current view is accordingly that 
the legal ground lies in the fulfilment of the purpose of the performance,267 whether that 










To sum up, if the purpose was achieved, there is no need to undo the 
db nbt require receipt, e g wills, are treated differently, in that What is authoritative is the actliaJ 
will of the declaring party: Kropholler BGB § 133 marg note 1. 
Palimdt § 133 hiarg note 9; Kiopholler BGB § 133 marg note 4: 'nach neu und Glauben liiiter 
BerUcksichtigung der Verkehrsitte'. 
Medicus Burgerliches Recht marg note 45; Palandt § 133 iharg note 9; KiophOller BGB § 133 
marg note 4; BGH 36, 33 and other cases cited in Palandt op cit. 
Stolte i 990 fziio at 221. 
Kropholler BGB § 133 marg note 3. 
LoeWeiiheiin Bereicherw1gsrechl 56. 
By introducing a subjective element (the intention of the performing party): Loewenheim 
Bereicherungsrecht 56. AthOugh it sli6uld be borne ili milid that this is sometifues deteriliilied 
objectively - see the discussion of the objectivierte EmpJiingerhorizont above. 
Medicus SChuldrechl II marg note 639. 
See Loewenbeim Bereicherungsrecht 26 and 56 for further details. This logically raises the 
coiitroversial question Whether a purpose (ahd therefore a legal ground) may rail even Where 
sorneone's purpose was to fulfil an obligation which in fact existed: see idem 57. Here, 
LoeWeiiheiirt points out that a significant nliihber Of (iiiflueiitial) authOrs Would regard the 
existence of a valid obligation as a legal ground which would therefore exclude an enrichment 
ciaim. 
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performance by means of the law of enrichment. 269 If, on the other hand, the purpose 
was not achieved, the law of enrichment will step in and allow the performing party to 
reclaim his performance. Whether or not the purpose has been achieved thus determines 
whether the receipt was justified, and therefore whether an enrichment claim willlie .27o 
The second important implication of the Leistungsbegriffis that it supposedly 
helps to identify the parties between whom the emichment claim will lie. Because the 
performing party's purpose must be directed at someone, it can be determined who the 
relevant parties are and it is therefore said that the requirement in terms of § 812 (1) 
BGB that the enrichment be 'at the expense of' the plaintiff is dispensed with in cases of 
Leistungen; it thus only applies to Nichtleistung ('non-performance') cases.271 Tills has 
even been said to be one of the main functions of the Leistungsbegriff272 
This also implies that where something was received by way of a Leistung, there 
is no need to prove that the performing party was impoverished. For a 
Leistungskondiktion to lie, all that is necessary is that someone received something 
(erlangt etwasi73 through the Leistung of another, where the purpose of that Leistung 
was not achieved. 
3 Manifestations of the Leistungskondiktion 
Medicus divides Leistungen according to the purpose of the performing party: in the 
first category one finds those cases where the performing party intends to settle a debt 






Medicus Schuldrechl II marg note 636. For an exception, see the discussion of § 817 in the text 
to note 287 below. 
Medicus Schuldrecht II marg notes 636, 639. 
Medicus Schuldrecht II marg note 731 ; Loewenheim Bereicherungsrecht 19; Zimmermann and 
Du Plessis [1994] Restitution Law Review 14 at 25-26. As, said above, although De Vos 
apparently adopted the 'auf Kosten von' requirement of German law (see 
Verrykingsaanspreeklikheid 339n 1 and C P Joubert (1959) 76 SAL! 471 at 475-6), he did not take 
over this distinction. Also see Medicus Biirgerliches Recht marg note 686: Es kommt nicht 
darauf an, wer dUTCh die Leistung ein Recht verliert. (It does not depend on who has lost a right 
as a result of the Leistung, i e there is no need to investigate whether there was a corresponding 
impoverishment.) For the same idea, see Stolte 1990JZ220 at 221. 
See Loewenheim Bereicherungsrecht 25 . 
It should be noted that the wording does not refer to enrichment. 
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discharge of a debt, he could fail to achieve his purpose for various reasons. Thus the 
debt could not exist at all, or could lie between other parties, or it could have a different 
content to that envisaged. In such circwnstances, his Leistungskondiktion274 would be 
called a condictio indebiti.275 One of the situations in which this condictio would be 
available will be of interest to South African lawyers: it can be used to reclaim a 
performance made in terms of a voidable obligation that has been avoided (i e when the 
contract is set aside, the Leistung retroactively loses its legal ground).276 
If, on the other hand, the performing party did not achieve his purpose because a 
valid claim which he intended to fulfil by his performance subsequently fell away, his 
Leistungskondiktion would go under the name condictio ob causamjinitam.277 This 
condictio is often used in the context of resolutive conditions,278 but it is not used upon 
cancellation of a contract for breach?79 
A Leistungskondiktion would also be available in circumstances where, even 
though the recipient had a claim to the Leistung, the debtor need not have made it 
because he would have been entitled to raise a permanent defence against the creditor 
had the latter decided to enforce it.280 Thus, for example, if someone makes a 
performance to a creditor who obtained the claim to that performance without legal 
ground, the performing party will be able to reclaim his performance by means of a 









In tenns of § 812 (1) sent 1 BGB. 
For all of this, see Medicus Schuldrecht II marg note 641. 
See Medicus Schuldrecht II marg note 646. 
§ 812 (1) sent 2 alt I BGB. See Medicus Schuldrecht II marg note 642, where he points out that 
this condictio has a narrow range of application. It will not be available where a voidable 
contract has been avoided because the obligation is extinguished with retroative effect in such 
cases i e it is as if there never was a valid obligation at all 
See Medicus Schuldrecht II marg note 647. 
Medicus Schuldrecht II marg note 649. In such circumstances, a performance made in terms of 
the contract may be reclaimed in terms of § 346 BGB, which creates an obligation to restore such 
performance. 
§ 813 (1) sent 1; Medicus Schuldrecht II marg note 643. According to § § 813 (1) sent 2 read 
with § 222 (2) BGB, this does not apply to the defence of prescription. The full text of § 813 
BGB, with a translation may be found in Appendix A. 
See Medicus Schuldrecht II marg note 643. 
On the other hand, a Leistungskondiktion will be available where the 
performance was aimed at a performance other than fulfilment of a debt.282 Thus an 
enrichment action in the form of a condictio ob rem will be available where the 
performance is aimed at a particular result which does not materialise.283 
Finally, the Leistungskondiktion can take on the likeness of a condictio ob 
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turpem vel iniustam causam,284 where the recipient disobeyed a statutory prohibition or 
offended against good morals in accepting the performance?8S It should be noted that 
the enrichment claim will only lie where the recipient alone contravened the law or the 
boni mores, and that it will accordingly not be available where both parties acted 
illegally or immorally?86 This form ofthe Leistungskondiktion is exceptional in that it is 
available despite the fact that the plaintiff achieved his purpose in performing.287 
4 The Leistungsbegrif/ and mUlti-party enrichment 
The Leistungsbegriff, as portrayed thus far, probably sounds like an attractive panacea 
for the worst kinds of ills to which enrichment law is prone. Thus, for example, it 
apparently dispenses with the troublesome requirement that someone receive something 
'at the expense of another'. As will become apparent in subsequent chapters ofthis 
thesis, however, it does not achieve all it seems to promise. 
If only two parties are involved, it is clear who performs (leistet) to whom. 
Where three or more parties are involved, however, the legal picture becomes more 
complex. What happens, for example, where A transfers property to C with the 
intention of performing to B, where C thinks that he is the recipient of A's performance? 
It can also be difficult to determine who makes the performance in question. Thus, for 







Medicus Schuldrecht II marg note 644. 
According to § 812 (1) sent 2 alt 2 BGB. Medicus (Schuldrecht II marg note 644) cites the 
following example, amongst others: payment in a cash transactions for which there is no prior 
obligation i e where the Leistung itself should create the legal ground for the payment. 
Medicus Schuldrecht II marg note 645. 
See the wording of § 817 sent 1 BGB. 
According to § 817 sent 2 - the Gennan equivalent of our par delictum rule. 
See Medicus Schuldrecht II marg note 645 for further explanation. 
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B, who intends to pay C, or is it A, which transfers the money to C's bank (or hands 
over cash ifit is a cash cheque), or is it C's bank, which debits C's bank account? What 
happens if someone makes a perfomance with the intention of simultaneously 
performing to two parties? The LeistungsbegrifJ does not provide easy answers to these 
questions. 
It is thus within the context of multi-party enrichment that the LeistungsbegrifJ 
has met its greatest challenges, and exposed its greatest shortcomings. Just as the 
LeistungsbegrifJ divides the law of enrichment, it divides enrichment lawyers into two 
camps: those who support it, and those who are critical of it.288 
The most influential of the Leistungbegriffs critics is Canaris. In a seminal 
essay, he identified many of its defects, using cases of multi-party enrichment to 
illustrate them?89 Some will be considered in subsequent chapters of this thesis. 
Despite his cogent criticisms, however, the LeistungsbegrifJhas proved remarkably 
resilient. It has a surprisingly tenacious hold on German enrichment lawyers, and still 
has some very influential supporters?90 Even the advocates of the LeistungsbegrifJ, 
however, would acknowledge the contribution made by Canaris. In particular, he 
formulated several general principles which are of great assistance in deciding whether 
an enrichment claim should be granted in the 'difficult' cases of multi-party enrichment. 
The 'Canaris principles' 




For criticism see, inter alia, Miinchener KommentarfLieb § 812 ffand 'Zur 
bereicherungsrechtlichen RUckabwicklung bei der Zession' (1990) 7 Jura 359; Lorenz (1991) 
191 AcP 279 at 295; Berthold Kupisch Gesetzespositivismus im Bereicherungsrecht: Zur 
Leistungskondiktion im Drei-Personenverhaltnis (1978); Stolte 1990 JZ 220; Canaris (n 141) 799 
ff. 
Canaris (n 141) at 802. 
For example, albeit to a limited extent, Medicus - see for example, his Biirgerliches Recht marg 
notes 668 ('Ein mit der Kontinuitiit brechender "Abschied vom Leistungsbegriff' ... scheint mir 
erst in letzter Linie vertretbar') and 686 (but cf his comments in Schuldrecht 11 marg note 731). 
For a recent contribution to the debate, see Alexander Schall Leistungskondiktion und 'Sonstige 
Kondiktion' auf der Grundlage des einheitlichen gesetzlichen Kondiktionsprinzips (2003), a 
thesis written in support of the Leistungsbegriffunder the supervision of Canaris. 
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Kausalverhiiltnis' ,291 for example a void contract, should be able to retain any defences 
that they would have had against each other had that causal relationship been valid. 
Secondly, each party to a defective causal relationship should be protected against any 
defences held by the other contracting party that arise from his legal relationship with a 
third party. Thirdly, the risk of insolvency of one of the parties must be borne by the 
person who chose to contract with him, even if their contract is defective for some 
reason. 292 
1 The notion of a 'causal relationship,293 
These principles raise three issues that are significant for the rest of this thesis. The first 
is that the notion of a causal relationship - as discussed above - is central to Canaris's 
approach. Effectively, an enrichment claim will lie between the two parties to a 
defective causal relationship (usually a contract).294 As it clearly identifies the two 
parties to an enrichment claim, the notion of a causal relationship also obviates the need 
for a requirement that the enrichment be 'at the expense of the plaintiff. 
The notion of a causal relationship is also interesting in that it is reminiscent of 
the old idea of a 'negotium' - still sometimes required for relief in the form of a 
condictio sine causa specialis - in that it refers to some sort of contact between the 






Zimmennann and Du Plessis [1994] Restitution Law Review 14 at 32. 
Canaris (n 141) at 802. 
For a general definition ofa causal transaction, see Palandt vor § 104 marg note 19 bb). 
See, e g, BGHZ 122, 46 at 51: the enrichment action is confined to 'that legal relationship in 
which the mistake arose' ('die Rechtsbeziehung, in der ein FeWer aufgetreten ist ... '.) 
See, e g, M de Villiers 'Negotium in Roman Law' (1928) 45 SAU223: 'The original form of the 
word negotium was nec otium, the negation of inactivity, hence it was used to denote active 
employment.' But' .. . negotium acquired a wider meaning in the case of contract as denoting 
that transaction itself, especially when in the making, and a better meaning may be it comprised a 
"reciprocal agreement of some sort." (My emphasis). He continues: 'Post-Roman cOlDJDentators 
on the law also sometimes used the word negotium to denote an agreement amounting to a 
contract. Thus Huber refers to a negotium habile ad obligationem producendam,a contract 
capable of establishing an obligation (thUS a causa obligationis), as was rightly held by DE 
VILLIERS, J., in the case ofConradie v Russouw [sic] (1919), App. Div., 314.' Also cfSir John 
G Kotze Causa in the Roman and Roman-Dutch Law of Contract (1922) 65 ff, particularly at 66, 
where he says: 'By this he intends to convey that the convention or agreement partakes 
somewhat of the nature of a contract (negotium) ... .' Dawson Unjust Enrichment: A 
Comparative Analysis (1951) 51 translates negotium as 'direct dealing . .. between the parties'. 
Referring to Julian's refusal to grant a remedy to someone who has improved the property of 
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This idea will be explored in later chapters. 
Bearing in mind that the most common 'causal relationship' is a contract, 
Canaris's focus on this relationship gives his views of German enrichment law (at least 
concerning triangular situations) a 'contractual' complexion?96 I do not mean that the 
claims arising in this area of law are contractual in any way; clearly their purpose is to 
reverse enrichment (and therefore restore the status quoi97 whereas contractual claims 
are usually aimed at achieving the promised result (i e changing the status quo in 
accordance with the wishes of the parties). I mean that, if one follows Canaris's 
approach, enrichment claims in triangular situations almost always rise from the shadow 
of a defective contract. 298 This is not surprising as it can probably, at least partly, be 
attributed to the existence of abstraction principle of transfer of ownership. The 
abstraction principle expels the 'causal' element of a transaction from property law; it 
finds a home in the law of enrichment. In legal systems which follow the causal system, 




another, he says that '[h]is reason, the absence of any direct dealing between plaintiff and 
defendant, expressed a practical limitation, the kind of working rule that kept the remedy 
manageable though it could be breached occasionally where reasons were good.' He adds that 
'[t]he instances are rare indeed in which a condiction was awarded in the absence of an 
antecedent "giving" by the plaintiff to the defendant or else of a prior agreement between the 
parties whose correction or enforcement was sought.' Also see Van Zyl Negotiorum Gestio 
11n34, where he says that the word 'continues to indicate any kind of action or activity which 
may give rise to an obligation.' 
Cf Zimmermann (1985) 18 CILSA 1 at 7-8: 'Savigny emphasised that the condictio could lie 
where a shifting of assets had taken place otherwise than by transfer, i e where the acquirer would 
be enriched at the expense of the original owner either through his own act or through accidental 
circumstances.' ... 'Instead of being quasi-contractual in nature, the condictio was held by him to 
be something like an actio quasi negotioria: it served to abate a state of unlawful "habere" and 
took the place of the rei vindicatio, which had been lost because the acquirer had become owner. 
The true basis of all condictiones, Savigny said, consists in claiming back something which has 
come from our property.' 
In this regard, see Zimmermann (1995) 15 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 403 at 404. 
But not always. For example, someone might make a performance thinking that he is obliged to 
do so in terms ofa statute. Although Canaris's views have been the most influential in this field, 
it should be pointed out that the views of other important writers do not have such a 'contractual' 
flavour. Thus Flume and Kupisch, for example, seem to look at the law of emichment from a 
more proprietory perspective, i e focusing rather on the shifts in economic value etc. See, e g, 
Berthold Kupisch 'Rechtspositivismus im Bereicherungsrecht' 1997 JZ 213; idem 'Der Gedanke 
"als ob": Zur wirtschaftlichen Betrachtungsweise bei der Anweisung, romarustisch und 
zivilistisch' in Reinhard Zimmermann, Rolf KnUtel and Jens Peter Meincke (eds) 
Rechtsgeschichte und Privatrechtsdogmatik (2000) 431; Flume (1999) 199 A cP 1. 
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2 A normative approach to multi-party enrichment 
The second issue that bears emphasising is that Canaris's approach should be seen 
within the context of the 'Normativierung' of enriclunent law 'whereby the underlying 
legal policy considerations are evaluated and weighed up against each other in order to 
reach a decision' ?99 This general approach is also followed by other writers and the 
German courts. Thus, for example, it has been said that the law of enrichment requires 
an economic rather than a formally legal approach.30o Similarly, the courts take into 
account the protection of a party's reliance interest, allocation of risk and other interests 
of the parties. 30 1 
It has been argued that an approach which takes underlying policies into account 
should be followed in the South African law of enrichment.302 Visser has identified the 
following policy factors as having relevance for cases of multi-party enrichment: the 
nature of the relationships between the parties; that the 'business risks' of contracting 
should be borne by the contractants; that a party should not have to bear the risk of 
settling the same debt twice; that a party should not be able to claim payment of the 
same debt twice; that a contracting party 'should not be unjustifiably deprived of the 
right to rely on his or her contractual defences against their contracting partner'; that the 
law should promote the 'security of receipts'; that the law should retain the paritas 
creditorum rule'; the 'economic consequences' of granting or dismissing an enrichment 





Zirrunermann and Du Plessis [1994] Restitution Law Review 14 at 38. Cf also Visser (n 2) and 
judicial approval of this approach per Van Zyl J in ABSA Bank Ltd tfa Bankjin v Stander tfa CA W 
Paneelkloppers supra at 951 ff. 
BGHZ 105,365 at 368-9. Also see BGHZ 36, 232 at 234; BGH WM 1983,792 at 793. 
See, for example, BGHZ 105, 365; BGHZ 122,46 where the judge says (at 51) that protection of 
reliance and proper allocation of risk must be taken into account because the Leistungsbegriffon 
its own does not always appear convincing: ('[Die] Gesichtspunkte des Vertrauensschutzes und 
der Risikoverteilung, die mitberUcksichtigt werden mUssen, da die Ableitung aus dem 
Leistungsbegriff a lie in nicht immer Uberzeugend erscheint.') . 
Especially by D P Visser. See, e g, the articles cited in notes 2, 10 (at 531 ff) and (together with 
Saul Miller) (2000) 117 SAL! 594. Regarding the role of policy and open-ended nonns in other 
areas of our law, see, e g, Corbett (1987) 104 SALJ 52. Unlike the South African law of contract, 
for example, which has been described as 'a seamless web of rules which possesses a 
determinative rationality of its own, such that answers to any disputes will be thrown up by the 
inexorable logic that is internal to the system itself, the 'hard edges oflegal policy' in the 
context of our law of unjustified enrichment have not yet been 'smoothed away by the sandpaper 
of legal doctrine' : see Alfred Cockrell 'Substance and fonn in the South African law of contract' 
(1992) 109 SAL! 40 at 40 . 
arising from a contract and the allied questions whether the plaintiff has exercised any 
alternative rights of recourse and whether (and why) the plaintiff's 'contractual claim 
against the third party is not enforceable or not worth enforcing. ,303 One could also 
mention the more general values of consistency and coherence. 
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Clearly there is some overlap between Visser's list of policy factors and the 
factors taken into account in German law. A policy consideration underlying some of 
the factors mentioned in Visser's list, but not mentioned specifically, is the protection of 
a party's reliance interest. 
3 Reliance on appearances 
The third issue to be discussed in the context of Canaris' s principles arises from his 
background in banking law. Understanding certain aspects ofCanaris's treatment of 
three-cornered enrichment situations304 is facilitated by an appreciation of the 
Rechtsscheintheorie, its function within the law of negotiable instruments, and its 
relationship to the rules on bonafide receipt of ownership.305 This theory, developed 
mainly by Ernst Jacobi and Herbert Mayer,306 is used in the law of negotiable 
instruments in order to distinguish the circumstances in which a holder in good faith 






Visser (n 10) at 530 ff. 
E g his emphasis on defences. 
See A Huek and C-W Canaris Recht der Wertpapiere 11 ed (1977) pp 30 ff and para 19 (pp 132 
ft). 
Op cit at 31. 
The possible defences can thus be divided into those which may be raised by the holder against 
the debtor (i e where the requirements of the Rechtsscheintheorie are met and the holder'S 
reliance may be protected), and those which may not (due to non-compliance with the 
Rechtscheinstheorie). Each ofthese categories has further subdivisions which need not be 
discussed here. For example, the former category includes Gultigkeitseinwendungen (,validity 
defences ') and personliche Einwendungen (' personal defences '): Huek and Canaris (n 305) at 
137. Gultigkeitseinwendungen are defences which arise from a lack of validity of the claim 
arising from the bill of exchange in circumstances where the requirements of the 
Rechlsscheintheorie are nevertheless fulfilled: op cit 138. Personliche Einwendungen, on the 
other hand, are those which result from the causal relationships which underlie the Wechsel 
( exchange): loc cit. The latter category of defences i e those which may not be raised, include 
InhaltlichelUrkundliche (content/documentary) defences, Zurechenbarkeit (attributability) 
defences and Unmittelbar (direct) defences: loc cit. lnhaltlichte defences are those which appear 
from the instrument itself e g where the formalities have not been complied with: op cit 140. 
Zurechenbarkeit defences are those which arise from a lack of attributability to the debtor e g 
where the instrument was written under duress, where there was no capacity to act, where the 
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advantages is that it is consistent with that part of the law of property which deals with 
the circumstances in which a bonafide recipient may acquire ownership.308 
The theory is based on 2 principles: the Rechtsscheinsprinzip and the 
Zurechenbarkeitsprinzip.309 The first is basically a principle which protects a party's 
reliance on the outward appearance of compliance with the legal requirements for the 
validity of an instrument, by making the other party liable for it. (It could therefore be 
seen to approximate our law of estoppel,310 or in the law of contract, the notion that a 
contract can be based on reasonable reliance on the appearance of consensus). 311 The 
second principle states that someone can only be held liable in accordance with this 
appearance of compliance if its creation is attributable to him.312 In other words, in 
tenns of the Rechtsscheintheorie, the reliance of a recipient in good faith creates liability 
on the part of the person to whom the creation of the apparent compliance is attributable. 
The requirements for the application of this theory are: the existence of apparent 
compliance with the legal requirements for validity;313 this must be attributable to the 
other party;314 and, in addition, the defect must relate to an earlier transaction. 315 For 
liability based on reliance to arise, one party must thus have done something to create 
that reliance (e g written a cheque or created a debit order) and the party acting in 
reliance must have acted bonafide. Finally, the defect in question must arise not from 









The third requirement requires some explanation. Consider the situation, for 
signature was forged., where there was no Begebungsvertrag (the special type of transfer 
agreement for negotiab Ie instruments) at all, or where there was a defect of will in tenns 0 f § § 
116ffBGB. 
§ 932 BGB: The recipient will also become owner through an alienation in terms of § 929 BGB 
if the thing does not belong to the transferor when he, at the time at which he would receive 
ownership in tenns of these provisions, is not in good faith. It the case of § 929 sentence 2 only 
applies, however, if the recipient had received possession from the transferor. 
Huek and Canaris (n 305) 31. 
In terms of which someone who makes a representation will be estopped from denying that 
representation if someone reasonably relied on it to his prejudice, provided that it is reasonable to 
expect third party to rely on the representation. 
Steyn v LSA Motors Ltd 1994 (1) SA 49 (A). 
Huek and Canaris (n 305) 31. 
Huek and Canaris (n 305) 134. 
Huek and Canaris (n 305) 135. 
Huek and Canaris (n 305) 134. 
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example, where someone receives possession of a thing in good faith from a minor. The 
recipient, though bonafide, will not receive ownership in terms of § 932 BGB (in other 
words, no effect will be given to his belief in the appearance of a real agreement) 
because the minor has no capacity to act and is therefore not able to conclude a real 
agreement. This may be contrasted with the situation where Z, who is bona fide, 
receives a thing from Y, who is in fact not owner himself because of the minority of the 
person who purported to transfer the thing to him. In this case, as Y has the capacity to 
conclude a real agreement, Z will become owner in terms of § 932 BGB. By way of 
analogy to this case, if someone, acting bona fide, receives a bill of exchange directly 
from a minor, he will not be protected in terms of the Rechtsscheintheorie. If, however, 
the defect (the lack of capacity of a party) arises from a prior transaction, it will not 
exclude the application of the theory i e the bonafide recipient ofthe bill of exchange 
will be protected in that the law will give effect to his bona fide belief in the appearance 
of compliance. 316 
APPROACH AND METHOD 
According to Zweigert and Katz, '[t]he basic methodological principle of all 
comparative law is that ofJunctionality .... [I]n law the only things which are 
comparable are those which fulfil the same function. ,317 In this thesis, I will compare 
the ways in which German and South African law deal with certain practical problems 
that arise in situations of multi-party enrichment. 318 
The fact-based treatment of the German law regarding multi-party enrichment 
greatly facilitates a functional comparative approach. It should be borne in mind, 
however, that the relevant facts used for categorisation of cases are usually legal 
constructs (e g contractual or other obligations, cession, pledge, suretyship and so on). 




I am extremely grateful to Sonja Meier for clarifying some aspects of this theory for me. 
See Zweigert and Kt)tz (n 113) 34. 
In other words, this will be a work of 'microcomparison': see Zweigert and Kotz (n 113) 5. 
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context. For instance, if one can be an enriched by the receipt of a personal right, the 
content and extent of that right must be determined by reference to the branch of the law 
of obligations from which it arose. 319 In order for comparisons to be meaningful, the 
rules of enrichment law must be considered within their own legal context and not in 
isolation; otherwise one runs the risk that apparent differences between legal systems 
might be misunderstood. 32o Thus a comparison of enrichment liability in different legal 
systems also entails a comparison of the broader legal context within which that liability 
arises. 321 This makes comparison of systems of enrichment law particularly difficult, 
and these difficulties are compounded when there are fundamental differences in these 
'contextual rules' between the legal systems under consideration. As said above,322 the 
broad similarity between the German and South African legal backdrops to enrichment 
law helps to focus the spotlight on any differences in the enrichment law of these two 
systems. 
This thesis, then, will not follow the 'typical' pattern of comparative theses 
written in South Africa i e where there is an introduction and identification of the 
problem; then a report of the South African law on the topic; followed by a report of 
German law on the same topic; and finally a comparison and critical evaluation. Partly 
to increase its comprehensibility, and partly to increase its practical usefulness/23 this 
thesis will be divided into chapters dealing with sets of practical problems. Each chapter 






I e the scope of a contractual right is determined by the law of contract. 
E g if X gives Y something in terms of an invalid contract, one system might grant X enrichment 
claim whereas another would not. To look at the law of enrichment in isolation might lead to the 
incorrect impression that X would have no claim at all in the second system, whereas he might 
actually have a claim in terms of the law of property (e g where that system follows a causal 
system of transfer of ownership). 
If, therefore, one wants to compare the German and South African enrichment law concerning a 
situation where A gives something to C rather than to his creditor B because he erroneously 
thinks that B has ceded the claim to that performance to C, one must take into account any 
differences between the German and South African law of cession. 
Atp 17 ff. 
This topic does not lend itself to following the traditional model. Because some of the rules are 
complex, and the number of factual permutations is great, it would be very difficult to retain all 
that is said about multi-party enrichment in Germany, and also to keep in mind the South African 
law on the topic all the way through the thesis until the two were compared in a frnal chapter, if 
the traditional approach were taken. It would also be impractical as it would involve much 
repetition and numerous cross-references. 
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which those problems arise. The different permutations of facts that can arise within 
that context will then be considered. For each of these permutations, the German law 
and South African law will be outlined/24 and then compared and critically evaluated.325 
In the course of this analysis, suggestions for the future path of South African law will 
be made, and these will be brought together in the final chapter. 
As said above, the main purposes of this thesis are to evaluate South African law 
and to provide suggestions for its reform. It is thus a work of 'national comparative law' 
in the sense that it only aims at assisting South African lawyers.326 It is not intended to 
be a thesis on German law. My approach will therefore be to focus largely on the most 
widely accepted opinions and the most important areas of controversy; it would be 
impossible, in a work ofthis scale, to consider every one of the multitude of minority 
opinions expressed on each aspect of multi-party enrichment in German law. Not only 
the positive law but also the policy considerations underlying specific decisions and 
rules will be considered. 
It is tempting, when faced with a system as sophisticated as the German law of 
enrichment, to try force South African law into the German framework (e g to divide 
enrichment claims into Leistungskondiktionen and Nichtleistungskondiktionen, or to deal 





Cfthe comments ofZweigert and Kotz (n 113) at 43: 'Separate reports should be offered for 
each legal system or family of legal systems, and they should be objective, that is, free from any 
critical evaluation, though containing all significant qualifications or modifications. Whoever 
reads or uses a work on comparative law must be made familiar with the basic material, or he 
will be in no position to make the necessary comparisons, but in any case it is useful to give 
jurists access to legal systems hitherto unfamiliar to them. Occasionally, an unusual topic will 
demand a different method of treatment, for example, where the problem under scrutiny involves 
several different sub-questions or crops up in cases of different types: then it may be desirable to 
devote separate treatment to each sub-question or type of case, and provide a country report on 
each.' 
See Zweigert and Kotz (n 113) 43, 44, 46-7. 
Cf the remarks of Zweigert and Kotz (n 113) at 46, where they criticise German work on 
comparative law which, they say, starts 'from a particular question or legal institution in German 
law, proceeds to treat it comparatively, and ends, after evaluating the discoveries made, by 
drawing conclusions - proposals for reform, new interpretations - for German law alone.' They 
would prefer an 'international comparative law approach', but nothing so ambitious will be 
attempted here. 
In this regard, it should be remembered that the SCA has expressed a preference for a general 
action that is subsidiary to the existing remedies: see McCarthy Retail Ltd v Shortdistance 
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in mind, however, that 'ultimately, law serves an eminently practical function,328 and 
that any analysis will have to be acceptable to a South African judge. One should 
therefore strive to find solutions which are consonant with our existing law,329 for 'to 
introduce a standard in one case which is greatly dissonant with those applied in existing 
rules may generate uncertainty in the law, which may dissuade judges from legislating in 
that way at all, since one of the objects of j udiciallaw-making is to reduce uncertainty, 
not to create it.' 330 In attempting to suggest guidelines for the future development of the 
South African law of multi-party enrichment, therefore, I shall use as points of reference 
those rules of South African law which can be considered as settled, and explain our law 
in its own terms, while at the same time being guided by the analyses of the German 
lawyers. 
Finally, although comparative law and legal history so closely related that the 
best approach is to consider a particular problem from both perspectives, I have 
deliberately chosen not to consider the historical background to this topic in any 
comprehensive way.33l Reference may, however, be made to historical factors that shed 






Carriers CC supra at 4880. 
Zimmennann: see the quotation in note 5 above. 
See, e g, the judgment of Smalberger ADCJ in McCarthy Retail Ltd v Short distance Carriers CC 
supra at 495H-I. 
John Bell Policy Arguments in Judicial Decisions (1983) 19. C P Joubert (1959) 76 SAL] 471: 
'Dit kom ons voor dat die skrywer hom op bierdie gebied ten onregte laat meevoer het deur die 
aufKosten-vereiste van Duitse reg (at 475) en dat sy kritiek van die Hoe Raad se beslissing op 17 
Julie 1707 ... asmede van die Suid-Afrikaanse regspraak op hierdie gebied ongegrond is. Ons het 
geen beboefte aan 'n Artikel 822 van die Duitse Wetboek nie. Ons enrichment liens ... is in 
hierdie opsig nie onsinnig en ten onregte nie. Die gesag waarop die skrywer hom ... beroep vir sy 
stelling dat 'n verrykingsaksie in die Romeins-Hollandse reg waar claar 'n tussenpersoon of 
tussenvermoe is nie kan slaag nie, is Duits! Die Hoe Raad betjuis die teendeel beslis.' 
This is partly due to the breadth of the enquiry, and partly due to the fact that the Roman rules 
regarding privity of contract (which reflect their social and economic environment) make the 
legal contexts of modem South African and German law, on the one hand, and Roman law and 
the ius commune, on the other, so different as to create too many variables for comparison. The 
historical background to our law of enrichment bas also been dealt with in detail in works such as 
De Vos Verrykingsaanspreeklikheid; Zimmermann Law a/Obligations; Visser (n 14) at 374 ff. 
See Zweigert and K6tz (n 113) 8: '[I]egat history and comparative law are much of a muchness; 
views may differ on which of these twin sisters is the more comely, but there is no doubt that the 
legal historian must often use the comparative method and that if the comparatist is to make sense 
of the rules and the problems they are intended to solve he must often investigate their history.' 
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STRUCTURE 
Clearly, in view of the volume of literature and the plethora of opinions on multi-party 
enrichment in Germany, and the need to contextualise each set of problems, it would not 
be possible to consider in detail all of the factual constellations that have been identified 
in Germany. I have therefore selected for discussion those problem-areas where 
comparison with German law may be most useful for the development of South African 
law. 333 
The first factual situation to be considered (in Chapter Two) will be performance 
in terms of the obligation or supposed obligation of another. Thus, A pays B's debt to C 
in the absence of any contract with or instruction by B. Within this factual paradigm, 
various factual permutations will be considered. For example, what happens if A hands 
money to C intending to settle B's debt to C, but in fact B does not owe anything to C? 
In the following chapter, I will deal with cases where A hands something334 to C 
in accordance with an instruction by B. For example, B owes or wishes to donate 
money to C. Instead of handing over the money himself, however, he instructs his 
debtor A to pay it on his behalf. Again, several variations of these facts will be 
considered. For example, what happens if B made no instruction, or he made an 
instruction and then withdrew it? 
The next problems to be discussed (in Chapter Four) revolve around cession: A 
owes a performance to B, and B cedes the right to this performance to C. A thus makes 
the performance to the cessionary, C. The law of enrichment comes into play where one 
of these legal Jinks is defective. Examples of the possible situations that can arise would 
be: what happens if the cession was invalid, or A did not owe anything to B? 
333 
334 
And which have not recently been compared to German law; as the German and South African 
law regarding subcontractor situations and the so-called 'garage cases' has been compared by 
Visser (in the essay cited in note 10 and, together with Saul Miller, in (2000) 117 SAU 594), 
these will not be considered in detail in this thesis. Also see the detailed comparison made by 
Sonnekus in 1996 TSAR I. Cf also the factual constellations mentioned in the section on 'third 
party enrichment' in DetlefKt)nig's draft law of unjustified enrichment, of which a translation 
appears in Zimmermann (1995) 16 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 403 at 425 ff. 
Or does something for him. 
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It will have been noticed that the same labels have been used to identify the 
parties in these various situations. These labels will be used consistently throughout the 
thesis: in each case Bowes - or purportedly owes - a performance335 to C but this 
performance is made by A to C. The 'constants' in all of these cases may be illustrated 
by this diagram: 
What is not constant is the reason why A made that performance to C?36 This reason 
provides the identifying characteristic of each category of cases. Thus, for example, in 
the instruction cases, A performs to C because he was instructed to do so; in the cession 
cases, A performs to C because he thinks that B has ceded his claim to C. 
The order in which I have chosen to deal with these situations has partly to do 
with these identifying characteristics. In order to assess the impact of an actual or 
supposed instruction, cession or contract, it seems sensible first to consider what 
happens in their absence. Therefore, although this is not typically done in Germany/37 I 
will begin with performances in terms of the obligation of another where they were not 
prompted by any instruction, cession or contract i e A acted sua sponte. 
The cases where there is a - usually unilateral - instruction (B-A) follow 




It should be emphasised that this word is used in an untechnical sense here. 
I e the reason for the 'deflection' of his perfonnance from B to C. 
An exception is Wieling Bereicherungsrecht 105 ff. 
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Gennany.338 Then come the cases on cession i e where the reason why A perfonns to C 
instead of B is a cession (or purported cession) B-c. 
It may seem that this thesis will therefore only deal with cases of Leistungen. 
This is not so. Both Leistungs- and Nichtleistungskondiktionen can arise from these sets 
of facts. German writers would usually sift out the Nichtleistung-situations and discuss 
them elsewhere. I have decided, however, not to follow the LeistunglNichtleistung 
distinction so closely, mainly for practical reasons: it seems more fimctional to consider 
all related practical situations together. 339 For example, performances in terms of the 
obligation of another can fall on either side of the Leistung-Nichtleistung divide. If the 
performance in question amounts to what call negotiorum gestio, a German lawyer 
would regard it as being a Nichtleistung case and would therefore not consider it 
together with situations where one pays the supposed debt of another (i e where debt B -
C, which A purports to settle, is invalid). 
In this introductory chapter, I have tried to provide a general picture of the South 
African and Gennan law of enrichment and to show how these systems generally 
approach cases of multi-party enrichment. In doing so, I have explained many of the 
basic concepts which are necessary for an understanding of the rest of this thesis. 
Before beginning the more detailed discussion of the practical situations mentioned 
above, some of these basic concepts will briefly be illustrated with the simplest case of 
multi-party enrichment: the so-called 'enrichment chain'. 
A PRELIMINARY EXAMPLE: ENRICHMENT CHAINS 
As already mentioned,34o the situation envisaged here is one of consecutive Leistungen: 
for example, A transfers something to B in terms of a contract, and B transfers the same 




They are also often used as a model for all other triangular situations in German law; it is thus 
necessary to understand the way in which instruction cases are handled, in order to understand 
the chapters that follow. Such cases have also given rise to considerable controversy in South 
Africa. 
And it is also easier for non-German lawyers to follow if all rules dealing with related practical 
problems are dealt with in one place. 
At p 28. 
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either or both of the underlying contracts are void. 341 Such cases obviously only 
potentially give rise to enrichment liability in those legal systems which follow an 
abstract system of transfer of ownership, because in a causal system, the would-be 
transferor would retain ownership and could therefore vindicate the property rather than 
having to seek an enrichment claim. 
The German solution in cases of this type depends on whether the transfers (or 
other Leistungen) were made gratuitously or for consideration. If both contracts are for 
value and ifthe contract between A and B is void, A will have an enrichment claim (a 
Leistungskondiktion) but only against B.342 Similarly, if in such circumstances only the 
contract between B and C is void, B can sue C for unjustified enrichment. Ifboth are 
void, it is a case of so-called Doppelmangel, or 'double-fault'. The old view was that A 
would have an enrichment claim against B, and the object of that claim was B's claim 
against C. In other words, he would have a condictio condictionis: a Kondiktion der 
Kondiktion?43 The current view is that A is confined to a claim against B, either for the 
object of the transfer, or for its value344 ifit has already been transferred to C. 
Every transferor, therefore, is limited to suing the person to whom he made the 
transfer345 and no direct claim would lie between A and C. The reasons given for 
limiting the transferor to suing the recipient of his transfer are first, that he had the 
opportunity to choose his contracting partner and should not be allowed to seek relief 







If, on the other hand, the transfer from B to C is gratuitous, A will be able to 
Or, in German law, it was voidable and has been avoided. 
See, e g, Medicus Schuldrecht II marg note 724. 
See, e g, Medicus Schuldrecht II marg note 726. This was contrary to the Canaris principles: 
after the cession A would bear the risk of the insolvency of a party whom he had not sought out 
(C) and C would lose any defences which arose from his relationship with B, in conflict with 
Canaris' principle 1, or be able to raise them against A, which would conflict with Canaris's 
second principle. Medicus Schuldrecht II marg note 726. 
8GB § 818 (2). 
Or other Leistung. 
Compare, in this regard, the discussion ofCanaris's principles at p 45 ffabove. 
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bring an enrichment claim directly against c.347 § 822 BGB expressly allows such a 
direct action because the interests of the third party are not deemed to be as worthy of 
protection in this sort of case because he did not pay for the thing which he has received. 
This sort of situation also arises in South African law. It may be illustrated by 
the facts of Rousseau and Others NNO v Visser and Another/48 which happens to be a 
case of' Doppelmangel'. It is one of the cases which arose from the notorious' Kubus 
cult,349 of the mid-eighties. The brainchild of a Mr Nieuwoudt, a company called Kubus 
Kwekery, conducted the business of duping members of the pUblic. In exchange for an 
interest-free loan ofR30 to the company, the customer received an 'activator' and an 
undertaking that the company would buy back fixed amounts of 'kubus' per month at a 
predetennined price. The 'kubus' was an absolutely worthless350 dried milk culture that 
the customers produced by mixing the activator with milk and cheese. Practically, this 
meant that customers would receive a monthly return of R40 on their investment of R30, 
provided that they diligently sent off the mouldy dried milk. This evidently sounded like 
a good investment to the 'thousands of people [who invested] millions of rands in the 
venture' .351 In order to pay Peter, however, the company had to rob Paul: as with all 
'pyramid schemes', it depended on the generation of new 'sales,352 of the activator in 
order to finance the repurchase of the dried product.353 Eventually, inevitably, the 
scheme collapsed and the company was liquidated. 
The two main questions which arose for decision were whether the customers 
were entitled to reclaim money paid to the company354 and whether the company's 










BGB § 822. See, e g, Zimmennann and Du Plessis [1994] Restitution Law Review 14 at 32; 
Loewenheim Bereicherungsrecht 164. 
1989 (2) SA 239 (C). 
See the judgment of Munnik JP at 293B. 
300F-G: '[T]he so-called dried product had no commercial value whatsoever. ... Even one 
optimist who took a load for pig food did not return.' 
293C. 
The judge refers to the transaction in question sometimes as a loan and sometimes as a sale. 





In answer to the first question, the court held that the scheme in question was illegal,356 
the parties were not in pari delicto/ 57 but that even if one assumed that they were/58 
justice and public policy359 would demand that the customers be allowed to bring claims 
against the company based on the condictio ob turpem vel iniustam causam.360 The 
judge held that the second question would have to be answered in the negative because 
the amounts in question did not constitute dispositions without value,361 as required by 
the Insolvency ACt.362 
If we analyse the facts, we can see that there was clearly an enrichment chain: A 
paid R30 to B, who used this to pay C. As both transactions were void for illegality,363 
B was unjustifiably enriched at A's expense and C, who gave nothing of value in 
exchange for what he received, was enriched at B's expense. This can be distinguished 
from the 'triangular relationships' in that A did not give anything directly to C; at least 
some of his money certainly ended up in C's pocket, but it went via B, i e the 
performance did not leapfrog B. In effect, the court's decision was that the unfortunate 
customers (A) could sue the company (in liquidation - B), and not the fortunate 
customers (C). B could, in theory, bring an enrichment claim against C, but was 
prevented from doing so by the wording of the Insolvency Act. In other words, as in 
German law, A cannot sue C directly. A must sue B who must sue C: the enrichment 
claims have to follow the links of the chain. 
The question that then arises is whether South African law and German law also 
follow this pattern (A-B-C) where A transfers something364 directly to C. In such 











As it was a lottery in tenns of the Gambling Act 51 of 1965: see the judgment at 300B. 
At 304H. 
At 305D. 
See 304H-I and 305-306. 
At 304I. 
307 ff. 
Act 24 of 1936: s 26. 
See the judgment at 308 B-C, where the judge, citing Estate Jager v Whittaker and Another 1944 
AD 246, holds that that the transactions in question here were 'illegal contract[s] which [give] 
rise to no obligations at all'. 
Or does something (i e makes alaeturn). 
Assuming that one or more of the contractual or other legal links are defective. 
CHAPTER TWO 
UNJUSTIFIED ENRICHMENT IN THE CONTEXT OF 
UNAUTHORISED PERFORMANCE IN TERMS OF THE 
OBLIGATION l OF ANOTHER 
INTRODUCTION 
Assuming that B owes a performance to C, I (a third party) could perform in terms of 
that obligation for various reasons. These could relate to my legal relationship to B. 
r could, for example, be B's agent or he could have given me a mandate to perform 
to C on his behalf. Or I could be B's debtor and for convenience he has asked me to 
perfonn to his creditor, C, to obviate the need for two performances: that is, from me 
to B and from B to C? For example, if! owe my absent landlord Rl 000 in terms of 
our contract of lease, and he owes my neighbour R 1 000 in terms of a contract of 
sale, my landlord might instruct me to give the money directly to my neighbour, thus 
extinguishing both debts. Or I could be obliged to make a performance to C in terms 
of a sub-contract between myself and B, where the main contract exists between B 
and C. Thus r might be a plumber who is obliged to install the plumbing in a house 
which a builder (B) has contracted to build for the owner of the land (C). 
Alternatively, I could pay C an amount equivalent to B's debt because I have agreed 
(with C) to stand surety for B vis-a-vis C. On the other hand, in juxtaposition to all 
these examples, I could have paid the debt without any prompting from B at all, 
without his knowledge or acquiescence, or even where he has expressly forbidden 
me to do so. 
Each of these situations is governed by different rules, re~ecting the differing 
Or supposed obligation. 
See, by way of analogy, the facts of Resnik v Lekhethoa 1950 (3) SA 263 (T): K sold his 
general store to L. The purchase price was the amount owed by K to his creditors. L paid 
two of the creditors directly. (In this case, it was apparently a term of the contract of sale 
between K and L that L perform to the creditors). 
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policies and values underlying the allocation of liability in that context. In this 
chapter, we will be dealing with the last situation, in other words, where I am neither 
legally obliged nor have I been instructed to pay B's debt to C, but I do so 
nevertheless. I could pay B's debt either knowingly (i e aware that I am not obliged 
to do so), or in error.3 The factual situation may be represented by the following 
diagram: 
I might be prompted to make the performance owed by B to C, despite 
knowing that I do not owe it, by various considerations. I could, for example, pay 
the debt on the grounds of altruism, friendship or family ties.4 A kindly aunt, hearing 
that her nephew is unable to pay his university fees, might thus pay them for him in a 
fit of generosity.5 Or I could make the performance in order to gain some sort of 
For example, I think that I am performing in terms of my own (non-existent) debt to B or C, 
or I erroneously think that B owes a performance to C, when he does not: see p 149 ffbelow. 
This might seem rather unlikely, or at least rare, today (see, for example, Medicus 
Biirgerliches Recht marg note 685; Josef Esser and Hans-Leo Weyers Schuldrecht Band II 
Besonderer Tei! Tei/band 28 ed (2000) 59: 'Praktisch nicht sehr wichtig') but in Roman 
times, it might have happened more commonly due to the expansive nature of the Roman 
amicitia (on this, see Fritz Schulz Principles of Roman Law (1936) at 233 ff). It was 
expected that one should undertake such things on behalf of one's friends, and such altruism 
(in this limited sense) was, at least amongst the upper classes (see Schulz op cit 233), a norm 
rather than, as today, at least in a Western context, merely a salutary exception (cfNiall R 
and Deon van Zyl 'Unauthorized management of affairs (negotiorum gestio)' in Reinhard 
Zimmermann, Daniel Visser and Kenneth Reid (eds) Mixed Legal Systems in Comparative 
Perspective: Property and Obligations in Scotland and South Africa (2004) 366 at 372, 
where they compare negotiorum gestio with the African concept of ubuntu. The Roman 
attitude to amicitia explains many aspects of Roman law, such as the relative unimportance 
of labour contracts compared to 'mandate and negotiorum gestio [which] belonged to the 
most important legal institutions .. .' (Schulz op cit 236) and the importance of personal rather 
than real security (Schulz op cit 237). See Reliance AgenCies (PtyiLtd'v Patel 1946 CPD 
463 (husband paying debts owed by wife's business) for a modem example; and also see Van 
Zyl Negotiorum Gestio 36. In most such situations, A would make the performance to C as a 
donation to B. In Roman law, it was assumed that if A and B were family members, the 
performance would amount to a donation: see, e g, Van Zyl Negotiorum Gestio 36; 
Zimmermann Law of Obligations 439n52. 
For analogous examples (but where A owed B a duty of support i e there was a legal 
obligation between A and B) see Reliance Agencies (Pty) Ltd v Patel supra (husband); Pauw 
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advantage or benefit for myself.6 For example, I might pay my debtor's debt to 
prevent his business being liquidated, so as to increase my chances of being paid 
what he owes me. I might even perform in terms of another's obligation in 
contravention of the express wishes of the debtor.7 I could thus settle my struggling 
sister's debts, despite her protesting that she wishes to extricate herself from her 
financial difficulties by her own efforts. 
Then again, I could perform in terms of someone else's obligation in error.8 
For instance, I might purport to pay someone's debt, not realising that it has already 
been settled or that it never existed at all. Thus, for example, when the kindly aunt 
pays the impecunious student's fees, they had already been paid by an equally kindly 
uncle. Alternatively, I make the performance because think that I am bound to do so 
in terms of a (non-existent) contract between myself and B (such as agency, mandate, 
or insurance ),9 or between myself and C (such as suretyship), 10 or as a result of a 
supposed cession II by my creditor (B) to c. 12 
As already mentioned, the focus of this chapter will fall on those situations 
where A is under no legal obligation at all, whether actual or supposed, to perform 





Observationes Tumultuariae Novae No 12 (mother), cited in Odendaal v Van Oudtshoorn 
1968 (3) SA 433 (T) at 438C-D. 
See, for example, Shaw v Kirby 1924 GWL 33 (where a prospective partner paid the debts of 
the partnership 'in consideration of benefits which, by these payments, he expected would 
accrue to himself when the partnership agreement should take effect' (at 36)); Van Staden v 
Pretorius 1965 (1) SA 853 (T) (where the purchaser of a piece ofiand, who had been in 
possession of the property for some time and had made various improvements, but who had 
not yet received title, paid the seller's debts in order to prevent a threatened sale in execution 
of the land); Odendaal v Van OuciJshoorn supra (where the purchaser of a restaurant paid 
what was owed by the seller to a supplier, as the supplier otherwise refused to supply certain 
goods to the purchaser). 
See, for example, Standard Bank Financial Services v Taylam (pty) Ltd 1979 (2) SA 383 (C). 
As to whether the case really concerned performance of the obligation of another, or 
performance of one's own obligation, see the cliscussion of trus case at p 124 ff below, and, 
for further details, see Chapter Three. Also cf Medicus's example of A settling B's debt to C 
in order to make B his (A's) own debtor: see Medicus Biirgerliches Recht marg note 952, 
and p 100 below. 
Again, in the absence of an obligation to do so. See, e g, Medicus Schuldrecht 11 marg note 
611. 
See Chapter Three below. 
Or some other contract e g I receive an electricity account and, thinking that it is mine 
because I have not yet received my monthly account, I mistakenly pay the amount in fact 
owed by someone else. 
See Chapter Four below. 
The examples mentioned in this sentence represent some of the categories that have 
'crystallised' in German law, and some will be dealt with in subsequent chapters. 
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myself (A) and B, B and C, and A and C) will now be examined in turn. A 
composite picture of the allocation of liability, whether deriving from a contract, 
from unjustified enrictunent or from any other source, will thus be outlined. Only 
once there is clarity about the pattern of liability in the absence of an actual or 
purported obligation l3 on the part of A to perform to C, can the effect of the 
existence of such an obligation (or purported obligation) be evaluated. 14 This will be 
considered in subsequent chapters. 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN A AND C 
For the purposes ofthis chapter, we will not only assume that there is no actual or 
supposed contractual relationshipl5 between A and B, as said above, but also that 
there is no actual or supposed contractual relationshipl6 between A and C. All that 
happens is that A either gives to or does something for C. In other words, between A 
and C there is either a datio l7 or afae/urn. A terminological problem arises in this 
regard. The shortest way to express this in English is to say that A has 'performed' 
to C. The problem is that this is the word generally used to translate the German 
verb 'leisten' and, as was explained in the previous chapter, this term carries with it 
all the baggage of the 'Leistungsbegriff .18 The Germans avoid this difficulty by 
using the verb 'zuwenden' (the corresponding noun being 'Zuwendung') instead. 
This can be loosely translated as 'to hand over', and is not a term of art. Continually 
speaking of ' A's handing over' would be very clumsy in English, however, and I 
have accordingly generally tried to use the words 'perform' or 'performance' to refer 
to this 'handing over' and either to use the German word 'Leistung' or to indicate 








Whether vis-a.-vis B or C. 
It should be pointed out that this is, however, not the approach of most German writers, who 
generally begin their discussion of so-called 'three-cornered enrichment' with the Anweisung 
as they use this is the model for all other such cases. 
Or other obligationary relationship. 
Such as suretyship, for example. 
In a literal sense, i e there is delivery, or a transfer of ownership (cfthe expanded notion of 
daJio in Phillips v Hughes, Hughes v Maphumulo 1979 (1) SA 225 (N) and Bowman, De Wet 
and Du Plessis NNO and Others v Fidelity Bank Ltd 1997 (2) SA 35 (A». 
See Chapter One above at p 38 ff. 
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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN B AND Cl9 
Assuming that B owes a perfonnance to C, the first question that arises is: what is 
the effect of a perfonnance by a third party on the obligation between the debtor and 
creditor? In other words, will perfonnance by a third party (A) constitute 
perfonnance in tenns of (i e 'fulfil') the debtor's obligation and thus extinguish the 
debt? The answer to this question is often crucial in detennining enrichment 
liability.20 For example, if A's perfonnance to C extinguishes the debt owed by B to 
C, C will not be enriched, as he will have merely received a perfonnance to which he 
is entitled. To put it differently, he will have acquired something but at the same 
time he will have lost the claim which he would otherwise have had against B. B, on 
the other hand, will arguably be enriched in such circumstances, as he will have lost 
a liability. If, however, the debt is not extinguished by A's perfonnance, C (and not 
B) will be the enriched party because he will retain his original claim against Band 
will have received an additional perfonnance. Similarly, if A perfonns to C, 
thinking that he is perfonning in tenns of B's obligation to C, where B in fact owes 





The answer given by both21 Gennan22 and South African23 law to the above 
In Gennan tenns, the 'Valutaverhaltnis', or 'value relationship'. 
In South African law, at least It is not always decisive in Gennan law, however, as § 812 
BGB has been interpreted as merely requiring that the defendant in an enrichment claim (a 
Leistungslwndiktion) has 'erlangt etwas' (i e 'received something'), and not necessarily that 
his net financial position has improved. See Chapter One at p 42 in this regard. 
The similarity of the South African and Gennan law in this regard is not surprising, since the 
rule has its roots in Roman law (see Zimmennann Law a/Obligations 3, particularly nlO, 
and 752). These roots are very deeply embedded; they are entangled with the very origins of 
the concept of an obligation as a vinculum iuris, a legal bond. Even before the drafting of the 
Twelve Tables, if someone committed a wrong, the victim could be prevented from 
exercising his right of vengeance by the payment of a sum of money - or, originally, cattle-
by the wrongdoer himself, or by a third party: Zimmermann Law a/Obligations 3. In other 
words, 'a debtor, liable for execution on his person, could be redeemed by third parties': 
Zimmennann Law a/Obligations 3n I O. Also see Max Kaser Roman Private Law 3 ed 
(1980) (Romisches Privatrecht 10 ed, translated by Rolf Dannenbring) at 261. This idea 
fmds expression in, for example, Romans 2:21 and also in aspects of the modem law of bail. 
In this regard, it is interesting to note that Gennan and Afrikaans use the same words for 
suretyship and bail: 'Bilrgschaft' and 'borg', respectively. 
§ 267 of the General Part of the BGB: '[Leistung durch Dritte] (1) Hat der Schuldner nicht in 
Person zu leisten, so kann auch ein Dritter die Leistung bewirken. Die Einwilligung des 
Schuldners ist nicht erforderlich. (2) Der GHiubiger kann die Leistung ablehnen, wenn der 
Schuldner widerspricht' (' [Perfonnance by third parties] (1) If a debtor does not have to 
perfonn in person, a third party may also make performance. The approval of the debtor is 
not necessary. (2) The creditor can refuse the perfonnance if the debtor objects.' (translation 
taken from Ian S Forrester, Simon L Goren and Hans-Michael Ilgen The German Civil Code 
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question is that, provided that personal performance of the debtor is unnecessary,24 a 
third partl5 may perform in his stead, even if he has neither agreed26 nor been 
instructed27 to do so, and this performance will indeed extinguish the obligationY 








See, generally, De Wet and Van Wyk Kontraktereg 260 ff; D J Joubert General Principles of 
the Law of Contract (1987) 275; Lubbe and Murray Contract 704 ff; Van der Merwe et al 
Contract 492 ff; Christie Contract 471-2; Hutchison (ed) Wille's Principles 47l. 
Either due to the express terms of the contract, or the surrounding circumstances: Christie 
Contract 471. The debtor must therefore have no special attributes which make personal 
performance necessary. Examples of situations where personal performance would be 
necessary: contracts of employment or mandate (PalandL § 267 marg note 1) or a contract to 
paint a portrait (Christie Contract 471) or to sing a song (De Wet and Van Wyk Kontraktereg 
261, where the authors point out that the rule regarding delectus personae is merely a 
manifestation of the general rule that obligations should be performed by the debtor, and the 
rule allowing performance by a third party is the exception). See Wessels Contract paras 
2129-30; Bousfield v The Divisional Council of Stullerheim (1902) 19 SC 64 at 70; Hanomag 
SA (Pty) Ltd v 0110 1940 CPD 437; Pienaar v Boland Bank and Another 1986 (4) SA 102 
(0) at 110; De Wet and Van Wyk Kontraktereg 4 ed (1978) 234 (who point out that in such a 
case a performance tendered by a third party will not amount to the promised performance, 
and see their 5 ed at 262); Joubert (n 23) 275; Van der Merwe et al Contract 492; Hutchison 
(ed) Wille's Principles 471. On the German law in this regard, see Medicus Schuldrecht I 
marg note 139 ff. 
I e someone who is 'neither an agent (Vertreter), nor an ancillary performer 
(Erfollungsgehilfe), nor someone who is fulfilling his own obligation (e g a surety or a co-
debtor)': Kropholler BGB § 267 marg note 1. Also see Palandl § 267 marg note 2. An 
Erfiillungsgehilfe is someone who performs on behalf of a contracting party, without being 
his agent. Thus, for example, a passenger may conclude a contract with the proprietor of a 
taxi company, but it does not matter if the proprietor himself does not drive the taxi that 
conveys the passenger: see Medicus Schuldrecht I marg notes 139 and 318. 
For example, in terms of a contract of mandate (see Odendaal v Van Oudlshoorn supra at 
437A, obiter) or agency. Neither system requires consent by the debtor. 
As, for example, in the 'Anweisung' cases: see Chapter Three. 
§ 267 BGB; Medicus Schuldrecht I marg note 140. See Wessels Contract para 2130; Union 
Bank v Beyers; Union Bank v Du Toil (1884) 3 SC 89; Bousfield v The Divisional Council of 
Stullerheim supra at 70; Rolfes, Nebel & Co v Zweigenhajt 1903 TS 185 at 195; Estate 
Thomas v Kerr & Another (1903) 20 SC 354 at 367; Rossler v Kemsley Millbourn 
Acceptance Corporation (Pty) Ltd 193] NPD 335 at 344-5; Reliance Agencies (Pty) Ltd v 
Patel supra 1946 CPD 463; Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Visser 1959 (1) SA 452 (A) 
at 458; Jones & Druker NNO & Another v Durban City Council & Another 1964 (2) SA 354 
(D) at 371; Froman v Robertson 1971 (1) SA 115 (A) at 124; Shaw v Burger 1994 (2) SA 
529 (C); APA Network Consultants (Pty) Ltd v Absa Bank Ltd 1996 (1) SA 1159 (W) at 
1166; Pienaar v Boland Bank and Another supra (see the judgment at 110G-H: 'The legal 
position is that if a debt is owed by a debtor to a creditor, then the payment by a stranger of 
such debt or an offer of payment by a stranger of such debt which is made for and on behalf 
of, and in respect of, the debtor's debt constitutes payment or tender, as the case may be, as 
effectually as if it were made by the debtor himself.' The judgment of the AD which 
overturned this decision did so on other grounds - see Boland Bank Ltd v Pienaar and 
Another 1988 (3) SA 618 (A)). Also see Joubert (n 23) 275; Van der Merwe et al Contract 
492; Hutchison (ed) Wille's Principles 471; Lubbe and Murray Contract 705-6. In South 
African law, an apparent exception is found in the law of suretyship: unless agreed 
otherwise, the payment of a surety extinguishes only the surety's own (accessory) obligation, 
and not the principal debt: see Hutchison (ed) Wille's Principles 616. A further exception is 
apparently made in cases where the third party is a bank which honours the cheque of its 
customer: see B & H Engineering v First National Bank of SA Ltd 1995 (2) SA 279 (A), and 
the detailed discussion in Chapter Three. 
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perfonnance and not in the identity ofthe perfonning party.29 
In order for the obligation to be extinguished, South African law requires that 
the 'third party ... [make it] clear that he is perfonning in the name and on behalf of 
the debtor' .30 Some authorities also require that the third party should make the 
perfonnance with the intention of discharging the debtor's obligation.3l While this 
seems unproblematic, and even obvious, at first sight, closer examination reveals 
certain difficulties. These difficulties flow from the possibility that the third party's 
communication to the creditor might not reflect his true intention. In other words, 
his (objective) declaration might differ from his (subjective) intention. In the case of 
contradiction, which will be effective? Will the debt be extinguished if the third 
party clearly and unambiguously states that he is perfonning for the debtor's account, 
even if he intends otherwise? For example, the postman puts my telephone account 
into my neighbour's postbox. My neighbour does not notice the error, but just 
glances at the total amount outstanding and hands the account together with an 
appropriate amount of cash to a cashier at Telkom's local branch, and the payment is 
reflected against my account, rather than my neighbour's. Will the payment 
extinguish my obligation to Telkom or not? 
Using a subjective approach, focusing on the intention of the third party, 




Palandt § 267 marg note 1; Zimmermann Law of Obligations 752. 
See Hutchison (ed) Wille's Principles 471; Christie Contract 471, who adds that if the third 
party does not do so, the creditor will be entitled to reject the performance. See Bousfield v 
Divisional Council of Stu1terheim supra at 71 ('It is necessary ... that the tender made by a 
perfect stranger should be made in the name of the debtor.. . .'); Estate Thomas v Kerr & 
Another supra at 367 (obiter); Landers v Vogel (1906) 27 NLR 458 at 461 (obiter); Rossler v 
Kemsley Mil/bourn Acceptance Corporation supra at 345; Hazis v Transvaal and Delagoa 
Bay Investment Co Ltd 1938 WLD 167; Reliance Agencies (Pty) Ltd v Patel supra at 473; 
Jones & Druker NNO & Another v Durban City Council & Another supra at 371; 
Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Visser supra at 457-8; Froman v Robertson supra at 
124-5, 126-7 (at 124H: '[I]n order to have this legal effect, the payment must be made in the 
name of the real debtor and in his discharge.'); Pienaar v Boland Bank supra at 11 OF-J; Info 
Plus v Scheelke 1998 (3) SA 184 (SCA). 
De Wet and Van Wyk Kontraktereg 260; Joubert (n 23) (implied) 275; Lubbe and Murray 
Contraet705; Van der Merwe et al Contract 492; Louis F Van Huyssteen, Schalk W J Van 
der Merwe and Catherine J MaxweU International Encyclopaedia of Laws: South Africa 2 
ed (2003) para 356. Implied, but not stated expressly, in Bousfield v The Divisional Council 
of S1ul1erheim supra; Rolfes, Nebel & Co v Zweigenhajt supra at 195; Estate Thomas v Kerr 
& Another supra at 367; Reliance Agencies (Pty) Ltd v Patel supra at 473; Froman v 
Robertson supra at 124-5; Rossler v Kemsley Mil/bourn Acceptance Corporation (Pty) Ltd 
supra at 344-5; Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Visser supra at 458; Jones & Druker 
NNO & Another v Durban City Council & Another supra at 371; Pienaar v Boland Bank & 
Another supra at 110. 
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basically subjective approach to contractual liability in general32 and to performance 
of contractual obligations in particular.33 Secondly, it seems more sophisticated than 
a strictly objective approach that ignores the performing party's true intention. Thus, 
for example, it would enable a third party to retain his right of action against the 
creditor rather than acquiring one against the debtor, ifhe so wishes. This may be 
illustrated by the following example: C runs a restaurant and his supplier B does not 
deliver the day's supplies. Another supplier, A, might make the performance in 
order to help C out of his difficulties, or to assist B (who does not want to breach his 
obligations and upset a good customer), or possibly to gain a new customer himself. 
Being of the view that C is more creditworthy than B, however, A may intend that 
this perfonnance not extinguish B's debt, so that he (A) will have a right of action 
against C rather than B. This would be impossible if we followed a purely objective 
approach. Similarly, A might perform in terms ofB's debt to C, in order to claim 
transfer of C's contractual right against B.34 Again, a purely objective approach 
would not allow the parties to achieve this result. 
On the other hand, commercial certainty demands that the creditor know 
whose account to credit. Requiring proof of intention alone does not meet this need; 
if A, in paying, intends to settle B's debt to C but does not communicate this 
intention to C, C may not know on whose account the performance was made. 
Secondly, it seems impractical to require proof of intention as well as an indication 
on whose behalf the performance was made. Apart from the general difficulty in 
proving a subjective state of mind, it should be borne in mind that the effect of A's 
performance on B's obligation would, more often than not, be at issue in disputes to 




See, for example, Saambou-Nasionale Bouvereniging v Friedman 1979 (3) SA 978 (A). 
It is clear that where the debtor himself performs, he must intend not only to make the 
performance in question but also to extinguish the obligation: see Van der Merwe et al 
Contract 487, and the authorities cited there. In other words, the parties must conclude a 
'debt-extinguishing agreement', and performance thus entails a bilateral legal act: see, e g, 
De Wet and Van Wyk Kontraktereg 263; Joubert (n 23) 274; Saambou-Nasionale 
Bouvereniging v Friedman supra. This was recently confirmed by the Supreme Court of 
Appeal in Vereins-und West bank AG v Veren Irrvestments and Others 2002 (4) SA 421 
(SCA). Cfthe discussion of 'performance' in Chapter One at p 31 ff, where it was pointed 
out that German law has abandoned this bilateral approach. Also see J E du Plessis 'Die 
Regsaard van Prestasie' (2002) 65 THRHR 59. 
See Van Huyssteen et al (n 31) para 356: 'Discharge of the debtor will result only when the 
third party has a specific intention to that effect, and does not occur when the third party 
intends, for example, merely to perform to the creditor in order to obtain transfer of his claim 
against the debtor or to fulfil his duty as surety.' 
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for specific performance) or the debtor (defending such an action) who would have 
to prove the intention of the third party. The only circumstances in which a third 
party who performs another's obligation (or supposed obligation) without 
authorisation would be directly involved in litigation would be where he himself 
seeks recourse on the basis of unjustified enrichment.35 That our law indeed often 
disregards the actual intention of the performing party in such circumstances is 
illustrated by the law of suretyship; if a surety were to pay another's creditor in terms 
of a contract of suretyship, he would, if asked, probablY say that he thereby intended 
to fulfil the debtor's obligation. The general rule,36 however, is that such 
performance will not extinguish the debtor's debt, regardless of the surety's intention 
at the time ofperformance.37 Finally, this (purely subjective) point of view is not 
supported by authority. The cases cited by the relevant authors merely state that the 
third party must perform in the name of the debtor or on his behalf. While this may 
be seen as implying that he should have so intended, intention is only expressly 
mentioned in Union Bank v Beyers; Union Bank v Du TOil. 38 It is noteworthy that, of 
the three judgments in this early case, it is only the one which does not require 
intention39 that is later cited with approval in subsequent cases. In fact, some of the 
difficulties caused by requiring proof of intention are well illustrated by the rather 
convoluted reasoning employed by the two judges whose views have since been 
. d 40 Ignore. 
For these reasons, it is submitted that preference should be given to the 
formulation quoted above,41 and that proof of subjective intention should not 









If, for example, A performed to C by mistake, indicating that he was performing in the name 
of B, and the debt were extinguished, he would have to sue B. If, on the other hand, the 
obligation were not terminated by the performance in question, then A would have to sue C 
for enrichment. 
The parties could agree otherwise in the original deed of suretyship. See, for example, the 
facts of Fircone Investments (Pty) Ltd v Bank of Lisbon and South Africa and Another 1982 
(3) SA 700 (T). 
See Van Huyssteen et al (n 31) para 356. Possible justifications for this rule are that the 
surety is to be afforded a stronger (i e contractual) right against B than he would have if he 
were forced to rely on enrichment liability, and that the surety is himself bound to C (i e he 
performs in terms of his own obligation to C, and C thus retains a right against B). 
Supra. 
That of De Villiers CJ. 
Viz those of Dwyers and Smith JJ. 
At P 67 (text to note 30). 
A case which can be interpreted as one where a third party extinguished the debt of another 
without intending to do so is Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Visser supra, where 
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completely disregarded. A possible means of accommodating his interests without 
jeopardising commercial certainty would be to state the rule as follows: if the third 
party indicated that he was performing in the name and on behalf of the debtor, the 
debt will be presumed to have been extinguished but this presumption could be 
rebutted by the third party if he could adduce proof of a contrary intention.43 
This would be similar, in result, to the approach followed in German law.44 
In terms of German law, the third party must perform with the intention of settling 
the debtor's debt.45 But this intention is often determined objectively.46 In other 
words, regard is had, not to the actual intention of the third party, but rather to the 
creditor's impression of this intention gauged by his conduct.47 
Some South African authorities go even further, and suggest that the 
performance must not only be made with the intention of settling the debtor's 







Visser's cheque in favour of the Commissioner for Inland Revenue was used by Visser's 
bookkeeper to pay a debt owed by another to the Commissioner. Thus Visser arguably paid 
the debt of another (via his bank and his bookkeeper) without intending to do so. This case 
will be discussed further in Chapter Three below. Also see Standard Bank oj SA Ltd v Nair 
2000 (I) SA 998 (D) but cf Info Plus v Scheelke supra. 
Or, drawing inspiration from the law regarding the basis of a contract, we could give effect to 
the creditor's belief or reliance i e what would be decisive is not what the third party 
intended, but what the recipient thought he intended. The law would have to require the 
creditor to prove that his reliance was reasonable in the circumstances, otherwise the balance 
would be weighted too heavily in his favour. 
See Chapter One at p 31 ff above regarding performance in general. 
Palandi § 267 marg note 4. Medicus Schuldrecht I marg note 140: 'der Dritte [muJ3] bei 
seiner Leistung auf die VerbindJichkeit des Schuldners Bezug nehmen, also erkennbar fur 
diesen leisten wollen.' ('In making performance, the third party must refer to the obligation 
of the debtor and therefore recognisably intend to perform for him.') 
'[O]er objektive ErkHirungswert seines Verhaltens' : Kropholler BGB § 267 marg note 2. Cf 
the explanation of the doctrine of the objektivierte EmpJangerhorizont in Chapter One at p 40 
ff above. This applies unless the recipient was aware of the performing party's actual 
intention, in which case the actual intention would be decisive. In this regard, also see 
Alexander Schall Leistungs/wndiktion und 'Sonstige Kondiktion' auf der Grundlage des 
einheitlichen gesetzlichen Kondiktionsprinzips (2003) . 
Palandi § 267 marg note 4: 'Dabei kommt es nicht auf den inneren Willen des Dritten, 
sond[ em] darauf an, wie der GHiub[iger] sein Verhalten verstehen durfie' (' In this regard, it 
does not depend upon the inner will of the third party, but upon how the creditor may have 
understood his behaviour' ); BGHZ 40, 276; BGHZ 72, 248. 
See, e g Reliance Agencies (Pty) Ltd v Patel supra at 473 : 'It must, however, be quite clear 
that the third party makes the payment for the benefit of the debtor' (per Sutton J, quoting 
Wessels Contract para 2134, who in tum cites Van Leeuwen); Lubbe and Murray Contract 
705 : 'it must be made not merely for the benefit of the debtor but with the intention of 
discharging him'; Van der Merwe et al Contract 492 : 'the third party should perform not 
merely for the benefit of the debtor but with the specific intention of discharging him'. On 
the difficulties of determining the meaning of 'benefit', see, e g, Edelstein v Edelstein NO 
and Others 1952 (3) SA 1 (A) at 14. 
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relied upon for this proposition by the modem writers indicates, however, that what 
is really meant is again that the performance be made for the debtor's account.49 If it 
were indeed required that the debtor benefit by the performance,5o this would have an 
impact on the scope of enrichment liability, particularly in cases where the third 
party has acted sui lucri causa. That benefit of the debtor is not required is shown by 
cases such as Odendaal v Van Oudtshoorn51 where the judge expressly states that the 
third party made the payment purely for his own benefit,52 but at the same time 
assumes that the debt was nevertheless extinguished. 53 
In South African law, the debtor's consene4 and even knowledge55 is 
unnecessary and the debt will be extinguished even if it is paid against the express 









It is also submitted that the idea that the debtor be benefited by the performance should also 
be rejected because it is unclear what exactly is meant by 'benefit' in this regard. Should the 
performance objectively be for the benefit of the debtor, or should the third party merely 
intend to benefit him? If A pays B's debt with the intention of benefiting him, but because 
the debt is about to prescribe or B is already insolvent, B derives no real benefit from the 
payment, would the debt nevertheless be extinguished? 
I e beyond the extinction of the debt. (Because this may be seen as not being a benefit at all 
when the overall position is considered: the debt and the claim cancel each other out, so the 
creditor's nett financial position remains the same. Of course, in certain practical situations, 
settlement of a debt might be more valuable to the creditor e g where the debtor is a man of 
straw.) 
Supra. Also see, for example, the facts of Pienaar v Boland Bank and Another supra, where 
Pienaar attempted to settle a mortgage debt owed by his former partner, not in order to 
benefit the former partner, but in order to prevent foreclosure of the bond over property in 
which Pienaar had an interest. 
See 435G: 'A ... sonder opdrag of kennis van C 'n skuld betaal wat C teenoor B het, nie met 
die doe! om daardeur vir C te bevoordeel nie maar suiwer in sy eie belang .... ' ('A ... 
without a mandate or knowledge of C, A pays a debt that C owes B, not with the intention of 
thereby advantaging C but purely in his own interests ... ') 
See the judgment at, e g, 436G. 
Union Bank v Beyers; Union Bank v Du Toil supra at 102; Reliance Agencies (Pty) Ltd v 
Patel supra at 472-3; Jones & Druker NNO & Another v Durban City Council & Another 
supra at 371B; Pienaar v Boland Bank and Another supra at 110; Van der Merwe et al 
Contract 492; Hutchison (ed) Wille's Principles 471. 
Bousfield v The Divisional Council of Stutterheim supra at 70; Rossler v Kemsley Millbourn 
Acceptance Corporation supra at 344; Reliance Agencies (Pty) Ltd v Patel supra at 472-3; 
Pienaar v Boland Bank and Another supra at 110; Volkskas Bank Bpk v Bankorp Bpk (hIa 
Trust Bank) en 'n Ander 1991 (3) SA 605 (A) at 612; De Wet and Van Wyk Kontraktereg 
260. 
Union Bank v Beyers; Union Bank v Du Toit supra at 102; Bousfield v The Divisional 
Council of Stutterheim supra; Rolfes, Nebel & Co v Zweigenhajt supra at 195 ('even though 
the debtor is unwilling'); Estate Thomas v Kerr & Another supra at 367; Rossler v Kemsley 
Millbourn Acceptance Corporation supra at 344; Reliance Agencies (Pty) Ltd v Patel supra 
at 472-3; Jones & Druker NNO & Another v Durban City Council & Another supra at 37lB 
('even against his will'); Pienaar v Boland Bank and Another supra at 110; Wessels Contract 
para 2130-1; De Wet and Van Wyk Kontraktereg 260: 'selfs teen die sin van die 
skuldenaar.'; Hutchison (ed) Wille's Principles 471. 
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creditor is not entitled to reject a performance tendered by a third party57 and there is 
some academic support for this proposition.58 In German law, although the debtor's 
approval is unnecessary for the extinction of the obligation,59 the creditor may refuse 
the performance if the debtor objects60 and at least one commentator states that the 
obligation will not be extinguished if the debtor has objected to the performance.61 
Another important difference between South African and German law should 
be noted at this stage. In terms of German law, if a third party makes a performance 
owed by B to C, thinking that he is performing on his own behalf, the debt will not 
be extinguished and the debtor (B) will remain bound.62 In South African law, on the 
other hand, it appears that a performance made by a third party under the erroneous 
impression that he was fulfilling his own obligation, might still extinguish the debt in 
question.63 
In terms of German law, the debt in question could arise from any sort of 
legal obligation.64 The South African examples that most readily spring to mind are 











Pienaar v Boland Bank and Another supra at 11ID-F and 1 ISO-E. Cf Boland Bank Ltd v 
Pienaar and Another supra (i e the AD decision), which reversed the decision but on 
different grounds, namely that a mortgagor can rely on a foreclosure clause even if the 
outstanding performance has been tendered. Although the court thus effectively, though not 
explicitly, decided that the creditor can ignore a tender of performance by a third party, this 
cannot be regarded as the ratio decidendi of the judgment, as the judge did not discuss, let 
alone attach any significance to the fact that the performance was tendered by a third party 
and not the debtor. 
See, e g, Wessels Contract para 2133. 
See § 267 (1) sent 2 BGB. 
§ 267 (2) BGB. 
Munchener KommentarlLieb § 812 marg note 101. 
Medicus Schuldrechtl marg note 140; Palandl § 267 marg note 4: 'Fehlt eine ... 
[Tilgungsbestirnmung], etwa bei der Leist[un]g eines PutativSchul[dner), liegt keine 
wirks[ame] Erf[lillung] vor; der Anspr[uch] des Glaub[iger] besteht weiter.' ('If there is no 
decision to pay (Tilgungsbesnmmung), e g where there is a performance by a putative debtor, 
there will be no effective fulfilment; the creditor's claim will continue to exist.') On the 
Tilgungsbestimmung, see Chapter One at p 35 above. 
This is implied by Van der Merwe et al Contracl 492n74: 'Performance by a third party who 
mistakenly believes himself to be the debtor may permit recovery by means of the condictio 
indebili.' In this sentence, they may merely be referring, however, to a situation where the 
performance took the form of payment of money: ownership would be transferred by way of 
commixtio, regardless of the intention of the paying party. 
Palandl § 267 marg note 1: it applies to all debt-relationships, even those in public law. 
This is also indicated by the fact that § 267 is situated in the General Part of the BGB. 
And this rule is discussed in textbooks on the law of contract, rather than those concerned 
with other areas of law. The cases which state this rule do not, however, limit it to the 
fulfilment of only contractual obligations. 
See, for example, Jones & Druker NNO & Another v Durban City Council & Another supra; 
Union Bank v Beyers; Union Bank v Du Toil supra; Estate Thomas v Kerr & Another supra. 
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some other contract). It is submitted, however, that the obligation could also be 
delictual (e g Bowes Rl 000 to C as compensation for injury), that it could arise 
from a court order (e g a court orders B to pay his ex-wife C RI 000 monthly as 
maintenance),68 from a statute (e g A, the purchaser of land, who has not yet received 
transfer, pays rates due on the property;69 or A pays a sum owed by B to the Receiver 
of Revenue),70 or ex lege in terms of some other branch of the common law (e g a 
trader, A, supplies necessaries to B's dependant, thus fulfilling his duty ofsupport).7! 
It could even be merely a natural obligation (e g a parent settles debts incurred by his 
child). 
It seems that the performance in question could be any sort of positive 
performance. Thus a datio (whether this be the transfer of ownership or merely the 
handing over of possession) or afactum would extinguish the obligation (unless of 
course it were an obligatio non faciendi.) 
From the above it is clear that, provided that certain requirements are 
satisfied, a third party's (A's) performance will indeed extinguish B's obligation to 
C. In such circumstances, C can thus usually not be regarded as having been 
enriched, provided that B does in fact owe the performance to c.72 The question that 
then arises is whether A can bring an enrichment action against B. He can only do so 
ifhe can prove that B was enriched sine causa. In order to determine whether B's 
enrichment was unjustified, we have to consider the legal relationships, if any, 
between A and B, on the one hand, and between A and C, on the other. 
If, on the other hand, these requirements are not satisfied, or if B does not 
owe the performance to C at all, we are faced with a different picture. Thus, for 
example, if A can prove that while he made a perfonnance to C, he did not thereby 







See, for example, Pienaar v Boland Bank & Another supra; Boland Bank v Pienaar & 
Another supra. 
In terms ofs 7(2) of the Divorce Act (Act 70 of 1979). For other examples of payments of 
judgment debts, see Reliance Agencies (Ply) Ltd v Patel supra and Resnik v Lekhethoa supra. 
As in Bousfield v The Divisional Council ofStutterheim supra. 
As in Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Visser supra. 
See, for example, Gammon v McClure 1925 CPD 137; Behr v Minister of Health 1961 (1) 
SA 629 (SR). 
In other words, where C's receipt of the payment is cancelled out by the loss of his right to 
claim performance from B. Cf German law, where the requirement is not that someone be 
'enriched', but that he 'receive something' ('erlangt etwas'). 
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something without losing a corresponding right to claim performance (because he 
will retain his right to sue B for performance), and C will thus be enriched. 
Similarly, should A perform to C in terms of an obligation that has either ceased to 
exist, or that never existed at all, C will not be entitled to the performance and it is 
therefore he who will be enriched. For example, the aunt (mentioned in the example 
given abovef3 pays the university, intending to settle her nephew's fee account, not 
realising that the amount has already been paid. Or she pays the university, unaware 
that her nephew has not registered for the year and has therefore not incurred any 
liability. In both cases, the lU1iversity will surely be the enriched party. Again, the 
legal relationship, if any, between the parties will be relevant in determining whether 
C is obliged to disgorge the enrichment and, if so, to whom.74 
Let us now examine the relationship between A and B. 
THE RELATIONSHJP BETWEEN A AND B75 
Introduction 
The rules discussed in the above section clarify what happens in terms of the 
relationship between Band C when A performs to C. What about A's relationship to 
B? As suggested in the introduction to this chapter, A's payment to C might have 
been prompted by A's legal relationship to B. Several of these legal relationships 
will be considered elsewhere in this thesis e g where A has a contractual obligation to 
perform to B, and B instructs A rather to perform to c.76 In order to evaluate the 
effect, if any, of the existence of a contractual tie between A and B, it seems sensible 
first to consider the situation where these parties (A and B) are not linked by any 
contract at all, whether actual or merely purported. For the purposes ofthis 






At P 62. 
And it should always be borne in mind that the relationship between A and B has to be seen 
through the eyes of C in terms of German law. In other words, what is important is not so 
much the actual relationship between A and B, but C's perception of that relationship. 
In German terms, the 'Deckungsverhliltnis', or 'cover relationship'. 
See Chapter Thee below. 
Cfthe discussion in section 4 at p 148 ffbelow. 
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valid one and that it was extinguished by A's performance to C. 
A and B could also potentially be linked by rights and duties which do not 
have a contract as their source. Certain rights and duties could arise between them 
merely by virtue of A's performance itself. 78 This would happen, for example, if the 
requirements of negotiorum gestio were fulfilled. The existence of negotiorum 
gestio proper provides a causa or justification for enrichment, just as a contract 
does.79 Partial fulfilment of the requirements of negotiorum gestio, however, 
constitutes one of the special instances of enrichment liability in South African and 
German law. The boundaries of such enrichment liability are defined by the 
boundaries of negotiorum gestio in both systems.80 What, then, are the requirements 
of negotiorum gestio or Geschiiftsfuhrung ohne Aujtrag,81 as it is known in its 
German guise? 
2 Unauthorised management of the affairs of another (negotiorum gestio)82 
B olQbt-- ) 7J C 
f 
::s 0 




Negotiorum gestio has been defined as 'the voluntary management by one person 






In other words, not by consensus, but by virtue of B' s act vis-a-vis C. 
See Hans Brox and Wolf-Dietrich Walker Besonderes Schuldrecht 25 ed (2000) marg note 
374. 
But cf, e g, the approach in Du Preez v Boetsap Stores (Pty) Ltd 1978 (2) SA 177 (NC) where 
the court insisted that the plaintiff not merely prove that he had incurred expenses (as 
required in order to sue on the basis of negotiorum gestio), but that he prove the amount by 
which the other party was enriched (at 181 H). In other words, the judge considered the 
requirements of the enrichment action separately in their own right. 
Literally, 'administration without mandate'. 
See Van ZyJ Negotiorum Gestio and Zimmennann Law of Obligations 436 ff for the 
historical development of this institution. South African law has deviated very little from the 
Roman and Roman-Dutch law in this regard: Van Zyl Negotiorum Gestio 6, 8; Leslie Rubin 
Unauthorized Administration (Negotiorum Gestio) in South Africa (1958) 11, 15; Standard 
Bank Financial Services Ltd v Taylam (Pty) Ltd supra at 387H. 
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consent or even the knowledge of the other'. 83 More accurately, it denotes the legal 
relationship that comes into being between the parties when the gestor manages the 
affairs of the dominus without his prior consent. It thus refers not to the factual 
circumstances themselves but to the legal institution84 that arises ex lege when 
certain requirements are fulfilled. 
These requirements, and the consequences which flow from the existence of 
negotiornm gestio, seek to balance the interests of the parties by ensuring a fair 
allocation of risks: 85 to protect the interests of the gestor who acts out of altruism86 
but also to discourage him from unwarranted meddling in another's affairs. 87 While 
the institution can be seen as promoting altruism (whether for moral or economic 
motives),88 it should be borne in mind that the approach of German and South 
African law is pragmatic rather than idealistic.89 The altruism required of the gestor 
in these legal systems is thus a limited sort of altruism. For example, a truly 
altruistic attitude (i e where someone intends to help another without expecting any 
recompense) excludes negotiornm gestio: in such circumstances the gestor will have 
made a donation.90 In evaluating the rules, the primary question should not be 










Van Zyl Negotiorum Gestio 3-4. Also see Eiselen and Pienaar Unjustified Enrichment 205, 
where the authors seem to confuse the institution of negotiorum gestio with the actions 
arising therefrom. 
In German law, a 'gesetzliches Schuldverhaltnis' (a statutory obligationary relationship). 
Medicus Biirgerliches Recht marg note 403; Brox and Walker (n 79) marg note 358; 
Zimmermann Law of Obligations 436 and 447-8; Whitty and Van Zyl (n 4) 373. 
See, e g, the preface to Rubin (n 82): 'Negotiorum gestio is based upon recognition of the 
need for encouraging a man to come to the aid of another when he is under no obligation to 
do so.' Also see op cit at 2. 
See John P Dawson Unjust Enrichment (1951) 137: ' ... the negotiorum gestio has centered 
on one leading idea - that there should be compensation, as well as liability, for action 
undertaken on another's behalf through the motive of altruisim.' Also see Hanoch Dagan' In 
defence of the good samaritan' (1999) 97 Michigan Law Review 1152; Brox and Walker (n 
79) marg note 358; D 50.17.36; Van Zyl Negotiorum Gestio 7n23. Acts committed in the 
interests of the dominus wi 1.1 not be regarded as wrongful, provided that the requirements of 
negotiorum gestio are satisfied: see Van Zyl Negotiorum Gestio 7-8, and the authorities cited 
there. 
See Eiselen and Pienaar Unjustified Enrichment 205: it is an 'action sui generis based on 
equity.' See Van Zyl Negotiorum Gestio 4-5. Also see Whitty and Van Zyl (n 4) 373: 'there 
is an economic as well as a moral case for encouraging altruistic conduct.' 
Both legal systems thus provide the same protection to a gestor who acts partly in his own 
interests and partly in the interests of another as to one whose motive is purely to help 
another: see pp 79 and 116 below. 
See, e g, § 685 BGB; Van Zyl Negotiorum Gestio 36; Eiselen and Pienaar Unjustified 
Enrichment 205. But cf Jonathan M Silke De Vi/liers and Macintosh The Law of Agency in 
Soulh Africa 3 ed (1981) at 276, where the authors state that such an intention is 'not readily 
presumed'. 
Cf Zimmermann Law of Obligations at 439, where he mentions the difficulties of analysing 
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hand, or private autonomy on the other,92 but whether they steer a middle course 
between these extremes93 and thus maintain an equitable balance between the 
interests of the parties, within the broader social and economic context. 
The existence of this peculiarly civilian legal institution94 can at least partl/5 
be attributed to the nature of friendship (amicitia) amongst the upper classes in 
ancient Rome: '[t]he Roman considered himself bound to help his friend by no 
matter what sacrifice.'96 Although the social and commercial mores prevailing in the 
21 SI century arguably no longer reflect this ideal,97 negotiorum gestio has survived, 







certain categories of cases 'based on the theory of hwnan help. This shows that genuine 
altruism is both an unrealistic and an unhandy criterion to determine the scope of application 
of negotiorum gestio.' 
CfDagan (1999) 97 Michigan Law Review 1152. 
See Zimmermann Law 0/ Obligations 466: 'the extent of the gestor's liability reflects the 
peculiar position of the institution of negotiorum gestio between amicitia and libertas.' 
See Zimmermann Law 0/ Obligations 435; Whitty and Van Zyl (n 4) at 367. Also see 
Zimmermann Law o/Obligations 448 ffregarding institutions developed in common law 
systems to fulfil similar functions. 
See Van Zyl Negotiorum Gestio 5 for explanations and justifications for the retention of the 
institution in the common law. Cf Silke (n 90) at 272, where the authors suggest that the 
importance of negotiorum gestio will wane with improvements in communication. Also see 
Fritz Schulz Classical Roman Law (1951) 624. Cfthe view expressed by Rubin (n 82) in his 
preface. Also see Whitty and Van Zyl (n 4) 371 and 373 (where they also mention the 
impact of public-law legislation). But it is debatable whether negotiorum gestio will decline 
in importance: with increasing globalisation comes increasing mobility, so the frequency of 
absences might balance out the increase in accessibility via modem telecommunications. 
Modem technology has also arguably increased the number of cases of unconscious domini -
both due to car accidents, and because medical expertise can keep injured people alive, 
though unconscious, for longer. 
See Schulz (n 4) 234; Rubin (n 82) 3; Zimmermann Law o/Obligations 435. See D 3.5.1, 
where Ulpian explains the reasons for its introduction. The archetypal case was one where 
someone handJed the affairs of an absent friend, but negotiorum gestio also fulfilled other 
functions in Roman law e g it was used to afford a right of recourse to curators and 
procurators: see Zimmermann Law o/Obligations 436-7. The pragmatic Romans allowed 
the friend a claim, provided that the friend intended to claim expenses (see note 96 below). 
Regarding family members, cf Van Zyl Negotiorum Gestio 36: 'In most cases where the 
administration of affairs was inspired or motivated by family bonds based on piety, pity, 
generosity or affection, such as maintaining children, tending the sick or burying the dead, it 
was accepted that the expenses incurred would not be claimed at a later stage, unless it could 
be shown that the gestor intended recovering his expenses and disbursements'. Also see 
Zimmermann Law o/Obligations 439. This exception finds expression in § 685 BGB: 'The 
manager does not have any claim if he did not have the intention to demand compensation 
from the principal. If parents or grandparents furnish maintenance to their descendants, or 
the latter to the former, it is to be preswned, in case of doubt, that there is no intention to 
demand compensation from the recipient.' (Translation taken from Zimmermann op cit 
439n52.) 
But cf Whitty and Van Zyl (n 4) 372, where they raise the interesting question whether the 
law of negotiorum gestio mirrors the 'traditional social vaJues of ubuntu which form an 
integral part of the vaJ ue system established by the new Constitution of South Africa. At first 
sight it seems that the doctrine does give practical and legal effect to some key values of 
ubuntu including human dignity, respect, inclusivity, compassion and concern for others.' 
78 
the modem South African and Gennan law of negotiorum gestio, or 
GeschiiJtsfohrung ohne Auftrag. For brevity's sake, I will deal with the South 
African and Gennan institutions together, where their rules coincide, and I will 
generally use the South African tenninology. 
The first requirement for the existence of a relationship of negotiorum gestio 
in both systems is that someone (the gestor or Geschiiftsfohrer) must have 
administered an affair or affairs (of another).98 It is clear that payment of another's 
debt constitutes 'administration' for the purposes of negotiorum gestio.99 It has even 
been said that this is the most common instance of such administration, in Gennan 
law at least. 100 It is, however, just one example falling within the compass of the 
broad concept of administration (gestio or GeschiiJtsbesorgung).IOI Other examples 






Van Zyl Negotiorum Gestio 10 and 24-8; Wessels Contract para 3555; Eiselen and Pienaar 
Unjustified Enrichment 205; Whitty and Van Zyl (n 4) 373 ('negotium', 'business or 
transaction or affairs'); Turkstra v Massyn 1959 (1) SA 40 (T) at 47. Regarding German law, 
see § 677 BGB: 'Geschiiftsbesorgung' (which may be translated as 'management' or 
'administration'); Medicus Schuldrecht II marg note 616-17; Brox and Walker (n 79) marg 
note 360-1. This concept is common to mandate and negotiorum gestio and this is why the 
two concepts are neighbours in the BGB: see Medicus Schuldrecht II marg note 617; 
Kropholler BGB vor § 677 marg note 1. 
See, e g, D 3.5.42 (43) per Labeo: 'Cum pecuniam eius nomine solueres, qui tibi nihil 
mandauerat, negotiorum gestorum actio tibi competit, cum ea solutione debitor a creditore 
liberatus sit: nisi si quid debitoris interfuit earn pecuniam non solui.' 'Since you made a 
payment in the name of a man who had given you no mandate, an action for unauthorised 
administration is available to you, since by this payment the debtor has been freed from 
liability by his creditor; unless there was any advantage to the debtor in not being paid.' 
(Translated by Mommsen, Krueger and Watson.) (Cf the pleadings in Odendaal v Van 
Oudishoorn supra at 434B, where the advocate mistakenly cites this text.) Also see D 
3.5.5.3; Van Zyl Negotiorum Gestio Iln37; Whitty and Van Zyl (n 4) 380. Negotiorum 
gestio is not the only legal institution used to provide the performing party with a remedy in 
German law; he could be afforded a remedy via a cessio legis: see Zimmermann Law 0/ 
Obligations 447nll0. 
See Dawson (n 87) 141 where he says that it is most common instance in German and French 
law. Also see the South African cases discussed below, particularly those mentioned under 
the heading of the malafide gestor. 
§ 677 BGB is read very widely and includes doing anything which is of use to another, even 
if it only takes a moment: see Zimmermann Law o/Obligations 447; Medicus Schuldrecht 
II marg note 617, where he cites the example of someone wrenching a steering wheel around 
in order to avoid hitting a child which has jumped into the road: BGHZ 38, 270 (275). 
Medicus loc cit: it need not even be a legal act. The concept is also very wide in South 
Africa: see e g Van Zyl Negotiorum Gestio 11 ff, 17 (where he states that it is sufficient if 
the dominus has an interest in the administration (also see Rubin (n 82) 16-17 in this regard) 
e g the provision of household necessaries); Silke (n 90) 279-81; Whitty and Van Zyl (n 4) 
380 ff. On the questions whether exceeding the bounds of a mandate or mistakenly believing 
that one was mandated would constitute a gestio see Van Zyl Negotiorum Gestio at 18 and 
Eiselen and Pienaar Unjustified Enrichment at 205-6. 
For example, sale of perishable goods, suretyship, insurance: see Van Zyl Negotiorum 
Gestio 11-15 for these and other examples. See, for example, Hochmetals Africa (Pty) Ltd v 
Otavi Mining Co (Pty) Ltd 1968 (1) SA 571 (A) (purchaser entering into further contract of 
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children,104 medically treating someone who is unconscious,105 tending crops or 
. fi 106 puttmg out a Ire. 
This transaction must be carried out not for oneself07 but for another (the 
dominus or Geschiijtsherr).108 109 It appears that if the transaction is partly in the 
interests of the dominus and partly in the interests of the gestor, negotiorum gestio 
could still arise. I 10 A genuine relationship of negotiorum gestio will not come into 
being, however, if someone carries out an affair solely for his own benefit or if he 
administers his own affairs, thinking that they are those of another. 111 It is 
immaterial whether the gestor knew the actual dominus or whether he was mistaken 
as to his identity: I 12 a relationship of negotiorum gestio will arise between the gestor 












sale for original seller). 
See, e g, Kehrman v Stewart 1905 TS 677. Other examples: collecting debts (Van Zyl 
Negotiorum Gestio 12); acting as a trustee (op cit 15); repairing or protecting property (op cit 
14) 
See Van Zyl Negotiorum Gestio 13. CfRoman law - see the quotation in note 96 above. 
Medicus Schuldrechl II marg note 623. 
In other words, it covers more ground than perfonnance of another's obligationl§ 267 BGB. 
It is important to remember this when dealing with the special enrichment actions that arise 
in this context: they are not confined to situations where A extinguishes B's obligation to C, 
but have a much wider scope. 
See, e g, Eiselen and Pienaar Unjustified Enrichment 206, where the authors state that a 
gestor must 'not act in his own interest', in their treatment of the animus negotia aliena 
gerendi. It is submitted that whether the administration in question is that of another and 
whether the gestor intended to act for another are slightly different questions, the first 
objective, and the second subjective: also see Whitty and Van Zyl (n 4) 375. 
§ 677 BGB; Brox and Walker (n 79) marg Dote 359 (this constitutes genuinelechte 
Geschtiftsfohrung ohne Aujtrag, as opposed to non-genuinelunechte Geschliftsfohrung ohne 
Aujtrag - see the discussion at p 101 ff below). Gennan writers treat this requirement 
separately from the first; in South African law, the two are conflated in one enquiry: see, e g 
Medicus Schuldrecht II marg notes 617 ('Gesch1iftsbesorgung') and 618 ('Fremdheit des 
Gesch1ifts'). In Gennan law, the question whether it was the affair of another is detennined 
objectively, but if the relevant act is 'objectively neutral', then it is detennined subjectively: 
see Medicus Schuldrecht II marg note 618. On South African law, see Van Zyl Negotiorum 
Gestio 24-8; Wessels Contract para 3555; Eiselen and Pienaar Unjustified Enrichment 205. 
This is not to say that the gestor acts as an agent; he must intend to administer the affairs of 
dominus, but in his own capacity. See e g D 3.5.2; Van Zyl Negotiorum Gestio 11; Medicus 
Schuldrecht II marg note 619. 
See, e g, Zimmennann Law o/Obligations 433; Whitty and Van Zyl (n 4) 373. Also see the 
next paragraph and p 116 below. 
See Van Zyl Negotiorum Gestio 25, Eiselen and Pienaar Unjustified Enrichment 206, and the 
discussion of the malafide and bonafide gestores below. Regarding Gennan law, see, e g, 
Brox and Walker (n 79) marg note 359; Medicus Schuldrecht II marg note 618-9. 
Eiselen and Pienaar Unjustified Enrichment 206; Van Zyl Negotiorum Gestio 26 and 40; 
Rubin (n 82) 16,36; Silke (n 90) 275; Whitty and Van Zyl (n 4) 376; Klug and Klug v Penkin 
1932 CPD 401; New Club Garage v Milborrow and Son 1931 GWL 86 at 99; Wessels 
Contract para 3576; § 686 BGB; Medicus Schuldrecht II marg note 621; Brox and Walker (n 
79) marg note 362. 
§ 686 BGB; Medicus Schuldrecht II marg note 621. See Van Zyl Negotiorum Gestio 26; 
Silke (n 90) 276. But cf ABSA Bank Ltd tfa Bankjin v C B Stander t!a CAW Paneelkloppers 
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Coincidental benefit to the dominus is insufficient: 114 the transaction must 
also be carried out with the intention of doing so for this other person. In other 
words, the gestor must act with the animus negotia aliena gerendi115 or 
Fremdgeschiijtsjuhrungswille. 116 He does not have to intend solely to act for the 
dominus, however. The gestor will be regarded as having the requisite intention 
even if his intention is mixed (i e he intends to promote his own interests as well as 
those ofthe dominus).ll7 This requirement embraces, not only the intention to 
benefit the dominus, 118 but also the intention to r:ecover necessary and useful 







1998 (I) SA 939 (C). The dominus need not have contractual capacity: see Van Zyl 
Negotiorum Gestio 26 and the authorities cited there. 
There might even be a relationship of negotiorum gestio where the dominus has not benefited 
at all - see the discussion of the requirement that the gestio be utiliter coeptum at p 86 ff 
below. 
Van Zyl Negotiorum Gestio 31-40; Eiselen and Pienaar Unjustified Enrichment 206 ('with 
the intention of promoting the interests of another person'); Whitty and Van Zyl (n 4) 375-6; 
Rubin (n 82) 34-42; Wessels Contract paras 3569-78; Odendaal v Van Oudishoorn supra at 
437 A; Standard Bank Financial Services Ltd v Taylam (Pty) Ltd supra at 388A-B; Maritime 
Motors (Pty) Ltd v Von Steiger and Another 2001 (2) 584 (SE). 
§§ 677 and 687 (1) BGB; Medicus Schuldrecht II marg note 619; Brox and Walker (n 79) 
marg note 362. If this requirement is not satisfied, i e if the gestor treats the transaction as 
his own, whether or not he knows that he is not entitled to do so, there will be no genuine 
negotiorum gestio (echte Geschaftsfiihrung ohne Auftrag), but a non-genuine one (unechte 
Geschiiftsfiihrung ohne Auftrag), provided that the other requirements are satisfied (see, e g, 
Palandt § 687 marg note 2). In such a case, § 687 (2) BGB will apply. In other words, the 
dominus may claim inter alia compensation for any damages arising from the gestio, the 
furnishing of information and the rendering of an account, the handing over of anything 
received as a consequence of the gestio, and interest on any money spent by the gestor that 
he should have spent for the dominus or that he had to account to the dominus (§ 681, read 
with §§ 666 to 668 BGB mutatis mutandis). Should he enforce these claims, the dominus 
wi.11 be obliged to hand over any benefits received as a result of the gestio (§ 684 sent 1 
BGB) i e he will be liable in terms of the law of unjustified enrichment, but only if he 
enforces his claims in § 687 (2) BGB. For further, more detailed, discussion see p 10 I ff 
below. 
See, e g, Whitty and Van Zyl (n 4) 376. This corresponds to the position in Roman law and 
modem German law: see Zimmermann Law o/Obligations 433. This requirement will be 
discussed in further detail at p 116 below. Rubin (n 82) states (at 34) that in such a case the 
gestor can 'claim to the extent that it is the affair of the dominus.' 
Cf Van Zyl who, at 32-3 in Negotiorum GestiO, seems to suggest actual benefit rather than 
merely the intention to benefit, particularly at 33nl28 (but cf35 and 35n137: 'In general the 
Roman-Dutch writers require the intention to manage the affairs of the dominus.' Cf also 
Van Zyl op cit 69: benefit not necessary.) See quote from Odendaal v Van Oudtshoorn 
supra at 437A: 'die bedoeling om C te bevoordeel' cf Taylam's case supra at 388B: 'the 
intention not only of administering the affairs of the dominus but also of being compensated 
for such administration.' In German law, there has been some controversy as to whether this 
intention must be subjectively determined or whether it will suffice if the affair is objectively 
that of another (see the text to note 129 ff below), but it seems that where the subjective 
intention is required, it should be that any advantages flowing from from the gestio should 
accrue to the dominus (see, e g, Brox and Walker (n 79) marg note 362) i e the gestor must 
intend, by his act, to benefit the dominus. 
The animus repetendi or recipiendi: Van Zyl Negotiorum Gestio 33, 35 ff; Rubin (n 82) 34; 
Taylam's case supra at 388B. That this is also so in German law is implied by the fact that 
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not have intended to make a donation to the dominus. 12o 
It is this intention that is the characteristic feature of a genuine relationship of 
negotiornm gestio; 121 should someone administer the affairs of another without this 
intention (i e where he intends solely to benefit himself), there will be no genuine 
negotiornm gestio, 122 although there might be an analogous relationship which also 
has certain, albeit different, consequences. (The most important of the legal 
consequences of such a relationship is that the only relief accorded to the gestor is 
that he can claim only to the extent of the dominus's enrichment.) In German law, 
this analogous relationship goes by the name of unechte Geschiiftsfuhrung ohne 
Au/trag ('non-genuine negotiornm gestio), which is something of a misnomer 
because the absence of the crucial intention means that it strictly falls outside the 
domain of Geschiiftsfohrnng ohne Auftrag. South African law also recognises the 
relationship (which may be called quasi negotiorum gestio) I 23 that arises when 
someone administers the affairs of another without the animus negotia aliena 
gerendi l24 and, like German law, regards it as being outside the parameters of 







the Geschdftsfohrer has no claim for expenses if he did not intend to claim expenses from the 
Geschtiftsherr (i e where he intends to make a donation): see § 685 BGB; Medicus 
Schuldrecht II marg note 626; Brox and Walker (n 79) marg note 377. 
See, e g, Eiselen and Pienaar Unjustified Enrichment 205; Van Zyl Negotiorum Gestio 36-9; 
Silke (n 90) 276; Odendaal v Van Oudtshoorn supra at 436; Medicus Schuldrechl II marg 
note 626. See note 96 above regarding the presumption that a gestio in favour of a family 
member would be regarded as having been made animo donandi. To the same effect, see § 
685 sent 2 BGB. CfSilke (n 90) loc cit: (regarding the animus donandi): 'but such an 
intention will not readily be presumed, even as between parent and child.' 
Or Geschdftsfohrung ohne Auftrag. 
Silke (n 90) 275; Eiselen and Pienaar Unjustified Enrichmerrt 206; J E Scholtens 
'Negotiorum gestio and unjust enrichment' (1951) 68 SAL..! 134 at 137. 
As it was labelled in Gouws v Jester Pools (Pty) Ltd 1968 (3) SA 563 (T) at 571A; Van Zyl 
Negotiorum Gestio 24. (Cf Van Zyl's criticism of the use of this expression in Wessels 
Contract to denote agency by necessity: Negotiorum Gestio 10n33.) Also cfthe 
nomenclature used by Eiselen and Pienaar Unjustified Enrichment 205 (where they seem to 
refer to the legal institution itself as 'negotiorum gestorum utilis') and 228 (where they refer 
to the enrichment action as the 'actio negotiorum gestorum uti lis), for example. 
Either because he intends to benefit himself i e to act sui lucri causa (the mala fide gestor) or 
because he erroneously thinks that he is administering his own affairs (the bonafide gestor): 
see Van Zyl Negotiorum Gestio 31, and p 95 ff below. 
These concepts wi 1.1 be examined in more detail later at p 101 ff (unechte Geschdftsfohrung 
ohne A uftrag) and p 110 ff (quasi negotiorum gestio). The other circumstances in which 
relationships akin to negotiorum gestio or Geschlftsfohrung ohne Auftrag are said to arise (e 
g, in South African law, where the affairs of a minor are administered, or where the gestor 
acts against the express wishes of the dominus) will also be discussed at that stage. 
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In South Africa, the gestor's intention, though subjective,126 is detennined 
with reference to the surrounding circumstances. I27 In view of the practical 
difficulties involved in proving a subjective intention,128 Gennan law has developed 
rules in order to assist in detennining whether the Geschiiftsfohrer had the necessary 
intention. 129 The law presumes that he had the intention to administer an affair for 
another where the affair in question is 'objectively that of another'. 130 In all other 
cases,131 the gestor specifically has to prove that he had the requisite intention, and 
he must do so by showing that he had given it outward expression. 132 An affair will 
be 'objectively that of another' if it clearly belongs within 'another's sphere of 
interest' .133 Thus, for example, feeding someone else's child will be regarded as 
'objectively the affair of another' and it can be presumed that anyone who does so 
had the intention to administer the affair of the child's parent or guardian. Similarly, 
perfonnance in tenns of an obligation is the responsibility of the debtor, so a third 
party who perfonns in tenns of the obligation of another is administering an affair 
that is 'objectively that of another' and it will be presumed that he did so with the 










Van Zyl Negotiorum Gestio 31. According to Van Zyl op cit at 39, this requirement will be 
met even if the gestor's intention arises from a mistake e g he thinks that he has been 
mandated to administer the affair of another. Also see Eiselen and Pienaar Unjustified 
Enrichment 206: 'The gestor will also be entitled to the action [i e the normal actio 
negotiorum gestorum contraria] ifhe was mistakenly under the impression that he had 
received authorization from the dominus to manage his affairs while there had been no 
authorization.' See Rubin (n 82) 34 to the same effect. 
Van Zyl Negotiorum Gestio 39. 
On these difficulties, see Medicus Burgerliches Recht marg note 407. 
See Brox and Walker (n 79) marg note 363 ff. 
Objectiv fremd. Medicus Burgerliches Recht marg note 409, where he says that this is 
according to the majority opinion. Hence Medicus's comment that the 
Fremdgeschtiftsfohrungswill often amounts to a fiction: Medicus op cit 407. 
In other words, where the affair is 'objectively neutral' (objectiv neutral) or 'subjectively that 
of another' (subjektiv fremd). An affair that is 'objectively neutral' becomes 'subjectively 
that of another' through the will of the gestor: see Medicus Biirgerliches Recht marg note 
409. 
See Medicus Burgerliches RechJ marg note 409; Brox and Walker (n 79) 364. 
See, e g, Medicus Burgerliches RechJ marg note 409; Brox and Walker (n 79) 363. Where 
someone simultaneously carries out an affair of his own and that of another (e g where a 
tenant puts out a fire in rented premises), his intention will be presumed in the same way as 
where he carries out only the affair of another: Brox and Walker op cit 364a. 
In this regard, see Medicus Burgerliches Recht marg note 408, where he also gives examples 
of situations which would not fall into this category. The classification of cases has led to its 
own difficulties (see Medicus op cit marg note 410 ff for a discussion of some controversial 
cases). In cases which do not clearly fall into one category or another, it seems that German 
law has merely exchanged one difficult enquiry (subjective intention) for another 
(categorisation), one of proof of fact for one of policy. 
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Both legal systems require that the dominus 135 must not have mandated or 
otherwise authorised the gestor to make the perfonnance. l36 This requirement is 
necessary to distinguish negotiorum gestio from its close relative, the contract of 
mandate. 137 This idea is expressed in the Gennan name, Geschiiftsfohrung ohne 
Au/trag, which literally means 'administration without mandate'. What is required is 
not merely the absence of a mandate, however, but also the absence of any other sort 
of authorisation. l38 In South Africa, the ambit of 'mandate' or 'authorisation' in this 
sense is relatively wide, and negotiorum gestio correspondingly narrow. For 
example, it seems that ratification of negotiorum gestio by the dominus is tantamount 
to a tacit mandate. 139 Not very much is required for ratification, either; if the 






Van Zyl Negotiorum Gestio at 22: if a third party mandates the gestor, it could still 
constitute negotiorum gestio. Also see Rubin (n 82) 21. 
See § 677 BGB: 'ohne von ... [dem Geschaftsherr] beauftragt oder ihm gegentiber sonst 
dazu berechtigt zu sein .... ' In other words, not only mandate, but also any other legal 
relationship justifying performance for another, will exclude a relationship of berechtigte 
Geschliftsfohrung ohne Auftrag. (See, e g, Medicus Schuldrecht /I marg note 622; Brox and 
Walker (n 79) marg notes 357, 360 and 368.) Examples of such other legal relationships 
include those between members of a family but not public law duties: see Brox and Walker 
(n 79) marg note 368. The herrschende Meinung in German law is that a relationship of 
Geschliftsfiihrung ohne Auftrag can also arise if the gestor and dominus purported to 
conclude a contract but it was void. This view has been criticised because, in such a situation, 
there is no intention to administer the affairs of another, and because the appropriate remedy 
where a performance has been made without a valid legal ground would be the 
Leistungskondiktion: see Brox and Walker (n 79) marg note 368; Medicus Schuldrecht /I 
marg note 622. Medicus (Ioc cit) is of the view that where there is a void legal relationship 
between A and B, A's primary remedy should be the Leistungskondiktion. On the South 
African law, see Eiselen and Pienaar Unjustified Enrichment 205 ('The gestor must have 
acted on behalf of the dominus without any authorization or ratification.'); Silke (n 90) 272; 
Mohamed v Kamaludien 1938 CPO 140 at 145 ('The whole essence of negotiorum gestio is 
the absence of authority'); Colonial Government v Smith and Company (1901) 18 SC 380 at 
392; Klug and Klug v Penkin supra at 404. 
Van Zyl Negotiorum Gestio 5: 'The essential element, ... which distinguishes negotiorum 
gestio from the consensual contract of mandate, is that it should be unauthorised (sine 
mandato).' Also see Rubin (n 82) 20, and the references cited by Van Zyl/oc cit at 5n17. 
The two concepts are closely related in that, apart from authorisation, the factual 
circumstances are similar, and, once the relationship arises, certain legal consequences are 
almost identical. The essential difference is that mandate is based on consensus, while 
negotiorum gestio arises from the act of administration, together with the gestor's animus 
negotia aliena gerendi. Mandate is therefore a contract, while negotiorum gestio is a quasi-
contract. For a comparison of the two legal institutions, see Zimmermann Law of 
Obligations 433-4. (See Van Zyl Negotiorum Gestio 4, 8n25, 11,84,94 for references to the 
quasi-contractual basis of negotiorum gestio.) The closeness of the relationship between the 
two legal constructs in German law is illustrated by their placement one after the other in the 
BGB. 
§ 677 BGB; Medicus Schuldrecht /I marg note 622 (Geschtiftsfiihrung ohne Auftrag is thus 
excluded where there is any contractual or statutory duty between the parties); Brox and 
Walker (n 79) marg note 357; Van Zyl Negotiorum Gestio 30. 
Van Zyl Negotiorum Gestio 5, 138. On the question of ratification and whether it results in 
negotiorum gestio or a contract of mandate, see Van Zyl Negotiorum Gestio 19 ff. 
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prevent it, his acquiescence would amount to ratification. 140 In other words, for a 
case to qualify as one of negotiorum gestio in South Africa, the act of administration 
must be done without the knowledge of the dominus: 141 he must either be absent, 
unaware of the gestio or lack capacity.142 In German law, on the other hand, while 
authorisation is also wider than mere mandate, and includes any legal relationship 
justifying performance to another,143 it does not go as far as South African law. 
Awareness or ratification of the administration would not exclude Geschaftsfiihrung 
ohne Auftrag. 144 The potential range of cases falling within the scope of 
Geschiiftsfiihrung ohne Auf trag in Germany is thus wider than those which would 
qualify as negotiorum gestiones in South Africa. 
In German law, there is a dispute as to whether Geschaftsfiihrung ohne 
Auf trag can arise where the dominus and gestor purported to conclude a contract but 
it is void for some reason, or the administration exceeded the bounds of a valid 
contract between the parties. For example, B agrees to paint C's house for €l 000, 
which is a reasonable price considering the size of the house. Another painter, A, 
who is in a desperate financial situation, approaches B to ask him for a loan. B 
agrees to lend him €500, if he (A) paints C's house. The agreement between A and 
B would be void because B has exploited A's need in obtaining his consent to make 







Van Zyl Negotiorum Gestio 5, where the author draws the analogy of the ratification of the 
acts of an hitherto unauthorised agent by a principal. Also see Van Zyl Negotiorum Gestio at 
30: 'It is clear that, if the dominus should indeed be aware of the management of his affairs 
or if he should consent thereto, it is no longer negotiorum gestio, but mandate.' He goes on 
(loc cit) to say that' failure to prohibit or object to the management of affairs once the 
dominus has become aware of it, amounts to tacit or implied consent to or authorisation of 
such management of affairs, which in turn must be construed as mandate.' But see the same 
author's comment at 31: 'Should the dominus become aware of the gestio and ratify it, it 
would appear that either the actions arising from negotiorum gestio or those arising from 
mandate are available to the parties.' On ratification amounting to a tacit mandate, see Rubin 
(n 82) 23. 
Rubin (n 82) 22; Van Zyl Negotiorum Gestio 28-31; Silke (n 90) 272; Williams' Estate v 
Molenschoot and Schep (Pty) Ltd 1939 CPD 360 at 369; Turkstra v Massyn supra at 47E-F; 
cf De Hart v De Jongh 1903 TS 260; Mohamed v Kamaludien supra; Odendaal v Van 
OuciJshoorn supra at 437 A. Colonial Government v Smith and Company supra at 392; Ex 
parte Abbas 1920 CPD 346 at 347: 'A negotiorum gestor is one who acts upon his own 
authority for an absent person.' 
Whitty and Van Zyl (n 4) 374-5. 
See the references in note l38 above. 
See text to note 153 below: indeed, ratification is a requirement for berechtigte Uustified) 
Geschtiftsfiihrung ohne Auftrag, or negotiorum gestio proper. 
See § l38 (2) BGB: 'Nichtig ist insbesondere ein Rechtsgeschafi, durch das jemand unter 
Ausbeutung der Zwangslage, der Unerfahrenheit, des Mangels an Urteilsvermogen oder der 
erheblichen Willensschwache eines anderen sich oder einem Dritten fur eine Leistung 
Verrnogensvorteile versprechen oder gewahren Hillt, die in einem auffalligen MiJ3verhaltnis 
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house notwithstanding the invalidity of the contract between A and B, would this 
amount to Geschdfisfohrung ohne Auftrag? Alternatively, A might make a 
perfonnance greater than that required in tenns of a valid contract. Thus, for 
example, A and B agree that A will pay B's rent of€500 to C, but instead of paying 
€500, A pays C €5 000. Would A's (over)payment constitute Geschaftsfohrung ohne 
Au/trag? Although the courts have in certain cases regarded such situations as 
falling within the scope of Geschafts/iihrung ohne Au/trag, the better view seems to 
be that they fall outside its scope because A does not intend to administer the affairs 
of another but to fulfil his own (supposed) obligation to B. 146 In such a case the 
primary remedy should accordingly be the Leistungskondiktion. 147 
In order for the rights and duties relating to Geschaftsfohrung ohne Au/tragi 48 
to arise, Gennan law requires, in addition, (1) that the gestio is in the interests of the 
dominus l49 and 150 in accordance with his actual or presumed Will,151 or (2) that ifit 








zu der Leistung stehen.' ('A legal transaction is also void whereby a person exploiting the 
need, carelessness or inexperience of another, causes to be promised or granted to himself or 
to a third party in exchange for a performance, pecuniary advantages which exceed the value 
of the performance to such an extent that. under the circumstances, the pecuniary advantages 
are in obvious disproportion to the performance.') 
See Medicus Schuldrecht l/ marg note 622. 
Medicus Schuldrecht l/ marg note 622: otherwise the BGB's provisions on 
Geschiiftsfuhrung ohne Auftrag could be used to sidestep the limitations built into the law of 
enrichment. On the Leistungskondiktion in general, see Chapter One. 
These correspond to the rights and duties arising from a contract of mandate (Auf trag): in 
other words, the Geschaftsfohrer must carry out the gestio properly (§ 677 BGB), furnish a 
report etc (§§ 681, 666 BGB), give up anything he has received by virtue of the gestio (§§ 
681,667 BGB), compensate the Geschtiftsherr for culpable damage. The Geschtiftsfohrer 
can, in turn, claim reimbursement of his expenses (§ 683 BGB) or § 280 ff and § 284 ff BGB 
(provisions relating to impossibility and breach) will apply. See text at p 92 ff below. 
Determined objectively: see Brox and Walker (n 79) marg note 369. 
While the BGB requires both, it appears that where the administration in question is not in 
the interests of the Geschaftsherr but is in accordance with his actual will, the requirements 
for berechtigle Geschtiftsfohrung ohne Aufirag would be met: see Medicus Burgerliches 
Recht marg note 422. 
§ 683 sent I BGB: 'Entspricht die Obernahme der GeschaftsfUhrung dem Interesse und dem 
wirklichen oder dem mutmaJ31ichen Willen des Geschaftsherrn, so kann der Geschaftsfiihrer 
wie ein Beauftragter Ersatz seiner Aufwendungen verlangen.' ('If taking over the gestio is in 
the interests of the dominus, and corresponds to his actual or presumed will, then the gestor, 
like a mandatary, can claim his expenses'.) See Brox and Walker (n 79) marg note 369, 
where he points out that the presumed will usually coincides with the objective interest of the 
Geschiiftsherr. 
§ 683 sent 2, read with § 679 BGB. § 683 sent 2 BGB: 'In den Fillien des § 679 steht dieser 
Anspruch dem Geschaftsfiihrer zu, auch wenn die Obernahme der Geschafisfiihrung mit dem 
Willen des Geschliftsfwmmg mit dem Willen des Geschliftsherrn in Widerspruch steht.' ('In 
cases covered by § 679, this claim is afforded to the gestor, even if taking over the gestio was 
against the will of the dominus.') The circumstances covered by § 679 BGB: in the absence 
of such a Geschaftsfohrung there would not have been no timeous compliance with a 
statutory duty on the part of the dominus to pay maintenance (in terms of family law or the 
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ratified by the dominus. 153 In these circwnstances, 1 54 it will be regarded as a 
'justified negotiorum gestio' (berechtigte Geschaftsfuhrung ohne Aufirag). If, 
however, none of these circumstances are present, but all the other requirements for 
Geschaftsfuhrung ohne Aufirag are satisfied, the relationship between the parties will 
amount to an 'unjustified negotiorum gestio' (unberechtigte Geschdftsfuhrung ohne 
Auf trag). 1 55 The importance of the djstinction is that, as with the case of non-
genuine, or unechte, Geschaftsfuhrung ohne Aufirag, 156 different consequences flow 
from a relationship of unberechtigte Geschaftsfohrung ohne Aufirag. (These will be 
discussed at a later stage. 157 Most importantly, the gestor will not be able to claim all 
his expenses, as he would in a case of berechtigte Geschaftsfohrung ohne Auf trag, 
but is confined to a claim for the amount by which the dominus is enriched by the 
gestio.) 
The last requirement for negotiorum gestio in South African law is that the 
management must have been utiliter coeptum. 158 This requirement has been 
expressed in various ways: for instance that the gestio should have been 









law of succession, and not a merely contractual duty), or some other duty imposed on the 
dominus in the public interest. 
§ 684 sent 2 BGB: 'Genehmigt der Geschaftsherr die Geschaftsfiihrung, so steht dem 
Geschaftsfilhrer der im § 683 bestimmte Anspruch zu.' ('If the dominus ratifies the gestio, 
the gestor will be entitled to the claim specified in § 683.') (i e claim to expenses). Such 
ratification need not be express: see, e g, Brox and Walker (n 79) marg note 371. 
Which are regarded as justification grounds: see, e g, Brox and Walker (n 79) marg note 369. 
Medicus Biirgerliches Recht marg note 422. Unberechtigte Geschdftsfiihrung ohne Auftrag 
will be discussed in detail at p 97 ff below. 
Note that the two concepts (unberechtigte and unechte GesclUiftsfiihrung ohne Auftrag) are 
not synonymous. While unberechtigte Geschiftsfiihrung ohne Auftrag is regarded as falling 
within the parameters of Geschiiftsfiihrung ohne Auftrag in general and is characterised by its 
not being in accordance with the will of the dominus, unechte Geschdftsfiihrung ohne Auf trag 
falls outside the boundaries of Geschliftsfiihrung ohne A uftrag altogether and is characterised 
by the absence of the intention to administer the affairs of the dominus. Although 
unberechtigte Geschdftsfiihrung ohne Auftrag is regarded as an instance of Geschdftsfiihrung 
ohne Auftrag, it attracts different consequences to berechligte Geschdftsfiihrung ohne Auftrag 
in that, for example, the gestor has an enrichment action rather than an action for his 
expenses. These distinctions are discussed in more detail below at 97 ff. 
At P 97 ff. 
Van Zyl Negotiorum Gestio 40-6; Rubin (n 82) 23 ff; Whitty and Van Zyl (n 4) 376 ff; 
Wessels Contract paras 3552, 3620, 3625; Wolmaransstad Ko-operatieve Vereeniging v 
Leask & Co 1915 TPD 272 at 276; Colonial Government v Smith and Company supra at 392; 
Amod Salie v Ragoon 1903 TS 100 at 103; Lewis Brothers v East London Municipality 21 SC 
(1904) 156 at 162; Williams Estate v Molenschoot & Schep supra; Standard Bank Financial 
Services v Taylam (Pty) Ltd supra. 
See Eiselen and Pienaar Unjustified Enrichment at 205, Van Zyl Negotiorum Gestio at 40; 
Lewis Brothers v East London Municipality supra at 162. 
See, e g, Amod Salie v Ragoon supra at 103; William's Estate v Molenschoot and Schep (Pty) 
Ltd supra at 367 and Van Zyl Negotiorum Gestio at 43. 
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dominus's interests,164 or such that the dominus would have perfonned it himself. 165 
The requirement thus seems to cover some of the same ground as the Gennan 
requirements mentioned in the previous paragraph and serves a similar purpose, 
namely to limit interference in the affairs of others to circumstances where such 
interference would generally be seen as just or socially desirable. 166 As yet, 
however, the South African requirement has not been precisely fonnulated and there 
. . . 167 
IS uncertamty as to ItS scope. 
While '[t]here are dangers in an unduly conceptual approach,/68 modem 
authors have made various attempts to define what 'uti liter' means. Thus Rubin 
refers to the interests of the dominus l69 and suggests that the administration should be 
such that the dominus would have undertaken it himse It: 170 but adds that this is an 
objective criterion in that what is relevant is 'not whether the gestor believed that the 
administration would benefit the dominus but whether it was in fact calculated to 
benefit the dominus.' 171 
Van Zyl criticises Rubin's approach and says that 'regardless of whether the 












See, e g, Klug and Klug v Penkin supra at 404. Also see the other cases mentioned by Van 
Zyl (Negotiorum Gestio at 43n 182). Also see Rubin (n 82) at 23-4, 26 (criticism) 28. 
See Van Zyl Negotiorum Gestio at 40. 
See, e g, Wolmaransstad Ko-operatieve Vereeniging v Leask & Co supra at 276; Klug and 
Klug v Penkin supra at 404; cfVan Zy!'s criticism in Negotiorum Gestio at 42 and Whitty 
and Van Zyl (n 4) 377 ff. 
Rubin (n 82) 24; Eiselen and Pienaar Unjustified Enrichment 205. 
Rubin (n 82) 24; Van Zyl Negotiorum Gestio 43. 
See, e g, Rubin (n 82) 23: in Roman law, the action for expenses was 'available only where 
an intervention, prima facie unwarranted, could be justifiable on equitable grounds.' Also 
see Whitty and Van Zyl (n 4) 376 (It 'is the main safeguard against "officious 
intermeddling". '); Standard Bank Financial Services Ltd v Taylam (Pty) Ltd supra at 392. 
The test postulated in this case (viz that the 'meddling [should be] ... necessary in order to do 
justice between man and man. ') is reminiscent of the balancing of interests necessary in 
deciding whether the par delictum rule should be relaxed or not, as recommended in Jajbhay 
v Cassim 1939 AD 537. Various other analogies come to mind e g the requirement that in 
order to rely upon a material mistake in the conclusion of an apparent contract, one must 
prove that it amounted to an iustus error (see, e g, George v Fairmead (Pty) Ltd 1958 (2) SA 
465 (A); Spindrifter (Pty) Ltd v Lester Donovan (Pty) Ltd 1986 (1) SA 303 (A); D B 
Hutchison and B J van Heerden 'Mistake in contract: A comedy of Gustus) errors' (1987) 
104 SALJ 522). More pertinently, one can compare the function of the utiliter-requirement 
with the general requirement that enrichment be sine causa. 
For example, (regarding one formulation of the test) see Whitty and Van Zyl (n 4) 380: 'It is 
an open question how far the test of the presumable wishes of the dominus is objective or 
subjective, or how, ifat all, it would apply where the dominus is incapax.' 
Whitty and Van Zyl (n 4) 377. 
(n 82) at 24. 
(n 82) at 24 and 26. 
(n 82) at 26. Also see op cit 23-5. 
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conduct was reasonable in all the circumstances of the case,l72 he will have acted 
utiliter.,173 While Van Zyl regards reasonableness as being the common 
denom inator of all the tests mentioned so far,174 he acknowledges the fact that 
various sources focus on the wishes of the dominus,175 and says that 'if the act was 
indeed one which the dominus himself would have performed, having regard to all 
the surrounding circumstances, there is little doubt that such act will be considered 
utiliter ... ' .176 He adds, however, that accordance with the wishes of the dominus is 
not a general test, and should not be applied without exception, for to do so might 
impose too heavy a burden of proof on the gestor, 'who would have to show that the 
subjective attitude of the dominus would have been such as to prompt him to conduct 
the affair or affairs himself .177 He points out that a further defect of the test is that it 
enables the dominus too easily to rebut the gestor's allegation that the administration 
was uti/iter; he would simply have to prove that in the same circumstances he would 
not have done what the gestor did. 178 
De Vos asserts that the administration must have been reasonable and 'of 
such a nature that it was in the interests of the dominus that the administration took 
place.'179 Similarly, Eiselen and Pienaar state that the administration 'must have 










He must mean the circumstances that existed at the time the gestio was undertaken, and not 
those that followed: see Negotiorum Gestio 41. 
Negotiorum Gestio 41, where he says that the weight of authority does not support Rubin's 
view. 
See Negotiorum Gestio 40n 167 and 4l. 
See, e g De Vos VerrykingsaanspreekJikheid 40 and Whitty and Van Zyl (n 4) 379. 
Negotiorum Gestio 43. This sentence as a whole is somewhat confusing if looked at in 
isolation; he says' In determining whether the management of affairs complies with the 
requirement of utiliter coeptum, an objective approach is followed: if the act was indeed one 
which the dominus himself would have performed, having regard to all the surrounding 
circumstances, there is little doubt that such act will be considered uti/iter, regardless of the 
final outcome thereof.' This is confusing because the second part of the sentence arguably 
does not follow from the first: referring to what this particular dominus would have done in 
the circumstances can surely not be an objective test, unless it is an objective test which takes 
SUbjective factors into account. It appears from the rest of his discussion, however, that the 
main thrust of his argument is that the administration should be reasonable, which would 
indeed be an objective test. See, for example, his remarks at p 44 of the same work. 
Regarding the wishes of the dominus, also cfthe sentence from Whitty and Van Zyl (n 4) 380 
quoted in note 167 above. 
Negotiorum Gestio 44. 
Negotiorum Gestio 44. 
VerrykingsaanspreekJikheid 39 (my translation). But cf op cit 40, where he says that if the 
gestio is clearly contrary to the wishes of the dominus it will not be uti/iter, which suggests 
that he regards this as the decisive criterion .. 
Unjustified Enrichment 205. 
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Although the definition of the utiliter-requirement remains unsettled,181 it 
thus appears that three criteria have found favour amongst the commentators: the 
wishes of the dominus, reasonableness, and the interests of the dominus. The first 
question that arises in this regard is whether the test is objective or SUbjective. While 
the criterion of reasonableness is clearly objective, the wishes and interests of the 
dominus could be objective or subjective criteria. The second question concerns the 
relationship between the criteria: does the gestor have to satisfy all of these three 
tests, or are they alternatives? 
When Rubin states that the test based on the wishes of the dominus is an 
objective one, he apparently means that it is objective in the sense that the gestor's 
intention is not taken into account. 182 The test, as he describes it, is subjective in a 
different sense, however. It is subjective in that what is relevant is the actual will of 
this particular dominus, and not his presumptive will. Van Zyl's criticism of Rubin's 
views appears to be aimed at this notion that the 'wishes of the dominus' is a 
subjective test i e that the actual wishes of this particular dominus are decisive. 
It is also not immediately apparent whether 'the interest of the dominus' is an 
objective or subjective criterion. One can argue that it poses a subjective test if it 
requires the gestor to prove that the gestio was in the interest of this particular 
dominus, i e taking his personal circumstances into account. 183 On the other hand, it 
would clearly be an objective test if all that is required is proof that the 
administration would generally be to the advantage of someone in the position of the 
dominus i e not taking all his personal circumstances into account. The writers who 
state that the gestio must be reasonable and in the interests of the dominus do not 
discuss the question of the objectivity or subjectivity of the latter criterion, and do 
not closely consider the relationship of these two criteria: 184 does a gestor have to 





See, most recently, the views of Whitty and Van Zyl (n 4) 376 ff. 
Cfthe argument that the test for intention and the test for excusability should not be confused 
- see Whitty and Van Zyl (n 4) 379. 
This criterion is similar, but not identical, to that of the wishes of the dominus: a particular 
act might be in someone's interest but against his wishes (e g it would usually be in 
someone's interest to pay his debt - provided that it was not about to prescribe etc - but it 
could be against his wishes if he does not want to accept charity and wants to settle it 
himself). 
Eiselen and Pienaar go on to restate the requirement in such a way that it suggests that the 
criterion is objective. 
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interest of the dominus), as they seem to suggest? Would it suffice if he showed that 
a reasonable person would have undertaken the gestio and incurred these expenses 
without reference to the particular circumstances of the dominus? While the two 
criteria would obviously often overlap, such questions might arise in circumstances 
where an act of administration is objectively reasonable and yet not (subjectively) in 
the interests of this specific dominus. 185 For example, it might seem reasonable to 
pay a debt for a cash-strapped friend, but this might not be in his interests if the debt 
is about to prescribe. I 86 
Our law apparently holds that such a transaction would be inutiliter. 187 This 
suggests, in other words, that there would be no relationship of negotiorum gestio in 
a situation where the gestio is not subjectively in the interests ofthe dominus, even 
though it seems reasonable from an objective point of view. It would thus be a more 
accurate reflection of the current state of our law to say that the gestio must have 
been reasonable and subjectively in the interests of the dominus. It appears that, 
unlike German law, South African law only allows a claim for expenses if both of 
these requirements are fulfilled, and not merely one or the other. 188 
Requiring the gestor to prove that the gestio was both reasonable and 
subjectively in the interests ofthe dominus,189 however, raises the problem 
highlighted by Van Zyl: the gestor would have to bring evidence concerning the 
particular situation of the dominus, which may well be inaccessible. This means that 
even if the gestor could show that his conduct was reasonable, the dominus would be 
able to defeat the gestor's claim for expenses by showing that it was not in his 
interests. This seems rather unfair to a gestor who has, after all, acted as a 
reasonable person would have done. 
In German law, it will be recalled, a gestor can claim his expenses whether 






Or in accordance with his actual wishes. 
Or it would arguably be reasonable to put out a fire that threatens to destroy a neighbour's 
house, but this might not be in the neighbour's interest if the house was in such a delapidated 
state that he would have derived more benefit from an insurance payout. 
See Van Zyl Negotiorum Gestio 45, and the references cited there. 
See previous footnote. 
Or in accordance with his actual wishes. 
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presumed will, or whether is at least objectively in his interest. 190 It seems, therefore, 
that the hurdles to be leapt in order to win an action for expenses are lower for a 
Gennan than a South African gestor. It should also be borne in mind that if a 
Gennan fails to clear these hurdles, he will still win a claim based on enrichment, 
whereas a South African might be left with nothing at all. 191 The present state of 
South African law is also open to the criticism that it confers too much discretion on 
individual judges; in effect, should all the other requirements be met, the judge has to 
assess whether the gestor's action amounts to negotiorum gestio by reference to a 
somewhat vague and nebulous notion. 192 The uncertainty as to precisely what is 
meant by 'utiliter coeptum' could deter parties from suing and, more importantly, 
from acting in the first place. The lack of clarity could thus undermine our legal 
system's recognition and protection of 'altruistic intenneddlers'. 
A more equitable accommodation of the interests of both parties could be 
achieved either by allowing the gestor's claim for expenses ifhe could prove either 
of these alternatives (i e that the gestiO had been reasonably undertaken, or that it was 
subjectively in the interests of the dominus),193 or (preferably) by recasting the 
requirement in an entirely objective mOUld, as suggested by the following sentence 
taken from Eiselen and Pienaar: 
... the question is whether a bonus paterfamilias would have 
incurred the same expenses or whether it was reasonable that the 
expenses be incurred on behalf of the dominus in these specific 
circumstances. 194 
This would amount to stating that a gestio would be justifiable (or excusable) if it 
was reasonably undertaken, or objectively in the interests of the dominus, or in 
accordance with his presumptive wishes. 
Finally, it should be mentioned that, while the requirement that the gestio be 
utiliter in some respects corresponds fairly closely to the special requirements for 
berechtigte Geschdftsfohrung ohne Auf trag stated above, South African law demands 






See p 85 above. 
But cfYan Zyl Negotiorum Gestio 45. 
Cfthe advantages of the criterion of reasonableness, not the least being its familiarity as a 
legal norm. 
Cf the approach in the South African law of contract regarding iustus error. See the 
references in note 166 above. 
Eiselen and Pienaar Unjustified Enrichmenl 205. 
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required in order for a relationship of negotiorum gestio to arise. 195 It seems, 
therefore, that if A intends to settle B's debt to C, and does not succeed in doing so, 
A and B will nevertheless be linked by a relationship of negotiorum gestio. Also, as 
already pointed out, 196 a relationship of berechtigte Geschiiftsfohrung ohne Au/trag 
can arise where the administration is later ratified by the dominus, whereas it seems 
that South African law would regard ratification as excluding negotiorum gestio 
altogether. 197 
The classification of a set of circumstances as being an instance of 
negotiorum gestio or berechtigte Geschiiftsfohrung ohne Au/trag brings certain 
consequences in its train. Most importantly for our purposes, the existence of a 
relationship of negotiorum gestio excludes enrichment liability.198 In other words, a 
benefit transferred as a consequence of negotiorum gestio cannot generally be 
regarded as having been acquired sine causa: just as a contract provides a "causa" 
~ . hm . 199 h . . 200 lor an enrlc ent, so too can a quasi-contract suc as negotIOrum gestIO. 
Negotiorum gestio also gives rise to certain reciprocal obligations.201 Thus, in 








See Rubin (n 82) 24: 'Regard must be had, not to the outcome of the gestorial act, but to its 
character and to the surrounding circumstances at the time it was performed.' Also see Rubin 
op cit 26; Eiselen and Pienaar Unjustified Enrichment 205; Van Zyl Negotiorum Gestio 41 
and 44-5; De Vos Verrykingsaanspreeklikheid 40; Whitty and Van Zyl (n 4) 376, 378. The 
outcome of the gestio is thus unimportant e g the requirements of negotiorum gestio could be 
satisfied if A attempts to put out a fire for his neighbour B but does not succeed in 
extinguishing the flames. 
See the text to notes 144 and 153 above. 
See, e g, De Vos Verrykingsaanspreeklikheid 40, where he expresses the view that if the 
gestor incurred disproportionately high expenses (i e acted inutiliter) in successfully 
administering the affairs of another, the dominus should distance himself from the proceeds, 
lest his acceptance be construed as ratification of the gestio. But cf Van Zyl Negotiorum 
Gestio 39,46. 
See, e g, Eiselen and Pienaar Unjustified Enrichment 205, 228. 
CfEiselen and Pienaar Unjustified Enrichment 205, where they argue that it should not be 
referred to as a quasi-contract, but should rather be regarded as an 'action sui generis based 
on equity.' 
Re German law: it generally constitutes a legal ground in terms of § 812 (1) sent 1 BGB and 
therefore excludes enrichment liability. 
Van Zyl Negotiorum Gestio 47 ff. In German law, with its usual 'economy oflegal forms', 
the gestor in such circumstances (i e berechtigte Geschafisfohrung ohne Aufirag) is treated in 
the same way as a mandatary: Medicus Schuldrecht 11 marg note 626; Zimmermann Law of 
Obligations 433 (and, for an exception, see op cit 444-5); Kropholler BGB vor § 677 marg 
note 3. These obligations are treated in this chapter in the barest outline as, unlike the 
requirements for the coming into being of negotiorum gestiO, they do not assist in 
determining the scope of enrichment liability. 
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the dominus of the gestio as soon as possible?02 In both systems, the gestor must 
complete the gestio203 properIy,204 taking a reasonable amount of care.20S He must 
therefore compensate the dominus for any damage caused by his negligence.206 He 
must give the dominus any proceeds received as a result of the gestio,207 necessary 
infonnation and an account of the gestio on completion thereof.208 
If the gestor complies with these duties, then he has a right to claim 









~ 681 sent 1 BGB; Medicus Schuldrecht 11 marg note 627. 
Van Zyl Negotiorum Gestio 49-51; Rubin (n 82) 50; Silke (n 90) 276; Hochmetals Africa 
(Pty) Ltd v Otavi Mining Co (Pty) Ltd supra at 580C. 
§ 677 BGB: ordnungsgemaj3 (appropriately). See Medicus Schuldrecht 11 marg note 627: in 
a way in which accords with the interest of the Geschtiftsherr, with reference to his actual or 
supposed will. Also see Brox and Walker (n 79) marg note 373. South African law requires 
that the gestio be carried out properly, diligently and reasonably - see next footnote. 
See, e g, Whitty and Van Zyl (n 4) 387. On the specific standard of care required in South 
African law, see Van Zyl Negotiorum Gestio 57-66, especially 63 ff; Jacobs v Maree (1902) 
19 SC 152; Amod Salie v Ragoon supra; Lawrie v Union Government (Minister 0/ Justice) 
1930 TPD 402; Minister 0/ Justice v Lawrie 1930 TPD 877; Mohamed v Kamaludien supra; 
Boyce NO v Bloem and Others 1960 (3) SA 855 (T) at 866D-H. On the standard of care 
required in German law, see, e g Medicus Schuldrecht 11 marg note 627; Zimmermann Law 
o/Obligations 447; Brox and Walker (n 79) marg note 375 (e g where the Geschafts/uhrer 
had limited or no capacity, he will only be liable in terms of the law of enrichment and the 
law of delict i e not in terms of the rules on Geschafisfohrung ohne Aufirag: see § 682 BGB 
and the discussion at p 108 below). 
Van Zyl Negotiorum Gestio 58; Whitty and Van Zyl (n 4) 369, 388; Eiselen and Pienaar 
Unjustified Enrichment 205; Silke (n 90) 276 (regarding the degree of care); Medicus 
Schuldrecht 11 marg note 627; Brox and Walker (n 79) marg note 375. Should the 
Geschiifisherr cause damage to the Geschiifisfohrer, he will also incur liability: see Brox and 
Walker op cit 376. 
§ 681 sent 2, read with § 667 BGB; Medicus Schuldrecht 11 marg note 627; Zimmermann 
Law o/Obligations 433; Brox and Walker (n 79) marg note 374 (exception: where the 
Geschtiftsfohrer lacked capacity or had limited capacity). Regarding South African law, see 
Van Zyl Negotiorum Gestio 55-7; Silke (n 90) 276; Whitty and Van Zyl (n 4) 368-9, 387; 
Eiselen and Pienaar Unjustified Enrichment 205 ('all profits'); Grant's Farming Co Ltd v 
Attwel/(1901) 9 HCG 91. 
§ 681 sent 2, read with § 666 BGB. Van Zyl Negotiorum Gestio 51-5 (prior to the institution 
of a claim for expenses: see discussion at 53-5; Whitty and Van Zyl (n 4) 387; cf J E 
Scholtens 'The actio contraria of the negotiorum gestor and his duty to account' (1970) 87 
SALJ284); Eiselen and Pienaar Unjustified Enrichment 205; Silke (n 90) 276; and the 
references cited by Van Zyl Negotiorum Gestio at 51-2. Also see Grant's Farming Co Ltd v 
Attwel/ supra at 96; Greenshields v Chisolm 3 SC (1884) 220 at 226; Rubin (n 82) 51; 
McEwen NO v Khader 1969 (4) SA 559 (N); J E Scholtens 'An old question of enrichment 
liability: payment of another's debt' (1969) 86 SAU 131. 
§ 683 sent 1 read with § 670 BGB. See, e g, Medicus Schuldrecht 11 marg note 626. This 
applies unless the gestor did not intend to claim compensation from the dominus (i e where 
he intended to make a donation): § 685 (1) BGB. South African law: these must be useful 
expenses or disbursements: Van Zyl Negotiorum Gestio 67-71; Whitty and Van Zyl (n 4) 
368,385; Eiselen and Pienaar Uryustified Enrichment 205; Klug and Klug v Penkin supra at 
404 ('if the person whose affairs have been managed has accepted the benefit of such 
unauthorised management' - cf comments by Van Zyl Negotiorum Gestio 43 on the notion of 
acceptance in this context); New Club Garage v Milborrow and Son supra; cf Theron v 
Africa (1893) 10 SC 246; Rubin (n 82) 65 ff; Wessels Contract para 3613; Silke (n 90) 277-
8. 
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to reimburse the gestor for certain losses.210 In South Africa, the dominus must also 
ensure that the gestor is released from any obligations incurred in the course of the 
gestio;211 and to grant the gestor a lien on his property (i e that of the dominus) 
pending satisfaction of his claims? 12 
Should either party fail to fulfil these obligations, the other will be entitled to 
enforce performance. Thus, for example, if the gestor negligently causes damage, 
the dominus can sue for compensation.213 In South Africa, the action of the dominus 
is called the actio negotiorum gestorum directa and the action of the gestor is called 
the actio negotiorum gestorum contraria. 
Returning to the hypothetical situation that is the focus of this chapter (i e 
payment ofthe debt of another), the overall position may be summarised as follows: 
if A pays B's debt to C (and thereby extinguishes it), and if the requirements of 
negotiorum gestio proper (or berechtigte Geschiiftsfiihrung ohne Auftrag) are 
fulfilled, A will not be able to sue B for enrichment. Negotiorum gestio will 
constitute a legal ground or justification for the benefit to B. In other words, B's 
enrichment will not be unjustified. In such a case, however, A, as gestor, will be 
able to sue B for his expenses with the actio negotiorum gestorum contraria. 
Proving negotiorum gestio would generally be to the gestor's advantage, as he would 
then be able to claim the amount by which he was impoverished, without being 
limited to the amount by which the dominus was enriched by the gestio. The first 





Van Zyl Negotiorum Gestio 67,71-6; Zimmermann Law o/Obligations 444; Whitty and Van 
Zyl (n 4) 386; Eiselen and Pienaar Unjustified Enrichment 205; Standard Bank Financial 
Services v Taylam (Pty) Ltd supra at 387H-388A; Williams' Estate v Molenschoot and Schep 
(Pty) Ltd supra at 370-2. In South African law, he would have to compensate for loss of 
interest (from the date of litis contestatio) but not, apparently, for a loss of income: Whitty 
and Van Zyl (n 4) 386. Regarding German law, see, e g, Medicus Schuldrecht II marg note 
626; Zimmermann Law a/Obligations 445; Brox and Walker (n 79) marg note 376, where it 
is stated that the obligation of the Geschaftsherr to compensate for losses corresponds to the 
obligation of the mandatary, except that the Geschtiftsfohrer is entitled to compensation for 
his work provided that the administration in question falls within the scope of his profession. 
(This exception is necessary because the BGB provides that mandate is gratuitous: also see 
Zimmermann Law a/Obligations 445 in this regard.) 
Van Zyl Negotiorum Gestio 76-8; Whitty and Van Zyl (n 4) 368, 385; Eiselen and Pienaar 
Unjustified Enrichment 205 ('he may claim that the dominus should honour all obligations 
concluded in the gestor's name on behalf of the dominus.'); Wessels Contract para 3628; 
Rubin (n 82) 69-70; Silke (n 90) 278; New Club Garage v Milborrow and Son supra at 100; 
D 3.5.2 and the references cited by Van Zyl Negotiorum Gestio at 78n336. 
Van Zyl Negotiorum Gestio 78-80; Whitty and Van ZyJ (n 4) 387; Wessels Contract para 
2629; Silke (n 90) 279; New Club Garage v Milborrow and Son supra. 
See the references cited in note 206 above. 
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is a debt B-C and that it was extinguished by A's payment: A will have managed the 
affairs of another. Provided that he did so animo neKotia aliena Kerendi,214 that B 
(the dominus) has not authorised the Kestio, and that the management is utiliter 
coeptum, A will succeed in bringing an actio ne!!otiorum Kestorum contraria against 
B. 
Let us now tum to the more important question for our purposes, namely 
what happens if these requirements are not satisfied. 
3 Enrichment liability where B owes a performance to C, A performs to C 
and thereby extineuishes B's obligation, and there is partial fulfilment of 
the requirements of negotiorum gestio 
As stated above. where the requirements of negotiorum Kestio are satisfied, we are 
not concerned with the law of enrichment:215 ne!!otiorum gestio constitutes a legal 
ground for anything given to or done for the dominus (including payment of his 
debts) by the gestor, and the latter will be entitled to claim all his expenses i e he will 
be entitled to full compensation for his loss. 
214 
215 
If, however, only some of the relevant requirements are fulfilled, and the 
Here it should be noted that the animus negotia aliena gerendi must be distinguished from 
the intention to settle the debt of another (assuming that such intention is required for 
extinction of the debt), as discussed above at p 65 ff. In the latter case, one must intend to 
settle the debt o/another, whereas for negotionlm gestio, one must intend to settle the debt of 
anotherfor another (not solely for one's own benefit, and not necessarily for the true debtor). 
Thus a debt might validly be settled by a malafide gestor (who intends to settle someone's 
debt for his own ends e g to promote his reputation as a benefactor, or to make him his own 
debtor): see the discussion of the mala fide gestor at pIll below. Only if an obligation can 
be extinguished by the performance of a third party who mistakenly believes that he is the 
debtor could the situation of a bonafide gestor (who intends to settle a debt, thinking that it is 
his own) arise in this context: see the text to note 63 above and the section relating to the 
bonafide gestor at p 142 ff below. The easiest way to distinguish between these two kinds of 
intention is that the animus negotia aliena gerendi arguably refers to the motive which 
prompts the gestor's act, whereas the intention to settle a debt is a requirement for (and 
therefore in a sense part of) the legal act in question. Regarding German law, it should be 
remembered that the requisite intention ofa party who performs in terms of the obligation of 
another is often assessed from the perspective of the recipient (i e the creditor) (see the text to 
note 47 above), but if someone performs in terms of another thinking that he is settling his 
own debt, the debt will not be discharged: see p 72 above. 
It might therefore legitimately be asked why the law of negotionlm gestio has been discussed 
at all in this chapter. As will become clear, sketching this background is necessary because 
the requirements for certain enrichment actions depend, in both German and South African 
law, upon the fulfilment or non-fulfilment of the requirements for negotionlm gestio. See 
Chapter One at pp 51-2 on the interstitial nature of the law of unjustified enrichment. 
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relationship between A and B is therefore not one of negotiorum gestio proper (or 
berechtigte Geschiiftsfohrung ohne Au/trag), and ifthere is also no contractual 
relationship between them, there will be no 'justification' or legal ground for the 
benefit to B. If A, as a result of performing in terms ofB's obligation, is out of 
pocket, he cannot sue B for all of his expenses, but he will, in certain circumstances, 
be entitled to claim back the amount by which B is enriched by the gestio.216 Partial 
fulfilment of the requirements for negotiorum gestio thus takes us out of the domain 
of negotiorum gestio, and into the domain of enrichment law.217 Hence the spotlight 
shifts from the gestor's loss to the dominus's gain. 
A is not, however, automatically entitled to sue B for enrichment in every 
case of partial fulfilment of the requirements for negotiorum gestio.218 He has to 
prove that his case is one where a legal relationship akin to negotiorum gestio would 
arise:219 in South African law, quasi negotiorum gestio; in German law, either 
unberechtigte Geschaftsfohrung ohne Auftrag (unjustified negotiorum gestio) or 
unechte Geschiiftsfohrung ohne Auftrag (non-genuine negotiorum gestio).22o A's 
legal situation accordingly depends on which of the requirements of negotiorum 
gestio have been met. First the German, and then the South African position will 






It must be remembered that C does not come into the picture because the performance 
discharged B's obligation to him i e, in South African terms, he has not been enriched. 
And, in certain circumstances, into the sphere of the law of delict: see pp 102, 105 ff and 108 
below. 
For example, it seems that he would have no claim in South African law if he fuliilled all the 
requirements for negotiorum gestio except the requirement that the administration be uti/iter 
coeptum. Cf the discussion of German law regarding unberechtigte Geschtiftsfohrung ohne 
Auftrag immediately below. 
See p 75 above. 
In German law, berechtigte and unberechtigte Geschtiftsfohrung ohne Au/trag are regarded 
as being more closely related, and the unechte variant as being more deviant. I have, 
however, chosen to deal with berechtigte Geschtiftsfohrung ohne Auftrag on its own, and the 
other two forms together, as the former constitutes a legal ground (causa) for enrichment and 
the latter two (arguably - see discussion below) not. 
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German law 
(a) Unberechtigte Geschiiftsfiihrung ohne Auftrafl21 ('unjustified 
administration without mandate') 
dt,bt-
----'--------77 G 
This legal relationship222 arises, according to Gennan law, when the gestio was not 
221 
222 
See § 684 read with § 683 BGB. § 683 BGB: '[Ersatz von Aufwendungen] Entspricht die 
Obemahme der Geschaftsflihrung dem Interesse und dem wirklichen oder dem mutmaBlichen 
Willen des Geschaftsherm, so kann der Geschaftsfuhrer wie ein Beauftragter Ersatz seiner 
Aufwendungen verlangen. In den Fallen des § 679 steht dieser Anspruch dem 
Geschaftsfuhrer zu, auch wenn die Obemahme der GeschaftsfPhrung mit dem Willen des 
Geschaftsherm in Widerspruch steht.' § 684 BGB: '[Herausgabe der Bereicherung] Liegen 
die Voraussetzungen des § 683 nicht vor, so ist der Geschaftsherr verpflichtet, dem 
Geschaftsfuhrer alles, was er durch die Geschaftsfuhrung erlangt, nach den Vorschriften tiber 
die Herausgabe einer ungerechtfertigten Bereicherung herauszugeben. Genehmigt der 
Geschaftsherr die Geschaftsfiihrung, so steht dem Geschaftsfuhrer der im § 683 bestimmte 
Anspruch zu.' (§ 683 BGB: '[Reimbursement of outlays] If the undertaking of the 
management of the matter is in accordance with the interest and the actual or presumptive 
wishes of the principal, the manager may demand reimbursement of his outlays as a 
mandatary. In the cases provided for by § 679 this claim belongs to the manager even if the 
undertaking of the management of the matter is contrary to the wishes of the principal.' § 
684: '[Return of enrichment] If the conditions of § 683 do not exist, the principal is bound to 
return to the manager all that he acquires through the management of the matter under the 
provisions relating to the return of unjust enrichment. If the principal ratifies the 
management of the affair, the claim specified in § 683 belongs to the manager.') (translated 
by Forrester et aJ (n 23)). 
According to the majority opinion, this relationship, unlike berechtigte Geschiiftsfohrung 
ohne Aufirag, is not a 'statutory obligationary relationship' (gesetzliches Schuldverhdltnis): 
see Brox and Walker (n 79) marg note 379. In other words, the provisions relating to the 
rights of the Geschiifisherr (§§ 677 and 681 BGB) do not apply by way of analogy to 
berechtigte Geschiiftsfohrung ohne Auf trag. The only provisions that apply, acccrding to this 
view, are those dealing with liability arising from unjustified enrichment and delict. This 
basically means that the Geschiifisfuhrer (gestor) acquires rights (e g to an enrichment 
action), but the Geschdfisherr (dominus) does not, except that he has a right to compensation 
(especially conferred by § 687 BGB) if the Geschiiftsfohrer should have been aware that the 
management of the affairs contradicted the actual or preswned will of the Geschiifisherr: see 
Medicus Schuldrecht 11 marg note 629; Brox and Walker op cit marg note 380. A minority 
view, which is gaining increasing support, however, advocates the application of §§ 667 and 
681 BGB (i e the provisions relating to the obligation to inform, disgorge benefits, 
compensate for damages etc), on the ground that the Geschiifisherr would otherwise be in a 
better position here than where there is berechtigte Geschiiftsfohrung ohne Auftrag: Brox 
and Walker (n 79) marg note 379. Also see KropholJer BGB vor 677 marg note 4. 
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ratified by the dominuJ23 and is neither in the interests of the dominus, nor in 
accordance with his actual or presumed will224 but it otherwise fulfils the 
requirements outlined above. In other words, if someone administers the affair of 
another, aware that it is not his own affair but that of the other and intending to do it 
for the other, where it is, however, not in accordance with the interests or wi1l225 of 
the dominus, then it will be a case of unberechtigte Geschiiftsfuhrung ohne Auflrag. 
For example, A settles B's debt to C, but does so when C's claim was about to 
prescri be. 226 
In such circumstances, A will be entitled, not to reimbursement of his 
expenses as in the case of berechtigte Geschaflsfohrung ohne Auf trag, but merely to 
any benefits received by the dominus (B) as a result of the gestio?27 In other words, 
he will have an enrichment claim. Why will it lie against B and not against C? A's 







Medicus Schuldrecht !I marg note 628. 
But this is disputed. In Medicus's view, the requirement (for berechtigte Geschiiftsfohrung 
ohne Auftrag) that the gestio be in accordance with actual or presumed will of the dominus 
takes precedence over the requirement that it be in his interests i e the two alternatives do not 
stand on an equal footing. In other words, if a particular act of administration is in 
accordance with the will of the dominus but not in his interests, a relationship of berechtigte 
Geschiiftsfiihrung ohne Auftrag would still arise. He adds that the actual will of the dominus 
also takes precedence over his presumed will and it is only where his true will cannot be 
established that one considers his presumed will. In establishing the presumptive will of the 
dominus, one can have regard to what is objectively in his interests, but if the circumstances 
are such that his presumed will confl icts with his objective interests (e g because of his 
previous behaviour), then his presumed will takes precedence. According to Medicus, there 
is general agreement that this order of precedence applies regardless of what was discernible 
by the gestor. He thus cannot claim his expenses even if administering the affairs of another 
contradicts what is for him not discernibly the actual will of the dominus. There is, however, 
controversy as to whether the gestor benefits from the reduction of liability according to § 
680 BGB if the gestio was undertaken to avoid an imminent danger to the dominus. For all 
of this, see Medicus Schuldrecht !I marg note 624. Jfthe case concerns a duty to act in the 
public interest (e g to prevent a car accident, but not to pay someone else's taxes) or a duty to 
pay maintenance, then the will of the dominus is irrelevant: see Medicus Schuldrecht !I marg 
note 625. 
Whether actual or supposed, preceding or subsequent - see previous footnote. 
Unberechtigte Geschtiftsfiihrung ohne Auftrag could, of course, also arise in circumstances 
falling outside the purview of this chapter egA engages a gardening service to mow the 
overgrown lawn belonging to a neighbour who is away for the weekend and this is not 
objectively in the neighbour's interests because the neighbour had a contract with another 
gardening service to do this anyway (adapted from an example given by Medicus in 
Schuldrecht !I marg note 623). 
§ 684 sent I, read with § 812 ff BGB. See Medicus Schuldrecht !I marg note 628 and see 
footnote 221 above. Regarding the (controversial) question whether any of the obligations 
imposed by the BGB on Geschiiftsherr in cases of berechtigte Geschtiftsfiihrung ohne 
Auftrag are also imposed on a Geschtiftsherr in a situation of unberechtigte Geschtiftsfohrung 
ohne Auftrag, see note 222 above. 
§§ 267, 268 BGB; Miinchener KommentarlLieb § 812 marg note 101 (except where it has 
been expressly been forbidden by the debtor in terms of § 267 (2) BGB); Medicus 
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was owed, and has thus simultaneously lost his right to claim performance, he has 
not received anything without legal ground.229 B, on the other hand, has received 
somethini30 in that his debt to C has presumably3' been discharged. The majority 
opinion232 is therefore that A will have an enrichment action (a 
Riickgriffskondiktion)233 against B. The limitation of A's claim to the measure ofB's 
enrichment is justified on the grounds of fairness: the dominus does not have to pay 
for all of the gestor's expenses and should at least not be allowed to retain what he 
received at the expense of another.234 In other words, the underlying motivation has 
nothing to do with the administration of the affairs of another, altruism, etc, but is 
rather concerned with the prevention of unjustified enrichment. The dominus is 
protected in that he will not have to give anything to the gestor if what he received is 
of no use or benefit to him and that is of such a nature that it cannot be given back.235 
It is also suggested that, if he loses the enrichment, he should not be forced to pay the 
gestor the objective value of what he had received, because it was imposed upon him 
. h' '11 236 agamst IS WI . 
A's enrichment action derives from the relationship of unberechtigte 
Geschaftsfohrung ohne Auftrag (more specifically § 684 BGB) but its consequences 










Burgerliches Recht marg note 684; Loewenheim Bereicherungsrecht 48. 
Munchener KommentarfLieb § 812 marg note 101; Loewenheim Bereicherungsrecht 48; 
Medicus Burgerliches Recht marg note 684. 
According to Munchener KommentarfLieb § 812 marg note 102, there is controversy as to 
what he has actually 'received' (erlangt): Lieb's view is that he received the 'Befreiung von 
der Verbindlichkeit' (release from the obligation). 
If not, see Medicus Schuldrecht II marg note 628, and the discussion under 4 (a) below. 
See, e g, Munchener KommentarfLieb § 812 marg note 101; Medicus Burgerliches Recht 
marg note 684; idem Schuldrecht II marg note 722. 
Medicus Burgerliches Recht marg notes 684, 950 ff, idem Schuldrecht II marg note 722; 
Brox and Walker (n 79) marg note 413; Munchener KommentarfLieb § 812 marg notes 103, 
104. Cf a minority opinion which holds that the enrichment action in question would be a 
Leistungskondilction because the third party is performing in order to create a relationship of 
berechtigte Geschdftsfohrung ohne Auftrag with B. In other words, he performed with this 
specific purpose in mind and the failure of this purpose is the reason for the enrichment. See, 
e g, Esser and Weyers (n 4) 346 ff and Loewenheim Bereicherungsrecht 48: 
Leistungskondilction. On the Ruckgriffskondilction, and how it fits into the general scheme of 
the German law of enrichment, see Chapter One at p 24 above. 
See Brox and Walker (n 79) marg note 381; Medicus Schuldrecht 1I marg note 628. 
Medicus Schuldrecht II marg note 628. 
Medicus Schuldrecht II marg note 628. 
In other words, from § 812 ff BGB. According to the herrschende Meinung, only the 
consequences of § 812 ff apply, not their legal requirements: see Brox and Walker (n 79) 
marg note 381. Where Geschtiftsfohrung ohne Auftrag relates to a triangular relationship, 
however, one should also refer to the requirements of the enrichment provisions: Brox and 
Walker op cit marg notes 381 and 413. 
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remembered that the Ruckgriffskondiktion is one of the 
Nichtleistungskondiktionen.238 At first blush, because we are dealing with a 
performance, it seems strange that the Leistungskondiktion is not the appropriate 
action. It is excluded because, in our situation, the performing party does not intend 
to settle his own debt, as is apparently required for the Leistungskondiktion.239 
This legal situation could be exploited by third parties who pay the debts of 
others in order to become their creditors?40 Thus, to use Medicus's example, A 
might pay a debt owed by his neighbour B, in the hope that, ifhe (A) sues him (B) 
with the Ruckgriffskondiktion, he (B) will be forced to sell the land that A wants to 
buy and that he (B) does not really want to sell.241 Or even if the third party's 
motives are exemplary, the debtor might not want his debt settled;242 for example, his 
debt may be about to prescribe or he might want to set it off against a debt owed to 
him by C. 
If the debtor (B) is aware that A is about to settle his debt and objects, the 
creditor can refuse the performance.243 There is, however, no obligation on the 
creditor to do so, and it would be unlikely that a creditor would refuse the 
performance of a debt owed to him. There is therefore the real possibility that the 
legal rules might be abused to the disadvantage of debtors, and thus a need to provide 
protection. 
This protection is provided by using the analogy of cession.244 In terms of the 
law of cession, a debtor may raise against the cessionary any defences which he had 
against the cedent at the time of the cession?45 Likewise, he may set off against the 
cessionary a claim which he has against the cedent, unless he knew about the «ession 









See Chapter One at pp 24 and 29-30 above. Also see Medicus Schuldrecht II marg note 719, 
where he points out that the Ruckgriffskondiktion can be seen as a special instance of an 
A ufwendungskondiktion. 
See Medicus Schuldrecht II marg note 721, and see note 233 above. Also see Chapter One 
above. 
Because this is a situation of so-called 'aufgedrlingte Bereicherung' i e 'imposed 
enrichment': Medicus Schuldrecht IImarg note 722; idem Burger/iches Recht marg note 
952. In other words, the enrichment is imposed on the debtor, regardless of his will. 
Medicus Burger/iches Recht marg note 952. 
In other words, the settlement of his debt may be against his will. 
§ 267 (2) BGB. 
Medicus Burger/iches Recht marg note 952; idem Schuldrecht 11 marg note 722. 
§ 404 BGB. 
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aware and the main debt had became due.246 These rules are applied mutatis 
mutandis in the context of unberechtigte Geschiiftsfiihrung ohne Auftrag. In other 
words, the original debtor in our set of circumstances may raise against the third 
party (A) any defences he would have had against the creditor (C) and, similarly, he 
may set off against the third party any claim that he had against the original 
creditor.247 
(b) Unechte Geschiiftsfiihrung ohne Auftrag ('non-genuine administration 
without mandate') 
l) cbhf- 7C 
A 
The second 'poor relation' of Geschiiftsfiihrung ohne Auftrag in German law is the 
so-called unechte Geschaftsfiihrung ohne Auf trag. As said above,248 because cases 
falling into this category are characterised by the absence of the intention to carry out 
an affair for another (the Fremdgeschiiftsfiihrungswille), this is, strictly speaking, not 
really an instance of Geschaftsfohrung ohne Auftrag at all;249 it goes by this name 
merely because it bears a close resemblance to members of that family.250 
Unechte Geschaftsfohrung ohne Auftrag arises in two sets of 
circumstances.25I Firstly, someone could take care what is objectively the affair of 









§ 406 BGB. 
See Medicus Biirgerliches Recht marg note 952. 
See p 81 above. 
See, e g, Palandt § 687 marg note 2. 
And the applicable provision of the BGB (§ 687) falls within the section on Geschiiftsfiihrung 
ohne Auftrag properly so-called. 
See, e g, Medicus Biirgerliches Recht marg note 416 ff. 
See, e g, Pa/andt § 687 marg note 1. Also see note 276 below. 
This is sometimes called irrtiimliche Eigengeschtiftsfiihrung ('erroneous administration of 
own affairs'): see, e g, Kropholler BGB § 687 marg note 1. This is the situation envisaged in 
§ 687 (I) BGB: 'Die Vorschriften der §§ 677 bis 686 fmden keine Anwendung, wenn 
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transactions in relation to certain property, in the bonafide belief that he owns255 or 
has inherited it.256 This type of situation is, for convenience, often referred to as 
irrtumliche Eigengeschdftsfuhrung (i e erroneous administration of one's own 
affair)?57 In such cases, the provisions relating to Geschiiftsfohrung ohne Auftrag do 
not apply?58 As said above, this is because there is no intention to administer the 
affairs of another.259 This does not mean, however, that someone who administers 
the affair of another in the erroneous belief that he is administering his own affair is 
without a remedy. While the two examples mentioned here are covered by special 
provisions ofthe BGB,260 an enrichment action would also be available in other 
circumstances according to the normal rules of enrichment Iiability?61 Where 
someone administers the affairs of another under the impression that they are his 
own, he obviously cannot consciously increase the other's patrimony. As there can 
be no Leistung unless the performing party consciously increases the estate of 
another, the appropriate enrichment remedy cannot be a Leistungskondiktion.262 The 
performing party would accordingly have to sue with a Nichtleistungskondiktion?63 
Should the performing party culpably cause damage in carrying out another's affairs, 
the latter may claim for delictual damages.264 Similarly, the person whose affairs are 
managed may sue the other party for enrichment in certain circumstances. These 
(enrichment and delictual) claims will be excluded, however, if the administration 
relates to a thing owned by the 'dominus', and the 'gestor' is what we would call a 
bonafide possessor (i e where he possesses a thing owned by another in the belief 













jemand ein fremdes Geschaft in der Meinung besorgt, daB es sein eigenes sei.' ('The 
provisions of §§ 677 to 686 do not apply where someone carries out the affair of another in 
the belief that it is his own.') 
For these examples, see Medicus Schuldrecht II marg note 611. 
In other words, a bonafide possessor: see § 987 ffBGB. 
See § 2018 ffBGB. 
See, e g, Palandl § 687 marg note I; Brox and Walker (n 79) marg note 383. 
§ 687 (1) BGB; Medicus Burgerliches Recht marg note 416; idem Schuldrecht II marg note 
611; Brox and Walker (079) marg note 383. Also refer to note 253 above. 
§ 687 (1) BGB, and see Medicus Schuldrecht II marg note 611. 
Namely § 987 ffand § 2018 ffBGB. 
§ 812 ff. See Medicus Schuldrecht II marg note 611; idem Burgerliches Recht marg note 
416. 
See Chapter One at p 38 above. 
Medicus Schuldrecht II marg note 611. The relevant Nichtleistungskondiktion would be an 
Eingriffskondiktion: on the Eingriffskondiktion, see Chapter One at pp 24 and 30 above. 
In terms of § 823 ffBGB: see Medicus Schuldrecht II marg note 611. Also cfMedicus 
Burgerliches Recht marg note 416, where he says that delictual liability would arise in cases 
of 'schuJdhaftem 1rrtum' i e 'culpable error'. 
Medicus Burgerliches Recht marg note 416. 
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The second species of unechte Geschaftsfohrung ohne Auftrag arises where 
someone carries out another's administration, with the knowledge that it is not his 
own affair but that of the other, but without the intention of doing it for the other 
party?66 For example, a thief steals a car, has it painted and then sells it. He knows 
that having a car painted and sold are the concerns of the owner, but he intends to do 
them for himself?67 This situation is sometimes labelled Geschaftsanmaflung (which 
may be loosely translated as 'usurpation of a transaction or affair' or 'taking over a 
transaction or affair,)?68 
The relevant provision of the BGB (§ 687 (2))269 does not specifically 
mention the intention of the gestor. It merely says that someone must have treated 
the affair of another as his own, with the knowledge that he was not entitled to do so. 
This has been interpreted, however, as denoting a situation where, despite knowing 
that he had no right to treat the affair as his own, the gestor does not intend to 
administer the affair as that of another (i e he does not have the 
Fremdgeschafisfuhrungswille), but carries it out primarily for his own benefit.27o In 
other words, his motive in ostensibly helping another is really to help himself. 
As said above, German law employs a presumption in an attempt to resolve 
some of the practical difficulties involved in proving whether the 
Fremdgeschafisfiihrungswille is present or not.271 It will be recalled that this 
intention will be presumed if the relevant affair is 'objectively that of another'. 
Thus, for example, if someone performs in terms of the obligation of another, it will 








§ 687 (2) BGB: 'Behandelt jemand ein fremdes Geschaft als sein eigenes, obwohl er weil3, 
daB er nicht dazu berechtigt ist, so kann der Geschaftsherr die sich aus den §§ 677, 678, 681, 
682 ergebenden Ansprliche geltend machen. Macht er sie geltend, so ist er dem 
Geschaftsfiihrer nach § 684 Satz 1 verpflichtet.' (' If a person treats the matter of another as 
his own, although knowing that he is not entitled to do so, the principal may enforce the 
claims based on §§ 677, 678, 681, 682. Ifhe does enforce them, he is liable to the manager 
as provided for in § 684 sent. 1.') (translated by Forrester el al (n 23». Also see Palandl § 
687 marg note 2. 
This example is taken from Medicus Schuldrecht II marg note 613. 
See, e g, Medicus Schuldrecht II marg note 613. It is also variously called 'angemal3te 
Geschaftsftihrung ohne Auftrag' (see, e g, Kropholler BGB vor § 677 marg note 5), or 
'angemal3te Eigengeschaftsfiihrung' (see, e g, Palandl § 687 marg note 2) or 'unerlaubte 
Eigengeschilftsfiihrung' (Brox and Walker (n 79) marg note 384. 
For a translation, see note 266 above. 
See Paland! § 687 marg note 2. 
See p 82 above, and the references cited there. 
For the view that the wording of § 677 BGB ('fiir einen anderen') means that the gestor 
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Practically, this means that if someone administers an affair that clearly falls within 
another's domain and all the other requirements are satisfied, there is a presumption 
in favour of genuine negotiorum gestio and against non-genuine negotiorum gestio. 
In what circumstances, then, will GeschiifisanmafJung arise? The scope of 
application of § 687 (2) BGB has been limited, by interpretation, to cases where the 
affair is 'objectively that of another,.273 The reasoning behind this is that one can 
only be aware that an affair is that of another, as required by the wording of the 
provision, if it is objectivel!74 that of another.275 This leads one to conclude that, in 
order to show that a case falls within the ambit of § 687 (2), the presumption that the 
gestor had the Fremdgeschiifisfuhrungswille would have to be rebutted.276 This 
means that someone who performs the obligation of another will only be limited to 
suing for enrichment if there is clear proof that he intended thereby to benefit 
himself.277 
Where the requirements for GeschdjisanmafJung have been met, there are at 
least four potential sources of liability: the law dealing with the relationship between 
an owner and a possessor,278 the law of delict, the law of enrichment,279 and the law 
of unauthorised administration.28o 
If the two parties stand in a relationship of owner and possessor, the 
'dominus' may have certain rights against the 'gestor' (possessor)?81 The 'dominus' 










should intend that any advantages arising from the gestiO should fall to the dominus, see, for 
example, Brox and Walker (n 79) 362. 
See Medicus Biirgerliches Recht marg note 409; Palandt § 687 marg note 2; Brox and 
Walker (n 79) marg note 382. 
And not merely subjectively that of another. 
Medicus Biirgerliches Recht marg note 409. As explained above (at p 82), an affair that is 
objectively neutral (i e not objectively that of another) only becomes subjectively that of 
another through the will of the gestor. The argument is thus that one cannot be aware of a 
situation that is itself brought about by one's own state of mind. 
See Brox and Walker (n 79) marg note 363: 'fur die Annahme, dass hier ausschlief.llich ein 
Eigengeschaft gefiihrt werden soli, mussen schon besondere UmsUinde vorliegen.' 
('[Sjpecial circumstances must exist for the acceptance that an affair is to be carried out 
exclusively as one's own'). This obviously also applies to the situation of irrtiimliche 
Eigengeschiifisfiihrung but I have mentioned it here in order to facilitate comparison with the 
South African law later. 
See, e g, Kropholler BGB § 687 marg note 3. 
§ 987 ffBGB. 
§ 823 ffBGB. 
See Medicus Schuldrecht 11 marg note 613. 
See § 987 ffBGB and Medicus Schuldrecht 11 marg note 613. 
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satisfied?82 Even if the 'dominus' cannot prove all the elements ofa delict,283 
however, he will be entitled to damages according to the provisions relating to 
Geschafisfohrnng ohne Auf trag. The 'dominus' may thus demand compensation 
from the 'gestor' in respect of any damage arising from the administration provided 
that the administration was against his wishes and the 'gestor' should have known 
this?84 It is not necessary to prove fault in order to claim these damages?85 In 
addition, the 'gestor' must give the 'dominus' any profits that he obtained as a result 
of the administration of the latter's affairs.286 If the 'dominus' enforces these claims 
(i e to the payment of damages and the handing over ofprofits),287 the 'gestor' in tum 
may sue him for enrichment.288 The enrichment action in question would be an 
Aufwendungskondiktion:289 the 'gestor' may claim reimbursement of his expenses 
(Aufwendungen), but his claim is limited to the amount by which the 'dominus' 
remains enriched. In practice, all that would happen would be that the 'gestor' 
would subtract his expenses from the profits to be disgorged to the 'dominus' ?90 In 
certain circumstances, on the other hand, it is the 'dominus' who can sue for 
enrichment. Thus, for example, if, in the course of the administration, there has been 
a valid transfer of ownership to a third party, the special Eingriffskondiktion in terms 











For these requirements, see § 823 ffBGB. 
E g fault. 
See § 678 read with § 687 (2) BGB. Also see Medicus Bilrgerliches Recht marg note 417. 
As Medicus says (in Bilrgerliches Recht marg note 417), '[nJobody will easily be able to 
believe that he is allowed to take care of the affairs of another for himself without fault'. 
§§ 687 (2), 681 sent 2, 667. Also see Medicus Bilrgerliches Recht marg note 418. It should 
be noted that the 'gestor' is thus potentially liable for more than he would be according to § 
816 (1) sent 1 BGB. This amounts to saying that the 'dominus' can put the (usually mala 
fide) 'gestor' in the position he would have been in had he carried out the transaction bona 
fide for the 'dominus'; in other words, he must at least perform what he would have had to 
perform had he acted bonafide: see Medicus Schuldrecht Jl marg note 613. 
§ 687 (2) sent 2. See note 266 above for the text of this provision. 
See § 687 (2) sent 2, read with § 684 sent 1 BGB. § 684 sent I BGB reads thus: 
'[Herausgabe der BereicherungJ Liegen die Voraussetzungen des § 683 nicht vor, so ist der 
Geschaftsherr verpflichtet, dem Geschaftsfiihrer alles, was er durch die Geschaftsfiihrung 
erlangt, nach den Vorschriften tiber die Herausgabe einer ungerechtgertigten Bereicherung 
herauszugeben.' ('If the requirements of § 683 are not satisfied, the 'dominus' is obliged to 
give the 'gestor' everything that he received through the administration, according to the 
provisions dealing with the restitution of unjustified enrichment.') See Medicus Biirgerliches 
Recht marg note 419 for a description of the 'juristic merry-go-round' ('juristische 
Karussell') caused by the wording of these provisions. 
See Chapter One at p 24 above. 
Medicus Biirgerliches Recht marg note 419. 
See Chapter One at p 30 above. § 816 BGB reads as follows: '[Verfiigung eines 
NichtberechtigtenJ (I) Trifft ein Nichtberechtigter tiber einen Gegenstand eine Verfiigung, 
die dem Berechtigten gegentiber wirksam ist, so ist er dem Berechtigten zur Herausgabe des 
durch die Verfiigung Erlangten verpflicbtet. Erfolgt die Verfiigung unentgeltlich, so trifft die 
gleiche Verpflichtung denjenigen, welcher auf Grund der Verfiigung unmittelbar einen 
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it to C. Assuming that C is bonafide, he will acquire ownership of the car.292 In 
such a case, the 'dominus' (B) can bring an Eingriffskondiktion against A for 
whatever A has received in exchange for the car. In other cases, the 'dominus' 
could bring the general EingrifJskondiktion.293 
How does all of this relate to performance of the obligation of another? It 
will be recalled that in order for someone to perform in terms of another's obligation 
in terms of German law, the performing party must make the performance with the 
intention of settling the debt for the debtor,294 and that ifhe makes the performance 
thinking that he is performing in terms of his own obligation, the obligation will not 
be extinguished and the debtor will remain bound.295 The first variety of unechte 
Geschiiftsfiihrung ohne Auftrag (the so-called Eigenleistung) could therefore could 
not arise in the situation presently under consideration296 viz where A perfonns in 
terms ofB's obligation to C and thereby extinguishes it. (Hence the question mark 
in the above diagram). 
The same cannot be said for the second type of unechte Geschiiftsfohrung 
ohne Auftrag, namely Anmaj3ung (where someone administers what he knows is the 
affair of another, but does so for himself). In such circumstances, A can settle B' s 
debt to c.297 Thus, for example, we can imagine that a busy businessman, Brian, 
telephones a garage called 'Cars To Go' and arranges for his car to be collected and 







rechtlichen Vorteil erlangt. (2) Wird an einen Nichtberechtigten eine Leistung bewirkt, die 
dem Berechtigten gegeniibuer wirksam ist, so ist der Nichtberechtigte dem Berechtigten zur 
Herausgabe des Geleisteten verplichtet.' ('[Disposition by person without title] (1) Ifa 
person without title to an object makes a disposition of it which is binding upon the person 
having title he is bound to hand over to the latter what he has obtained by the disposition. If 
the disposition is made gratuitously the same obligation is imposed upon the person who 
acquires a legal advantage directly through the disposition. (2) If an act of performance is 
done for the benefit of a person not entitled thereto, which is effective against the person 
entitled, the former is bound to hand over to the latter the value of such performance.' 
(translated by Forrester et al (n 23)). 
See § 932 ff BGB and Chapter One above at p 18 ff. 
In terms of § 812 (1) BGB. See Medicus Sehuldreeht II marg notes 613 and 708. 
But his intention is assessed from the point of view of the recipient i e it is objectively 
determined: see p 70 above. 
See p 72 above; Medicus Sehuldreeht II marg note 721. Because this performance would not 
free the real debtor, the real debtor would not receive anything and would therefore not be 
exposed to a Riickgriffskondiktion - the performing party could only sue the supposed 
creditor with a eondietio indebiti: see Medicus loe cit and p 150 below. 
See the text to note 77 above. Also see p 148 ff below. 
In this regard, it should again be borne in mind that A's intention to settle B's debt to C is 
typically determined objectively i e it is C's perspective that is decisive: see p 70 above and 
Chapter One at p 40. 
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collect the car, as is his usual practice. A garage attendant duly collects the car and it 
is serviced at the garage's premises. Later in the day, Alexander arrives at the garage 
and says that he is one of Brian's employees and that he has come to pay Brian's bill 
and to collect the car. Thinking that everything is in order, the garage attendant 
accepts payment and hands over the car. Alexander is not Brian's employee, but a 
thief He intends to settle Brian's debt to the garage, but only so that he will be able 
to gain possession of the car. In the circumstances, it seems that Alexander will have 
validly settled Brian's debt to the garage, which acted bonafide. 
In such circumstances, Brian might have claims in terms of the law of delict 
and the law relating to the relationship between owners and possessors. In addition, 
if Alexander has sold the car to a bonafide purchaser, Brian can bring an 
Eingriffskondiktion against Alexander for the purchase price in terms of § 816 BGB. 
Alexander can bring an Aufwendungskondiktion against Brian for his expenses (i e 
settling the debt to the garage). As it is an enrichment action, he can only claim for 
any amount by which Brian remains enriched. Alexander can also only raise this 
claim if Brian enforces his own claims against Alexander. 
(c) Geschiiftsfuhrer (gestores) who lack full capacity 
German writers generally do not deal with situations where one of the parties lacks 
capacity as a special category or subspecies of Geschiiftsfiihrung ohne Auf trag. 298 In 
order to facilitate comparison with South African law, however, the rules concerning 
such cases will here be dealt with as if they fall into a separate category. 
In terms of German law, any lack of capacity on the part of the dominus is 
apparently legally insignificant for the purposes of Geshaftsfiihrung ohne Auf trag. A 
valid relationship of Geschaftsfiihrung ohne Auftrag can thus arise, for example, 
where a gestor administers the affairs of someone who is insane or a minor or 
otherwise incapacitated. 
298 Such cases apparently do not fall within the categories of either unberechtigte or unechte 
Geschtiftsfiihrung ohne Auftrag: see, e g, Medicus Schuldrechl II marg note 627 and 
Burgerliches Recht marg note 426, where he deals with such cases under the heading of 
berechtigte Geschtiftsfohrung ohne Auftrag (but also cfthe schematic representation in 
Burgerliches Recht marg note 435). 
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The lack of capacity of the gestor affects only the claims of the dominus. The 
dominus's claim against a gestor (i e a claim for damages, or for the proceeds of the 
administration) will be limited to the extent of the latter's enrichment in situations 
where the gestor lacks capacity, or has only limited capacity. Such a gestor will 
therefore not incur the same liability as other gestores under berechtigte 
Geschiiftsfuhrung ohne Aujtrag;299 according to § 682 BGB, he will only be liable in 
terms of the law of delict and the law of unjustified enrichment.30o The claims of a 
gestor who lacks capacity against a dominus are not, however, limited to the extent 
of the latter's enrichment.30l In other words, if A, who lacks full capacity, settles 
B's debt to C, and A wants to sue B for his expenses, A would be treated like any 
other plaintiff in such circumstances. If, however, A had made a profit from the 
transaction, or had caused loss to B, B could only sue A for the amount by which A 
was enriched. 
(d) Synthesis 
At first sight, the main difference between the German unechte (non-genuine) 
Geschaftsfohrung ohne Auftrag and unberechtigte (unjustified) Geschaftsfuhrung 
ohne Auftrag seems to be that the unechte variant requires a primarily subjective 
enquiry, whereas the unberechtigte variant is established primarily by means of an 
objective enquiry. In other words, the identifying feature of the unechte 
Geschaftsfohrung ohne Auf trag is the absence of the necessary intention to carry out 
the administration for another, and the identifying feature of the unberechtigte 
Geschaftsfohrung ohne Auftrag is that the administration is not in accordance with 




See previous footnote. 
§ 682 BGB: '[Fehlende GeschaftsHihigkeit des Geschaftsfuhrers] 1st der Geschaftsfuhrer 
geschaftsunfahig oder in der GeschaftsHihigkeit beschrankt, so ist er nur nach den 
Vorschriften tiber den Schadenersatz wegen unerlaubter Handlungen und tiber die 
Herausgabe einer ungerechtfertigten Bereicherung verantwortlich.' ('[Lack of capacity of 
the gestor] If the gestor has no capacity or has limited capacity, he is only liable in terms of 
the provisions on damages for delict and the provisions on disgorgement of unjustified 
enrichment. ') The liability of a gestor who acts in a situation of necessity or emergency is 
also reduced, according to § 680 BGB, which reads: '[Gesch1i.ftsfuhrung zur 
Gefahrenabwehr] Bezweckt die Geschaftsfiihrung die Abwendung einer dem Geschaftsherrn 
drohenden dringenden Gefahr, so hat der GeschaftsfUhrer nur Vorsatz und grobe 
Fahrlassigkeit zu vertreten.' (' [Gestio to avert a danger] If the purpose of the gestio is the 
averting of an irnrninent and threatenening danger to the dominus, the gestor is only liable for 
intentional and gross negligent conduct.') 
See Medicus Schuldrecht II marg note 627. 
be qualified, however, in that the test for intention is not purely subjective; for 
example, it will be presumed that the gestor had the necessary intention when the 
affairs were objectively those of another.302 Similarly, the test for whether the 
administration was 'justified' is not purely objective; for example, unberechtigte 
Geschaftsfohrung ohne Auftrag may arise where the administration did not accord 
with the actual will of the dominus. 303 
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As far as the consequences are concerned, both variants give rise to 
enrichment liability, but to different species of Nichtleistungskondiktionen: if A 
performs in terms ofB's debt to C in cases of unberechtigte Geschdftsfohrung ohne 
Auf trag, A (the 'gestor') can sue B with a RiickgrifJskondiktion; in cases of unechte 
Geschdftsfohrung ohne Auftrag, on the other hand, A's action against B would be an 
Aujwendungskondiktion.304 
Enrichment liability also arises if the gestor lacks full legal capacity: the 
other party may not sue him for all the proceeds gleaned from the administration, but 
only those by which the gestor remains enriched. A gestor who lacks full capacity 
may, however, sue for all ofbis expenses,just as a major could in the circumstances. 
Whether the dominus is incapacitated or not has no impact on the measure of 
liability. 
To sum up, then, if A fulfils B's obligation to C, without mandate or 
ratification, where he does not intend to do so for B, or where doing so is not in B's 
interests or against his actual or presumed will, A may recover from B the amount by 
which B is enriched by A's performance. If A lacks capacity, he will be entitled to 






See the text to note 130 above. 
See p 98 above, and the controversy outlined in note 224 above. 
Which would only be available ifB had enforced his claims to profits and damages against 
A: see p 105 above. 
And for compensation for any losses caused by his negligence. 
South African law Wht-
B /L 
A 
As already mentioned,306 South African law also imposes liability in certain 
instances where only some, and not all, of the requirements for negotiorum gestio 
proper are fulfilled: situations of so-called 'quasi negotiorum gestio'. The liability 
in question is always based on the enrichment of the dominus. The gestor307 can 
accordingly sue the dominus for his expenses with the 'extended actio negotiorum 
gestorum',308 but he will only be able to recover the amount by which the dominus 
remains enriched by the gestio.309 
This action is generally regarded as being available where the gestor acted 
malafide for his own benefit, where the gestor acted against the express will of the 
dominus, where the gestor administered the affairs ofa minor/ 10 and where the 
gestor acted in the bona fide bel ief that he was managing his own affairs.3l1 Here it 
should be noted that one of these situations might not arise in the category of cases 
presently being discussed; a bona fide belief on the part of A that the affairs are his 
own would probably be inconsistent with his intention to discharge B's debt to C,312 
assuming that such an intention is required.3J3 Each of the relevant situations will 









At P 96. 
Strictly speaking, the labels gestor and dominus should not be used here, as there is no 
relationship of negotiorum gestio, properly so-called. It would be clumsy to use the terms 
quasi-gestor and quasi-dominus (extrapolated from quasi negotiorum gestio), and I will 
therefore use the terminology used for negotiorum gestio proper. 
Or actio negotiorum gestorum utilis: see, e g, Eiselen and Pienaar Unjustified Enrichment 
xiii and 228. 
Eiselen and Pienaar Unjustified Enrichment 218: or the impoverishment of the gestor, 
whichever is the lesser. 
See Whitty and Van Zyl (n 4) 393 cfVan Zyl Negotiorum Gestio 87 (gestor or dominus). 
See Van Zyl Negotiorum Gestio 86; Whitty and Van Zyl (n 4) 389 ff. 
ef notes 63 and 214 above, and the discussion of the bonafide gestor at p 142 ff below. 
See the discussion above at p 67 ff. 
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(a) Where a gestor acts mala fide for his own benefit 
The situation envisaged here occurs when someone administers the affairs of another 
(e g by performing the obligation of another) sui lucri causa i e for his own benefit. 
As the 'gestor' does not act with the intention of benefiting another (animo negolia 
aliena gerendi), the case does not fall within the parameters of negotiorum gestio 
proper in South African law. Provided that the remaining requirements are satisfied, 
however, the performing party will still have a right of recourse against the dominus. 
This claim is based, not on a relationship of negotiorum gestio, but on the enrichment 
of the dominus. The performing party's claim for expenses is thus limited to the 
amount by which the dominus is still enriched. 
In what circumstances might a party perform another's obligation in his own 
interests? In Shaw v Kirby,314 for example, a young man, eagerly anticipating his 
21 st birthday when he would come into an inheritance, visited his aunt at her hotel in 
Mafikeng. Intending to become her partner, and apparently feeling (prematurely) 
affluent, he settled various debts related to the running of the hotel. He did so 
thinking that he would ultimately benefit by keeping the business afloat. In Van 
Staden v Pretorius,315 A purchased a farm from co-owners B and X, and took 
possession. B and X had an arrangement that, prior to transfer to A, they would 
exchange their half-shares in this and another property and would consequently each 
own one property outright. The plan was that once this exchange had taken place, 
and B became full owner of this farm, he would transfer ownership to A. Several 
years later, however, the transfer had still not been effected. In the meantime, while 
A was making various improvements to the farm, B was running into financial 
difficulties. Eventually B's creditors advertised the sale in execution of the farm. In 
order to avoid suffering substantial losses, A paid B's debts.316 
In these and other cases,317 the courts held that the so-called mala fide gestor 








For the facts, see the judgment at 853. 
E g Bernstein v Taylor (1888) 5 HCG 258 at 266; Amod Salie v Ragoon supra. See Van Zyl 
Negotiorum Gestio at 96. 
See Van Zyl Negotiorum Gestio 96 IT; De Vos VerrykingsaanspreekJikheid 215; W de Vos 
'Miskenning van negotiorum gestio' (1965) 28 THRHR 229; Eiselen and Pienaar Unjustified 
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the leading case of Odendaal v Van Oudtshoorn,319 the court rejected these decisions 
and followed another line of authority,320 holding that the gestor would indeed have 
recourse against the dominus in such circumstances. In this case,32! Odendaal (A) 
took over the Trek-In Restaurant in Standerton from Van Oudtshoorn (B) and 
ordered goods from B's supplier, L Suzman Ltd (C). C refused to supply the goods 
unless A paid debts previously incurred by B. A paid the debts, not because he 
wanted to assist his predecessor, B, but because he wanted to carry on the 
business.322 He thus settJed the debts sui lucri causa.323 Because there was no 
intention to benefit the other party, the ordinary negotiorum gestio action (the actio 
negotiorum gestorum contraria) was not available. After reviewing the authorities, 
the court said that Shaw v Kirbi24 had been wrongly decided and that an action 
based on enrichment should be allowed. In other words, if A pays B's debt to C for 
his own benefit, A has a right of recourse based on unjustified enrichment. The court 
added the proviso, however, that such an action would only lie if the circumstances 
were such that the dominus's enrichment were 'improper or unjustified,325 and that 
the reasonableness of the gestor's behaviour was one ofthe factors to be considered 
in deciding this question.326 The weight of opinion seems to be that the case was 
correctly decided, although reservations have been expressed regarding the relevance 










Enrichment 232; Scholtens (1969) 86 SAL.! 131at 133-5; J E Scholtens 'Rights of recourse of 
sureties and third persons who paid another's debt' (1959) 76 SAL.! 266. 
Supra 
Prince qq Dieleman v Berrange, alias Anderson (1830) 1 Menz 435 (cfthe discussion at p 
136 below); Stoll's Trustee v Kriege and Bosman (1835) 3 Menz 448. See Van Zyl 
Negotiorum Gestio 97-8. Van Zyl argues that Harman's Estate v Bartholomew 1955 (2) SA 
302 (N) is also authority for this proposition. 
For the facts of the case, see the judgment at 435-6. 
At 435H infin. 
See the judgment at 435 G: he 'paid, not with the aim (doel) of benefiting (bevoordeel) B but 
purely in his own interests'. Also see the judgment at 437 A. 
Supra. 
If it were 'onbehoorlike of ongeregverdigde': 442F. 
See the judgment at 442F-G. 
See, for example, De Vos Verrykingsaanspreeklikheid215 ('dit [will voorkom asof ons 
regspraaak in hierdie verband na die suiwer regsbeginsel teruggekeer het.'); Van Zy[ 
Negotiorum Gestio at 98-9 (albeit with reservations regarding the court's stipulation that the 
gestor must have acted reasonably in the circumstances); Eiselen and Pienaar Unjustified 
Enrichment at 232, where they suggest that allowing the gestor to recover the dominus's 
enrichment in such circumstances is fair because A could have claimed this sum from B by 
means of cession ofC's action (also see Scholtens (1969) 86 SAL.! 131 at 134 for this 
argument). For criticism of the requirement of reasonableness, also see Scholtens (1969) 86 
SAL.! 131 at 135. The decision was followed by the Cape Provincial Division of the 
Supreme Court in Standard Bank Financial Services Ltd v Taylam (Pty) Ltd supra. This 
question will be considered further at p 119 ff below. 
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The effect of Odendaal v Van Oudtshoom thus appears to be that someone 
who administers the affairs of another with the intention of benefiting himself can 
claim from the dominus the amount by which the latter has been enriched, provided 
that such enrichment is unjustified or 'improper' and the gestor acted reasonably. 
The general formulation of the requirements ofthe extended actio negotiornm 
gestorum has made it an attractive alternative to a general enrichment action, and has 
led to its use in contexts far removed from negotiornm gestio and the policies and 
values which underpin it.328 (In this respect, it is perhaps significant that Odendaal v 
Van Oudtshoom329 was decided merely two years after Nortje en 'n Ander v Pool 
NO.i30 In view of the fact that the Supreme Court of Appeal has now reopened the 
door for the recognition of a general enrichment action,331 it has been argued that the 
heyday of the extended actio negotiornm is drawing to a close; the functions that it 
has fulfilled will now be fulfilled by a general enrichment action, and there will be 
no need to stretch the boundaries of the extended action to accommodate cases that 
really have nothing to do with the ideas behind negotiornm gestio.332 
In this regard, it is interesting to note that although the German Civil Code 
makes provision for general enrichment liability,333 it also expressly makes special 
provision for a close parallel to our situation ofthe malajide gestor.334 This is the 
so-called Geschdftsanmaflung, the second type of non-genuine negotiornm gestio 
(unechte Geschiifts/iihrung ohne Au/trag). According to § 687 (2) BGB, someone 
who treats another person's affair as his own, aware that he is not entitled to do so, 
may sue the other person for his enrichment in certain circumstances.335 Although 
modem writers point out that this is not really a case of Geschiiftsfohrnng ohne 
Au/trag, as the crucial intention to administer the affairs of another for the other is 










See Whitty and Van Zyl (n 4) 394 ff. The fact that an extended actio negotiorum gestorum 
contraria can also be used to claim afactum (i e a plaintiff does not have to prove that a OOtio 
took place) also makes it attractive as an alternative to the condictiones. 
Supra. 
1966 (3) SA 96 (A), with its restrictive approach towards what constitutes 'enrichment' and 
its rejection of a general basis of enrichment liability. 
In McCarthy Retail Ltd v Shortdistance Carriers CC 2001 (3) SA 482 (SeA). 
Whitty and Van Zyl (n 4) 395-6. 
In § 812 ffBGB. 
In § 687 (2) BGB. 
He is entitled to an enrichment action provided that the dominus has enforced his own claims 
against the gestor: see p 105 above. 
See, e g, Palandt § 687 marg note 2; Meclicus Burgerliches Recht marg note 406, 416. 
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lead one to the general enrichment provisions,337 it is perhaps significant that the 
'gestor's' claim occupies one of the special niches carved out of the general 
enrichment liability by von Caemmerer: the Aufwendungskondiktion, or 
'expenditure action,.338 This suggests that, although the result may be the same as in 
any other enrichment case (viz that the enriched party must give up his gains), there 
is something to be said for dealing with it as a special case of enrichment liability. 
This should be borne in mind in evaluating the requirements of the extended action 
of the malafide gestor in South African law. 
The requirement that has received the most attention in South Africa is the 
gestor's intention. This, after all, is the pivotal factor in deciding whether a 
particular situation is one of negotiorum gestio proper, in which case the gestor can 
claim all his expenses, or one of quasi negotiorum gestio, in which case he is limited 
to an enrichment claim. In other words, like German law, South African law regards 
the gestor's state of mind as being crucial in deciding to what extent to condone his 
interference in the affairs of another. 
First it must be pointed out that although the gestor who acts for his own 
benefit is commonly called the mala fide gestor,339 our case law does not demand 
mala fides in the sense that the gestor should have acted in a way that is hostile to the 
interests of the dominus. He will be acting mala fide merely by virtue of the fact that 
he 'knowingly ... undertakes the management of another's affairs, not with the 
animus negotia aliena gerendi, but with the intention of benefiting himself (sui lucri 
causa)' .340 
It is implied, though not always stated, that what is relevant is the gestor's 






§ 687 (2) refers one to § 684 sent. 1, which in tum directs one to the enrichment provisions of 
§812ff. 
See Chapter One at p 24 in this regard. 
See, e g, Eiselen and Pienaar Unjustified Enrichment at 228; Van Zyl Negotiornm Gestio 90; 
Maritime Motors (Pty) Ltd v Von Steiger and Another supra. Cf De Vos, who does not 
mention malajides at all (in Verrykingsaanspreeklikheid at 215) and Odendaal's case supra, 
where there is also no mention of malajides. 
Van ZyJ Negotiornm Gestio at 90. Thus a farmer who puts out a fire on his neighbour's land 
in order to prevent his own crops catching alight, will be acting mala fide and his claim for 
any expenses incurred in extinguishing the flames will be limited to the extent that the 
neighbour was enriched by these actions. 
But see Van ZyJ Negotiorum Gestio at 31. 
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difficult, but our law does not shy away from requiring it in various other contexts. 
There could be particular difficulties in this context, however. The gestor wants to 
claim his expenses. The dominus, on the other hand, will at the very least try to limit 
the gestor's claim to the amount by which he (the dominus) is enriched. In order to 
claim all his expenses, the gestor will have to prove that all the requirements of 
negotiornm gestio are satisfied, including that he intended to benefit the dominus. 
He will have to prove his intention by reference to objective circumstances.342 The 
dominus, on the other hand, could argue that the gestor did not intend to benefit him, 
but to act in his own interests. The only way he can prove what the gestor's 
intention was is by bringing circumstantial evidence, including evidence as to any 
actual benefit that ensued. A court thus has to decide what the gestor subjectively 
intended by referring to the objective circumstances, and the most important of these 
must surely be whether a benefit resulted or not, and whether this benefit accrued to 
the dominus or the gestor. The relationship between the gestor's intention and the 
dominus's interests has not been clarified by the courts,343 but it is difficult to 
imagine a case where a court would hold that someone intended to act animo negotia 
aliena gerendi in circumstances where the gestio in question was objectively solely 
in the gestor's own interests. German law does not provide any assistance in this 
regard. While the Fremdgeschiiftsfiihrnngswille will be presumed in cases where 
someone administers what is objectively the affair of another (including performance 
of another's obligation), a case of Geschiiftsanmaj3ung can only arise where there is 
clear proof to the contrary.344 In other words, as in South African law, it must be 
proven that the gestor intended to carry out the affair for himself. 
What exactly must the content ofthe gestor's intention be? It is clear that if 
the gestor intends purely to benefit the dominus, there will be a situation of 
negotiornm gestio. It is also clear that ifhe intends only to benefit himself, his case 
would fall within the scope of quasi negotiornm gestio. But what happens where his 
motives are mixed? In other words, would a farmer who puts out a fire on a 
neighbour's farm be allowed an actio negotiornm gestornm contraria or would he be 
confined to its extended version if he were prompted not only by good 




See Van Zyl Negotiorum Gestio at 31. 
Cf the discussion at p 86 ff above, concerning the requirement that the administration be 
uti/iter coeptum. 
See pp 82 and 103 above. 
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Jaw regard someone who pays the debt of another with the genuine intention to help 
the debtor, but also with the awareness that he himself stands to benefit from doing 
so? 
In German law, all that has to be proven for a case to fall within the scope of 
GeschiiftsanmafJung is that the administration was primarily in the interests of the 
'gestor,.345 South African law is not as clear. It seems to say that in cases where the 
gestor intends to benefit both himself and the dominus, he can nevertheless sue for 
his expenses.346 He will thus be confined to an enrichment claim only where he 
intended solely to benefit himself. 
The law thus appears to say that if someone's motives are at least partly 
altruistic,347 it is fair for him to claim reimbursement for any costs he has incurred. If 
his motives are purely selfish, on the other hand, he can still sue the dominus, but 
only for the dominus's gain, and he must bear the risk that the dominus was either not 
enriched or that he might have lost any enrichment he did receive. This implies that 
the law discourages meddling in the affairs of another for self-interest, but only by 
possibly48 reducing the quantum of the gestor's claim. Looking at the situation 
from the dominus's point of view, why should he not be allowed to keep whatever he 
has received as a result of someone's self-interested interference in his affairs 
without his consent? Allowing him to retain what he has received in such 
circumstances seems to 'compensate' him for the encroachment into his private 
sphere by the gestor. From the gestor's point of view, the dominus's enrichment in 
such circumstances seems merely coincidental (where the gestor's primary aim was 
to benefit himself). Why should the gestor be allowed to take advantage349 of the 
fact that his interference in the affairs of another in furtherance of his own interests 
has actually resulted in a benefit to that party? To allow the gestor a claim in such 
circumstances seems to tip the balance too much in favour of the gestor, if the 






See PaJandi § 687 marg note 2. 
See, e g, Zimmennann Law of Obligations 433; Whitty and Van Zyl (n 4) 373. But cf earlier 
cases, e g, the comments of Innes CJ in Amod Salie v Ragoon supra at 103: the gestor must 
not act 'with a view to benefit himself in any way' . 
In the limited sense explained above at p 76. 
The measure of the expenses and the enrichment might be the same, especially where 
someone has paid the debt of another. 
I e by suing the dominus for enrichment. 
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gestio. It should be remembered, however, that the law is not only concerned with 
steering a middle course between the values of altruism350 and autonomy. It is also 
concerned with preventing situations of unjustified enrichment, and this seems to be 
the true rationale for the rule allowing the mala fide gestor a claim. In other words, 
the dominus should not be out of pocket due to the gestor's interference, but he 
should also not be allowed to profit from it. 
The next issue is what is meant by 'benefit' in this context. Must the benefit 
be one which is measurable in fmancial tenns, or would it suffice if the gestor 
intended a non-pecuniary benefit (to another, in the case of negotiorum gestio proper, 
or to himself, in the case of quasi negotiorum gestio)? Would a gestor succeed in 
claiming his expenses ifhe could show that he perfonned the obligation of another 
with the intention of preserving that person's reputation (e g to stave off bankruptcy), 
or could he bring an enrichment claim ifhe proved that he did so with the intention 
of boosting his own image as a benefactor? The recent case of Maritime Motors 
(Pty) Ltd v Von Steiger35 I suggests that a gestor who intends to protect his reputation 
acts mala fide and can therefore not rely on the actio negotiorum gestorum 
contraria.352 It appears, therefore, that even an intention to benefit oneself in a non-
pecuniary way can shift a case from the province of negotiorum gestio proper to that 
of quasi negotiorum gestio. This implies that any kind of selfish motive makes 
enrichment in such circumstances unjustified. 
Finally, how does the gestor's intention to benefit relate to the law on 
extinction of the debts of another? According to one fonnulation of the requirements 
for the payment of another's debt, as discussed above,353 the paying party should 
have the intention to settle the other's debt. For the fonner party (A) to bring an 
enrichment claim against the latter (B), under the heading of quasi negotiorum 
gestiO, A would have to prove that he intended to settle B's debt, but also that he was 





It must also be remembered that the 'intention to benefit the dominus' only implies a motive 
of limited altruism; if the gestor's motives are purely altruistic (i e he intends to help the 
dominus without any quid pro quo), he cannot claim his expenses as he will have made a 
donation, and not acted as a negotiorum gestor. 
Supra. 
At 600B. 
See p 67 ff. 
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terms ofB's obligation for his own benefit.i54 If, on the other hand, as some writers 
seem to suggest,355 extinction of an obligation by someone other than the debtor 
requires that the performing party not only intend to perform the debtor's obligation 
but that he does so with the intention of benefiting the debtor, the debt will not be 
discharged i e B will not be enriched but C will. As was argued above,356 the 
approach of the court in Odendaal's case seems to suggest that the 'intention to 
benefit' is not required in order to settle a debt. 
As said above, although the gestor's intention occupies central stage, there 
are other requirements that must be met before a plaintiff can succeed with an 
extended actio negotiorum gestorum in South African law. He must accordingly 
prove that the dominus was enriched by the administration,357 and that this 
enrichment was unjustified, in the sense that it took place without legal ground.358 It 
is also implied, but not usually stated, that the affairs administered must objectively 
be those of another, for quasi negotiorum gestio to arise.359 
The enrichment in question need not be by way of a datio, as required for 
most of the eondietiones;36o it could thus be a/aetum. In our context, the enrichment 
would result from the extinction of a liability; if A performs to C in terms of an 
obligation B-C, and such performance extinguishes B's liability to C, B would be 
enriched. A question that has not generally been considered in this context is 
whether A must have been correspondingly impoverished.361 In other words, must 









See the remarks in note 214 above. 
See note 48 above. 
At p 71. 
See Du Preez v Boetsap Stores (Pty) Ltd supra at 181 H, where the court said that the plai ntiff 
had to prove that the defendant had been enriched 'and that onus is not discharged merely by 
proving that specific amounts were disbursed, more especially since plaintiff alleges that he 
acted in his own interests.' 
Thus negotiorum gestio and quasi negotiorum gestio will both be excluded if the actls in 
question took place in terms of a contract of mandate (cf, e g, Kunneke v Eerste Nasionale 
Bank van Suidelike Afrika Bpk 1997 (3) SA 300 (T) at 313G-l and Blesbok 
Eiendomsagentskap v Cantamessa 1991 (2) SA 712 (T». And quasi negotiorum gestio (and 
consequently enrichment liability) will be excluded if all of the requirements of negotiorum 
gestio are met. 
Thus the extended action is inappropriate where the performing party was in fact 
administering his own affairs. Cfthe discussion of banking cases in Chapter Three below. 
See Chapter One at p 7 ff. 
This question does not arise in German law, as the wording of § 812 BGB only requires that 
someone 'erlangt etwas' (i e receive something) - there is no general requirement of 
impoverishment. See Chapter One at p 42 in this regard. 
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party perfonns the obligation of another, the one party's impoverishment would 
equal the other's enrichment. IfB owes Rl 000 to C, and A pays Rl 000 to C, there 
is no difference between A's loss and B's gain (at least in financial tenns). 
Situations could arise, however, where the enrichment exceeds the impoverishment. 
For example, B is abroad for several months and A pays the annual fee for B's 
television licence which faits due during B's absence. The broadcasting company 
has a 'competition' to encourage licence-holders to pay their fees, and arbitrarily 
awards prizes to some of those who pay timeously. As B's fees are paid promptly, B 
wins a valuable prize. Here, B's enrichment (the loss ofa liability and the gain ofa 
prize) exceeds A's impoverishment. The general approach of South African law is to 
require the impoverishment of a plaintiff in an enrichment action362 and to limit the 
measure of his claim to whichever is the lesser: his impoverishment or the 
defendant's enrichment. It is probable that these general rules also apply within the 
context of payment of the debt of another and quasi negotiorum gestio. 
Finally, the provisos mentioned by the court in Odendaal v Van Oudtshoorn 
must be considered. The court said that the gestor would only have a claim if the 
dominus's enrichment were 'improper or unjustified' and that the reasonableness of 
the gestor's behaviour was one of the factors to be considered in deciding this 
question.363 In using the word 'unjustified' in this context, the court seemed not 
merely to be referring to an absence of a valid legal ground, but to something broader 
i e a lack of justification on the grounds of fairness or other policy considerations. 
Although this has been criticised by academics, the approach of the courts 
still appears to be that the extended actio negotiorum gestorum can be refused where 
allowing it would lead to an unfair result.364 Thus, where A settles B's debt to C in 
circumstances where the debt was about to prescribe, it would be unfair to expect B 




Cf the approach in German law: see Chapter One at p 42. 
See the judgment at 442F-G. 
See, e g, the obiter comments of the AD in B & H Engineering v First National Bank of 
South Africa Ltd supra at 295B: 'Thus a bank might have paid a debt which was on the point 
of being prescribed, or it might have paid while the parties were negotiating to reduce the 
debt, etc. Moreover, in exceptional circumstances the drawer may have an interest in not 
having the debt paid. In such cases a court may conceivably hold that, even if the drawer 
were enriched, the bank would not in equity be entitled to restitution.' Cf the comments of 
Whitty and Van Zyl (n 4) 392-3, quoted below at p 127, which seem to imply (in the context 
of a protesting debtor) that a substitution of creditors is not a serious matter. 
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There might also be circumstances where A performs in terms ofB's obligation to C 
in order to improve A's bargaining position vis-a-vis B. For example, A might want 
to buy land from B, who is reluctant to sell it. If A were assured of an enrichment 
action in all cases where he administered B's affairs sui lucri causa, A could then 
pay B's debts to C, acquire a claim against B, and use this to 'persuade' B to sell him 
the land he wants.365 In my opinion, measuring the gestor's behaviour against an 
objective standard, such as reasonableness, and considering the interests of the 
dominus would provide the safeguards necessary to prevent inequitable results.366 
The riders added by the court may also be explained in a slightly different 
way. The statement of the court seems to echo some of the formulations of the 
requirement that the administration of the affairs of another be utiliter coeptum.367 It 
certainly gives expression to the thinking behind the utiliter-requirement: 
interference in the affairs of another will only be condoned in circumstances which 
make it acceptable368 according to our boni mores. It could thus be argued that, in 
effect, the court was saying that where someone manages the affairs of another sui 
lucri causa, such management must nevertheless be utiliter for him to have the 
limited legal relief provided by the extended action. In other words, moving from 
the domain of negotiorum gestio proper into that of quasi negotiorum gestio does not 
meant that all of the requirements of negotiorum gestio are abandoned. Thus a mala 
fide gestor need not prove that he acted with the intention to benefit the dominus, but 
he must satisfy all the other requirements of negotiorum gestio in order to recover 
those expenses by which the dominus remains enriched. The appropriateness of 
posing the utiliter-requirement in the context of an enrichment action might be 
debatable, but I think that the court's proviso serves a useful function in preventing 
cases of injustice and should therefore be retained in some form. 
While South African law balances the interests of the parties by requiring that 
the malafide gestor act reasonably (and the resultant enrichment not be 'improper'), 





CfMedicus's example cited at p 100 above. 
Cf Whitty and Van Zyl (n 4) 3%, who argue that the requirement of negotiorum gestio 
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gestor by stipulating that it will only be available to him if the 'dominus' has 
enforced his claims to the proceeds of the administration and compensation for any 
damage caused by the gestor.369 If the dominus does not sue, the mala fide gestor 
will be without a remedy. If, on the other hand, the dominus does sue, the malafide 
gestor's claim will be set off against that of the dominus. In a sense, the action of the 
mala fide gestor in Gennan law is thus only conditional; like its South African 
equivalent, it is subject to a proviso. It is interesting to note that South African 
writers on negotiorum gestio do not generally discuss the position of the party whose 
affairs have been managed by a mala fide gestor?70 Perhaps th~ fact that the rights 
of such a dominus have not been clearly set out has also contributed to the court's 
reluctance to discard the provisos attached to the action of the malafide gestor.371 
(b) Where a gestor acts domino prohibente 
The question whether a party (A) who manages the affairs of another (B) against his 
express wishes is entitled to an action against the dominus has long been a vexed 
one.372 Even in Roman law, the question was disputed until Justinian ruled out an 
action in such circumstances.373 Martinus, one of the quattuor dottores, suggested 
that it should be pennitted. Subsequent lawyers who considered the question fell 
into two camps; some adhering to the Roman position;374 others, some very 
influential, following the lead ofMartinus.375 In South Africa, while the earliest 
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proper. In this regard, see Zimmennann Law o/Obligations 443. 
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acting against the protest of the dominus in Colonial Government v Smith and 
Company.377 
Smith and Company was a firm that imported and traded in explosives.378 
With the informal consent of the Port Elizabeth Town Council, it stored its 
explosives in magazines situated on the outskirts of the town. Later, with the 
expansion of the town and the advent of the Boer War, the council regarded the 
magazines as a source of danger to the public. It accordingly requested Smith and 
Company to remove the magazines to a different site. In spite of repeated requests 
and ultimata from the council and the government, the company did nothing to 
comply with this request. Eventually, despite the formal protest of Smith and 
Company, the government had the explosives placed on a ship for safe storage. The 
government sued for the cost of removing and storing the explosives. 
Regarding the removal of the explosives to the ship, Smith and Company 
argued, inter alia, that the explosives had been moved without its consent and despite 
its protest. 379 The government, on the other hand, argued that it had acted like a 
negotiorum gestor and that it should accordingly be reimbursed for its expenses. The 
court stated that 
the usual conception of a negotiorum gestor is one who, without 
express mandate, carries on the business, or who protects the property 
of another who is absent or who is incapable of acting for himself. As 
a rule, if the owner is present, or is unwilling or forbids the business 
being done, the unauthorised agent cannot force his services upon such 
owner.380 
It went on to hold/81 however, that a mala fide possessor could claim compensation 






Menz 185 (where the Court allowed one Brand to appear on behalf of the Wine DepOt 
Company as negotiorum gestor but only because the opposing party consented, and not 
because it in any way 'admitted that he had any right to appear in that capacity if any 
objection had been made to his so doing': see 185. This case is cryptically short, and it 
appears that the institution of negotiorum gestio was used in circumstances analogous to the 
Roman law i e Brand acted as the dominus's representative in the legal proceedings. Such 
circumstances would not arise today because nobody is 'permitted to raise or defend an 
action on another's behalf and in his name, or to represent another in legal proceedings' 
without a mandate: see Whitty and Van Zyl (n 4) 383). 
Supra at 392. 
See the judgment at 388 ff for the facts. 
See 390. 
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possessor) should not be in a worse position than a mala fide possessor, and therefore 
that the government's claim for the cost of removal should succeed.382 (The 
government's claim for the costs of storage was also granted, but on a different basis. 
The court allowed the claim because the goods were stored with the implied consent 
of Smith and Company, as they were free to move the explosives to another location 
at any time but chose not to do SO.)383 
This case is usually cited as authority for the proposition that a gestor who 
acted domino prohibente is allowed to sue the dominus with an extended actio 
negotiorum gestorum i e an enrichment action.384 It should be noted, however, that, 
although the court mentioned that Smith and Company were 'the richer for the 
expenditure, in that they [had] ... been saved incurring the expenses themselves, and 
their property [had] ... been preserved to them thereby', 385 it held that the 
government should be reimbursed for all the expenses it incurred in removing the 
explosives. It could thus be argued that the action in question was the normal action 
for expenses and not an enrichment action;386 that it was thus an actio negotiorum 
gestorum contraria proper, and not an extended action. The case therefore does not 
constitute clear authority for the granting of an enrichment claim to a gestor acting 
against the express wishes of the dominus.387 Even if the claim had merely been for 
Smith and Company's enrichment, it could be argued that the government was a 
mala fide gestor in that it acted in its own interests (as the representative of the 
public) in removing the explosives. 
Nearly eighty years later, the question again raised its head in the case of 
Standard Bank Financial Services Ltd v Taylam (Pty) Ltd.388 Rejecting an obiter 










At 394. There was also a claim for the cost of storing other explosives which had been 
placed on the ship by Smith and Company themselves. The court also dealt with this as a 
contractual question i e the goods had been stored with the company's consent. See the 
judgment at 394. 
See Van Zyl Negoliorom Gestio 108-9; Whitty and Van ZyJ (n 4) 392-3. 
At 393. 
Although, admittedly, it could be said that the measure of the expenses and the amount of the 
enrichment coincided. 
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Supra, at 438A, where he refers to Pretorius v Van Zy11927 OPD 226 at 230. Also see 
Joubert (n 23) at 276: 'According to authority the third party will, however, have no claim 
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Division allowed an extended negotiorum gestio action.390 
In this case,391 Murray and Stewart agreed to build a shopping centre in 
Wynberg for Taylam. Taylam authorised Standard Bank to pay the builders most of 
the contract price upon presentation of the architects' certificates. When the builders 
presented a certificate to the bank, however, Taylam advised the bank not to pay the 
relevant amount, as Taylam believed the certificate not to be binding. Taylam 
further warned the bank that if it paid Murray and Stewart, it would be doing so 'at 
its own peril,.392 The bank, believing that it was bound to pay, did so, 
notwithstanding Taylam's warning. 
It then claimed the amount of the payment from Taylam, on the basis of 
unjustified enrichment. Taylam argued, in defence, that the payment had been made 
in contravention of its express instructions, that it was not in Taylam's interests but 
rather purely in the bank's interests, that it was unreasonable and that any enrichment 
was not unjustified.393 The bank thereupon raised an exception to this defence, 
arguing, inter alia, that Taylam's defence was based on its belief that it (Taylam) 
was not indebted to the builders and that, as Taylam presumably394 did owe the 
amount to the builders, it had been enriched at the expense of the bank which had 
settled its (Taylam's) debt.395 
Although the first question for decision therefore appears to have been 
whether or not Taylam was indebted to the builders,396 the judge identified the main 
issue as being 'whether the payment of another's debt made in own interest and in 








[under negotiorum gestio J if he has performed contrary to an express prohibition of the 
debtor'. As authority for this statement he cites Vinnius 1.3.29 (30) pr n 9, Huber 
Heedendaegse Rechtsgeleertheyt 3.38.20, Van Leeuwen Censura Forensis 1.4.32.4, Shaw v 
Kirby supra, Van Staden v Pretorius supra, Odendaal v Van OudJshoorn supra but does not 
mention Taylam's case. 
Also see Whitty and Van Zyl (n 4) 392. 
For the facts, see pp 384-387 of the judgment. 
At 386A and 386G of the judgment. 
At 386C-D. 
See paragraph 4 of the plaintiffs grounds for the exception at 387C ('On the premise that the 
defendant was in fact indebted to M & S .. .'), which suggests the plaintiff's uncertainty in 
this regard. 
At 386H - 387C. 
See 384F: 'It is this exception that is now being tried.' 
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based on unjustified enrichment. ,397 After discussing the Roman and Roman-Dutch 
authorities in this regard, and what he characterised as the 'only ... decision of any 
real importance', 398 Colonial Government v Smith & CO,399 the judge held that the 
performing party would be entitled to an action even if he acted against the express 
wishes of the debtor, provided that the performing party proved 'circumstances that 
would make it just for it to have acted in contravention of. .. [the debtor's] expressed 
wishes. ,400 
Most commentators approve of the court's granting the actio negotiornm 
gestorum utilis in such circumstances, but they differ in regard to the qualifications 
attached to the remedy by the court.401 
The first point to make here is that Tay/am's case does not properly belong in 
the category of cases being discussed in this chapter, because there was a legal 
relationship between A and B. They were linked by a banker-client contract, and 
against that background, B gave A an instruction to pay C. B later revoked this 
instruction but A nevertheless paid. In other words, there was initially an instruction 
or authorisation, but it was later withdrawn. This is a case concerning what the 
Germans would call an Anweisung (a special kind of instruction or authorisation), 
and it will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter. Secondly, it appears that 
the intention of the bank was not to assist B, but to fulfil its own contractual 
obligations. In other words, this was really a case of a mala fide gestor,402 and 
imposing enrichment liability could have arguably been justified on that ground 
alone. It was accordingly unnecessary for the court to hold that a gestor who acted 
domino prohibente was entitled to an extended enrichment action. 
At this stage, however, it might be useful to ask whether, as a general rule, 
our law should grant relief to a gestor who has acted against the express wishes of 









Supra and 11 CTR 521. 
At 395C. 
De Vos Verrykingsaanspreeklikheid215 and Rubin (n 82) 33 approve, whereas Van Zyl 
Negotiorum Gestio 110 and Eiselen and Pienaar Unjustified Enrichment 228 disapprove of 
the qualification. 
The necessary animus negotia aliena gerendi being absent: the bank intended to pay the 
amount in question, not for Taylam, but for its own purposes. 
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aimed at compensating the gestor for acts of altruism - in the limited sense explained 
above - but it should not go so far as to condone all instances of interference in the 
affairs of anDther. To allow the gestor a claim for all of his expenses (an actio 
negotiorum gestorum contraria) where he acted against the express wishes of the 
dominus would clearly be going tDO far. It would tilt the scales too much in favour 
of the gestor by permitting him to ignore the explicit wishes of the dominus and to 
'encumber him with help,403 which he clearly dDes not want.404 It would also 
inadequately protect the dominus's interest in 'the autonomous and independent 
management of his own patrimony and affairs. ,405 What more cou ld the dominus do 
to prevent interference in his affairs than to forbid it? It seems inequitable to expose 
him to an action in such circumstances. The original idea behind recognising 
negotiorum gestio as a legal institution was to accommodate the interests of a party 
who has helped another without his consent, in circumstances where that person was 
either not present or incapable of giving his consent. A situation of negotiorum 
gestio could thus only arise where the will of the dominus could not be established.406 
Where the dominus has forbidden the administration of his affairs, his wiiJ is clear. 
Moreover, if the dominus could forbid the act in question, he was surely also capable 
of permitting it. Someone who administers the affairs of another against the express 
wiiJ ofthe latter should therefore not be considered under the head of negotiorum 
gestio. 
Attempts to justify allowing the gestor an enrichment claim on the basis of 
the policies underlying negotiorum gestio similarly founder. To say that someone 
who interferes in the affairs of another against his wishes should be granted any 
compensation for doing so (even if it is only the amount by which the dominus has 
been enriched) offends one's sense ofjusti-ce. In general,407 the only justification for 
allowing an action in such circumstances would be the prevention of unjustified 






Samuel Johnson, quoted in James Boswell Life of Johnson 3 ed (1987, OUP World Classics) 
185. 
The gestor might be motivated to act for paternalistic reasons, or to promote his own interests 
(in which case the situation overlaps with that of the mala fide gestor, as does Taylam's case 
supra). 
Whitty and Van Zyl (n 4) 392. 
Cfthe requirement in Gennan law that the gestor is obliged to inform the dominus of the 
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reward or condonation of the gestor's administration of the affairs of another, they 
should accordingly be treated as ordinary situations of enrichment, and not 
(unhappily) forced into the mould of negotiorum gestio, whether in its true or its 
extended form. 
Even if one accepts that a gestor who acts domino prohibente should be 
allowed to sue for enrichment, it could be argued that, at the very least, the 
enrichment action of such a gestor should be confined to narrow limits. Whitty and 
Van Zyl thus argue that the action should only be available in certain 'narrow 
categories of cases. ,408 They cite the following categories as examples: 'where the 
gestio promotes an overriding public interest outweighing the prohibition, ,409 and the 
payment of debts.41o Regarding the payment of the debts of another, the authors go 
on to say that 
[c lases involving discharge of liabilities over the debtor's protests do not 
normally involve a serious infringement of the debtor's independence 
and autonomy because their net effect is nothing worse than a 
compulsory change of creditor. There must however be safeguards to 
protect a debtor-dominus who has a right of retention or lien, or of 
compensation (set-off).411 
The statement of the court in Tay/am's case that a plaintiff would have to prove 
'circumstances that would make it just for it to have acted in contravention of ... [the 
debtor's] expressed wishes' is an attempt to safeguard the interests of the protesting 
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Whitty and Van Zyl (n 4) 392-3: 'such as the need to remove a store of explosives away from 
the dangerous neighbourhood of a town to a place of safety, or the provision of necessary 
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what it perceived to be its own contractual obligations. Regarding the second category, see 
note 451 below. 
See the discussion of payment in accordance with countermanded instructions in the next 
chapter. 
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There might be negative consequences for a debtor, however, e g the new creditor might be 
harsher than the old, the debt might be about to prescribe etc. That there is also a need to 
protect the debtor who has a change of creditors imposed upon him against his will is 
illustrated by the law of cession, which provides certain protection to a debtor whose creditor 
cedes the claim to another. On the protection of debtors in cases of cession, see, e g, Van der 
Merwe et at Contract 452 ff. Also see the text at p 131 ff below. 
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Rubin (n 82) 33 support it. In this regard, also see Silke (n 90) 274: 'Where there is 
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is rather vague, and therefore unhelpful.413 
A comparison with German law might shed some light on the questions 
whether an enrichment claim should be granted to a gestor who acts against the 
express wishes of the dominus, and what safeguards might serve to protect the 
interests of the dominus in such circumstances. 
As mentioned above, it should be borne in mind that a case such as Taylam's 
would not be dealt with under the heading of 'performance of the obligation of 
another' in German law because the bank's administration was originally authorised 
by Taylam (even though that authorisation was later withdrawn). In Germany, cases 
of authorisation or instruction (Anweisungen) are dealt with in a category of their 
own, with their own rules, because there are different policies at play, and different 
interests to be balanced.414 In terms of German law, Taylam's original authorisation 
of payment would also exclude the case from the ambit of Geschaftsfohrung ohne 
Auf trag in any of its forms. The essence of Geschaftsfohrung ohne Aujtrag is, after 
all, the absence of a mandate or any other legal relationship authorising performance 
to another. Where a 'dominus' specifically instructs a 'gestor' to perform the 
administration in question, the case is immediately excluded from the ambit of 
Geschaftsfuhrung ohne Aujtrag, even if that instruction is later withdrawn or the 
performance subsequently prohibited. 
That said, how would German law treat a situation where if A performed in 
terms of B' s obligation to C against B' s express will in the absence of any actual or 
purported instruction or authorisation? It will be remembered that if a third party 
purports to make a performance owed by another, and the debtor objects, the creditor 
is entitled, but not compelled, to refuse to accept the performance. If he accepts the 
413 
414 
even more important that the meddling should not be gratuitous, but that both parties should 
have a real interest in the matter that is meddled with. It is nDt only the meddling that must 
not be gratuitous, but there must not be gratuitous disregard of the wishes of the dominus. In 
fact, there must be some just cause for disregarding his wishes. The public spiritedness and 
the good neighbourliness that occasions the concern for the affairs of another must be present 
to bring the matter within the ambit of the actio negotiorum gestorurn rontraria, which action 
covers a claim based upon unjust enrichment as well as a claim based upon a quasi-contract.' 
As an ex post facto enquiry, it is particularly unhelpful to a gestor who, when deciding 
whether to ignore the prohibition of the dominus, might want to know whether he would be 
entitled to some relief should he intervene in spite of such prohibition. 
Analytically, the Anweisung-situation is not seen as an instance of performance of another's 
obligation, because the performing party (A) is regarded as having performed to the 
instructing party (B), and not to B's creditor (C). 
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perfonnance notwithstanding the debtor's objection, the debt would be extinguished 
(although there is some authority to suggest that the debt would not be extinguished 
by the perfonnance of a third party in such circumstances).415 Assuming, however, 
that the creditor does not refuse to accept the third party's perfonnance, and that such 
perfonnance indeed extinguishes the obligation in question, what would the legal 
position be? A and B would not be linked by a relationship of berechtigte 
Geschaftsfohrung ohne Aufirag Gustifed negotiorum gestio) because the 
administration took place against B's wil1.416 Provided that the other requirements of 
Geschiiftsfuhrung ohne Aufirag are met, however, the case would constitute one of 
unberechtigte (unjustified) Geschiiftsfohrung ohne Auf trag. 4 17 A would thus be able 
to claim B 's enrichment by means of a Ruckgriffskondiktion, as explained above.418 
It will also be recalled that the Gennans justify granting a claim to A merely on the 
basis of the prevention of unjustified enrichment.419 Special safeguards have been 
developed, however, to protect the position of the original debtor. Thus he will not 
be liable if he receives something that is of no use or benefit to him and that is of 
such a nature that it cannot be returned.420 Secondly, he will probably not be liable if 
he loses the enrichment.421 Thirdly, when sued by A, he may raise any defences that 
he would have had against his original creditor, C, and can set off against B's claim 
any claim which he may have against c.422 
This raises several points of interest. First of all, it is interesting to note that 
anyone who administers the affairs of another against his wishes will be entitled to 
an enrichment action, and Gennan law regards the prevention of unjustified 
enrichment as sufficient reason for granting a remedy to such a person. It thus seems 
that, as far as the policies underlying the law are concerned, the prevention of 
unjustified enrichment overrides the prevention of interference in the affairs of 
another in these circumstances. It is perhaps also significant that although Gennan 
law has a general basis for enrichment liability, the remedy afforded to the gestor 
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of enrichment law developed by von Caemmerer.423 As was said above, this is also 
true of the enrichment action of the Gennan equivalent of our mala fide gestor,424 
and the same point may be made here: this suggests that there is some justification 
for treating this as a special case even after our courts recognise a general enrichment 
action.425 
Next, it should be pointed out that Gennan law requires that, apart from the 
will of the dominus, all the other requirements for Geschafts/uhrung ohne Au/trag 
must be satisfied for the case to qualify as unberechtigte Geschiifts/uhrung ohne 
Au/trag. In other words, the gestor must have administered the affair of another 
without his authorisation but with the intention - whether actual or presumed - of 
doing so for his benefit.426 In addition, the requirements posed by the law of 
unjustified enrichment must be met in order for the Ruckgriffskondiktion to be 
available. Amongst these requirements, attention should be drawn to the one which 
demands that the defendant must have received something 'at the expense or the 
plaintiff. As was explained in Chapter One,427 this requirement applies to all of the 
Nichtleistungskonditionen, the species of enrichment remedy of which the 
Riickgriffskondiktion is a member. 
It is not only certain requirements of Geschafts/uhrung ohne Au/trag that 
apply in cases where someone administers the affairs of another against his wishes, 
but also certain of its consequences.428 Thus the gestor must compensate the 
dominus for any loss his actions have caused.429 The liability thus imposed on the 
gestor provides a counterweight to his enrichment claim against the dominus that is 
absent in South African law. Perhaps we should follow Gennany's lead in spelling 
out the ways in which the gestor might incur liability that would balance his interests 








The Gennan rules which seek to protect the interests of the dominus can also 
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Also cfReinhard Zimmennann 'Unjustified enrichment: the modem civilian approach' 
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See, for example, Medicus Schuldrecht 1I marg note 629. 
§ 678 BGB and see Medicus Schuldrecht 1I marg note 629 for further details in this regard. 
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guide us in developing our law by more precisely defming the 'circumstances that 
would make it just for [a gestor] ... to have acted in contravention of ... [the 
debtor's] expressed wishes' .430 We, too, can find safeguards in our law of cession 
(which is analogous to this situation because it also entails a substitution of 
creditors431 against the will of the debtor). Our law of cession provides certain 
protection to a debtor whose creditor cedes the claim to another, provided that the 
debtor acts bonafide.432 Thus a debtor who concludes a compromise with his 
original creditor (i e the cedent) will be treated as if he concluded the compromise 
with the cessionary. Similarly, if the original creditor releases the debtor, or extends 
the time within which the debtor had to perform, the debtor may raise these as 
defences against the cessionary; he will be regarded as having been released from 
liability, or granted an extension by the cessionary. Finally, if the debtor purports to 
set off a claim against that of his original creditor, this will be treated as a set-off 
against the ceded claim now held by the cessionary, even if the debtor's claim was 
not yet liquidated when the cession took place.433 There is no reason why the 
protection afforded the debtor in these circumstances should not be extended, by way 
of analogy, to the dominus who has suffered a change of creditors against his will. 
Thus a protesting dominus (B) who is sued for enrichment should be able to raise 
against the gestor any defences (such as compromise, release, or extension of time 
for performance) that he would have had against his original creditor. Similarly, he 
should be able to set off against the gestor's extended actio negotiorum gestorum any 
claim which he could have set off against his original creditor's claim. 
The other methods which German law uses to protect a dominus in a case of 
unberechtigte Geschiifisfohrung ohne Au/trag are perhaps not as pertinent to cases of 
performance of another's obligation as the cession-analogy.434 A possible exception 
is the rule that the dominus will not have to restore to the gestor anything that he has 







As required by Taylam's case supra. See p 125 above. 
B's contractual creditor (C), for example, would be substituted by an enrichment creditor (A). 
On the protection of debtors in cases of cession, see, e g, Van der Merwe el al Contrac/453 
ff. (Obviously, notice to the debtor - as discussed by those authors at 452 - would not be 
apposite in the circumstances presently being considered.) 
For all of these examples, see Van der Merwe el al Contrac/453-4, and the sources cited 
there. 
Thus it is difficult to understand how one can 'lose' the extinction of a liability by a third 
party. 
See Medicus SchuldrechlIl marg note 628: where the dominus derives 'keinen Nutzen'. 
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Perfonnance in tenns of an obligation that was about to prescribe could fall into this 
category: in such circumstances the enrichment of the dominus is merely technical 
as he would have imminently lost the liability even if it had not been discharged by 
the gestor. Equity demands that the gestor be denied a claim to this 'enrichment', 
which is as unsubstantial as something 'writ in water'. That this is so is illustrated by 
the fact that judges who grant the extended actio negotiorum gestorum on the basis 
of Taylam's case cite the payment of a debt that was about to prescribe as an 
example of circumstances where it would not be just for the gestor to have acted 
against the debtor's expressed wishes.436 
Another interesting insight emerges from this comparison of the South 
African law and Gennan law regarding the action against a protesting dominus. In 
view of the various qualms expressed about this action, it is striking to note that a 
wider range of gestores will be granted recourse in tenns of Gennan law than in 
South Africa. Thus Gennan law allows a Rilckgriffskondiktion not only to a gestor 
who acts against the express wishes of the dominus but also to one who acts against 
his actual (unexpressed) wishes, or his presumed will, or against his interests.437 In 
the light of this, it seems almost bizarre that South African law grants an enrichment 
action only to a gestor who acts against the express wishes of the dominus, the 
situation which is the most extreme fonn of unjustified administration of the affairs 
of another (i e the one in which the gestor's actions seem most objectionable). In the 
circumstances, and bearing in mind that the rationale for granting the gestor an 
enrichment claim is the prevention of unjustified enrichment, I cannot see why a 
similar claim should not be granted to the gestor who administers the affairs of 
another against his actual or presumed will or against his interests. If the gestor who 
acts against the protests of the dominus (and is thus clearly aware of his wishes) is 




Standard Bank Financial Services v Taylam (Pty) Ltd supra at 395C. See, for example, B & 
H Engineering v First National Bank of SA Ltd supra at 295E. 
I e the other situations of unberechtigte GeschOfisfiihrung ohne Auftrag. Note that these echo 
some of the arguments raised in Taylam's case supra. It will also be recalled that ratification 
by the dominus can convert a situation from one of unjustified (unberechligte) 
GeschOfisfiihrung ohne Auftrag to one of justified (berechtigte) Geschiiftsfiihrung ohne 
Auftrag. As Medicus says, however, after the event, the dominus will usually not want an 
administration that he did not originally want and he will therefore not ratify it: see 
Schuldrecht II marg note 628. 
Bearing in mind that this is the only recourse that would be available, as the action arising 
from negotiorum gestio proper would also be unavailable because the administration was 
arguably inutiliter. 
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having received an express prohibition, administers the affairs of another against his 
will or against his interests? If the enrichment of a dominus who has protested 
against the interference in his affairs is regarded as unjustified, why should the 
enrichment of a dominus against whose will or interests the administration has taken 
place be regarded as justified? 
The comparison also highlights an anomaly in South African law. In general, 
the law of unjustified enrichment mirrors its legal neighbours. Thus the borders of 
enrichment liability are often determined by the limits of contractual liability439 and 
by certain rules of property law.440 To a certain extent, the extended actio 
negotiorum gestorum similarly mirrors the law of negotiorum gestio proper. The 
three main requirements of negotiorum gestio are that there must be an act of 
administration of the affairs of another, with the animus negotia aliena gerendi, and 
such administration must be utiliter. Each of these has a counterpart in the law of 
enrichment. For example, someone will arguably be entitled to an enrichment action 
if is act is 'defective' because he purports to administer the affairs of another without 
the capacity to act.44 I If someone administers the affairs of another without the 
animus negotia aliena gerendi, he also will be entitled to an enrichment action: if 
the requisite intention is lacking because he thinks he is administering his own 
affairs, he will be a bonafide gestor; if the requisite intention is lacking because he 
intends to benefit himself, he will be a malafide gestor. Against this background, it 
seems anomalous that the only circumstances in which an enrichment action will be 
granted to a gestor who acts inuti/iter are arguably those where he has acted against 
the express prohibition of the dominus.442 A piece of the picture thus seems to be 
missing. It is as startling as looking at one's reflection in a mirror and seeing a blank 
space where there should be an eye. In my opinion, anyone who administers the 
affairs of another against his will (whether actual or presumed, express or implied) or 





Thus. for example. where there is a shi ft of assets from one person to another in terms of a 
valid contract, there can be no question of unjustified enrichment; the enrichment will have 
taken place cum causa. See Zimmermann (1995) 15 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 403 
regarding the relationship between the law of unjustified enrichment and the other two 
branches of the law of obligations. 
Here we can think of the impact of the abstract principle of transfer of ownership: see 
Chapter One at p 17 ff above. 
See p 139 below. 
Administration in the face of an express prohibition by the dominus must surely be regarded 
as having been uti/iter coepmm. 
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for this kind of extension, or argument by analogy. Thus, in Colonial Government v 
Smith,443 the court argued that the government should be allowed an action because it 
should not be in a worse position than a malafide possessor.444 
(c) Where the dominus or gestor is a minor 
If a minor administers the affairs of a major, in circumstances where all the 
requirements for negotiorum gestio are fulfilled, there is no reason why the minor 
should not be able to claim all the expenses he has incurred in doing SO.445 Similarly, 
the law confers upon a minor dominus the same rights as those enjoyed by a major 
dominus.446 While a minor's rights are thus identical to those held by any other 
gestor or dominus, a minor's liability under the law of negotiorum gestio is 
somewhat different. The leading author on quasi negotiorum gestio in South Africa 
states that, just as a contractual action against a minor with limited capacity447 is 
limited to the extent to which the minor remains enriched,448 so too are the actions 
based on negotiorum gestio.449 In other words, whether the minor is sued as dominus 










See the text to note 382 above. The same sort of argumentation has been used to justify the 
claim of the bonafide gestor- see Van Zyl Negotiorum Gestio 105: 'In any event, in view 
of the recognition of the malafide gestor's action, there can be little doubt that the gestor 
who administers the affairs of another in the bonafide belief that they are his own, will be 
accorded an action for the recovery of his necessary and useful expenses .... ' 
See, e g, D.3.5.3.4 and Rubin (n 82) 61. This is also the position in German law: see p 107 
above. 
Note that, as said above at p 84, the dominus need not have contractual capacity for a 
relationship of negotiorum gestio to arise between himself and the gestor: also see Van Zyf 
Negotiorum Gestio 26; Wessels Contract para 3583. This is the same as German law, which 
disregards any incapacity of the dominus: see p 107 above. 
Who concluded the contract without the assistance of his parent or guardian. 
Regarding the limitation of the contractual liability of minors see, e g, Edelstein v Edelstein 
NO and Others supra, which did away with the 'benefit theory' introduced in Nel v Divine 
Hall & Co (1890) 8 SC 16. See Belinda van Heerden, Alfred Cockrell and Raylene 
Keightley (general eds) Boberg's Law of Persons and the Family 2 ed (1999) at 772 ff for a 
discussion of the benefit theory, 'born in bastardy, reared in confusion and dispatched with 
decision' (at 777). Also cf Wessels Contract para 3580 ff. It should be borne in mind that 
the two forms of liability should be clearly distinguished: De Vos 
Verrykingsaanspreeklikheid 214. 
Van Zyl Negotiorum Gestio 87 ff. He thus regards this as an instance of the actio negotiorum 
gestorum utilis (the action based on quasi negotiorum gestio). Cf Whitty and Van Zyl (n 4) 
393 (limitation apparently only where the dominus is a minor - minor gestor not discussed) 
and De Vos Verrykingsaanspreeklikheid214 (where he only discusses the limitation of the 
gestor's action in circumstances involving a minor). 
Van Zyl Negotiorum Gestio 87. CfWhitty and Van Zyl (n 4), who refer only to the situation 
where the dominus is a minor: 393. Also cfWessels Contract para 3580 ff, where he leaves 
open the question of the liability ofa minor gestor. For criticism of the limitation of the 
claim ofa minor gestor, see Rubin (n 82) at 49. Also see idem 60-1 (for discussion of the 
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(i) Liability of a minor dominus 
Most modem commentators agree that, as in Roman452 and Roman-Dutch law,453 
anyone who has managed the affairs of a minor may only sue the minor for his 
enrichment, notwithstanding compliance with the requirements of negotiorum 





situation where the dominus is a minor). 
Situations where the minor is a dominus or gestor should also be distinguished from those 
where the true dominus is the minor's guardian: see, e g, De Vos 
Verrykingsaanspreeklikheid214. In this regard, also see De Vos op cil47 and 95.) The duty 
to provide children with what is necessary, taking into account the family's standard of 
living, falls within the parameters ofthe parental duty of support. If a third party (A) 
perfonns what is owed by C's parent or guardian (B), then he can sue the parent or guardian 
on the basis of negotiorum gestio or unjustified enrichment. (Van Heerden et al (n 449) at 
813,814; Pretorius v Van Zyl supra; De Vos op cit 214) Thus an aunt who pays her 
(unemancipated) 17 year old nephew's school fees, or provides him with food and shelter, in 
the absence of his parents should be able to sue his parents for reimbursement. Whether she 
may claim all her expenses or whether her action is limited to the extent by which the parents 
have been enriched (by the saving of expenses) would depend on whether the case satisfies 
the requirements of negotiorum gestio proper or falls into one of the categories of quasi 
negotiorum gestio, and the nonnal rules would apply. It has been suggested that provision of 
necessaries to a minor is one of the situations where it is unobjectionable for a gestor to act 
domino prohibente. (See Whitty and Van Zyl (n 4) 393.) If one considers the situation from 
the perspective of the values and policies underlying the law, this appears to be correct; the 
minor's interest in being maintained and the public interest in the care of minors outweigh 
the parent's interest in private autonomy. 
It appears that if the minor has no guardian, or is self-supporting, a party who has supported 
the minor may sue the minor himself for the amount by which he has been enriched by the 
saving of expenses. (See, e g, Van Heerden op cit at 813.) Thus, in Pretorius v Van Zyl 
supra, Pretorius maintained an orphaned minor, Gertruida, in tenns of a contract concluded 
with Lamprecht, who had been elected her guardian but who had never been fonnally 
appointed by the Master. Later, Van Zyl was appointed guardian and took over the 
maintenance of the minor. Pretorius then sued Van Zyl 'for compensation in the amount of 
his costs and expenses in maintaining Gertruida during the period' in question. (See 
judgment at 228.) The court granted Pretorius's claim on the basis of enrichment, not 
negotiorum gestio and the case has been interpreted as an instance of the extended actio 
negotiorum gestorum. (See, e g, Eiselen and Pienaar Unjustified Enrichment 219, 222.) The 
judge regarded the enriched party as being Gertruida herself (see the judgment at 229 ff) in 
that she did not have to support herself with funds from her inheritance, and said (at 227) that 
in suing Van Zyl, he was 'virtually' suing the minor. In effect, the case concerned the claim 
ofa major gestor against a minor dominus and the comments made in the text below would 
apply. 
In which all obligations binding pupilli were limited to the extent of their enrichment: see D. 
3.5.(36) 37 pr; Van Zyl Negotiorum Gestio 87. For the common-law position also see De 
Vos Verrykingsaanspreeklikheid 46 ff, 95 ff, 214 and Rubin (n 82) 60. 
Voet 3.5.8 and the authors cited in the previous footnote. 
Van Zyl Negotiorum Gestio 87 ff; Whitty and Van Zyl (n 4) 393; Eiselen and Pienaar 
Unjustified Enrichment 219 ff; Wessels Contract paras 3583 and 3621 (but cf his criticism in 
para 3622: ' ... there does not seem to be any reason why there should be an exception made 
in the case of minors to the general rule that the gestor is entitled to be indemnified for all 
useful expenses .. .' .); De Vos Verrykingsaanspreeklikheid 214 (where subscribes to the view 
of Wessels); Rubin (n 82) 60. Also note the point made by Eiselen and Pienaar Unjustified 
Enrichment at 222 that' [t]he gestor will in any case be entitled to claim all his losses and 
expenses from the guardian if the conditions for the actio negotiorum gestorum conlraria 
against the guardian habe been complied with in the event of the guardian having a duty to 
maintain the minor.' 
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The South African judgment generally cited in support of this proposition was 
delivered in the old case of Prince qq Dieleman v Berrange, alias Anderson.455 Mr 
and Mrs Dieleman executed a mutual will in terms of which the survivor would have 
a usufruct over the children's share (half of their joint estate, which amounted to R41 
640) until the children reached majority, in order to enable the surviving parent better 
to educate the minor children. Mr Dieleman died and Mrs Dieleman executed a 
kinderbewys in her children's favour, in respect of their half of the joint estate. She 
then remarried and became Mrs Anderson. The chi ldren (represented by their 
attorney, Prince) later sued their mother for their inheritance. 
She claimed various deductions, two of which are interesting for our 
purposes.456 First, she claimed that the children's inheritance should be reduced by 
the R33 230 that she had spent on their education in England.457 The court held that 
she was bound to educate the children in a 'suitable manner' and if, in doing so, she 
spent more than the income of the children's inheritance, the excess could not be 
claimed from her children.458 Her argument seems to have been based on the idea 
that, in paying for their schooling, she had settled a debt on their behalf, or on behalf 
of her husband's deceased estate (i e that she was fulfilling the obligation of another, 
and that she should be reimbursed for her outlay in doing so). The fallacy is 
obviously that neither the children nor the deceased estate had an obligation to pay 
for their education, and that in making the payments, she was performing in terms of 
her own duty of support. 
She also claimed a deduction for half of the legal expenses she incurred in 
pursuing a case concerning the value of the joint estate459 all the way up to the Privy 
Council.460 At the time of those legal proceedings Mrs Anderson was not her 







Supra. CfEiselen and Pienaar Unjustified Enrichment 219 ff, who cite Pretorius v Van Zyl 
supra as their main authority for the actio negotiorum gestorum uti/is 'where the gestor 
administered the affairs of a minor'. 
The court allowed the third deduction, which related to an error in the valuation of the joint 
estate.456 This amount concerned the value of one Steyntje and her children who were, at the 
time of valuation, supposed to be slaves owned by the joint estate, but who were held by the 
Privy Council to have been free at that time and hence not part of the joint estate. 
For the facts, see the summary of the judgment at 435. 
See the summary of the judgment at 435-7. 
The matter of Steyntje and her children. 
At 436-7. 
I 
the proceedings.461 In other words, they had not consented to the litigation. The 
court held that 
as the defendant had instituted that action causa sui proprii commodi, 
and, as owing to its unsuccessful tennination, the minors, the 
plaintiffs, have derived no benefit whatever from it, those costs have 
not been in rem versum of the plaintiffs, nor have they been 
locupletioresfacti thereby, the defendant cannot, as a negotiorum 
gestor, claim any part of those expenses, actione contraria 
negotiorum gestorum (vide Voet 3: 5, 8 and 9), and the plaintiffs are 
under no equitable obligation, to repay any part of those costs.462 
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The court added that guardians who institute legal proceedings with regard to 
their minor wards' property cannot claim the costs of those proceedings from the 
children if the litigation is unsuccessfu1.463 Mrs Anderson's argument is clearly 
based on negotiorum gestio: she had, as gestor, administered the affairs of her 
children (without their consent) by instituting legal proceedings to detennine the 
value of their inheritance, and she should be entitled to deduct the expenses she 
incurred in doing so. The case is used as authority for the proposition that an action 
brought by a gestor against a dominus who is a minor is limited to the extent to 
which the minor remains enriched by the gestio. While it is correct that Mrs 
Anderson's action was limited to her children's enrichment, it appears that the reason 
why the court held that her action was merely an enrichment action was not that the 
domini were minors, but that she was acting in her own interests (i e she was a mala 
fide gestor)464 or that she thought she was administering her own affairs (i e she was 
a bonafide gestor). The children had not been enriched, as the proceedings had been 
unsuccessful, and therefore Mrs Anderson's argument was rejected.465 In my 
opinion, the case therefore does not constitute good authority for the proposition that 







Limiting claims against minor domini to the extent by which they remain 
436-7. 
See the summary of the judgment at 437. 
At 437. 
See pIll ff above. 
The court thus seems not to consider the saving of legal expenses as a form of enrichment. 
Had it decided otherwise, it would have opened the door to interfering lawyers taking up 
cases 'on behalf or potential plaintiffs without their consent (but cf Ryneveldv The Wine 
Depot supra), and then suing them for enrichment if the proceedings were unsuccessful. 
From a public policy perspective, this decision thus also appears to be correct. 
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enriched is also questionable from the perspectives of legal doctrine and public 
policy. A contract concluded by an unassisted minor cannot give rise to legal 
obligations that are binding on the minor, because he has, at most, limited capacity to 
act
466 
and because he needs to be protected from his 'own immaturity of 
judgment' .467 Lack of capacity does not, however, preclude the imposition of duties 
that arise ex lege, such as those flowing from negotiorum gestio or unjustified 
enrichment.
468 
If a gestor, who is a major, sues a minor dominus, it is not clear why 
the claim should be limited to the minor's enrichment. Surely the law should 
encourage people to help minors, and there seems to be no reason why someone who 
has assisted a minor by means of a gestio should not be able to recover his full 
expenses. This is one of the areas in which interference in the affairs of another 
would generally be socially acceptable, and it seems strange to say that this is not a 
case of negotiorum gestio but only quasi negotiorum gestio. If a gestor who helps a 
minor is only allowed to claim the amount by which the minor is enriched, parties 
might be discouraged from giving assistance to minors. To say that the minor 
dominus only has to disgorge his enrichment is to give him an advantage due to his 
immaturity, where that immaturity is irrelevant except in that it might be the very 
reason why the gestor has intervened. It also seems illogical to allow a claim for 
expenses against a dominus who was, for example, temporarily insane or 
unconscious (and therefore unable to give his consent to the gestor) and not to allow 
such a claim against a minor. The normal rules of negotiorum gestio strike a balance 
between encouraging good neighbourliness and discouraging meddling, and there is 




Cf in/antes, who have no capacity to act at all, and emancipated minors, who have full 
capacity. 
Edelstein v Edelstein NO and Others supra at lSC-D. 
See Van Heerden et al (n 449) at 748, and the authorities cited there. See also Edelstein v 
Edelstein NO and Others supra at 12D and \3E-F. Such duties are imposed regardless of the 
will of the party in question, so the immaturity of the minor is arguably irrelevant. See the 
argument of Pothier cited by Rubin (n 82) at 60-61: (regarding negotiorum gestio) the 
dominus 'incurs the obligation without his consent, because he incurs it even before he is 
aware of the administration from which it arises. It is immaterial, therefore, in order that his 
obligation should be valid, whether or not he is capable of validly consenting, because it is 
not as a result of any consent on his part that he incurs the obligation. It follows, therefore, 
that it should be immaterial, in order to enable him to incur a valid obligation, whether he is a 
puber or impuber, minor or major.' Also see Van Zyl Negotiorum Gestio 88-9 in this regard. 
Also see De Vos Verrykingsaanspreeklikheid214 and Eiselen and Pienaar Unjustified 
Enrichment 222. The latter authors also point out that' [t]he gestor will in any case be 
entitled to claim all his losses and expenses from the guardian if the conditions for the actio 
negotiorum gestorum contl'aria against the guardian have been complied with in the event of 
the guardian having a duty to maintain the minor.' 
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If any additional support is needed for the point of view expressed here, it 
may be found in German law. As said above,47o German law disregards any lack of 
capacity on the part of the dominus. A minor dominus will therefore incur the same 
liability in terms of the law of Geschaftsfuhrung ohne Auftrag that a major would. A 
gestor can thus sue the minor471 dominus according to the normal rules.472 
In conclusion, it seems unnecessary and even inadvisable for modem South 
African law to retain a common-law rule that limits a gestor's claim against a minor, 
where that rule seems to be out of step with the position in a comparable modern 
legal system, especially where that rule serves to undermine rather than protect the 
position of a minor. 
(ii) Liability of a minor gestor 
Turning to the position of the minor gestor in Gennan law, we find that a dominus 
may only sue him in terms of the law of enrichment and the law of delict.473 Thus, if 
a minor receives proceeds as a result of the gestio, he will not be required to give 
them all to the dominus;474 he will only be liable to the extent of his enrichment. If, 
on the other hand, a minor negligently causes loss to the dominus in the course ofthe 
gestio, he will be required to compensate him for that loss according to the normal 
rules.475 
According to our common law, a claim against a minor gestor was apparently 
also limited to his enrichment, if any.476 While some authors ignore the rule 
altogether,477 others have levelled various criticisms at it. These range from textual 
arguments to arguments based on policy considerations. Thus it has been suggested 










At P 107. 
Or a person who is insane, or otherwise incapacitated. 
German law thus appears to have followed the views of writers such as Thomasius, Pothier 
and Kohler: for a summary of their views, see Van Zyl Negotiorum Gestio at 88-9. 
§ 682 BGB. Also see p 108 above. 
As required by the normal rules: see BGB § 681 sent 2 read with § 667; Medicus 
Schuldrecht II marg note 627. 
See, e g, Medicus Schuldrecht II marg note 627. 
See Ulpian D.3.5.3.4; Groenewegen Tractatus de Legibus abrogatis et lnusitatis adD 3.5, 
Voet Commentarius ad Pandectas 3.5.3; Rubin (n 82) at 49; Wessels Contract para 3582. 
Whitty and Van Zyl (n 4) 393. 
I e it was interpolated and therefore does not reflect the classical law, in terms of which the 
minor gestor's liability was the same as that of any other gestor: in this regard, see Rubin (n 
82) 49. 
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Rubin argues that minor gestores do not need the same sort of protection against the 
pitfalls of youth as that afforded to (unassisted) minor contractants.479 This is 
because, he says, in contrast to contractual liability, the gestor's liability derives, 'not 
from consent, but simply from his act of interference in the affairs of the dominus .'480 
This argument implies that the immaturity and inexperience of a minor might cause 
an error of judgement in entering into a contract, but that such considerations are not 
relevant where he makes a gestio, on the other hand. This argument is, with respect, 
unconvincing. Both undertaking a gestio and concluding a contract arguably require 
an exercise of will. It seems to me that it isjust as possible for a minor gestor to 
make an error of judgement in deciding to pay someone's debts or carrying out some 
other gestio as to make a foolish decision to enter into an unfavourable contract.48 1 
It is helpful, however, to compare the position of a minor gestor with that of a 
minor contractant.482 The law protects a minor contractant from any detrimental 
consequences of his having entered into a contract without the assistance of his 
guardian. It does not, however, deny him any advantages that might flow from the 
same legal act.483 Thus he cannot be sued for performance in terms of such a 
contract, but this will not prevent him from acquiring rights against the other party.484 
What are the legal consequences of negotiorum gestio, as far as the gestor is 
concerned? The positive consequences for the gestor include a claim to 
compensation for his expenses, a lien on the property of the dominus, and release 







(n 82) 49. 
(n 82) 49. 
Rubin's argument seems to echo Pothier's thoughts quoted in note 468 above, but it should 
be noted that Pothier was referring to the liability of a minor dominus, and not a minor 
gestor. By definition, the dominus is not required to consent or otherwise authorise the 
gestio, or even to be aware of it, so no exercise of his judgement is required - this means that 
it is irrelevant whether he has full capacity, limited capacity or none at all (see note 446 
above). The same argument cannot be applied to a minor gestor, as Rubin attempts to do, 
because the gestor has to form the requisite intention, etc. 
Bearing in mind that the two legal situations must not be confused. Regarding the 
importance of clearly distinguishing between the liability of those minors who have entered 
into contracts and those involved in negotiornm gestio, see De Vos 
Verrykingsaanspreeklikheid214. Although he is referring to liability of a minor dominus, the 
same caution should apply where the minor is a gestor. Also see Eiselen and Pienaar 
Urifustified Enrichment 222. 
But this, the policy underlying the rules of law protecting minors, should not be confused 
with the 'benefit theory', which was a general rule in ist own right. 
Although he may only be able to exercise certain ofthese rights (e g the right to claim 
performance by the other party) once he himself has performed (otherwise his claim would 
be defeated by the exceptio non adimpleti contractus). 
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reason why a minor who successfully (and justifiably) administers the affairs of 
another should not at least be entitled to recover his expenses.485 Similarly, looking 
at the situation from the perspective of the dominus, there is no reason why he should 
incur a lesser liability just because the gestor who has justifiably intervened in his 
affairs happened to be a minor. These positive results of negotiorum Restio should 
thus accrue to a minor gestor. 
The 'negative' consequences of negotiorum gestio, on the other hand, include 
the im position of I iabi I ity on the gestor for any loss he has caused to the dominus 
through his negligence, and for any proceeds acquired through the gestio. In 
addition, he is obliged to complete the gestio properly and to account to the 
dominus.486 Let us assume that a minor gestor managed the affairs of another, 
satisfying all the requirements of negotiorum gestio, in circumstances where an adult 
would not have intervened. If the law absolved a minor of all of these consequences, 
he would not have to complete the gestio, he would not have to account to the 
dominus, he would not be liable for losses, and he would be able to keep any 
proceeds of the gestio. This would mean that a minor gestor could profit from what 
seemed like a foolhardy decision to interfere in another's affairs. Our law states, 
however, that he should incur liability, but only to the extent that he remains 
enriched by the gestio. This seems to me to be an equitable way of dealing with a 
minor gestor; he will not suffer as a result of the gestio,487 but he will not profit from 
it either. It also accounts for the real possibility that the minor's immaturity may 
have led to his loss or disposal of some of the proceeds of the gestio: he may, for 
example, have spent the money on taking all his friends to the cinema, or on buying 
presents for his girlfriend. This adjustment in the rule that the gestor must disgorge 
any proceeds thus achieves a fine balance between the encouragement of altruistic 
behaviour, the protection of private autonomy, and protection of minors against the 
dangers of youth. I therefore would be in favour of retaining this common-law rule, 





Where a gestor acts bonafide thinking that he is administering his own 
affairs 
Release from contractual obligations would not generally be relevant here, as the minor 
cannot incur obligations without his guardian's assistance. 
See pp 92-3 above. 
E g by having to pay the dominus for proceeds of the gestio that he no longer has. 
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The fourth category of cases generally regarding as falling under quasi negotiorum 
gestio is that of the bonafide gestor.488 Such cases correspond to the first situation 
of non-genuine Geschaftsfiihrung ohne A~ftrag in German law i e the case of so-
called Eigenleistung ('own performance,).489 In other words, someone administers 
the affairs of another in the bonafide belief that they are his own. For example, A 
thinks that he has inherited a small business which he has been running for his now-
deceased father. He therefore pays the business's debts to C out of his own pocket. 
In fact, the business has been left to B in terms of a later will. It is important to 
remember that, as mentioned above,490 this manifestation of quasi negotiorum gestio 
would only relevant here491 if-as seems unlikely - an obligation is extinguished by 
the performance of a third party who does not intend to perform for that other 
person.492 I have decided to deal with it along with the other instances of quasi 
negotiorum gestio in South African law for convenience. 
The case usually cited493 as the main authority in South African law for the 
proposition that a bona fide gestor is entitled to bring an enrichment claim against 
the 'dominus' is Klug & Klug v Penkin.494 In this case, the City Health Department 
asked Daisy and Maria Klug, who have been recorded for posterity as 'spinsters and 
property owners', to make some repairs to their buildings.495 The owners were 
absent so their agents effected the necessary repairs. But the agents also had an 
adjacent building, owned by Penkin, repaired at a cost of £14. They did so acting in 
the bonafide belief that this building, which had been mentioned in the list furnished 
by the Health Department, was also owned by the Klugs. The Klugs (A) paid for the 
repairs, including the £ I 4, and later claimed it (the £ 14) from Penkin (B), alleging 









Hutchison (ed) Wille's Principles at 642-3; Eiselen and Pienaar Unjustified Enrichment 232 
ff; De Vos Verrykingsaanspreeklikheid215; Whitty and Van Zyl (n 4) 388,390-1. On the 
common law, see De Vos op cit 43,85; Eiselen and Pienaar Unjustified Enrichment 234; 
Rubin (n 82) 36 ff. 
See p 101 ff above. 
At p 110. 
That is, in section 3 of this chapter: where A performs (and extinguishes) B's obligation to 
C. 
See the discussion of the relationship between Band C in the first part of this chapter at p 65 
ff, especially the text to note 63. Also see note 214 above. 
See, e g, Hutchison (ed) Wille's Principles at 642-3; Eiselen and Pienaar Unjustified 
Enrichment 232 ff; Whitty and Van Zyl (n 4) 391. 
Supra. 
See the judgment at 403-404 for the facts. 
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the work, whereby the property of the defendant has been enhanced in value and he 
himself thus enriched.,496 The Magistrate upheld the defendant's exception that 
there was no cause of action. 
On appeal, Watermeyer J stated the general rule that a negotiorum gestor may 
claim for necessary and useful expenses.497 He assumed that the repairs were 
necessary and useful to Penkin. He then said that the problem was that the agents 
thought that the building belonged to the Klugs (A). 'It seems clear from the Digest 
and [from] ... Voet that [the agents'] ... mistaken belief at the time they made the 
repairs does not effect [sic] their right. ,498 He cited the following passage from Voet, 
stating that it was apposite: 
Moreover, to found this action, it is not necessary that the gestor 
should precisely have the intention of binding him whose affairs were 
in truth conducted, but it suffices that he thought he was conducting, 
and wished to conduct, the affairs of another. For what if he thought 
that he was conducting the affairs ofTitius, when they were really 
not the affairs of Titius but of Mae vi us? It is answered that he can 
with effect proceed in such a case against Maevius.499 
The judge therefore concluded that the agents would have a right to claim the 
expenses as gestor. He went on to ask whether this claim could be brought by the 
Misses Klug in the absence ofa cession to them.500 He said that Voet continued: 
and even against Titius himself if he has ratified what has been 
carried on: for his ratihabitation makes that to be his business, where 
from the beginning it was not in reality, but had by an error been 
undertaken supposing it to be his because Titius himself, after 
ratification, was in turn bound by this action to him whose business it 
really was, just as if he had himself carried it on.50l 
The judge held that, although the agents exceeded their authority, they purported to 
act as agents and their action was impliedly ratified by the plaintiffs who were 








Two points need to be made about this case. First of all, the first passage 
See the judgment at 404. 
At 404. 
Ibid. 
Commentarius ad pandeclas 3.5.12, Buchanan's translation, cited at 404. 
At 404. 
3.5.12, Buchanan's translation, cited at 405. 
At 405. 
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cited from Voet, which the judge said was 'directly in point,503 relates to the situation 
where one does not know the identity of the dominus - the rule is that the true 
dominus will be liable for expenses in such a case. It therefore does not deal with a 
case ofthe bonafide gestor, i e one who administers the affairs of another, thinking 
that he is administering his own affairs. To clarify the difference between the two 
situations: in the situation ofthe bonafide gestor, A administers B's affairs, thinking 
that they are his own (A's); in Voet's first example, on the other hand, A administers 
B's affairs, thinking that they are C's. 
Which situation was applicable in the Klugs' case? The first question should 
be whether the agents' acts were authorised. If there were no relationship of agency 
between the owners and the 'agents', then Voet's first example would be apposite. It 
seems, however, that the agents' acts that fell outside the scope of their authority 
were at least ratified by the owners. Therefore the agents' acts can be imputed to the 
principals, and we can say that the owners (the principals), as gestores, administered 
the affairs of another in the bona fide belief that they were their own. In other words, 
Voet's example was not in point. 
It is submitted that a better approach would therefore have been first to 
consider whether the acts ofthe agent could be imputed to the principal, and then to 
ask whether the requirements of negotiorum gestio were satisfied. This is necessary 
because one has to consider the intention with which the acts are made, i e whether 
the gestor intends to manage his own affairs or not. In order to do so, one needs to 
know whether the dominus's affairs are legally-speaking those of the agent, and 
therefore one cannot look at the agent's intention in isolation, if he is acting as agent. 
Secondly, the judge treats this as a normal actio negotiorum gestorum 
contraria.504 In other words, the claim was for the necessary and useful expenses 
incurred by the plaintiffs, and there was no mention that this claim was limited to the 
amount by which the dominus remains enriched. 
Be that as it may, it is generally accepted that, as in German law, a bonafide 
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by the administration.505 Bearing in mind the policy factors at play in cases of true 
ne!!,otiorum !!,estio and quasi ne!!,otiorum !!,estio, this is probably correct. Allowing a 
!!,estor to claim back his expenses is to 'reward' altruism, and any tendency towards 
meddling is kept in check by the requirement that it be utiliter coeptum. To 
adminster the affairs of another in the mistaken belief that they are one's own is not 
an indication of good-neighbourliness; it rather suggests an irresponsible attitude to 
one's own affairs. On the other hand, a bonafide gestor has not deliberately ignored 
the will of the dominus506 and he has not administered the affairs of another for his 
own ends.507 If a mala fide gestor and a gestor who acts domino prohibenLe are 
given relief, why should such relief be withheld from a bonafide gestor? Looking at 
the situation from the point of view of the dominus, on the other hand, why he should 
have to cover all the costs incurred by someone who purely coincidentally 
administered his affairs, even in cases where he no longer has the benefits of that 
administration?508 There is, however, no compelling reason why the dominus should 
retain any benefits which he still has; he should therefore have to disgorge any 
enrichment that remains in his hands at the time when the gestor institutes his claim. 
Allowing the bonafide gestor an enrichment claim thus seems to strike an 
equitable balance between the interests of the parties.509 As said above, however, 
this situation probably belongs in the next section of this thesis - it is only relevant 
here if A can discharge B's debt to C thinking that he is performing in terms of his 
own obligation. 
German and South African law: comparison and synthesis 
Regarding the relationship between A and B, the findings so far can be summarised 
as follows. Assuming that B owed a debt to C, and A performed in terms thereof in 






See, e g, Van Zyl Negotiorum GestioI04-5; Eiselen and Pienaar Unjustified Enrichment 232 
ff; Whitty and Van Zyl (n 4) 391. 
As in the case ofa gestor who acts domino prohibente. 
As in the case ofa ma/ajide gestor. 
As he would have to do if this were a case of negotiorum gestio proper. 
Also see Whitty and Van Zyl (n 4) 391: 'It is difficult to refute the argument that if the law 
allows an enrichment action to a person intervening to promote his own interests, it ought 
equally or aforliori to allow an action to the bonafide gestor who erroneously promotes the 
interests of the dominus.' 
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the debt - where was no contract between A and C: 
In tenns of both Gennan and South African law, if the requirements of 
negotiorum gestio510 are fulfilled, A will not sue B for enrichment; negotiorum gestio 
would constitute a legal ground, or justification, for the benefit to B.511 In other 
words, B's enrichment would not be unjustified.512 In such a case, however, A, as 
gestor, will be able to sue B for his expenses.513 
If the requirements of negotiorum gestio are not satisfied, on the other hand, 
there will be no causa for the benefit that A has rendered to B by settling the latter's 
debt to C. A may accordingly bring an enrichment action against B in certain 
circumstances. 
In both Gennan law and South African law, a minor who administers the 
affairs of another is not limited to suing for the other party's enrichment; he may 
accordingly claim aU his expen?es. In Gennany, someone who manages the affairs 
of a minor may also recover all his expenses. In South Africa, on the other hand, a 
gestor who manages the affairs of a minor may only sue him for enrichment. 
Comparing our law with Gennan law and assessing it from the point of view of the 
underlying policy considerations that are relevant in such cases has shown that our 
law is defective in this regard. 
In tenns of both Gennan and South African law, A can sue B for unjustified 
enrichment ifhe (A) administered B's affairs, knowing that they were the affairs of 
another, for his own benefit i e sui lucri causa. In South African law, this would be 
considered a situation of quasi negotiorum gestio, where A is a mala fide gestor. 
Gennan law would regard this as an instance of angemaj3te Geschafts/uhrung ohne 
Au/trag, a type of non-genuine negotiorum gestio. In both cases, it must specifically 
be proven that A actually intended to administer the affairs for his own benefit. In 
German law, the availability of A's enrichment claim (an Aufivendungslwndiktion) is 





Here I will use the South African terminology for convenience. 
In any case, A would obviously not want to sue B for enrichment, as he would usually be 
able to claim more with an action for expenses against B. 
Or, in German terms, B will not have received anything without legal ground. 
See above at p 92 ff. 
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be left without a remedy. In South African law, on the other hand, A can only sue B 
if, in the circumstances, B's enrichment was 'improper or unjustified' (an ex post 
facto enquiry, which also takes into account the reasonableness of the gestor's 
behaviour). This requirement could be seen as a general norm, requiring the judge to 
consider various policy factors including the boni mores or it could be seen as a 
manifestation of the utiliter-requirement, which gives expression to the same policy 
considerations. Both systems thus pose an extra requirement that seeks to protect 
B's interests. The German requirement is certainly easier to apply, but cannot be 
followed in South Africa until there is clarification legal recourse, if any, available to 
B. 
Both South African law and Gennan law afford an enrichment remedy to 
someone who administers the affairs of another, thinking that he is administering his 
own affairs (i e a bonafide gestor): in Gennany, this remedy would be the 
Eingriffskondiktion; in South Africa, it would be another instance where the extended 
actio negotiorum gestio would be available. In Germany, this action would not be 
available where the affair that was administered took the form of fulfilment of 
another's obligation, and this is probably also true of South African law. 
South African law apparently also allows A an enrichment action against B 
where A has acted domino prohibente, but it has been suggested that the cases 
usually cited as authority for this proposition are questionable authority: the fITSt was 
really a case of a mala fide gestor and the second was really a case of a revoked 
instruction (analogous to the countennanding of a cheque which will be considered 
in the next chapter, along with the corresponding German law). Whether such a 
claim should be allowed is doubtful when judged from the perspective of the policies 
underlying negotiorum gestio. Comparison with German law, however, suggests that 
the prevention of unjustified enrichment would, on its own, provide sufficient 
justification for the provision of such a remedy. German law thus grants a 
Riickgriffskondiktion to someone who administers the affairs of another where such 
administration is neither in accordance with the interests or will of the dominus (i e in 
a situation of unjustified negotiorum gestio, or unberechtigte Geschiiftsfiihrung ohne 
Auf trag). This would cover our situation of administration the affairs of a protesting 
dominus but also situations where the dominus did not expressly say that the 
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administration was against his will, and where it was not necessarily against his will 
but against his interests. German law specifically states that the other requirements 
of negotiorum gestio must be fulfilled in such circumstances, and allows the dominus 
to set off the cost of any damage caused by the gestor during the course of the gestio. 
It provides the dominus with additional protection by using protective devices 
derived from the law of cession. South African law again protects the dominus by 
referring to an open-ended norm: the gestor must prove 'circumstances that made it 
just' for him to intervene. It has been suggested that, following the Gennan example, 
more concrete protection can be provided by borrowing protective rules from our 
own law of cession. 
Now we have to tum our attention to what would happen if there were no 
legal relationship between A and B at all: no contract (whether actual or purported), 
no relationship of agency, no instruction, and, because there was no administration of 
the affairs of another, no negotiorum gestio and no quasi negotiorum gestio. 
4 Enrichment liability where A performs to C in terms of an obligation or 




(a) Enrichment liability where B owes a performance to C, A performs to C, 
but this performance does not discharge the debt owed by B to C 
Thus far, we have been discussing what would happen if A's perfonnance to C 
discharged B's obligation to C. Now we have to consider the situation where A's 
perfonnance to C fails to discharge a debt validly owed by B to C. 
Sl4 In other words, they are neither linked by a contractual obligation, nor an obligation which 
arises ex lege, nor by a relationship of negotiorum gestio or quasi negotiorum gestio, and B 
has not instructed A to perform to C. 
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For example, a pop star (B) enters into a contract with an impresario C, in 
terms of which B agrees to sing at a concert in Cape Town. IfB does not arrive, and 
a would-be singer in the audience (A) leaps on to the stage and sings all the songs B 
was supposed to perform, A's performance will not discharge B's obligation to C: it 
would be a situation of delectus personae (i e where the performance in question is 
so personal that nobody can make it on behalf of the debtor).515 Another example of 
a situation where a debt B-C would not be discharged would be where A makes a 
performance to C but the performance does not correspond to the terms of the 
obligation B-C. In such a situation, A's performance will not usually extinguish B's 
obligation to c.5J6 Or, in terms of German law, the creditor might have physically 
received but legally refused to accept a performance made by a third party because 
the debtor has voiced his objection thereto.5J7 Or A might have performed to C in 
the mistaken belief that he (A) was obliged to do so, whereas the performance is in 
fact owed by B to C. 5J8 
This last case is similar to the situation of the bonafide gestor. Whether it 
falls into this category or the last depends on whether a party can extinguish the debt 
of another, thinking that he is performing in terms of his own obligation. In German 
law, he clearly cannot discharge the debt of another in such circumstances;5J9 he 
would therefore not have administered the affairs of another, and the case can 
therefore not be one of irrtumliche Eigenleistung. In other words, the 
Nichtleistungskondiktion available in cases of irrtiimliche Eigenleistung would not be 
available against B. Whether or not a party can extinguish the debt of another 
thinking that he his performing in terms of his own obligation in South Africa is not 
clear. Ifhe can do SO,520 he would be treated as a bonafide gestor.52J If not, his case 








See p 66 above. 
Unless, in German law, the performance is a Leistung an Erfollungs Stall: see Chapter One at 
p 37 above. 
§ 267 (2) BGB. 
See, e g, Koppensteiner and Kramer Bereicherung 38 ff. 
See p 72 above. 
For example by virtue of commixtio. 
See p 142 ff above. 
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In circumstances where A's performance fails to discharge B's debt to C,522 C 
would be entitled to sue B for breach in both legal systems.523 There is no contract 
(real or supposed) between A and B. Neither is there a relationship of true 
negotiorum gestio nor one of quasi negotiorum gestio (or the corresponding German 
institutions) between A and B, as B's debt still stands (i e his affairs were not 
administered). As B is thus completely uninvolved, this is really a two-party 
situation,524 and should be solved according to the normal rules of enrichment 
liability. Therefore, if C had derived any financial benefit from A's performance,525 
then A should sue C directly for this enrichment.526 In German law, the appropriate 
action would generally be a Leistungskondiktion.527 In South African law, there 
would arguably be general enrichment liability, or if the performance in question 
amounted to a datio, one of the condictiones would be available,528 depending on 
whether the other requirements of that specific condictio are satisfied. 
(b) Enrichment liability where A performs to C, intending to discharge a 
debt owed by B to C, but B in fact owes nothing to C 
Alternatively, A could have ostensibly performed in terms ofB's 'obligation' to C 
where no such obligation existed. The obligation could be void, or it could have 
already been discharged, or the performing party could have performed more than 
was required. For example, an aunt pays her 22-year old nephew's university fees, 
unaware that he has already scraped together the money and settled his debt to the 
university, or that he has not registered this year, or that he had never registered at 









See Koppensteiner and Kramer Bereicherung 39 regarding the last example viz where A 
performs to C, erroneously believing that he was himself obliged to make this performance to 
C, whereas B owed it to C: A's performance will not extinguish B's debt to C and B is thus 
not involved in any way. Also see Medicus Schuldrecht I marg note 140. 
Assuming that the requirements for breach are satisfied in the particular case e g the debt 
must have been due. 
Koppensteiner and Kramer Bereicherung 38: 'Bier ist aus keiner Perspektive ein 
Dreiecksverhaltnis zu sehen, wenn man voraussetzt, daB sowohl D [A] als auch G [C] 
(falschlicherweise) meinen, D [A] sei Schuldner des G [C].' ('Here, no triangular 
relationship can be seen from any perspective, if one requires that both A and C (erroneously) 
believe that A is the debtor of C.') 
And had not given any counter-performance for it 
Assuming that the value of a factum were recoverable. 
More specifically, at least in relation to the last example mentioned, it would be a condictio 
indebiti: Koppensteiner and Kramer Bereicherung 39. 
See, e g, Van der Merwe et al Contract 492n74. 
See, e g, Medicus Burgerliches Recht marg note 684. Also see the examples (which I have 
slightly elaborated) given by Larenz and Canaris Schuldrecht 1112 243: A, the owner of a 
piece ofland concludes a contract with a builder, B, who is to erect a building on A's land. B 
151 
SlILoooscwl ckbt-f3 - - J!: - - - - - - - -:7 C 
The majority opinion in German law is that, ifhe acted of his own accord530 
in making the 'performance' to C, A should be able to bring an enrichment action 
directly against C:531 C has received something (etwas erlangt) in terms of § 812 
BGB without legal ground.532 This view has been explained in terms of the 
Leistungsbegriffas follows: when A makes the 'performance' to C, he makes this 
performance in his own right and not under the instruction of B. A is thus the 
appropriate person to form the intention that determines the path of the Leistung,533 
and his intention is to increase the patrimony ofC.534 The'Leistungsbeziehung' 
('performance-relationship') accordingly lies between A and C, and A should 
therefore be able to bring a Leistungskondiktion (in this case a condictio indebiti) 






subcontracts some of the work to an electrical flrm, C. C, who is awaiting payment in tenns 
of its contract with B, is paid by A, who wishes to speed up the progress on the building. 
Similarly, X sells something to Y but reserves the right of ownership until the purchase price 
is fully paid. Y then sells the same thing to Z. Z then pays X the rest of the purchase price to 
X in order that he receive ownership. In either case, it turns out that the contract between B 
and C is void. 
Loewenheim Bereicherungsrecht 47; cfLarenz and Canaris Schuldrecht 1I12 who deal with 
cases where he is not acting on his own initiative under this heading, and distinguish them 
from Anweisung-cases. A is acting on his own initiative and not on the instruction ofB. It is 
thus not an Anweisung-situation: Loewenheim Bereicherungsrecht 47; Medicus 
Biirgerliches Recht marg note 684: there is no Anweisung, whether real or supposed. The 
case must also be distinguished from those where A has a right to perfonn to C eg in tenns of 
§ 268 or § 1142 BGB which would take the case out of the category of three-cornered 
enrichment because in such cases there is a statutory transfer of the claim to A who thus takes 
C's place as B's creditor upon making the payment: Loewenheim Bereicherungsrecht 47. 
Koppensteiner and Kramer Bereicherung 49; Miinchener KommentarfLieb § 812 marg note 
108; Loewenheim Bereicherungsrecht 48 ff; Medicus Biirgerliches Recht marg note 685; 
Larenz and Canaris Schuldrecht 1I12 243; Reuter and Martinek Bereicherung 467. 
See Chapter One at p 22 ff above. 
I e a conscious and purpose-directed (zweckgerichtet) intention to increase the patrimony of 
another: see Loewenheim Bereicherungsrecht 48. Also see Chapter One at p 38 above. 
In other words, this is not a case where B decides to perfonn to C, and instructs A to make 
the performance for him, so that when A hands something or does something for C, this 
really constitutes the perfonnance (Leistung) of B to C. 
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On the other hand, certain writers535 consider that B should have an 
enrichment action against e, and that A's only recourse should be against B. The 
Leistungsbegriffis also used to justify this point of view: when A performs, he has B 
in mind; he thinks that he is performing in terms ofB's obligation and he must thus 
have some sort of purpose, such as donation, which is directed towards B rather than 
c.536 In other words, A's intention or purpose, in delivering something to em and 
thus extinguishing B's (supposed) obligation to e, is either to make a gift to B or to 
impose some sort of obligation on B (e g obligations in terms of the law on 
Geschiiftsfiihrung ohne Auftrag (negotiorum gestio)).538 A's Leistung was 
accordingly made to B. Thus, for example, the aunt might intend the payment of 
university fees as a gift to her nephew, or she might intend to pay her nephew's fees 
in order to make him liable towards her as gestor. B, in tum, is regarded as having 
made a Leistung to e and, because § 267 BGB implies that a third party may form 
the intention to perform for the debtor, B's intention or purpose in 'performing' to e 
is inferred from A's purpose. In other words, there are two 'performance-
relationships': B performs (leistet) to e, and A performs (leistet) to B. Ifit turns out 
that there was no obligation between Band e, B will accordingly be entitled to sue 
e, A must sue B, and B must cede his claim against e to A. 
The fact that the same theory is used to justify two opposing viewpoints (and 
the convoluted reasoning employed in doing so) very nicely illustrates some of the 
shortcomings of the Leistungsbegrif.!. As explained in the previous chapter, the focus 
of this theory is the intention of the performing party. This is usually unproblematic 
where only two parties are concerned, or where the performing party clearly intends 
to perform only to one party. Where more than two parties are involved or where, as 
in this case, the performing party's intention is ambiguous, adherence to the 
Leistungsbegriffcauses more confusion than clarity. Stated in simple terms, the 
theory sounds appealing: 'if you performed to X, and that performance was 
unjustified, you can claim it back'. To add that the performance is determined with 
reference to the performing party's intention also seems unproblematic; there are, 





Led by Esser (n 4) 346 ff. 
Medicus Biirgerliches Recht marg note 684. 
Or doing something for him. 
See Loewenheim Bereicherungsrecht 48. 
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intending it for another.539 But each further refinement of the theory seems to cause 
as many problems as it is intended to solve. Ultimately, to make the liability of the 
parties depend on something as spectral as whether A consciously directed his 
purpose towards increasing the patrimony ofB or C, bearing in mind that this 
conscious purpose can be detennined objectively from the perspective of someone in 
the shoes of C, seems to take us from the realm of common sense into the somewhat 
surreal world of Begrijfsjurisprudenz. The focus of the enquiry is too narrow and too 
far removed from reality. 
As said in the previous chapter, while the Leistungsbegriff still has its 
supporters, many Gennan lawyers have heeded the criticisms of Canaris540 and 
others and now look at three-cornered situations from a broader perspective. Thus 
the situation where someone pays the non-existent debt of another has been analysed 
taking into account the interests of all of the parties, bearing in mind the 'Canaris 
principles' mentioned in the above chapter.541 
Thus it has been argued that B should not be involved in the 'unravelling' of a 
situation like this: he is not drawn into the picture by a relationship of justified or 
unjustified Geschafisfohrung ohne Aujtrag, or any other causal relationship, vis-it-vis 
A, and there are no other grounds for attributing A's perfonnance to B.542 It is not a 
so-called 'triangular situation' and the normal enrichment rules would apply. 
Who should bear the risk of the insolvency ofB? If A had to sue Band B to 
sue C, (i e to proceed 'via the triangle'), A would bear the risk ofB's insolvency. In 
other words, ifB goes insolvent, A gets nothing. B's creditors would be advantaged, 
on the other hand, in that they would have an enrichment claim against C. This 
would give an advantage to B's creditors that they have done nothing to deserve.543 
If A can sue C directly, A will not have to bear the risk that B goes insolvent, and B's 






In other words, in certain situations the intention of the performing party carries more weight 
than the outward results of his performance. 
Claus-Wilhelm Canaris 'Der Bereicherungsausgleich im Dreipersonenverhaitnis' in Gotthard 
Paulus, Uwe Diederichsen and Claus-Wilhelm Canaris (eds) Festschrift Karl Larenz zum 70. 
Geburtstag (1973) 799. 
At P 45 ff. 
Canaris (n 540) at 848-9. 
See Loewenheim Bereicherungsrecht49. 
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received by C constitutes an unexpected windfall; to B's creditors, a claim against C 
would similarly be a stroke ofluck; neither C's nor B's creditors' interests would 
accordingly be infringed if they were forced to give up what was to them a lucky 
windfal1.544 In other words, allowing A to sue C directly merely means that C has to 
give up something that he was not entitled to, and that B's creditors will have to 
forego an advantage that they could not count on.545 It is also stated, in accordance 
with the second of Canaris's principles,546 that C cannot counter A's action with any 
defences arising from his (C's) relationship with B.547 
Although there is some dispute whether A's action against C is a 
Leistungskondiktion or a Nichtleistungskondiktion,548 the majority view is that it is a 
Leistungskondiktion, more specifically, a condictio indebiti.549 
The courts also allow A to sue C directly, with a Leistungskondiktion.550 The 
leading case is the notorious BGHZ 113,62 (1990),551 which concerned an 
entanglement of insolvent companies, mandates, alleged overpayments and 
disgruntled former employees. A company, W, mandated a firm of architects (X) to 
renovate a house. The architects in tum gave a mandate, in the name of W 
Company, to a firm of builders (L Company) to carry out certain work.552 One of the 
employees of the firm of architects (E) was required to check the accounts. After he 
had cleared various accounts submitted by the builders, he was dismissed from the 
firm of architects. 553 The job of checking the accounts was then taken over by one of 
the architects, K. K retrospectively reduced several of the builders' accounts 











See Loewenheim Bereicherungsrecht 49. 
Loewenheim Bereicherungsrecht 49. See Canaris (n 540) at 847 in this regard. 
See Chapter One above at .p 46 
Medicus Biirgerliches Recht marg note 684; Loewenheim Bereicherungsrecht49; Canaris (n 
540) 847. 
Miinchener KommentarfLieb § 812 marg note 109. 
See the text above at p 151. 
Miinchener KommentarfLieb § 812 marg note 108. See Lieb lac cit for further case 
references. 
This case is so complicated (involving a four-party-relationship), exceptional and improbable 
that it has been suggested that it should not be asked in examination questions: see Horst 
Heinrich Jakobs 'Die RUckkehr der Praxis zur Regelanwendung und der Beruf der Theorie 
im Recht der Leistungskondiktion' 1992 NJW 2524 and Medicus Biirgerliches Recht marg 
note 685. 
Handwerkerarbeiten i e work to be done by skilled craftsmen. 
The circumstances of his dismissal are not mentioned in the report, so we can assume that 
they were not relevant to this case. 
than the billed amounts. He alleged that W Company had therefore overpaid the 
builders in the amount of 45258,71 OM. This amount was not repaid, and the 
builders' firm was sequestrated. Then W Company also went insolvent. 
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One of the members ofW Company, C, subsequently wrote to B, who had 
previously been one of three architects who made up fmn X but who had left due to 
some unspecified unpleasantness. In the letter, C (who wrote it as a 'personally 
liable shareholder/partner' ofW Company),554 demanded settlement of the loss 
incurred viz 45258,71 OM. B passed the claim on to his professional liability 
insurer, A, instructing him to investigate whether the claim was valid in law, and 
informing him that it appeared that it would be well-nigh impossible to controvert the 
claimant's evidence should the matter result in legal proceedings. The insurer 
requested proof from C that he was entitled to receive the amount that had been 
claimed. C answered that W had not been liquidated and that he was claiming the 
money in his personal capacity as he had advanced this sum to W Company. 
Apparently satisfied that C was entitled to receive the payment, the insurer (A) 
transferred 44 456, 26 OM to him (the original amount having been reduced by the 
excess due to the insurer). 
K became aware of the payment555 and informed the insurer that there had in 
fact been no real overpayment to the builders; what had in fact happened was that the 
builders had threatened to stop working on the project as they had not been paid by 
W Company, and the firm of architects had alleged that there had been overpayments 
merely in order to induce the builders to continue the work. 
The insurer A thereupon instituted legal proceedings against C and B, 
reclaiming payment of the relevant amount on the grounds that they had obtained it 
fraudulently. In addition, A claimed that C had to repay the money on the basis of 
unjustified enrichment, because W Company had not ceded the claim to him (C) and 
he had therefore not been authorised to receive the money. 
To summarise the core facts: C (a former employee ofW) asked B (a former 
partner in the firm of architects) to pay a debt and B submitted that claim to his 
554 
555 
'[P]ersonlich haftender Gesellschafter': see the judgment at 63. 
As the finn's 'no claims bonus' was reduced: see 64. 
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insurers A. The Bundesgerichtshof characterised the case as one where A made a 
payment to C with the intention of settling B's supposed (but non-existent) debt to 
c.556 The court held that the enrichment claim (which would be a 
Leistungskondiktion) against C was a valid one and that the insurer was the 
appropriate plaintiff in the circumstances. The Leistung in question, according to the 
court, was the transfer of the money from the insurer to C, and the insurer's intention 
in making this performance was to settle B's professional liability to W Company. 
The court said that A 'performed' to C because A had regarded C as the party who 
was entitled to claim damages.55? As there was no defect in the insurance contract 
between the insurer and X, which the court identified as the Deckungsverhiiltnis, 
insurer was under the impression that he was obliged to pay.558 
The court also held that the defendant had received the Leistung without legal 
ground.559 In doing so, it dismissed as irrelevant the question whether W Co had a 
claim for damages against B. It also held that W Co had not ceded any claim to 
damages to C or authorised C to collect damages in his own name, and that C could 
not assume the right to represent the company in legal proceedings.56o In other 
words, C had no right to the payment. The court also rejected the argument that the 
payment to C had simultaneously extinguished B's professional liability to W CO.561 
The court accordingly rejected the argument that the enrichment claim should 
be directed against B. 562 The court distinguished this from a case of an instruction563 
(with B as the instructing, and the insurer as the instructed party).564 The court said 
that B 'only informed the insurer that he was being sued for compensation by C, i e 










Cf a simplified summary from Loewenheim Bereicherongsrecht 49-50: 'Architect B had 
third party insurance with insurance company A. A believed that they had to answer for 
damage caused by B to W, which B had reported to it. Because C was of the opinion that W 
had ceded his claim against B to him, A paid the sum to C. Later it turned out that there 
neither was a valid insurance claim nor had there been an effective cession of the alleged 
claim by W to C. A claimed back from C the sum which had been transferred to him.' (My 
translation, and I have changed the letters). 
At 70. 
See the judgment at 65. 








justified' and added that the insured was not entitled to instruct the insurer to pay,565 
and the insurer had no obligation to obey.566 The court pointed out that, before 
paying a creditor, an insurer checks the validity of both the contract ofinsurance567 
and the creditor's claim against the insured.568 In this case, when B informed the 
insurer of the claim against him, the insurer tested the validity of the claim. The 
insurer's initial doubts were dispelled by the further particulars received from C, and 
the insurer accordingly paid what it supposed to be B's debt to c.569 Here, the third 
party performs in his own right, whereas when someone is acting under instructions, 
he intends to perform as the debtor ofthe instructing party.570 In other words, where 
A settles B's debt to C of his own accord, he intends to 'perform' to C, whereas ifhe 
is carrying out B's instruction in making the payment, he himself intends to 
'perform' to B, and to carry out B's 'performance' to c.57I 
Finally, the court held that this case was not covered by § 814 BGB,572 
according to which anything that has been performed with the purpose of fulfilling 
an obligation cannot be reclaimed if the performing party knew that he was not 
obliged to perform. The court said that this provision only applies where the 
performing party knew that he was not legally obliged to perform, and this was not 
the case here.573 
Significantly, the court confirmed that where a third party pays another's 
supposed debt, the paying party (A) can bring a condictio directly against the 
apparent creditor (C) ifthe debt did not exist, assuming that the supposed debtor (B) 
did not cause574 the performing party to perform. The court thus emphasised the fact 
that B had not instructed A to make the performance, and that there was therefore no 
reason to attribute the performance to B rather than to A.575 The court was therefore 












I e to make an Anweisung. 
At 65. (My translation of the section enclosed by quotation marks). 
The so-called Deckungsverhaltnis ('cover relationship'). 
The Valutaverhtiltnis ('value relationship'). See the judgment at 66. 
At 66. 
See 68-9. 
See Chapter Three of this thesis. 
See Appendix for text of this and the other enrichment provisions of the BGB. 
I e not merely the facts which led to his not being obliged. See the judgment at 70. 




C d· I 576 sue Irect y. 
In tenns of South African law, such cases would fortunately not present much 
difficulty. In general tenns, we would say that C, and not B, has been enriched at 
A's expense. According to general principles, therefore, A should sue C directly. 
There would also be no difficulty in suing with one of the condictiones if the 
performance in question constituted a datio577 (in its most literal sense)578 from A to 
C, provided that the other requirements of the relevant condictio are satisfied in the 
circumstances. Thus, for example, for A to succeed with the condictio indebiti, he 
would have to prove that he made a datio to C in the absence of an underlying 
obligation due to an excusable error.579 
It would not be possible according to the existing rules of South African law, 
however, for A to sue C for the value ofaJaetum. (Thus, strangely, if A makes a 
Jactum to C, he can sue B for the value thereof if it constitutes a gestio, under the 
heading of negotiorum gestio or that of quasi negotiorum gestio, but he cannot sue C 
for the value thereof, if the case does not fall into either of those categories.) The 
restriction of the eondictiones to dationes has often been criticised/so and it is to be 
hoped that, should such a case arise, the court will use the opportunity at least to 
extend the eondictiones to allow recovery of the value of a Jaetum, or to recognise a 
I . 5Sl genera actlOn. 
There was nothing to suggest that the datio should be legally regarded as a 
datio to B/S2 as there was neither a contract nor an instruction between A and B, nor 
did A act as B's agent. There would also not be any relationship of negotiorum 
gestiO or quasi negotiorum gestio between A and B because A would not have 
administered B's affairs (as B had no obligation to C). It is thus clear that A could 









As opposed to afaeturn. 
In other words, 'a giving': see D P Simpson Cassel/'s Latin Dictionary 5 ed (1968) q v. 
See Chapter One at pp 7-8. 
See, e g, Eiselen and Pienaar Unjustified Enrichment 108. 
See Chapter One in this regard. 
Cf Phillips v Hughes; Hughes v Maphurnulo 1979 (1) SA 225 (C). 
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CONCLUSION 
At the end of the previous chapter, the following question was posed: where A 
transfers something to (or does something for) C, who will have an enrichment claim 
against whom? 
This chapter has shown that, provided that there is neither a contract nor any 
other valid causa in the relationship between A and B, and also no contract or other 
causa between Band C, A can bring an enrichment action directly against C in both 
systems. (In South African law, the traditional remedies do not allow recovery of a 
factum in such circumstances, but the general principles would.) 
If A and B are not linked by any contract, and A purports to perform in terms 
ofB's valid obligation to C but fails to discharge this obligation, A can also sue C for 
unjustified enrichment in both systems. (Again, the traditional remedies would not 
cover afactum in current South African law). 
If, in the absence of any contract (between himself and A) obliging him to do 
so, A succeeds in discharging B's obligation to C, however, his case may fall within 
the boundaries of negotiorum gestio or its German equivalent. In such a case, A's 
recourse will be directed against B and not C. Should all the requirements of 
negotiorum gestio or Geschiiftsfiihrung ohne Auf trag be met, A may recover all his 
expenses from B. If, however, only some of the requirements are met, and the case 
therefore amounts to one of quasi negotiorum gestio, unberechtigte or 
Geschiiftsfiihrung ohne Auf trag, A may still sue B, but can only recover the amount 
by which B is enriched. 
According to the general principles of South African law, we would say that 
B would only be drawn into the picture ifhe was enriched by A's performance in 
that his debt to C was extinguished. If A's performance failed to discharge a valid 
obligation between Band C, or if there was no such obligatiori between Band C, C 
(not B) would be the enriched party. It is therefore crucial to determine whether A's 
performance had the effect of discharging a valid obligation between Band C. 
1(,0 
How would we determine whether the enrichment in question is sine causa? 
IfC was the enriched party (i e where A's performance failed to discharge an 
obligation between B and C), our law would have no difficulty in saying that his 
enrichment would be sine causa: he had no claim to A's performance. If A's 
performance discharged a debt validly owed by B to C, however, A's performance 
would, in a sense be regarded as B's performance to C, and C would therefore have 
received it cum causa. If A's performance in such a case fell within the ambit of 
neRotiorum Restio vis-a-vis B, B would also have received it cum causa. If the 
performance did not create a relationship of neRotiorum Restio between A and B, 
however, B will have been enriched sine causa and A can sue him for unjustified 
enrichment. 
The legal situation created by our traditional remedies, therefore, can also be 
explained using these two general requirements, on their own, without having to ask 
at whose expense the enrichment took place.583 They do not, however, explain the 
various protective requirements posed in the different situations of quasi neRotiorum 
Restio. The fact that German law still has some of those categories, with 
requirements aimed at the protection of B, suggests that these categories should not 
be abandoned when we have a general enrichment action. 
In German law, the best answer for the cases which do not fall into the 
categories identified by von Caemmerer is arrived at by using Canaris's principles. 
These indicate that in circumstances where A's performance to C does not extinguish 
an obligation B-C, A should be able to sue C directly. In other words, ifC's receipt 
cannot be attributed to B, then A can recover any enrichment from C. If it can be 
attributed to B, then A should direct a possible enrichment action against B, unless A 
and B are linked by a relationship of justified negotiorum gestio (in which case A 
could recover all his expenses). 
In the next chapter, we will consider what happens where A is prompted to 
perform to C rather than to B by B's instruction. 
583 Cf, e g, the approach of the SCA in B & H Engineering v First National Bank of SA Ltd 
supra. 
CHAPTER THREE 
UNJUSTIFIED ENRICHMENT IN THE CONTEXT OF 
PERFORMANCE IN TERMS OF AN ACTUAL OR PURPORTED 
INSTRUCTION 
If Bowes C something and is in turn owed something by A, B might instruct or 
authorise A to perform to C on his behalf. 1 Thus, for example, if A and B have 
concluded a contract of sale in terms of which A is to deliver a computer to B, and B and 
C conclude a contract for the sale of the same computer, B can instruct A to deliver the 
computer directly to c.2 Or ifB holds a bank account3 at bank A, he can order the bank 
to pay his creditor C either by writing a cheque, or by signing a credit card slip, or by 
authorising a standing order or bank transfer. Then again, B could owe damages to C in 
respect of a car accident. B could then instruct A, his insurer, to pay C in terms of the 
insurance contract between himself (B) and A. 
Alternatively, B could instruct or authorise a third party (i e someone who is not 
his debtor) to perform to C on his behalf. For example, B leases premises from C and 
owes C R2 500 as rental. B can ask his mother (A) to pay the rent for him. Or B might 
ask A to lend him money by settling the debt owed by B to C. (For example, B could 
ask his bank to grant him an overdraft, and then instruct the bank to pay the rent to C.) 
The question of enrichment might arise in anyone of the above cases if the 
payment or transfer (A-C) takes place in terms of the instruction4 but one or more of the 
legal links between the parties is absent, invalid or otherwise ineffective. So, for 
4 
See, for example, Munchener KommentarlLieb § 812 marg note 29. 
In other words, a case of so-called 'short-cut delivery'. See, for example, the hypothetical case 
discussed by Wieling Bereicherungsrecht at 87. 
With a credit balance; but cfthe discussion (at p 165 below) of the abstraction principle in this 
regard. 
Whether actual or supposed. 
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instance, if A delivers the computer to C in accordance with B' s instruction, but it 
transpires that both of the contracts for the sale of the computers are invalid, will B or C 
be liable in terms of the law of enrichment? Alternatively, if B draws a cheque on his 
bank A for payment to his creditor C and then countermands the cheque, but the bank 
makes the payment regardless of the countermand, can either A or B sue C on the basis 
that he has been unjustifiably enriched? Or if insurer A pays C the damages as 
requested, but subsequently discovers that B's policy had lapsed before the car accident, 
will A have an enrichment claim, and, if so, against whom should it be directed? Or 
what would happen ifB's mother paid his rent to C, but it turned out that the contract of 
lease was void and the money therefore unowed? 
What the hypothetical situations in the first paragraph have in common is that a 
party instructs5 his debtor6 to perform to his creditor.7 In other words, in accordance 
with the instruction8 of B,9 A 10 makes the performance owed by B to a third party c. 11 12 
In the situations in the second paragraph, on the other hand, a debtor instructs a third 
party to perform to his creditor. 
Instructions and authorisations: the Anweisung in German law 
In German law, these situations would all be seen as manifestations of the same legal 







Or purports to instruct. 
Whether actual or supposed. 
Whether actual or supposed. 
On such cases in general in German law, see Claus-Wilhelm Canaris 'Der 
Bereicherungsausgleich irn Dreipersonenverb1iltnis' in Gotthard Paulus, Uwe Diederichsen and 
Claus-Wilhelm Canaris{eds) Festschriji Karl Larenz zum 70. Geburtstag (1973) 799 at 800 ff; 
Medicus Burgerliches Recht marg notes 674 ff; Medicus Schuldrecht II marg notes 728-9; 
Koppensteiner and Kramer Bereicherung 24 ff; Loewenheim Bereicherungsrecht 35 ff; 
Jauernig/Schlechtriem § 812 marg notes 34 ff; S Meier' Mistaken payments in three-party 
situations: a German view of English law' (1999) 58 Cambridge Law Journal 567; Miinchener 
KommentariLieb § 812 marg note 30 ff; B Markesinis, W Lorenz and G Dannemann The 
German Law o/Obligations Vol 1, The Law o/Contracts and Restitution (1997) 733 ff. 
The Anweisender or 'instructing party'. 
The Angewiesene or 'instructed party'. 
The Anweisungsemp/iinger or 'recipient'. 
Miinchener KommentarlLieb § 812 marg note 30. In other words, B can perform to C via an 
intermediary A, acting under B's instruction. 
This is often translated as 'order' or 'instruction': see, e g, Meier (1999) 58 Cambridge Law 
Journal 567 and Daniel Visser 'Searches for silver bullets: enrichment in three party situations' 
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banking law, for example, it is the device used to explain cheques and bank transfers, 14 
and, in enrichment law, it provides the archetype for all situations of three-cornered 
enrichment. 15 
The concept is not only fertile and versatile, but also mutable. Although certain 
core characteristics remain the same, the fmer details differ from context to context. 
Even within one particular area, there might be differing opinions as to the exact scope 
and nature of the Anweisung. Thus, in the law of enrichment, while we find all writers 
discussing the Anweisung, there is no such unaninimity as to what an Anweisung is, or 
which cases would fall within its purview. 
A narrow version of the concept fmds statutory expression in § 783 BGB,16 




in David Johnston and Reinhard Zimmermann Unjustified Enrichment: Key Issues in 
Comparative Perspective (2002) at 526 ff at 540. It should more accurately called 'delegation': 
see the text at p 170 ffbelow. In the mean time, I will use the German terminology, to avoid 
confusion. 
It should be borne in mind that, although the relevant paragraph of the BGB (§ 783) is the civil 
law basis for the law regarding cheques etc, most of the provisions regulating this area of the law 
do not form part of this code or of the Handelgesetzbuch (i e the Commercial Code) but are 
contained in other statutory enactments, starting with the Bills of Exchange Act (Wechselgesetz) 
enacted on 21 June 1933 and the Cheques Act (Scheckgesetz) of 14 August 1933: see Norbert 
Hom, Hein Kotz and Hans G Leser German Private Law and Common Law: An Introduction 
(transl Tony Weir) (1982) at 218. These two statutes were passed in response to the Geneva 
Conventions 'which unified the continental European Law on these subjects.' See Hom et alop 
cit 218-19. 
Other examples of three-cornered enrichment: third party insurance, contracts for the benefit of 
third parties, life insurance, cession, pledge, suretyship, 'shortcut delivery', etc. See Chapter One 
at p 28. 
This paragraph is contained in Chapter 21 of the BGB, which generally deals with written orders 
relating to the detivery of money, other fungible property or commercial papers. The paragraph 
reads thus: 'Handigtjemand eirle Urkunde, in der er einen anderen anweist, Geld, Wertpapiere 
oder andere vertretbare Sachen an eirlen Dritten zu leisten, dem Dritten aus, so ist dieser 
ermachtigt, die Leistung bei dem Angewiesenen im eigenen Namen zu erheben, der Angewiesene 
ist ennachtigt, fUr Rechnung des Anweisenden an den Anweisungsempfanger zu leisten.' (If 
someone hands a third party a document irI which he instructs another to give money, commercial 
papers or other fungible things to the third party, this third party is entitled to demand 
performance from the instructed party in his own name, and the irlstructed party is entitled to 
perform to the third party for the account of the instnJcting party.) An Anweisung made in terms 
of this provision is itself regarded as a form of commercial paper because the instructed party 
(drawee) need on1y perform upon presentation of the instrument. Thus cheques, postal orders, 
letters of credit are examples of Anweisungen. ('Commercial paper' is the term used by Malan 
and Pretorius Bills of Exchange as the English equivalent for 'Wertpapier' or 'waardepapier': see 
index and pp 4-5.) 
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should ultimately receive the object of the perfonnance (which must take the fonn of 
money, fungible things, or commercial papers). 17 For example, B, who holds an account 
at bank A, gives C a document which instructs the bank to pay € 1 00 to C, and to deduct 
this sum from B's account. The most familiar example of such a document would be a 
cheque. IS 
The Anweisung, in this technical sense at least, gives rise to a 'double 
authorisation': upon presentation, it simultaneously authorises the instructed party (A) 
to perform to the recipient of the instrument (C) on behalf of the instructing party (B), 
and the payee (C) to collect the perfonnance from the instructed party (A) in his own 
name. 19 On the other hand, it does not create any obligations?O Thus the payee does not 
automatically acquire any right to claim performance from A,21 even if the instructed 
party is obliged to perform vis-a.-vis the instructing party on the basis of an underlying 
relationship (e g a banker-client contract). An Anweisung can therefore be revoked by 
the instructing party?2 (The picture changes, however, if the drawee accepts the 








Medicus Burgerliches Recht marg note 674. 
The Anweisung in terms of § 783 BGB must be distinguished from various other legal concepts. 
While the third party is authorised to collect performance, this is not a cession because the third 
party does not generally receive transfer of the claim. An instruction to a bank to transfer money 
to a third party (an Uberweisungsauftrag}, a direct debit order (Lastschriftverfahren), and a postal 
transfer are not regarded as Anweisungen in this narrow sense. An Anweisung as defIned by § 
783 BGB must also be distinguished from a mandate (Auf trag in terms of §§ 662ffBGB); for a 
comparison, see the discussion at p 169 below. 
See, e g, Palandt Einfvor § 783 marg note 3. 
In other words it is typically unilateral, and is not a contract. See, e g, Koppensteiner and Kramer 
Bereicherung 24, where they also distinguish this from cases of co-debtorship or suretyship, 
where A (along with B) is obliged vis-a-vis C and thus makes a performance 'solvendi causa' in 
the relationship A-C. 
And, while the instructed party has a duty (arising out of its underlying contract with the 
instructing party) to make a performance (A-B), it has no legal duty to make that performance to 
C. 
Such as happens when someone countermands a cheque - see p 209 ffbelow. See Palandt § 790 
marg note 1. 
See § 784 BGB: '[Annahme der Anweisung] (1) Nimmt der Angewiesene die Anweisung an, so 
ist er dem Anweisungsempf<l.nger gegenUber zur Leistung verpflichtet; er kann ihm nur solche 
Einwendungen entgegensetzen, welche die Gtiltigkeit der Annahme betreffen oder sich aus dem 
Inhalte der Anweisung oder dem Inhalte der Annahme ergeben oder dem Angewiesenen 
unmittelbar gegen den Anweisungsempfii.nger zustehen. (2) Die Annahme erfolgt durch einen 
schriftlichen Vermerk auf der Anweisung. 1st der Vermerk auf die Anweisung vor der 
Aushandigung an den Anweisungsempfanger gesetzt worden, so wird die Annahme diesem 
gegenuber erst mit der Aushandigung wirksam.' ([Acceptance of Anweisung] (1) If the 
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circumstances, the drawee (A) is bound to perform to the payee (Ci4 upon presentation 
of the document containing the instruction. In other words, the payee will have a right 
against the drawee.25 Acceptance, however, does not create a contract between A and 
C?6) 
It is also important to note that the principles of separation27 and abstraction28 
apply to both authorisations?9 In other words, their validity does not depend on the 
validity of any underlying legal transactions. So, for instance, if B instructs A to 
perform to C in circumstances where the underlying relationship between A and B is 
defective or absent, the instruction will nevertheless be valid. Let us imagine, for 
example, that Bowes €IOO to C in terms ofa contract, and A owes €IOO to B. B 
instructs A (in the form of a written document presented to C) to hand the sum directly 
over to C. B's instruction to A can constitute a valid Anweisung even if A's debt to B 
has prescribed or terminated, or if their contract was void or voidable from the outset.30 
Perhaps the most important feature of all, at least from an enrichment 
perspective, is that A's 'performance' to C is regarded as embodying two performances: 
A's performance to B, and B's performance to C. By means of this convenient legal 









instructed party accepts the Anweisung, he is obliged vis-a-vis the recipient to make performance; 
he can raise against him only such defences as concern the validity of the acceptance or arise 
from the content of the Anweisung or the content of the acceptance or that are available to the 
instructed party directly against the recipient. (2) Acceptance takes place by a written note on 
the Anweisung. If the note is placed on the Anweisung before it is handed to the recipient, the 
acceptance is only effective vis-a-vis the recipient upon delivery of the Anweisung.) 
See Palandt § 784 marg note I. 
See Palandt § 784 marg note 1. 
Palandt § 784 marg note 3. 
Trennungsprinzip. 
Abstraktionsprinzip. 
See Palandt Einf. Vor § 783 BGB marg notes 6-7: the validity of the Anweisung is independent 
of the Valutaverhiiltnis and the Deckungsverhiiltnis. Also see § 783 marg note 4. 
This partially explains why, when B draws a cheque on bank A, he is making a valid Anweisung 
even if A is not B's debtor in the sense that A owes B money (i eeven ifB's account has a nil 
balance, or a debit balance). In other words, even though the archetypal case envisages a debtor-
creditor relationship between A and B, the application of the abstraction principle means that 
there can be a valid Anweisung even in the absence thereof. 
See, e g, Zimmermann Law of Obligations 159-60; D.l2. 1.15. 
1.66 
act. 32 It is this feature that distinguishes the situation of an Anweisung from the 
situations discussed in the previous chapter. If A takes it upon herself to pay a debt 
owed by her impecunious sister (B) to C, A is regarded as perfonning to C. If, however, 
A pays the rent he owes to his landlord (B) to B's creditor Con B's instruction, A will 
be regarded as having perfonned to B, and B to C. Or, to use the computer example 
cited above, ifB instructs a seller A to deliver a computer directly to B's contract-
partner C, such delivery will discharge A's obligation to B, and B's obligation to C. 
As said above, the Anweisung of § 783 BGB is just one manifestation of a much 
broader concept, and it is in its broader guise that it is used by writers on unjustified 
enrichment as the model for dealing with three-cornered enrichment situations.33 
Enrichment lawyers thus apply the rules outlined above to all cases where someone has 
been instructed to pay the instructing party's creditor (where the instruction or one ofthe 
other legal relationships between the parties is defective). Anweisungen in the context of 
enrichment, therefore, are not confined to instructions that are embodied in written 
documents; the perfonnance in question need not be the delivery of money, securities or 
fungibles; and the instruction need not necessarily authorise the third party to collect 
from the drawee in his own name. The tenn 'Anweisung' in this broad sense would 
therefore include mandates,34 postal orders,35 inter-account bank transfers,36 debit orders, 
cases of ' short-cut deli very', and so on. 
The central role given to the Anweisung in the Gennan legal literature on 
unjustified enrichment is justified by the fact that it is the most common three-cornered 







In other words, for example, when A hands money to C in terms ofB's instruction, A's debt to B 
and B's debt to C will both be discharged. Wieling Bereicherungsrecht 80: this corresponds to 
what happens in terms of property law. Cfthe discussion of the GeheifJerwerb in Chapter One at 
p 19. 
Medicus Schuldrecht If marg note 579: 'Mittel zur Erleichterung von Leistungen in 
Dreipersonenverhaltllissen .... ' 
See, e g, Wieling Bereicherungsrecht 88. 
Medicus Schuldrecht 11 marg note 579. 
See, e g, Wieling Bereicherungsrecht 88n 1. 
See Medicus Schuldrecht 11 marg note 581. It should be borne in mind that although many of the 
earlier German cases concern cheques, this mode of payment is now used relatively seldom in 
Germany; it has been superseded by Uberweisungen (i e instructions to the bank to make a 
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consequently more case law) than any of the other situations covered in this thesis. That 
this is so is obvious especially if one bears in mind that all cheques and bank transfers38 
fall into this category.39 It is also useful as an archetype because of its versatility, and its 
applicability in apparently dispirate contexts.40 Moreover, its somewhat fluid 
boundaries make it malleable and flexible, in that analogous cases may easily be brought 
within its compass.41 Finally, it provides a good basis for discussion because of the 
nature of the legal relationships (contractual or proprietory) linking the three parties. 
The existence of actual or supposed contracts between the parties is important in 
determining who has 'performed' to whom. As said above, in terms of German law, the 
instructed party's 'handing over' (Zuwendung)42 comprises two performances:43 within 
a banking context, for example, it constitutes the bank's performance in terms of its 
agreement with its client and the drawer's performance in terms of its contract with the 
payee.44 This rule helps to locate the causa for a particular 'performance'. It also 
obviously plays a crucial role for the supporters of the LeistungsbegrifJ. Finally, as 
mentioned above, it distinguishes Anweisung cases from those where someone pays the 
debt of another (covered in the previous chapter): if A pays B's debt to C, his intention 
is to settle B's debt to C by his own performance to C; if, on the other hand, in 
accordance with an instruction (Anweisung) from B, A makes a payment to C, A does 
not intend to settle B's debt to C, but to settle his own debt to B,45 and the extinction of 










transfer to a third party, without any negotiability being attached to the written instruction), 
transfers made over the internet, and credit card payments. 
Oberweisungen. 
Medicus Burgerliches Recht marg note 674. 
Thus we find Anweisungen in banking law, insurance law, the law of sale and lease, etc. 
As is shown by the fact that some authors regard a particular set of factual circumstances as 
constituting an Anweisung-case, whereas others regard exactly the same circumstances as merely 
analogous to the Anweisung. 
See Chapter One at p 39. 
At P 165. 
Loewenheim Bereicherungsrecht 33; Jauernig/Schlechtriem § 812 marg note 34; R Zimmennann 
and J du Plessis 'Basic features of the German law of unjustified enrichment' 1994 Restitution 
Law Review 14 at 33. 
In other words, it is not a case covered by § 267 BGB. See, e g, Koppensteiner and Kramer 
Bereicherung 31. 
In other words, it results from B's intention in making the instruction to A, and not from A's 
intention in making the payment. 
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According to Wieling,47 this contractual pattern corresponds to that of the 
passing of ownership in such circumstances. He says that unless B expressly instructs A 
to transfer ownership directly to C, ownership will pass from A to B to c.48 The reason 
given for this is that, in the absence of such an express instruction, A will not be sure 
exactly why B wants him to hand possession to C. For example, A might intend to 
retain ownership of the thing, (such as where he merely wants to lend it to C).49 It 
seems, however, that ownership would als050 pass directly from A to C where A hands 
cash to C. This would generally51 result in C's acquiring ownership of the money, in 
terms of the German equivalent of our principle of commixtio. 52 A shift of assets 
directly from A to C could also occur by means of a credit against C's account at his 
own bank. It should also always be borne in mind that the transfer of ownership is not 
dependent on the validity of any underlying causal transactions, due the application of 









Unlike many other institutions of German law,54 the Anweisung, especially in its 
Bereicherungsrecht 88. 
As happens with the GeheiJ3erwerb: see Chapter One at p 19 above. 
For all of this, see Wieling Bereicherungsrecht 88. He adds that if A handed the thing to C, and 
the transfer of ownership by B to C was invalid for some reason, ownership would pass merely 
from A to B. 
In other words, even ifB did not expressly instruct A to transfer ownership directly to C. 
Unless the individual coins and notes can be separated from those of the recipient e g if the serial 
numbers had been recorded. 
See § 948, read with § 947 BGB. § 948 (I) BGB 'Werden bewegliche Sachen miteinander 
untrennbar vermischt oder vermengt, so finden die Vorschriftendes § 947 entsprechende 
Anwendung. (2) Der Untrennbarkeit steht es gleich, wenn die Trennung der verrnischten oder 
vermengten Sachen mit unverhaltnisma13igen Kosten verbunden sein wilrde.' [( 1) If movable 
things are inseparably mixed or mingled with each other, the provisions of § 947 apply mutatis 
mutandis. (2) For the purposes of inseparability, it is irrelevant whether the separation of the 
mixed or mingled things would entail disproportionately high costs.] § 947 (1) BGB 'Werden 
bewegliche Sachen miteinander dergestalt verbunden, daB sie wesentliche Bestandteile einer 
einheitlichen Sache werden, so werden die bisherigen Eigentil.mer Miteigentiimer dieser Sache; 
die Anteile bestimmen sich nach dem Verhaltnisse des Wertes, den die Sachen zur Zeit der 
Verbindung haben. (2) 1st eine der Sachen als die Hauptsache anzusehen, so erwirbt ihr 
Eigentiliner das Alleineigentum.' «1) Should movable things be joined in such a way that they 
become component parts ofa unified thing, the former owners become co-owners of this thing; 
the shares are determined with reference to the value that the things had at the time of joining. 
(2) If one of the things is to be regarded as the main thing, the owner thereof will acquire sole 
ownership.) 
See Chapter One at p 17 ff. 
E g Geschiiftsfohrung ohne Auftrag (negotiorum gestiO), Abtretung (cession), Biirgschaft 
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narrow sense, is not immediately recognisable to a South African lawyer. The 
instruction given by B to A superficially resembles our contract of mandate. But this 
resemblance is illusory. Just one distinction, for example, lies in the fact that a mandate 
is necessarily bilateral, whereas an Anweisung may, but need not be, accepted by the 
instructed party (in fact, it is typically unilateral). In short, a mandate is a contract, 
whereas an Anweisung, in its narrow guise, is not.55 Typically, where there is an 
Anweisung, the instructing and the instructed parties are linked by an underlying contract 
(e g sale of the computer in the first example above, or the banker-client contract in the 
second, or the contract of insurance in the third), but the Anweisung, though related,56 
does not form part of the contract itself. This is shown by the fact that the Anweisung is 
usually made after A and B have concluded their contract. Moreover, unlike a mandate, 
an Anweisung is not a source of obligation. 57 Thus, for example, in contrast to a 
mandate, an Anweisung does not itself58 oblige the instructed party to make the 
performance in question; it merely authorises the deflection of a performance owed in 
terms of the underlying contract. That mandate and Anweisung are mutually exclusive 
legal institutions in German law59 is also indicated by the fact that a mandate (Auf trag) is 
necessarily gratuitous,60 whereas an Anweisung can be carried out for remuneration.6J 
It should also be borne in mind that we are dealing not merely with an 
instruction, but also with an authorisation. Not only does B instruct (and therefore 








(suretyship), modes of transfer of ownership, the doctrine of subjective rights. 
While an angenommene Anweisung is accepted by the instructed party (drawee), and is bilateral 
in that sense, it is still not a contract: see p 165 above. 
In that the instruction relates to the performance owed in terms of that contract. 
Unless it has been accepted by the drawee: an angenommene Anweisung in terms of § 784 BGB. 
Although perhaps the underlying contractual relationship could effectively require acceptance of 
the Anweisung. 
At least in the narrow te<:hnical sense of § 783 BGB. 10 the broader sense in which it is used by 
enrichment law, mandate wou Id be embraced by the concept - see, e g, definition of Anweisung 
by Wieling Bereicherungsrechl E8. The German angenommene Anweisung is closer to our 
mandate in that it is bilateral (in that the instruction is accepted by the instructed party) and 
creates an obtigation to perform. h should be borne in mind, however, that acceptance in such 
circumstances does not create a contract: Palandt § 784 marg note 3. 
§ 662 BGB; Medicus Schuldrecht II marg note 417. It was also (at least nominatly) gratuitous in 
Roman law: see Zimmermann Law o/Obligations 415 ff. CfSouth African law, at least in a 
banking context: see J C Stassen 'Driepartybetalingsmeganismes in die modeme bankreg: die 
regsaard van die verhouding tussen bank en klient' 1980 Modern Business Law 77 at 80. 
For example, bank charges. 
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being from 8. In carrying out the performance on behalf of B, is A acting as his agent? 
Again, the answer must be no. For A does not take B's place, but makes B's 
performance in his own capacity. There are, legally-speaking, three parties, and not 
merely two as there would be in a case of agency. Similarly, C cannot be seen as acting 
as B' s agent in accepting performance from A on B' s behalf: C accepts performance in 
his own capacity, in fulfilment of a debt owed to him by 8. Again, therefore, it has to be 
accepted that we are dealing with three parties and that C is not merely a representative 
of 8.62 
Although there are points of resemblance, therefore, neither mandate nor agency 
corresponds exactly to the German Anweisung. Tracing the concept back to Roman law, 
which provides not only the common ancestor of South African and German law but 
also a common 'language' of legal concepts, provides South African lawyers with the 
key to understanding the Anweisung as it is applied in modem German law. 
Roman law: delegatio 
In Roman law, there were various forms of delegatio. It was a type ofauthorisation,63 a 
'unilateral informal declaration that one was prepared to acknowledge the act of a third 





A further distinction between agency and an Anweisung is that agency, like mandate, is a bilateral 
legal relationship. 
See Kaser Roman Private Law at 269; idem Das romische Privatrecht: Erster Abschnitt: Das 
altr6mische, das vorklassische und klassische Recht 2 ed (1971) at 650: 'Die Delegation ist ein 
Anwendungsfall der Ermachtigung .... ' The technical term for authorisation in this sense was 
iussum, but it was sometimes more loosely called mandatum: Max Kaser op cit at 265n41, 579 
and 650; Zimmermann Law of Obligations 61. It was not an instance of mandatum proper, 
because it was not a contract. 
Kaser Roman Private Law at 269. Iussum or 'authorisation' was also used to effect indirect 
representation: see Kaser (n 63) (1971) 265; Zimmermann Law of Obligations 49. Zimmermann 
loc cit points out that iussum differed from the modem authorisation of an agent by a principal in 
that 'it had no "external effect": it did not give rise to a contractual relationship between the 
"principal" and the party with whom the "agent" contracted.' (Also see Kaser Roman Private 
Law at 230 in this regard.) lussum also helped to fill the space in Roman law occupied in modem 
legal systems by agency in that it was one of the devices used to make the paterfamilias liable for 
acts concluded by a person within his power: 'an express (formless) authority ... had to have 
been communicated to the party with whom the person in power was about to contract. .. ' in 
order to found the actio quod iussu: Zimmermann Law of Obligations 52; also see Kaser Roman 
Private Law at 248. On the post-classical law in this regard, see Kaser Roman Private Law at 70. 
Kaser (n 63) at 650. 
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The specific instance of the Roman delegatio that might seem somewhat familiar 
to South African lawyers is the delegatio obligandi, or 'delegation of obligations'. Here, 
one party authorised another to assume an obligation vis-a-vis a third party.66 In other 
words, it was a device used to effect substitution of a party to an obligation. It could 
take either of two fonus, depending on which of the parties to the original obligation 
was substitited: active delegation involved a change of creditors whereas passive 
delegation involved a change of debtors. To achieve active delegation of obligations, 
the original creditor would authorise the debtor to assume an obligation towards the new 
creditor.67 To bring about passive delegation of obligations, on the other hand, the 
original debtor would authorise the creditor to assume an obligation towards a new 
debtor. Delegatio obligandi was thus used by the Romans in order to arrive at the same 
results as our cession68 and 'assignment of debts' .69 It differed from modern South 
African law, however, in that it required the co-operation of the party who was to be 







This assumption of obligations usually entailed a novation of the original obligation: see 
Zimmermann Law 0/ Obligations 60, for the law regarding a change of creditors ('active 
delegation'). Also see Kaser (n 63) at 650, where he points out that delegatio was bound together 
with novation by Justinian because delegatio obligandi led to a novation. The new contract 
restated the tenus of the original obligation, except that the name of the new party would be 
substituted for the old: see Zimmermann Law o/Obligations 60 and Kaser (n 63) at 647. Cf 
Kaser Roman Private Law 270: Delegatio obligandi took place by way of stipulatio or dotis 
dictio. If the parties referred to the original obligation in the stipulatio, there usually had to be a 
novation of the obligation to effect substitution of the authorised party for the original debtor or 
creditor. If, on the other hand, the stipulatio did not refer to the original obligation, it appears 
that no novation was necessary; the assignee made an abstract promise to the third party (e g to 
give him a specific amount of money), 'which was effective in relation to the assignor by virtue 
of his authorisation'. 
See Zimmermann Law o/Obligations 60, where the relevant/ormulae are quoted. 
Regarding the post-classical Roman law, see, e g, Max Kaser Das romische Privatrecht: Zweiter 
Abschnitt: Die nachklassischen Entwicklungen 2 ed (1975) at 451 (where he states that the 
economic need for exchange of creditors was adequately met by various devices, including active 
delegation) and 453 (where he mentions that Justinianic law still regarded substitution of debtors 
as only being possible by way of passive delegation and procuratio in rem suam). 
See Van der Merwe et at Contract 504 ff, where this terminology is used to refer to substitution 
of debtors without novation, whereas the term 'delegation' is to denote something similar to the 
Roman passive detegatio obligandi, as in the following phrase at 504-5: 'delegation involving a 
novation of the existing obligation'. 
See Zimmermann Law o/Obligations 60 for a discussion of this and other disadvantages of using 
the delegatio obligandi to achieve the results of cession. 
Cf footnote 66 above, regarding the 'abstract stipulatio' discussed by Kaser. The fact that 
delegatio solvendi (usually) entailed a novation was not only inconvenient but also resulted in the 
lapsing of any rights accessory to the original obligation. These accessory rights would therefore 
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the Romans never accepted that rights and duties could be transferred to third parties 
without the co-operation of the original parties 72 was their deeply-rooted conviction that 
obligations were personal. 73 The delegatio obligandi was also used for other purposes. 
Thus, for example, it was used to meet the practical need for a contract in favour of third 
parties,74 which was also prevented by the rules which conserved the personal nature of 
obligations. 75 
Perhaps less familiar to South Africans is the other form of delegatio developed 
by the Romans: delegatio solvendi. 76 This was 'an authorisation to pay' 77 in terms of 
which B (is qui delegat) authorised A (is qui delegatur) to perform to a third party (is cui 
delegatur).78 A creditor could thus authorise his debtor to discharge his (the debtor's) 
obligation by performing to a third party; or a debtor could authorise a third party to 
perform to his (the debtor's) creditor. 79 In other words, it allowed the debtor to fulfil his 












have to be re-established in relation to the new obligation: see Zimmennann Law o/Obligations 
60. Modem South African law clearly does not require novation for the substitution of creditors 
by cession: see the discussion in Chapter Four below. The traditional approach of South African 
law regarding substitution of debtors, on the other hand, was that this was not possible without a 
novation: see Van der Merwe et al Contract 504-5; Froman v Robertson 1971 (I) SA 115 (A). 
In Botha v Van Niekerk 1983 (3) SA 513 (A), however, it was held that there was no need for 
novation, but that the creditor had to consent to the transfer of the duty: see S v Commissioner 0/ 
Taxes 1984 (3) SA 584 (ZS); Wildrice Investments (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner/or Inland Revenue 
1987 (I) SA 247 (T); Mignoel Properties (Pty) Ltd v Kneebone 1989 (4) SA 1042 (A); Hodges v 
Coubrough NO 1991 (3) SA 58 (D); Van der Merwe et al Contract 505 ff. 
Nomina ossibus inhaerent: Zimmennann Law o/Obligations 58 ff. 
See Zimmennann Law o/Obligations 5, 34 ff. 
Zimmermann Law o/Obligations 39. 
SpecificaJJy, alteri stipulari nemo potest: see Zimmennann Law o/Obligations 34 ff. 
German: Zahlungsanweisung - see Kaser (n 63) at 650. 
Kaser (n 63) at 650: it was usually money, but there is authority for delegatio of operae and 
usufructus. 
Kaser Roman Private Law at 269-70. This also entailed that C was authorised to accept the 
performance of A as emanating from B: Kaser (n 63) at 650n34; 046.3.56. 
Paul D.46.3.56; Kaser Roman Private Law at 270; idem (n 63) at 650-1. 
See A M Honore 'Condictio and payment' 1958 Acta Juridica 135 at 138, where he suggests that 
the Romans regarded the provision of a 'delegate' as 'equivalent to payment'. 
In other words, where A owed a performance to B, he could discharge his obligation by 
performing to C. See, e g, Kaser Roman Private Law at 261, where he refers to the delegatio 
solvendi in his chapter on 'performances and other modes of extinction', in the list of persons, 
other than the creditor, who were entitled to accept performance: 'If the creditor authorised the 
debtor to make perfonnance to a third person ... , the debtor could release himsel f by making 
performance to the third person . He was released even without such authorisation if the creditor 
subsequently ratified the performance to the third party (ratihabitio; Ulp 0.46.12.4).' 
In other words, where B owed a perfonnance to C, he could discharge it by instructing A to make 
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with the modern Gennan Anweisung,83 the perfonnance in question was, by way of 
fiction, 'regarded as being made by [A] to [B], and by the latter to the third party .... ,84 
This legal construction, by imagining two legal perfonnances where there was factually 
only one, obviated the need for two perfonnances in a literal sense.85 
This characteristic, in particular, made the delegatio solvendi a very useful 
device. For example, it was used by the Romans to avoid some ofthe drawbacks of the 
'real' nature of the contract of mutuum.86 Originally, mutuum (loan for consumption) 
required that the lender transfer ownership of the coins, in the case of a money loan, 
directly to the borrower.87 In other words, it required a datio from the lender to the 
borrower.88 This was obviously inconvenient, and did not allow the credit transfers 
necessary for the development of commercial banking.89 Delegatio solvendi provided 
the answer: a creditor (B) could instruct his debtor (A) to pay the third party (C) to 
whom the creditor wanted to lend the money, thus giving rise to a contract of mutuum 
between the creditor and the third party.90 Although A handed the money to C, it was 
regarded as perfonnance by A to B, and B to C,91 and hence two dationes;92 the law thus 
simultaneously (ostensibly) adhered to the original requirements of mutuum and met a 












It should also be borne in mind that the remedy afforded to a lender who wanted 
the performance in question. 
The German word 'Anweisung' is apparently the equivalent of the Latin 'delegatio': see Kaser 
(n 63) at 650, where he writes, 'Die Anweisung (delegatio) .... ' Also see Medicus Schuldrechl 11 
marg note 579. 
This construction stemmed from Celsus: Zimmermann Law a/Obligations 159-60 and Kaser (n 
63) at 651 (where he refers to this as the 'Durchgangstheorie'). 
See Zimmermann Law a/Obligations 159-60 on the importance of this fiction. 
It was also employed for purposes other than discharge of obligations and the granting of a loan 
(mutuum); it could be used to constitute a dowry or effect a donation: Kaser Roman Private Law 
at 270. Kaser (op cit at 261) says that it was one of the means used to meet the practical need for 
a genuine contract for the benefit of third parties. 
Zimmermann Law a/Obligations 158. 
Zimmennann Law a/Obligations 153. 
Zimmermann Law a/Obligations 159. 
D 12.1.15; Zimmermann Law a/Obligations 159. 
Zimmermann Law a/Obligations 159. 
Zimmennann Law 0/ Obligations 161. 
See Fritz Schulz Principles 0/ Roman Law (I 936) on Roman pragmatism, the conservative nature 
of Roman law and economy oflega! forms. 
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to reclaim his money from the borrower was a condictio (i e an actio certae creditae 
pecuniae).94 By implication,95 therefore, when money was lent to a third party using 
delegatio solvendi, not only were there two dationes, but these would give rise to two 
condictiones: should the money not be repaid, A had to bring a condictio against B, and 
B in turn had to bring a condictio against C. In other words, the pattern of the 
condictiones presumably followed the pattern of the dationes. This is borne out by the 
fact that, according to Kaser, in a case of delegatio solvendi where the relationship 
between A and B was defective, A would have to sue B with a condictio (i e A would 
sue B, not C).96 
Before turning to the South African law, several factors should be emphasised. 
Firstly, the Romans drew a distinction 'between the authority as such (iussum) and the 
causal transaction giving rise to the granting of such authority. ,97 Secondly, such 
authorisation was sometimes loosely called mandate, although this was technically 
incorrect.98 Thirdly, both forms of delegatio were employed by the Roman 'banking 
industry' .99 Fourthly, iussum in the form of delegatio was used to avoid the practical 
disadvantages caused by the view that obligations were inherently personal; thus it was 
used to achieve the practical results of cession, assignment of debts, and contracts in 
favour of third parties. loo Fifthly, the delegatio solvendi was vital to the development of 
our modem contract of mutuum. Finally, the view that the delegatio solvendi resulted 








Zimmermann Law of Obligations 153. 
I have not found authority for this specific point, but it follows logically from the fictional double 
datio. 
Kaser (n 63) at 651 n 37: a defect in the Deckungsverha/tnis does not prevent C from acquiring 
the performance, but gives A a condictio against B: D 12.4.9.1; D 16.1.8.2; D 23.3.78. 
Regarding a defect in the Va/utaverhaltnis, see D 24.1.3.12. There need not always have been an 
obligation B-C, however, as in the case where a creditor instructed his debtor to perform to a 
third party (to whom, for example, he might merely have wished to make a donation). 
Zimmermann Law of Obligations 61n 194, where he gives the following as examples of such a 
causal transaction: 'the purchase of a claim (or, in the case of procuratio in rem alienam a 
mandatum stricto sensu.)' 
Cf note 59 above. E g sometimes the underlying causal transaction was mandate. 
Kaser (n 63) at 650: the 'Bankwesen' of the late Republic and the principate. He points out that 
although this industry was influenced by hellenism, delegatio was a specifically Roman legal 
institution. 
And, in a broader sense, iussum was used to bring about indirect representation and liability of 
the paterfamilias for acts of another (in place of our agency). 
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both Roman law and modem civilian legal systems: it is 'still fundamentally important 
for the modem law of unjustified enrichment. ... ,101 
So here is the elusive Anweisung. The next question is whether the delegatio 
solvendi lives on in modem South African law, or whether it has disappeared entirely. 
South African law 102 
At least two modem judgments I 03 suggest that it survives, although we might have 
forgotten its name: Minister van Justisie v Jaifer 104 and The Standard Bank of South 






In Jaffer's case, a drug dealer, who was, according to the judge (E M Grosskopf 
Zimmermann Law o/Obligations 159-60. 
This is not intended as an exhaustive discussion of the topic, which would fall outside the scope 
of this thesis, but rather as background to the discussion of enrichment law which follows. A 
more detailed consideration of the delegatio solvendi in the common law and modern South 
African law will be the subject of an article to be published later. 
Cf also Resnik v Lekhethoa 1950 (3) SA 263 (T): B sold his general store to A. The purchase 
price was the amount owed by B to his creditors (C). A paid two of these creditors directly. In 
an action for the balance of the purchase price, the Native Appeal Court held that the amount 
owed to one creditor, CX, was still outstanding and gave judgment for the plaintiff (B) in this 
amount. A therefore paid CX the outstanding amount and informed Resnik, B's attorney, of this 
fact. B subsequently ceded 'all his right, title and interest in the judgment in the Native Court' to 
Resnik. Resnik then sued A for payment in the Magistrate's Court. The Magistrate decided in 
favour of A, and Resnik appealed against this decision. The court said that the original 
agreement between B and A required A to pay B's creditors, and while it had as a matter of strict 
law been novated by the judgment of the Native Appeal Court, B should have warned A if he 
wanted payment to himself and not to CX. The judge said that 'principles of the exceptio doli ... 
seem very apposite' but went on to hold that' [w ]hether the principles of the exceptio doli are 
applied or the rule [that payment to a creditor'S creditor will be a valid payment if it benefits the 
creditor] '" in my judgment the magistrate correctly gave judgment for the defendant and it 
becomes unnecessary to consider whether the respondent paid as negotiorum gestor .... ' See the 
commentary by J E Scholtens 'Payment to one's creditor's creditor' (1950) 67 SALJ315. While 
he apparently agreed with the result of the judgment, he disputed the translation of the text relied 
on by the court in coming to its conclusion. He argued that payment to a creditor's creditor 
would only be a valid payment if made with the consent of the creditor or if 'his affair has been 
usefully managed by me though unknown to him.' (at 315). The word actually used by Voet in 
this passage was valuntas, which, being broader than mere consent, would cover an instruction: a 
perfonnance made under instruction would surely be in accordance with the will of the creditor. 
Also see Licences and General Insurance Co v Ismay 1951 (2) SA 456 (EDL), which will be 
dealt with at p 203 ff below. 
1995 (1) SA 273 (A). 
A decision of the CPD: Standard Bank o/South Africa Ltd v Haskins (C) Case No 4688/1990 II 
April 1991, unreported. 
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JA), a 'glibberige kalant' , 106 was allowed out of prison on R30 000 bail paid by his 
brother, Mohammed Hoesein, who received a receipt for the payment. Later, a Mr 
Jaffer accompanied Hoesein to the court to collect the bail. Jaffer, an attorney, was one 
of the drug dealer's creditors. He requested the relevant official to pay the bail, not to 
the depositor Hoesein, but to himself, indicating that he had lent the money to one of the 
Hoeseins. l07 The official was reluctant to do this because the relevant statutory 
provisionl08 specifically stated that bail may only be paid back to the accused or the 
depositor thereof, notwithstanding the fact that it may be ceded to another person. 109 In 
order to get around this problem, Hoesein made an endorsement on the receipt, in terms 
of which payment was to be made to Jaffer. The bail was accordingly paid, not to Mr 
Hoesein, but to Jaffer. It later emerged that the bail had been repaid in error as, 
unbeknown to the official in question, the drug dealer was free at the time. llo 
The part of the judgment that is most interesting for present purposes is the way 
in which the judge deals with the 'endorsement'. He says that Hoesein 'tried to have the 
money (or cheque) actually handed over,111 to Jaffer and 'endorsed the receipt as 
evidence of this request' . 112 He adds that it was 'a mere authorisation to the Registrar to 
make payment in a particular manner, namely by means of a cheque to [Jaffer]' .113 
Declining to follow the court a quo, which had treated it as a cession, 114 he says that the 
parties did not intend to grant Jaffer an exclusive right to claim the bail in the future 
without Hoesein's co-operation. I 15 'All that was at issue,' he adds, 'was the manner in 
which performance should take place.' Citing the well-known case of Baker v 












At 276G of the judgment. For a sununary of the judgment see D P Visser 'Unjustified 
enrichment' 1994 ASSAL 221. 
At 2770. 
Subsection 69(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. 
See 277F-H. 
See 276F. 
At 279J (my translation). 
Ibid. 
280A (my translation). 
280A (my translation). 
280B. 
1985 (3) SA 429 (A) at 4381. Baker v Probert concerned the sale of a share block in a company. 
According to a mandate from the seiler, Baker, a firm of estate agents, York Estate & Investment 
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to a creditor by handing the money over to the person whom he has authorised (his 
gemagtigde).,117 In other words, A can perform to B by paying C, where B has 
authorised C to accept performance. He then went on to hold that A can perform to B by 
paying C, where B has authorised A to make that performance. 
Baker's case concerned payment by a debtor to the creditor's agent. Was C 
acting as B's agent in accepting performance in Jaffer's case? I 18 In both cases a party 
apparently made a payment to someone other than his original creditor: a purchaser 
Probert (A) paid York Estate (C) rather than the seller Baker (B); the registrar (A) paid 
Jaffer (C) rather than the depositor Hoesein (B). In both cases, too, B made an 
'authorisation' or instruction. 
There, however, the similarity ends. In Jaffer's case, the authorised or instructed 
party was the party who made the payment (the registrar, A) whereas Baker's case 
represents the flip-side of the coin: the authorised or instmcted party was the recipient 
of the payment (York Estate, C). 
117 
118 
Co, found a buyer, Probert. A written contract of sale was duly signed by the parties. The 
contract specified that the parties should direct their respective performances to York Estate. The 
purchaser was accordingly to pay the purchase price to York Estate, and the seller to deliver to 
York Estate the relevant documentation relating to the share block and its transfer. The estate 
agent was required to release the purchase price to the seller only upon his delivery of the 
documentation. While the purchaser duly handed over the purchase price, the seller never 
delivered the documentation. After a year, the purchaser validly cancelled the contract for 
breach. A mere eight days later, York Estate was liquidated and the purchaser received no 
dividend despite having proved a claim (in the amount of the purchase price) against the 
liquidated estate. Ms Probert thereupon instituted an action against Mr Baker for the repayment 
of the purchase price. The court a quo (per Nienaber J, as he then was) held that her claim was 
one for damages for breach of contract, and decided the case in Ms Probert's favour. The appeal 
court considered that Ms Probert's daim was the normal contractual claim for restitution 
following upon cancellation for breach, and neither a claim for damages nor a condictio. The 
court confirmed that Mr Baker had to pay the purchase price to Ms Probert, but held that this was 
because York Estate had acted as Baker's agent (in terms ofa contract of mandate between them) 
in receiving it and 'payment to an agent is equivalent in law to payment to the principal'. Upon 
cancellation Mr Baker thus had to return to the purchaser what he had legally received when she 
handed the money to his authorised agent. (The majority of the court also expressly rejected the 
seller's arguments that York Estate had acted as a stakeholder, and that there was an implied term 
requiring York Estate to repay the purchase price to Ms Probert in the event of breach of the 
contract of sale.) 
280B-C (my translation). 
As suggested by the English version of the headnote to Jaffer'S case: 'It is settled law that 
payment can be made to a creditor by the handing over of the money to his agent.' (at 274E). 
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Moreover, in Baker's case, Probert (A) was obliged to make the payment to York 
Estate (C) in terms of the contract of purchase and sale between herself and Baker (B). 
The registrar in laffer'S case, on the other hand, was under no contractual obligation to 
make the payment to C; the contract between himself (or his principal, the Minister of 
Justice) and B (supposedly) ohliged him to pay the deposited sum to the de12.ositor B. 
When he made the payment to C instead, he was doing so not in terms of a contract 
between himself and B, but in terms of a subsequent instruction or authorisation by BY9 
The most crucial difference between the cases is that while laffer'S case 
concerned A's payment to his creditor's creditor, it was held in Baker's case that A 
made the payment to his creditor's mandatory or agent. In other words, the 
authorisation in Baker's case amounted to a conferral of agency. As B's mandate to C 
was a valid one, C received the payment as his agent or representative. C thus received 
the payment on behalf ofB. As the Appellate Division quite correctly pointed out, 
'payment to an agent is equivalent in law to payment to the principal' .120 A's handing 
the money to C therefore amounted to a payment to B. There were, thus, legally 
speaking, only two parties to the transaction (A and B), and C was a mere conduit for 
this payment. 
In laffer'S case, on the other hand, it does not appear that C acted as B's agent in 
receiving the payment. C arguably received the payment in his own name, and not on 
behalf of B. If C was not B's agent, A's payment to C could not amount to a payment to 
B. When the judge in laffer'S case says that 'payment can be made to a creditor by 
handing the money over to the person whom he has authorised' (his gemagtigde)', it 
ll9 
120 
Focusing on the obligationary relationship between Band C highlights another factual difference 
between the cases. While party A in both cases at least supposedly owed something to B (probert 
owed Baker the purchase price and the registrar owed Hoesein the deposit), the relevant duty (i e 
the duty between B and C extinguished by the payment in question) in the relationship B-C 
differs: C owed a duty to B in Baker's case (York Estate was obliged to receive and hold 
Probert's payment), whereas B owed a duty to C in Jaffer's case (Hoesein bad to repay what he 
had borrowed from Jaffer). In other words, in Baker's case, B is creditor of A and C whereas, in 
Jaffer's case, B is creditor of A, and C is the creditor ofB. This becomes clear when we consider 
which liabilities are extinguished by the payments in question: in Baker's case, the payment A-C 
extinguished A's debt to Band C's debt to B; in Jaffer's case, however, the payment A-C 
extinguished A's debt to B and B's debt to C. 
See the judgment of Botha JA at 4381. 
appears that he took the principle in Baker v Probert a step further. Whereas Baker v 
Probert focused on B's authorisation of C to accept perfonnance, Jaffer's case 
concerned B "s authorisation of A to make perfonnance to C. 
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In my opinion, the authorisation in Jqffer's case amounted to a delegatio 
solvendi, or an Anweisung. Jaffer's case concerned an Anweisung in a general 
context;121 what is also needed is authority for an Anweisung in banking law. This is 
provided by the unreported case of The Standard Bank o/South Africa Ltd v Haskins. 122 
Although the surrounding circumstances in Haskin's case were far removed from 
drug dealing and the criminal courts, the case also concerned someone who sounds 
rather a rogue, although it appears that he had an excuse for his errant behaviour. Mr 
Haskins supposedly incurred various debts in order to do 'some queer things' ,123 
including purchasing a house for RI,9 million and a Rolls Royce for R660 000. 
Ultimately, he owed Standard Bank R61 000 in tenns of two contracts of suretyship, and 
he had an overdraft of R 113 000. It appears that, at the time in question, Haskins had 
been 'unable to incur contractual obligations' as he was insane. The bank accepted that 
he had had no contractual capacity and therefore proceeded against him on the basis of 
unjustified enrichment. The rest of this excellent judgment will be discussed in detail 
elsewhere,124 but what is most interesting in the present context is the judge's statement 
that' [c ]heques and credit cards have this in common: they are instructions by a 
customer to his banker to pay his, the customer's creditor.' 125 
It seems that statements such as these are not mere glimmers of a distantly 
perceived historical feature, but isolated expressions of a principle that simply needs 
elucidation. That there is a need to give it a more prominent role may be illustrated by 
two examples. A survey of the leading works on the South African law of negotiable 






And Ismay'S case concerned an Anweisung in the context of insurance liability. 
Supra. 
Per Conradie J (as he then was). 
See the discussion of Doppelmangel in section 3 below. 
See p 5 of the typewritten judgment. 
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cheque, there is not as much clarity concerning various aspects of the relationship 
between the banker and its client. 126 In South African law, it is unclear what type of 
contract exists between banker and client: while some hold that it is a contract sui 
generis,127 others argue that it is a type of mandate. 128 Although a distinction is drawn 
between the banker-client contract and the cheque itself, there also seems to be a lack of 
certainty as to the nature of the cheque and the juristic effects of the bank's payment in 
tenns of a cheque. Whilst one must bear in mind that our banking law has an English, 
rather than Roman-Dutch pedigree, the delegatio solvendi provides a useful analytical 
tool for deepening our understanding of the legal implications of such transactions. 
A second example which may be used to illustrate the usefulness of this concept 
as an analytical device is Standard Bank Financial Services Ltd v Taylam (Ply) Ltd. 129 It 
will be remembered that, in this case, Taylam instructed his bank to pay the builders 
whom he had appointed to construct a shopping centre. Prior to payment, he revoked 
this instruction. The judge could thus have treated the case in the same way as those 
concerning countennanded cheques, instead of resuscitating the controversial domino 
prohibente rule. 
In the present context, one is faced with the following difficulty: how can one 
compare South African law with an area of Gennan enrichment law that revolves around 
a fundamental and pervasive concept that is, at best, a rather ghostly presence in South 
African law? Bearing in mind that' [iJncomparables cannot usefully be compared, and 
in law the only things which are comparable are those which fulfil the same function' ,130 
how can the Gennan Anweisung be compared with something that could be a functional 






See p 1 &7 below. 
E g Denis V Cowen and LeonardGering The Law of Negotiable instruments in Soulh Africa 4.ed 
(1966) 36&. 
For eXijrnple, Malan and Pretorius Bills of Exchange 336; Stassen 19&0 Modern Business Law 77 
at 79-&0; L Tager 'Negotiable Instruments' (revised by H Daniels) LA WSA vol 19 First Reissue 
(1996) para 154. 
1979 (2) SA 3&3 (C). See the discussion of this case in Chapter Two above at p 123 ff. Also see 
p 216 ffbelow. 
Zweigert and Katz An introduction to Comparative Law 3 ed (transl Tony Weir) (1998) 34 and 
see Chapter One at p 51. 
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best approach seems to be to select a particular practical problem common to both 
systems and to consider the solutions they offer, and the routes that they take to arrive at 
these solutions.!3! The most common situations falling within this category might be 
said to be those involving cheques.!32 The following situation will therefore be used as 
the focus of the following discussion, bearing in mind that it is merely one of a range of 
possible analogous problems: i33 B draws a cheque 134 on his bank A, thereby instructing 
it to pay C (his creditor or the person to whom he wishes to make a donation or other 
gratuitous payment). The parties l35 involved would therefore be the bank, !36 its client!37 
and the payee! 38 of the cheque, (or the ultimate possessorI39 of the document itself).14o 
Various factual permutations could arise, depending on the validity or otherwise of the 











Cf Zweigert and Kotz's comments (An Introduction to Comparative Law 3 ed (transl Tony Weir) 
(1998) at 34) regarding the ' functional' comparative law approach. It should be borne in mind, 
however, that it is sometimes difficult to divorce legal concepts from the practical situations e g 
how can one explain what happens in a cession without reference to the rights involved? 
Although this is something of an overstatement: in present-day Germany, cheques are rarely 
used, and in South Africa, litigation in this field is surprisingly sparse. Cfthe comments of Preiss 
J in First National Bank of SA Ltd v B & H Engineering 1993 (2) SA (T) 41 at 44 : 'I would have 
thought that the issues in the stated case would have been dealt with in munerous reported 
decisions. To my surprise I have ascertained ... that there are only two cases in which this 
specific issue has arisen for decision.' See also Eiselen and Pienaar Unjustified Enrichment 195. 
Some of these will be dealt with where necessary e g where there is an apposite case. 
That is, in South African tenns, 'unconditional order in writing addressed by one person to a 
banker, signed by the person giving it, requiring the banker to pay on demand a sum certain in 
money to a specified persoo or his order or to bearer.': Tager (n 128) para 5; Bills of Exchange 
Act 34 of 1964 subsecs I (vi) and 2(1). 
Should enrichment come into question, it will almost always be a situation involving more than 
two parties. But this will oot invariably be so because, for example, the drawer and the payee 
could be the same person: Tager (n 128) para 10. 
Or 'drawee' i e 'the person to whom the drawer addresses the order.' Tager (n 128) paras 6 and 
10. 
Or 'drawer' i e the 'party who gives the order and who signs the bill' : Tager (n 128) para 10. 
His signature is a prerequisite for the validity of the cheque; 'without it there is no bill.' : Tager 
(n 128) para 6. 
In other words, the person to whom the drawer originally made out the cheque; in other words, 
'the first holder of the instrument' : Tager (n 128) para 607. 
Where this possessor is a 'holder in due course' i e certain requirements have been satisfied, 
including possession and that the document has been negotiated to him, that he takes the 
instrument in good faith aod for value (i e ex causa onerosa) - but oote that '[e]very holder of an 
instrument is prima facie deemed to be a holder in due course': Tager (0 128) paras 3, 9 and 78. 
This is made possible by the concept of negotiability i e transfer in terms of s 29 (1) of the Bills 
of Exchange Act 34 of 1964. Or it could be ceded: Tager (0 128) para 2. 
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PA YMENTS BY CHEQUE AND ANALOGOUS TRANSACTIONS 













There can obviously be no question of an enrichment claim in circumstances where all 
of the legal transactions are valid/4! as any shift of wealth will be made cum causa, but 
it might be useful to consider this situation fIrst, so that the context is clear before we 
examine the complications which arise when enrichment liability enters the picture. 
German law: the relationships between the parties 
In German law, the relationships between the parties are generally given special labels, 
which are useful in extrapolating principles developed in this context. Thus the 
relationship between the instructing party (B) and the recipient of the 'performance' (C) 
is called the Valutaverhiiltnis (the 'value relationship'), and the relationship between the 
instructing party (B) and the instructed party (A) is generally called the 
Deckungsverhiiltnis (the 'cover relationship,).!42 Broadly speaking, we can say that the 
relationship between Band C involves a shift of assets to C for B, and the relationship 
between A and B explains why A (rather than B) should be responsible for bringing 
about that shift. 
141 
142 
Except, arguably, in the case of overpayment, but then there would be no valid contract 
envisaging transfer of the excess. 
See, for example, Medicus Burgerliches Recht marg note 674; Loewenheim Bereicherungsrecht 
32; Wieting Bereicherungsrecht 80. 
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The relationship between Band C 
Generally speaking, in this context at least, it is unimportant what particular type of 
contract or other legal relationship constitutes the Valutaverhiiltnis. It could thus either 
be a legal duty which arises ex lege,143 or any contract which envisages performance by 
B to C. I44 This contract could, for example, be a sale or lease, an interest-bearing loan 
or an interest-earning deposit. The identity of a contract between Band C will generally 
not affect the enrichment rules that come into play where one of the legal relationships 
between A, Band C is defective. The important exception to this general rule is the 
contract of donation, because the law of enrichment applies special rules to cases of 
. -c 145 gratuitous pellormances. 
What is the effect of the 'performance' A-C on the relationship between Band 
C? As explained above,146 A's 'performance' to C will be regarded as a performance by 
B to C,147 and it will therefore extinguish B' s duty 148 to perform to C. Fictionally, 
therefore B himself performs - it is thus not a case of third party performance, as 
discussed in Chapter Two. For example, let us imagine that Brigitte buys a watercolour 
from an art dealer, Cecilia, for €l 00. Cecilia hands the painting to Brigitte, who puts it 
in her bag and gives Cecilia a cash cheque for €l 00, drawn on her bank, A-Kasse. 
Cecilia banks the cheque at the local branch of A-Kasse, and the cashier hands her €l 00 
in cash. A-Kasse's 'payment' to Cecilia will simultaneously constitute Brigitte's 
performance to Cecilia and extinguish Brigitte's duty to pay Cecilia. 149 
The relationship between A and B 
The more significant legal relationship for our pw-poses is the one between A and B. It 








For example, a statutory duty of support. 
And, generally, counter-performance by C to B. 
In such cases § 822 BGB would apply. See Chapter One at p 22 above. 
Atp167. 
As well as a performance by A to B: see the next section below. 
Assuming that such a duty exists i e there is a promise of donation or another contract requiring 
A to perform to B, or B owes a performance to C in terms of some sort of extra-contractual 
obligation. 
And its own duty vis-a-vis Brigitte - see p 185 below. 
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category. 150 While all German writers appear to agree that the relationship between B 
and C is the Valutaverhaltnis, it is not quite as clear what is denoted by the word 
'DeckungsverhaItnis' . 
The problem is that, as will be recalled from the discussion above, lSI the link 
between A and B usually has two 'components': the Anweisung and the underlying 
contract between A and B. For example, where a client issues an instruction to his bank 
by means ofa cheque, there are two legally significant 'transactions' 152 between the 
client and his bank: first, the underlying banker-client contract, which, in Gennan law, 
is a type of non-gratuitous mandate,153 and then the instruction itself, which is the 
Anweisung. 154 They are linked in that the cheque embodies an instruction to the bank to 
fulfil an obligation arising from its underlying contract with its client, by paying the 
client's creditor. But it win be recalled that, in Gennan law, the validity of one does not 
depend on the validity of the other. In other words, it is possible to conceive of a 
situation where there is a valid Anweisung in the absence of a valid underlying 
contract/ 55 and vice versa. Which of the two 'transactions' is regarded as the 








Some writers seem to allude to the Anweisung itself as the Deckungsverhaltnis, 
See Chapter One at p 56. 
For example, at 165. 
One bilateral (the underlying contract) and one unilateral (the Anweisung). 
This contract is similar to mandate but is distinguished from it by the payment of fees, the 
contract of mandate being gratuitous by definition, as was explained above. 
In a way, therefore, these are the most complicated of the three-cornered enrichment situations in 
that they involve not three, but at least (e g another would be an agreement between the drawer of 
the cheque and the payee, embodied in the handing over of the cheque, that the cheque would 
constitute a conditional payment i e conditional upon being honoured by the bank - see D V 
Cowen 'A bank's right to recover payments made by mistake: Price versus Neal revisited' 
(1983) 16 elLSA 1) four legal 'transactions': to use banking terminology, there would be the 
contract between the drawer B and the payee C (i e the Valutaverhaltnis), the underlying contract 
between the bank A and its client B (the banker-client contract), B's specific instruction to A in 
the form of a cheque, and the handing over of the relevant amount by A to C. 
See, e g, RGZ 60, 24. Such cases seem improbable in a banking context, although one can 
conceive of circumstances where a cheque would be written by a person who was no longer in a 
banker-client relationship to a bank; for example, B's bank could have closed his account while 
he was still in possession of a cheque book. 
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while others use the term to refer to the underlying contract. 1S6 Yet others seem to use 
the term to denote the overall legal relationship between A and B. When a particular 
writer refers to a 'defective Deckungsverhiiltnis', it is therefore not always immediately 
obvious whether he means that there is a defective Anweisung, a defective underlying 
contract, 157 or that there is a defect in either and it does not matter which. IS8 In order to 
avoid this sort of confusion, 159 I will avoid using the term in this chapter, and will 
specify whether I am referring to the Anweisung or the underlying contract. 
Again, it should be borne in mind that any 'perfonnance' made by A to C in 
terms of an Anweisung by B to A will be regarded as performance in terms of the 
relationship between A and B.160 In other words, if A has a duty to perform to B, and B 
tells him rather to direct this performance to C, and A does so, A's action will extinguish 
his duty to perform to B. Thus, to embroider on the example mentioned above, assume 
that Brigitte has previously deposited money in her account held at A-Kasse Bank. In 
terms of their banker-client contract, A-Kasse has a duty to honour Brigitte's cheques, 
provided that she has sufficient funds in her account or an adequate overdraft facility. 
When Brigitte instructs A-Kasse, by means of a cheque, to pay €l 00 to Cecilia, and A-






See, for example, the ambiguity ofthis sentence taken from Koppensteiner and Kramer 
Bereicherung at 31 (my translation): 'the Deckungsverhaltnis ... is ... defective in that the defect 
does not lie in the causal Deckungsverhaltnis (the loan is valid) but in the absence of an 
attributable Anweisung.' Also see 32 regarding their discussion ofPtister's views. 
See, e g, Jauernig/Schlechtriem § 812 marg note 35: 'Auch bei Mangeln des Deckungsverhaltnis 
oder Valutaverhaltnis .... Fehltjedoch eine Weisung .... ' (my emphasis). Also see Loewenheim 
Bereicherungsrecht (at 35), where he draws a distinction between cases where there is a defective 
underlying relationship and those where there is a defective Anweisung relationship. He seems to 
use the word Deckungsverhdltnis to refer to the underlying relationship and not to the Anweisung. 
(i e the Deckungsverhdltnis and the Valutaverhdltnis are the causal relationsrups (see 32). 
In other words, that there is a defect somewhere in the overall relationship between these two 
parties. See, e g, Koppensteiner and Kramer Bereicherung, who distinguish conceptually 
between situations were there is a defective underlying relationship between A and B and where 
this relationship is valid but the Anweisung B--A is defective. They seem to use the term 
Deckungsverhdltnis to refer to the overall relationship between A and B and not consistently for 
the underlying relationship on its own - see, e g, p 24. Cf 31: '[D]as Deckungsverhaltnis D-S 
[i e A-B] ... [ist] feblerhaft, wobei der Febler aUerdings nicht im kausalen DeckungsverhaItnis 
liegt (der Darlehensvertrag D-S [i e A-B] ist gUltig vereinbart worden), sondern im Fehlen einer 
zurechenbaren Anweisung Uberhaupt.' 
Which is symptomatic of differences of opinion as to which relationship constitutes the causa in 
such cases: see p 266 ffbelow. 
As well as 'performance' by B to C: see above. 
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relationship between B and C as being significant only where it is gratuitous. In other 
words, provided that the relationship between B and C is valid, the only important 
question for our purposes is whether B intends to make a gratuitous performance to C. 
Assuming that B does owe a debt to C, and he hands C a cheque in settlement of 
this debt, B and C thereby conclude a conditional 'debt-extinguishing agreement'. This 
agreement is dependent upon the bank's honouring the cheque. When the cheque is 
honoured by the bank, payment is regarded as having taken place by B to C (and the 
debt B-C as having been discharged) upon the date of delivery of the cheque (not the 
date on which the cheque is honoured). In other words, the bank's payment of the 
cheque fulfils the condition, payment becomes final, and the underlying debt owed by B 
to C is extinguished. 165 
The relationship between A and B 
South African law focuses more attention on the cheque as a form of negotiable 
instrument166 than on the relationship between the drawer and drawee. While there 
seems to be agreement that a distinction should be drawn between the underlying 
banker-client contract and the cheque itself, the nature and content of these two juristic 
acts seem uncertain. 
As said above, there has been some dispute as to the legal nature of the banker-
client contract. It has, for example, been characterised as a form of mandate. 167 Stassen, 
for instance, goes to great lengths to show that it is a special kind of mandate coupled 





This will be discussed in further detail below at p 2 16fT. 
In other words a document (a 'waarde papier', from the Gennan 'Wertpapier' i e 'paper which 
has an inherent value that derives from the rights which it embodies; paper which in itself 
constitutes property.': Tager (n 128) para 2) which 'is by the custom of trade transferable, like 
cash, by delivery, and is also capable of being sued upon by the person holding it pro tempore': 
Crouch v Credit Foncier of England (1873) LR 8 QB 374 at 381, quoted by Tager (n 128) para 2; 
Hill v The Colonial Banking & Trust Co 1927 TPD 138 at 148. 
See Malan and Pretorius Bills of Exchange 203; Tager (n 128) para 154; Stapelberg NO v 
Barc/ays Bank DC&O 1963 (3) SA 120 (T); and see J T Pretorius 'Aspects of the collection of a 
cheque cleared through an automated clearing bureau' (1998) 10 SA Mercantile LJ 326 at 332 
and 334 regarding the contract of mandate between the payee and his collecting banle 
Stassen 1980 Modern Business Law 77 at 79 ff. 
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client's agenL 169 Cowen, on the other hand, argues that it is a contract sui generis. 170 In 
my opinion, Cowen's view is correct: the contract between a bank and its client is a 
special kind of contract, which cannot fit into the traditional scheme of specific contracts 
without distortion of the essentialia of the category of contracts in question.17l 
This lack of certainty also extends to the juristic nature of the cheque itself. It 
seems that the instruction embodied in the cheque, if discussed at all, is regarded as a 
mandate. 172 This is unsatisfactory for various reasons relating to the contractual nature 
of mandate. For example, if one accepts that a cheque is a mandate, and therefore a 
contract in its own right, the naturalia of mandate and the general principles of the law 
of contract become applicable. This opens the door, for example, to the argument that a 
cheque is voidable on the basis of misrepresentation. In other words, it is able to be 





Cfthe comments of Moseneke AJ in Standard Bank of SA Ltd v ABSA Bank Ltd and Another 
1995 (2) SA 740 (T) at 746G-H: 'To typify the relationship between a bank and its customer as 
one of agency is to simplify and perhaps to trivialise an inherently and conspicuously complex 
collection of juristic relationships which exist between a banker and its customer.' 
Cowen and Gering (n 127) 368. Also see Standard Bank of SA Ltd v ABSA Bank Ltd and 
Another supra at 747 A-D, where the learned judge points out that 'the proper course to take is 
not to apply a rigid and pre-existing characterisation of the customer-banker legal relationship, 
but to examine the specific legal nexus which exists between a particular banker and its customer. 
Indeed, some such relationships would have strong features of a principal and an agent; 
sometimes characteristics of a loan for consumption; and indeed sometimes such relationship is 
.. , one between a debtor and a creditor and very often the relationship would be a collection of 
features of each of these legal institutions 1 have referred to.' 
Stassen 1980 Modem Business Law 77 sets himself the task of categorising the contract in terms 
of the traditional scheme of specific contracts. Tbere are various reasons why its characterisation 
as a mandate does not make sense. For example, it may happen that someone opens a bank 
account, makes a deposit, and then does not issue any instructions to the bank before closing the 
account: in such a case, it would be ludicrous to label the contractual relationship between the 
parties a 'mandate'. Ifwe were to force the banker-client contract into the mould of any of the 
classic specific contracts, deposit would perhaps be a better choice, although this would also lead 
to mental contortions in situations where a client has made no deposit, but merely taken out a 
loan. 
See, e g, Stassen 1980 Modern Business Law 77 at 80 (who regards the underlying contract as a 
combination of mandate and mutuum and the cheque itself as a 'besondere mandaat waardeur die 
verpJigtinge uit die algemene mandaat vir 'n besondere geval gekonkritiseer word'). Regarding 
other forms of payment, such as debit order, credit card, credit transfer and EFTS, see, for 
example, Malan and Pretorius Bills of Exchange para 202 at 333: 'In none of these instances 
does the bank effecting the payment act as the representative of the debtor: it functions as a mere 
mandatary.' On the preceding page, the authors say that although these forms of payment are 
different from cheques, the 'legal relations do not necessarily differ', thus implying that the bank 
also acts as a mandatary in paying a cheque. Later, when discussing the underlying contract 
(para 203 at 337), they mention almost in passing that cheques are ' "dependent" orders, because 
their consequences are in many respects governed by the terms of this embracing relationship.' 
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someone forges a signature on a cheque, and uses such cheque to pay C, who is the 
aggrieved party? Could the aggrieved party elect to ignore the fraud (as he would be 
entitled to do in terms of the general principles of contract) and uphold the 
contract/cheque anyway? Just one other example which might illustrate the 
unsatisfactory (and somewhat ludicrous) logical consequences of classifying a cheque as 
a contract relates to the 'basis' of contractual liability. Contracts are said to be based on 
consensus or the reasonable reliance by one party on the appearance of consensus. 
When would the bank and its client reach consensus? It could surely not be argued that 
the client, when writing a cheque, reasonably believes that a contract between himself 
and his bank comes into being. This is also borne out by the fact that a cheque, unlike 
other bills of exchange, does not require acceptance by the drawee. 
Analysing the various relationships in tenns of the delegatio solvendi, as 
suggested above, allows a way out of these difficulties. It provides insight into the 
various legal relationships without distorting the accepted legal principles relating to 
cheques. For example, banks have certain duties relating to their customer's cheques 
(e g, a bank has a legal 'duty to honour its customer's cheques when the account is in 
credit or provision has been made for an overdraft,).173 By using the analysis suggested 
above, it becomes clear that the cheque is not a contract of mandate but merely an 
instruction by a client to his bank that the bank perform in terms of the underlying 
banker-client contract in a particular way viz by paying a third party. 174 Payment of a 
cheque is thus merely the bank's perfonnance of one of its obligations in terms of the 
banker-client contract. 
The relationship between the cheque and the underlying banker-client contract is 
also generally not discussed but it seems more likely that the principle of abstraction 




Pretorius (1998) 10 SA Mercantile U326 at 332-3; Cowen and Gering (n 127) 368. 
This appears to lie behind the thinking of Malan and Pretorius Bills a/Exchange para 203 at 337, 
particularly since they refer to German authority for their notion of 'dependent orders'. 
E g in view of the fact that South African law does not recognise that cheques can be 'valid on 
the face of it'. Also see Malan and Pretorius Bills a/Exchange para 203 at 337: '''dependent'' 
orders' (my emphasis). 
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circumstances where the underlying banker-client contract was void, it is likely that the 
cheque would also be void. 176 On the other hand, it has been stated that if a bank 
purports to tenninate its contract with its client but does not give notice as required, its 
duty to honour its client's cheques will continue. 177 It seems, therefore, that in certain 
exceptional circumstances, an instruction to a bank in the form of a cheque would still 
be effective even though the underlying contract was no longer in existence. 
When is a cheque regarded as having been 'paid', in tenns of the relationship 
between the drawer and his bank?178 IfC cashes a cheque at a bank, delivery of the cash 
would be the moment of payment. If, however, C deposits the cheque in his bank 
account, the moment of payment of the cheque depends whether C's collecting bank is a 
branch of A bank (i e the drawee bank) or a different bank. If C's collecting bank is a 
branch of A bank, payment of the cheque takes effect when the drawee bank makes the 
decision to honour the cheque. 179 If, on the other hand, C's collecting bank is not a 
branch of the drawee bank (i e it is a completely separate legal entity, necessitating 
clearance through the automated clearing bureau), 180 then payment takes place 'when the 
period provided for in the inter-bank agreement expires without the drawee bank having 
given notice of the dishonour of the cheque', 181 except 'where the decision to honour the 








For example, if the underlying contract was void because the would-be client lacked contractual 
capacity on the grounds of insanity, any cheques that he drew would arguably also be void, even 
if he drew them during a lucid interval. 
Malan and Pretorius Bills of Exchange para 214. 
See p 187 above regarding payment in tenns of the relationship between Band C. 
Rosen v Barclays National Bank 1984 (3) SA 974 (W). For criticism of this decision see, e g, 
Coenraad Visser 'The automated clearing of cheques: when is payment effected?' (1991) 21 
Businessman's Law 3 at 4-5; M Greeffand C J Nagel 'Die tydstip van betaling en die 
sertifiseering van ~eks' (1992) 25 De Jure 56 at 60; Pretorius (1998) 10 SA Mercantile U 326 at 
327-8. The most convincing reason why this decision is unsatisfactory is, in my view, the 
difficulties of proof that it causes; as Visser points out (op cit at p 5), even in this case, the court 
could not decide when the decision to pay had been made, and had to refer the case back for the 
hearing of oral evidence in th.i.s regard. 
On the functioning of this bureau, see e g the articles mentioned in the previous footnote, 
particularly Pretorius (1998) 10 SA Mercantile U326 at 327 (where a very clear account of the 
procedure is given); Rosen's case supra at 975-7 and Volkskas Bank Bpk v Bankorp Bpk (h/a 
Trust Bank) en 'n Ander 1991 (3) SA 605 (A) at 609C-G. 
Pretorius (1998) 10 SA Mercantile U 326 at 329 and 330; Volkskas Bank Bpk v Bankorp Bpk 
(h/a Trust Bank) en 'n Ander supra. Also see the other articles in note 179 for discussion of this 
case. 
Pretorius (1998) 10 SA Mercantile U 326 at 329; Greeff and Nagel (1992) 25 De Jure 56 at 60-
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The relationship between A and C 
As in Gennan law, there would typically be no contractual or other obligation between 
A (the drawee) and C (the payee). If A honours B's cheque to C by handing cash to C, 
ownership of the money will pass from A to C by commixtio. 183 If, on the other hand, C 
deposits the cheque in an account held at a collecting bank, C would receive the money 
via book entries. 
Is the payment A-C regarded as a payment by the bank (directly to C) in its own 
right, or is this regarded as a perfonnance of the bank's obligation to its client, and a 
simultaneous perfonnance of the client to the payee? The question of the effect of the 
transfer A-C on the other two relationships (i e whether it constitutes two 
perfonnances,184 as in Gennan law or only one perfonnance A-C) has led to controversy 
and will be discussed in detail below. 
2 While the relationship between Band C is valid, there is a defect in B's 
relationship with A 
A 
This section deals with situations where B owes a perfonnance to C (i e there is a valid 




See C G van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) at 263 ff. Also see First National Bank of Southern 
Africa Ltd v Perry NO and Others 2001 (3) SA 960 (SCA) at 967H-J for an example of the 
application of this principle in the context of payments by a bank in terms of a cheque. 
A-B and B-C. 
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unbeknownst to A,185 the relationship between A and B is defective. For example, B 
validly owes R5 000 to his landlord C, B writes a cheque instructing his bank (A) to pay 
C R5 000, and A honours the cheque. It transpires, however, that the cheque was 
invalid; for example, due to non-compliance with the formal requirements for validity 
(e g B forgot to sign the cheque). In other words, in what follows, it will be asswned 
that A performed to C in circwnstances where there is no problem with the relationship 
between B and C. The focus thus falls on the relationship between A and B. 
A myriad of faults could bedevil the relationship between A and B. These could 
relate to the underlying relationship, 186 to the Anweisung itself, or to both. 187 As in other 
situations where there are 'parallel' legal transactions,188 a question naturally arises as to 
the interrelationship between these transactions. In other words, can there be a valid 
Anweisung in the absence of a valid underlying relationship? Or is the validity of one 
dependent on the validity of the other? 
Difficulties in categorising such cases 
As mentioned above, German law applies the separation princi pIe and the abstraction 
principle to such cases. 189 In other words, the validity of the Anweisung and the validity 
of the underlying relationship are regarded as being independent of each other. As a 
matter of logic, therefore, cases where there is a legal defect in the relationship/s 
between A and B could be divided into the following categories: (a) situations where 
there is neither a valid underlying relationship nor a valid Anweisung; (b) situations 
where there is a valid underlying relationship but this particular Anweisung is defective 







While categories (a) and (b) seem unproblematic, at first it is difficult to conceive 
Otherwise, in terms of German law, § 814 BGB would apply: see Appendix A. 
For example, a contract such as a banker-client contract, or an insurance contract. 
Or both e g someone lacking in capacity purports to open a bank account and then write a 
cheque. 
For example, the transfer of ownershiplcontract of sale; cession/contract to cede. 
See p 165 above. 
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of practical situations where an Anweisung could be valid even if the underlying contract 
is void. For instance, it seems strange to imagine that a cheque could be valid, even if 
there were no valid underlying banker-client contract. The effectiveness of the cheque 
as a legal instrument seems to be derived 190 from the underlying contract. This idea 
appears even more bothersome when we consider other instances of delegatio solvendi: 
how can someone validly delegate the performance of an obligation to a third party with 
whom he has no valid legal relationship? Thus, for example, how can a negligent driver 
validly instruct an insurer (with whom he has no valid policy) to pay damages to a 
person injured by the driver? 
Upon reflection, however, is this any stranger than allowing a valid transfer of 
ownership in the absence of a valid underlying obligationary agreement? Or does it 
demand a greater suspension of disbelief than the acceptance that a claim may validly be 
ceded by one party to another in circumstances where they have not concluded a valid 
obligatio nary agreement to cede the claim? 
It should also be borne in mind that, as said above, according to German law, an 
Anweisung does not itself create any obligation to perform. If B instructs A to perform 
to C, A is under no legal obligation to do so, and C has no right to claim such 
performance from A. A is merely authorised (by B) to 'perform' to C, just as C is 
authorised to accept the performance as coming from B. The validity of the Anweisung 
is therefore slightly different in nature to the validity of an obligation. Whereas a valid 
obligation creates a duty to perform and a right to claim that performance (and hence a 
causa for the performance), a valid Anweisung merely has the effect of allowing a debtor 
to extinguish his obligation to his creditor by performing to someone other than the 
original creditor. It thus has the effect of 'deflecting' the effects of the performance so 
that they do not operate between A and C directly, but via B (i e A-B-C). 
This appears more clearly from a comparison between an Anweisung (or 
delegatio solvendi) and a cession. If A owes a performance to B, and B cedes the claim 
190 At least partly; validity is also derived from the appropriate legislation. 
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to that performance to C, C will acquire the right to claim the perfonnance from A, and 
A will have the duty to perform to C. If A accordingly performs to C, his performance 
will not have been made sine causa (assuming that all the transactions involved are 
valid), and the relevant causa will lie between A and C. If, on the other hand, A owes a 
performance to B, and B instructs A to perform to C, A has no duty to do so, and C 
cannot enforce this performance. 191 If, however, A nevertheless performs to C, his 
performance will also have been made cum causa, but the causa does not lie in the 
'relationship' between A and C, as no obligations exist between them. In In such 
circumstances, the obligations which provide the causae for A's performance - which is 
regarded as a performance A-B and a performance B-C - lie in the relationships 
between A and B (i e the 'underlying relationship'), on the one hand, and Band C on the 
other. This is the result of the fiction that arises upon performance that the performance 
in question was made by A to B and B to C, allowing the extinction of both obligations 
and distinguishing this situation from performance of the obligation of another. 193 To 
decide, therefore, that there can be a valid Anweisung where there is no valid underlying 
relationship (i e that the abstraction principle applies) seems to have little practical 
consequence outside the law of enrichment. It should also be borne in mind that there 
might be requirements for the validity of a particular kind of Anweisung that constitute 
exceptions to the general principle that the validity of the Anweisung and that of the 
underlying relationship are to be determined independently of one another. 
The first possible objection to the theoretical categorisation mentioned above 
therefore seems more apparent than real. The second problem is a more practical one. 
While there are many examples of cases where there is some defect in the legal 
relationship/s between A and B, it is not always easy to slot them into one of the three 
categories mentioned above.194 It should be borne in mind that the purpose of 





Unless it has been accepted i e the so-called angenommene Anweisung. 
But cfvon Caemmerer's view and Pfister's criticism thereof: see below at p 216. 
In that, in this case, A is performing in terms of his own obligation to B, whereas in the case 
where A performs the obligation of another - as discussed in the previous chapter - he is not 
regarded as performing in terms of his own obligation. 
And to distinguish them from the other situations dealt with in this chapter e g Doppelmangel. 
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its own sake is a fruitless exercise. The underlying question here is whether cases where 
an Anweisung is defective or absent should be treated in the same way as cases where 
the underlying relationship between A and B is defective or absent. 
An example of a situation falling into category (a) (i e where both the underlying 
relationship and the Anweisung are defective or absent) would be: B was insane or 
otherwise lacking in legal capacity to act, both when he opened a bank account and also 
when he instructed his bank to pay a sum of money to C. 195 
More common are cases resorting under category (b) (i e situations where there is 
a valid underlying relationship but the particular Anweisung in question is defective or 
absent).I96 For example, by writing a cheque, B purports to instruct his bank, A, to make 
a payment owed to C, but although there is a valid underlying contract between A and B 
(viz a banker-client contract), this specific instruction is defective. The defect could 
relate to the capacity or authority of the drawer (B). For instance, while he had legal 
capacity to act when he opened his account with A, B could have been insane197 or 
otherwise lacking in capacity when he wrote the cheque. Alternatively, the defect could 
be a fonnal one: for instance the cheque might bear the rubber stamp of the drawer 
company (B), rather than the appropriate signature/s. 198 One could also cite the example 
mentioned above (viz the drawer forgets to sign the cheque), or any of the other 
situations where a cheque might be invalid due to non-compliance with the fonnal 
requirements for validity. Alternatively, the reason for invalidity could relate to the state 
of mind of the drawer e g where he signed a cheque under duress. 
These are all cases where the cheque, or other Anweisung, is legally void i e B 
instructs A to make a performance owed by B to C but, as a matter of law, there is no 





Ega mature-looking unemancipated minor: see Koppensteiner and Kramer Bereicherung 31. 
For a list of German examples, see Koppensteiner and Kramer Bereicherung 31. 
See, e g, BGHZ 111,382; Loewenheirn Bereicherungsrecht 35-6; The Standard Bank of South 
Africa Ltdv Haskins supra. 
BGHZ 66, 362. Also see Loewenheim Bereicherungsrecht 35-7. 
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matter of fact. Thus, A might not have received any instruction at all. 199 
A further sub-category is required to accommodate situations where B validly 
instructs A to pay C, but withdraws this instruction prior to payment. For example, B 
writes a cheque in favour of his creditor, C, instructing bank A to pay C Rl 000. B then 
countermands, or stops, the cheque i e he revokes his original instruction to A. C 
nevertheless deposits the cheque in his account at bank D, D presents the cheque to A, 
and A pays the amount notwithstanding the countermand. 
One can also imagine cases where B instructs his bank A to pay a creditor, but A 
does not obey the instruction to the letter. Thus a bank might transfer transfer too 
much/oo such as where it transfers the same amount twice.201 For example, B draws a 
cheque on his bank A in favour of his landlord C, instructing the bank to pay C R2 500. 
The bank pays C R25 000. Or the bank transfers R2 500 twice. The categorisation of 
such cases depends on whether B owed the excess to C anyway (e g as arrear rental). If 
this excess was not owed to C, the case should arguably be regarded as one of so-called 
Doppelmangel (,double fault'): regarding the excess, there was no valid instruction, and 
it was not owed to C. If, on the other hand, the amount paid in excess was nevertheless 
owed by B to C, it could arguably be dealt with as one of the cases presently under 
consideration. 
Finally, we come to category (c) viz situations where there is a valid Anweisung 
in the absence of a valid underlying relationship. An example of such an instance 
recognised in South African law is where B writes a cheque instructing bank A to pay 





The examples cited in the previous paragraphs are relatively unproblematic, as 
Whether actual or imputed by law e g in terms of the RechtscheinhaJtungsprinzipien (i e rules on 
protection of reliance): see Koppensteiner and Kramer Bereicherung 3 1. 
See, for example, African Diamond Exporters (Pty) Ltd v Barclays Bank International Ltd 1978 
(3) SA 699 (A); BGH JZ 1987, 199 at 200 ff; BGH NJW 1987 185 at 186. 
OLG Hamburg NJW 1983, 1499; OLG Munchen NJW-RR 1988, 1391; KG NJW 1992,816. 
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far as classification is concerned. The real difficulties arise when one tries to categorise 
cases where a fourth party is involved, such as where a bank honours a forged or stolen 
cheque, or transfers the correct amount to the wrong recipient.202 Imagine that the 
cheque in each of the following situations is drawn on Bank A, and that Bank A makes a 
payment: 
D steals a blank cheque from E, completes the cheque (drawn on A) in favour of 
his creditor F, and forges E's signature on the cheque.203 
2 G makes out a cheque in favour of H, J steals the cheque and forges an 
endorsement to his creditor K.204 
3 L signs a blank cheque, which is subsequently stolen by M, who completes the 
cheque in favour of his creditor N. 
4 P fills out and signs a cheque purporting to pay Q R6 000. R steals the cheque, 
changes the amount to R60 000 and uses it to pay his own debt to Q. 
5 S makes out a cheque in favour ofT, the cheque is stolen and deposited in the 
account of U, and A mistakenly pays U via his collecting bank. 
6 V makes out a cheque in favour of his creditor W, a third party (X) comes into 
possession of the cheque and uses it to pay V's debt to W. 
Some of these problems arise due to the nature of the cheque as a portable 
'commercial paper'. There is always the danger that a cheque may come into the wrong 
hands, either before or after completion thereof. This risk is increased by the fact that 
the cheque is not given directly to the drawee bank, as happens with transfer orders 




Assuming that there was a valid Valutaverhiiltnis between the instructing party and the incorrect 
recipient, otherwise it would be a case of Doppelmangel, to be treated as discussed at p 312 ff 
below. BGHZ 66, 372 (375) = NJW 1976, 1449. 
See, e g, ABSA Bank Ltd v Standard Bank o/SA Ltd 1998 (1) SA 242 (A) and First National 
Bank o/Southern Africa Ltd v East Coast Design CC and Others 2000 (4) SA 137 (D). Cf John 
Bell & Co Ltd v Esselen 1954 (1) SA 147 (A), where a company cheque was signed by the 
employees who were entitled to do so, but it was used to settle the private debt of one of the 
employees, without the company's knowledge. In this regard, also see Honore 1958 Acta 
Juridica 135. 
Or, as in King v Cohen Benjamin & Co 1953 (4) SA 641 (W), G makes out a cheque in favour of 
H and gives it to K to deliver to H. K persuades H to endorse the cheque to him. See the judge's 
summary of the facts of this case at 648A-E of the judgment. 
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automatic teller machine. (In such cases, B directly instructs A to pay C, whereas the 
instruction in the form of the cheque is usually handed or sent to the payee, who usually 
deposits it in his own bank account, and the collecting bank presents the cheque to the 
drawee bank via the automated clearing bureau.) 
The risks of deception are not confined to cheques, however. When B buys 
something from a vendor C, and hands over his credit card to effect payment, the vendor 
swipes the card through a machine which conveys an electronic instruction to B's banle 
B confirms this instruction by signing a credit card slip. Although the line of 
communication between the client and his bank is arguably more direct than that 
involved with payments by cheque, the portability of the credit card and the information 
contained on it205 presents hazards of a different kind. For example, if B lets the card 
out of his sight, C's employee has a chance to switch cards, or to copy the card number 
and the date of expiry of the card (which is often all the information needed to make a 
transaction over the telephone, for example.) 
Assuming that the bank in each of these cases is A, who are the parties at the 
other two points of the triangle (i e B and C)? Which is the Valutaverhiiltnis? Is there a 
triangular relationship at all? Is B always the party who makes the instruction (whether 
as client or thief), or is B the holder of the bank account which is debited consequent to 
the payment in accordance with the instruction, or is B always the payee's debtor? Is C 
the actual recipient of the money, or is C the recipient originally intended by the 
account-holder? Unless it is clear which party is which, it is impossible to decide 
whether there is a valid underlying relationship between A and B, or a valid obligation 
owed by B to C. 
Ifit is assumed that A's contract-partner (i e where A is a bank, one of its 
customers) is B, then cases 1 to 5 all concern situations where there is a valid underlying 
205 The lack of sufficient legal safeguards is also a problem e g in practice, the only inspection of the 
signature on the card and that on the slip is made by the vendor or its employee; the ease of 
paying over the telephone or internet using the card number and expiry date; the possibility of so-
called 'manual overrides'; etc. Cf, e g, the facts of Living Legend Motors (Pty) Ltd v De Vi/liers 
and Others (W) Case No 20279/2001 15 March 2002, unreported. 
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contract but no valid Anweisung to pay the recipient in each case.206 In other words, 
those cases would fall into the second of the three categories mentioned at the outset. If, 
on the other hand, the underlying relationship must lie between A and the party who 
actually instructs A (i e if one identifies the instructing party as '8 ') to pay the recipient, 
the picture looks different. In cases 1,3 (and possibly 2, if one regards the endorsement 
as an instruction), there is no valid underlying relationship and, it would appear, no valid 
cheque (due to the fraudulent completion or alteration of the cheques); in case 4 there is 
a valid underlying relationship but no valid instruction to pay this amount to the 
recipient; in case 5 there is a valid underlying relationship but no valid instruction to pay 
this recipient; in case 6 there is both a valid underlying contract between the instructing 
and instructed parties, and a valid instruction to pay this recipient (W). In other words, 
cases 1 to 3 would fall into category (a); cases 4 and 5 would fall into category (b); and 
case 6 should not be discussed in this section at all (as there is no defect in the 
relationship/s between A and 8 [YD. 
German lawyers seem to follow the first approach mentioned in the previous 
paragraph. In other words, they regard the account-holder as 'B' ,207 and the 
Deckungsverhiiltnis as thus lying between A and B. The recipient is whoever has 
'received something' (etwas erlangf).208 Most writers seem to take a pragmatic rather 
than an exhaustive approach. They typically divide their discussion into three 
categories: cases where there was no valid underlying relationship between A and B; 
those where there was initially a valid Anweisung but it was subsequently withdrawn; 
and those where there was never a valid Anweisung. Although cases which fall into the 
first category are rare, this category was the focus of much of the early discussion of 
three-cornered situations, and it was in this context that the Leistungsbegriffwas 





Thus, in case 1, there was no valid instruction to pay F; in case 2, there was no valid instruction 
to pay K; in case 3, there was no valid instruction to pay N; in case 4, there was no valid 
instruction to pay Q (at least regarding the excess); and in case 5, there was no valid instruction 
to pay u. 
Who would usually also be the instructing party, but not in cases of stolen and forged cheques. 
In terms of § 812 BGB; see introductory chapter above at p 22. 
Miinchener KommentarfLieb § 812 marg note 45: these were the cases that dominated 
discussion, and it was in this context that the Leistungsbegriffwas developed. 
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situations arising in practice, are accordingly seen against the background of this earlier 
discussion. In order to give an accurate picture of the German law and to be able to 
make meaningful comparisons,2lo I will follow this categorisation. In other words, when 
I refer to B, I am referring to the bank's actual or purported client. 
(a) Situations where there is no valid underlying relationship between A and B 
Here we are concerned with cases where' B' instructs A to pay his creditor C, in 
circumstances where A and 'B' are not linked by any underlying 'covering' 
obligation.211 
German law 
The classic German case falling into this category is the case of the fraudulent postal 
employee. 212 He ('B,)213 fraudulently instructed the post office, A, (via postal orders 
which he processed himself) to pay a debt which he owed to his bank C. He neither had 
an account with the post office nor had he made a deposit to cover the postal orders.214 
In other words, as the post office did not have any contract with him,2ls there was no 







In other words, to 'compare apples with apples and pears with pears'. Cf C-J Pretorius 'Mistaken 
payments by a bank on a countermanded or dishonoured cheque - the condictio sine causa and 
condictio indebiti: Saambou Bank Ltd v Essa 1993 4 SA 62 (N)' (1994) 57 THRHR 332 at 337: 
'Inadvertent payments by banks on countermanded and dishonoured cheques, may be regarded as 
species of the same genus, the genus being inadvertent payments by a bank caused by some 
mistake or other on the part of the bank. In both instances the bank has paid out its own money 
due to some mistake or oversight on its part and it should, in principle, have an enrichment 
claim.' They are species of the same genus (as both cases involve a defect in the relationship 
between A and B), but there are good policy reasons for distinguishing between the last two 
categories, as will become clear from the ensuing discussion. 
Loewenheim Bereicherungsrecht 36: in other words, there is a valid Anweisung and only the 
underlying Kausalverhaltnis (causal relationship) is void. Cfthe example given by Larenz and 
Canaris Schuldrecht JII2 at 224: a bank might carry out a transfer order where it was not obliged 
to do so because B did not have sufficient funds in his account. 
RGZ 60, 24. 
1 have put B in inverted commas in this section, because the instruction did not arise from an 
underlying contract between himself and A. In other words, there was only purportedly an 
underlying contract between A and B. 
He merely pretended to deposit the amount in question: see Medicus Burgerliches Recht marg 
note 678. Also see Larenz and Canaris Schuldrecht JII2 224. 
Except the contract of employment, which is irrelevant as the Anweisung was not 'covered' by 
this i e it would not amount to a Deckungsverhaltnis. 
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office could not sue C directly. 
Most writers agree that in such circwnstances A must direct its enrichment claim 
against 'B', and not against c.216 In other words, the bank can only bring an enrichment 
claim against its supposed client. Various justifications have been offered for this result. 
The supporters of the Leistungsbegriffwould argue that, in handing the money to C, A 
did not intend to 'perform' to C in the accepted sense;217 A intended to comply with 
'B's' instruction and thus to perform to 'B,.218 The bank's intention, in honouring the 
cheque, was to perform vis-a.-vis its (supposed) client and not to make a performance (as 
required by the law of enrichment) to the payee.219 As such performance had no legal 
ground (because the relationship between A and 'B' was defective), A should be able to 
sue 'B' with a Leistungskondiktion. Or, looking at it from C's point of view, C carmot 
be said to have received the money as the performance22o of A (with whom it had no 
legal relationship at all), but rather as the performance of its debtor, 'B'.221 
Canaris, on the other hand, substantiates the same result (i e that A should sue 
'B') by analysing the interests of the parties.222 He argues that C should not be exposed 
to an enrichment action brought by A in such circwnstances because he should not be 
detrimentally affected by a defect in a legal relationship to which he is not party.223 To 









See, e g, Larenz and Canaris Schuldrecht //12 224; Koppensteiner and Kramer Bereicherung 25. 
Larenz and Canaris Schuldrecht //12 224: according to this view, A was merely acting as a 
'Leistungsmittlerin' (i e 'conveyor of the perfonnance'). 
See, e g, Munchener KommentarfLieb § 812 marg note 33; Koppensteiner and Kramer 
Bereicherung 25. Here we see the importance of the fiction that, in cases of delegatio solvendi, 
A's physical handing over to C is regarded in law as his performance to B, and B's perfonnance 
to C. 
Loewenheim Bereicherungsrecht 33; Zinunerrnann and Du Plessis 1994 Restitution Law Review 
14at33. 
Or in any other way (in sonstiger Weise): Munchener KommentarfLieb § 812 marg note 33. 
There would accordingly be no basis for a Nichtleistungskondiktion against C. See Larenz and 
Canaris 225 on the effect of the 'subsidiarity principle' in this regard. 
Koppensteiner and Kramer Bereicherung 25. For criticism of these views, see e g Larenz and 
Canaris Schuldrecht 1112 224-5 (e g in certain circumstances, C might have had a claim against A, 
so that A intends to perform to B and C); Munchener KommentarfLieb § 812 marg notes 34 ff. 
See Larenz and Canaris Schuldrecht 1112 224. Also see Medicus Burgerliches Recht marg note 
678: if the money was owed by B to C, C should be entitled to keep it. 
Larenz and Canaris Schuldrecht 1112 225; Koppensteiner and Kramer Bereicherung 25. Also see 
Zimmermann and Du Plessis 1994 Restitution Law Review 14 at 33. 
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A and 'B', he is not in a position to recognise possible defects or to influence the 
validity of their underlying relationship.224 It would also be unfair to require C to carry 
the risk of 'B' s' insolvency; such a risk should properly be carried by B' s (purported) 
contract partner (A),225 who had the opportunity to evaluate his creditworthiness and so 
on. Although A was not obliged to hand the money to C, this alone should not entitle A 
to sue C directly.226 To sum up, then, any enrichment claim should lie between the 
parties to whichever 'Kausalverhaltnis' (causal relationship) is defective?27 
If it is accepted that it is appropriate that 'B', rather than C, should be exposed to 
A's eruichment action, one is faced with the following conundrum: what has 'B' 
received ('erlangt,)?228 In South African terms, how has he been 'enriched'? The first 
answer given by the writers to this question was that what 'B' had received was the 
extinction of his obligation vis-a-vis C (i e he had been enriched by being freed from his 
obligation to C in the Valutaverhiiltnis)?29 This reasoning comes to grief inter alia 
when it is applied to cases of 'double fault' (Doppelmangel i e situations where there is 
also no valid relationship between 'B' and C). It is also open to the objection that 'B' 
could argue that he is no longer enriched. The majority view is now therefore that 'B' is 
obliged to restore the value of the performance. 
Lieb also points out that the suggestion that what 'B' receives is his being freed 
from his obligation to C is inconsistent with the thinking behind the Leistungsbegriff: 
how can one argue on the one hand that A's primary purpose in performing is to 
extinguish his obligation to 'B', and on the other that he intends to extinguish 'B' s' 
obligation to cf30 Following Kupisch, therefore, Lieb argues that as a fiction provides 
the basis for the conclusion that A performs to 'B' legally-speaking even though he 








Koppensteiner and Kramer Bereicherung 25. He should not have to defend himself for a mistake 
made by an official at the post office: see Larenz and Canaris Schuldrecht /I12 224. 
Koppensteiner and Kramer Bereicherung 25. 
Larenz and Canaris Schuldrecht IU2 224. 
See, e g, Loewenheim Bereicherungsrecht 35. 
As required to found enrichment liability under § 8128GB. 
See Munchener KommentarfLieb § 812 marg note 34. 
Munchener KommentarfLieb § 812 marg note 34. 
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problem of locating the enrichment. In other words, 'B' can be legally regarded as 
having received the performance even if it has never formed part of his estate.231 Lieb 
argues that this has the advantage of being able to explain why A should have an 
enrichment claim against 'B' even if 'B' had subsequently received the object from C.232 
Finally, it should be borne in mind that this is only part of the picture. The other 
general provisions of the law of enrichment also apply in this case, and it should be seen 
against that backdrop. Thus, for example, a claim would be excluded if A had 
'performed' while knowing that it was not obliged to do SO.233 By way of exception, a 
direct action would lie directly against C if he had received the money gratuitously in 
terms of § 822 BGB.234 
South African law 
As suggested above,235 it is questionable whether someone who does not have an 
underlying relationship with a bank can validly instruct that bank to pay a creditor. It is 
therefore doubtful whether the situation dealt with in this section could ever arise in 
. . bank' 236 practlce In a mg context. 
Outside the arena of banking law, however, analogies may be found. For 
example, an analogous case in the context of third-party insurance is Licences and 
General Insurance Co v Ismay.237 Mr Ismay purported to insure his vehicle with the 
Licences and General Insurance Co. The contract of insurance was later found to be 
void,238 however, as its validity was conditional upon the truth of various statements 









Munchener KommentarlLieb § 812 marg note 34. 
See Munchener KommentarlLieb § 812 marg notes 35-6 for further justifications. 
§ 814 BGB. 
According to § 822 BGB, if a recipient hands what he has received to a third party gratuitously, 
the recipient is obliged to return it, in so far as the recipient is not liable in terms of the law of 
enrichment. See Appendix A. 
At P 190. 
Cf the example given by Larenz and Canaris Schuldrecht /lJ2 224 to illustrate this situation. 
Supra. 
See the discussion at 462H-463F (particularly 463A), where the judge overruled that part of the 
exception which suggested that the contract was voidable, and not void (see the exception at 
460C-D). 
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involved in a car accident with a Chevrolet lorry belonging to a Mr Watson, and he 
(Ismay) accordingly submitted a claim to the company. The company, unaware that Mr 
Ismay's statement was untrue, paid for repairs to Mr Ismay's car and for his medical 
expenses, and it paid Mr Watson in respect of the damage to his lorry.239 The company 
later discovered the untruth ofMr Ismay's statement, and approached the court for a 
declaration that Mr Ismay had been 'unjustly enriched' by the company's payments?40 
Both parties agreed that the enrichment action in question would be the condictio 
indebiti241 but Mr Ismay excepted to the declaration on various grounds.242 The most 
important of these was that the company had not alleged '[t]hat the amount which 
plaintiffs are reclaiming was transferred or paid by plaintiffs or its agents to the 
defendant. ,243 In other words, it was suggested that the company could not bring a 
condictio indebiti against Mr Ismay as such a remedy can only be directed against 'the 
actual recipient of the money' ,244 and the sums in question had been received by third 
parties24S and not Mr Ismay. 
The judge (Sampson J) was not aware of any previous cases which dealt with the 
issue at hand,246 so he decided the case according to the common law. He first referred 
to Voet 12.6.9 (relating to D 12.6.44) where he states that 'when the payment is made on 
behalf of the true debtor, there is an action of negotiorum gestio or other similar action 
against the true debtor by the person who pays; and that the condictio indebiti falls 
away.'247 The judge distinguished the factual situation dealt with by Voet from the 










See the judgment at 459 for the facts. 
At 459. 
See the judgment at 461 D. 
See 460 for the exception. 
See 460B. 
See 461F. 
In other words, Mr Watson and presumably the garage which effected the repairs to Mr Ismay's 
car and the medical service provider that attended to his own injuries - see the declaration at 
459C-E. 
See 461 G-H, where the judge says that the legal question concerned 'an insurance company's 
right to recover by condictio indebiti or other condictio from the insured money paid in terms of a 
policy to third parties under a mistaken belief of liability .... ' 
See 461H. 
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to a case in which the payment has been made at the instance or upon the mandate of the 
true debtor. ,248 A text which he considered to be more apposite was D 50.17.18, which 
reads 'quod jussu alterius solvitur pro eo est quasi ipsi solutum esset.'249 In this regard, 
he referred to Pothier's statement that 'I am understood to pay someone not only when I 
pay him himself but also when I pay to another on his order.'2so Regarding enrichment 
in such circumstances, he cited this example mentioned by Voet: an engaged woman 
owes a dowry to her fiance and, in accordance with her instruction, someone who 
erroneously thinks that he is her debtor pays the owed sum to her fiance. 2S1 Voet says 
that, upon realising his mistake, the party who made the payment could sue the woman 
with a condictio indebiti 'as if what had been paid on her order had been paid to her' ?52 
The judge went on to quote two further passages from the Digest:253 'Qui hominem aut 
decem tibi aut Titio dari promisit, si Titio partem hominis tradiderit, mox tibi decem 
numeravit, non Titio set tibi partem hominis condicat (quasi indebitum tua voluntate 
Titio solverat),254 and 'ut nihil intersit, jubeam Titio solvare an ab initio stipulatio ita 
concepta sit. ,255 
In other words, the judge drew a distinction between the type of situation dealt 
with in Chapter Two of this thesis (payment of the debt of another without having been 
instructed to do so) and the situations presently under consideration (payment of the debt 
of another in accordance with the instruction of the debtor). In both cases, the 
perfonning party (A), would be entitled to sue the debtor (B), and not the payee (C).256 
In the first case, the appropriate action would not be the condictio indebiti, according to 
Voet, but the actio negotiorum gestorum. In the second case, however, the condictio 











As quoted in the judgment at 462A-B. 
In his edition of the Digest (12.6.40). 
Voet 12.6.11. 
See the judgment at 462B-C. 
The first of which was relied upon by Pothier as authority for the view cited above. See the 
judgment at 462D. 
D 46.3.34. 
D 46.3.59. 
The judge commented, in passing, that no action could be brought against the 'actual payees in 
the case, as the payments were made on behalf of the insured ... .': see 461G-H. 
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The judge accordingly held that in principle the company would be entitled to 
bring a condictio indebiti against Ismay.257 He was of the view that the declaration 
effectively stated that 'the defendant required the company to dispose of the claims for 
damage in terms of the policy.'258 Overruling the exception,259 the judge concluded: 
I think that the provisions of the policy in regard to payment for repairs to 
defendant's car and settlement in his name of third party's claims for 
injuries have substantially the same effect as the stipulation in Digest 
(4.3.34); for they provide merely the manner in which the indemnity may 
be paid. The declaration appears to me to set out sufficiently what amounts 
to a mandate to the company, and will enable plaintiffs to show that 
payment ofthe sums in question was made with the knowledge of 
defendant. 260 
I would argue that the word 'mandate' was used loosely in this regard,261 and that 
what was really at issue was not a mandate in its true sense262 but an instance of 
delegatio solvendi.263 That this is so is borne out by the fact that the Digest texts relied 
upon by the judge are those used as authority for the recognition of this principle by the 
Romans?64 The case is therefore useful as further evidence that the notion of delegatio 
solvendi exists in South African law?65 
Secondly, the case is authority for the view that where B instructs A to perform 












It was alleged in the exception that the defendant had been prejudiced by the payment. The 
argument was that if the insurance contract were void, then the company should have returned the 
premiums paid by the defendant, and 'tendered to place defendant in the position of having all 
claims and defences intact against the said Watson and arising out of the accident .... ' As the 
premiums had not been returned, ran the argument, and as the company had settled Watson's 
claim although the accident was allegedly not due to the defendant's negligence, the defendant 
was prejudiced by losing any claims or defences against Watson. The court did not deal with 
these allegations except to order that they be struck out on procedural grounds (they were 
allegations of fact which should not have been inserted in an exception made on the basis that a 
declaration did not disclose a cause of action). See the judgment at 460F-G and 464A-B. 
At 462F-G. 
As was even done by the Romans: see the discussion above at p 174. 
In other words, a contract of mandate. 
One of the most common contexts in which Anweisungen arise in Germany is third-party 
insurance. 
Cfthe discussion of Roman law above at p 170 ff. 
Also see Minister van Justisie v Jaffer supra. 
performance to B, A can recover the amount in question by means of an enrichment 
action directed against B, and not against the ultimate recipient, c.266 The court thus 
came to the same result, therefore, as that reached in German law. 
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It is also significant that the rules applied by the judge in coming to this 
conclusion echo some of the ideas of German law. Ismay argued that he, Ismay, was not 
the recipiens of the performance made by the insurance company. Ismay was thus 
arguing that the insurance company had made a datio to C, and that the condictio 
indebiti should accordingly be directed against C. The effect of the judgment was to say 
that a datio in law need not be the same as a datio in fact. 267 In other words, even if A 
physically hands something directly to C, this could constitute a datio to B, if A was 
acting under 8's orders. The South African datio thus sounds rather like the German 
L . 268 elstung. 
It was assumed that Ismay's debts had been extinguished by the .insurance 
company's performance 'in his name'. As the datio required for a condictio indebiti269 
(with.in the realm of the traditional enrichment remedies) corresponds to the general 
requirement of 'enrichment', it can be argued that this decision is authority for the 
proposition that, in a case like this, B would be 'enriched' by A's payment to C. 
As the judge justified his decision purely according to the principles of the 
common law, he unfortunately did not explicitly refer to the policies at play in such 
situations. It is likely, however, in the light of more recent pronouncements of the 
judiciary,270 that a court faced with such a case today would analyse the respective 






At least in cases where B was aware of the defect in his relationship with A. 
Cfthe distinction in German law between a factual, or physical, 'handing over' (Zuwendung) and 
a Leistung. Refer to the discussion in Chapter One for further details in this regard. 
Further cases illustrating the widening boundaries of a datio, and the consequent expansion of the 
scope of the condictio indebiti, will be discussed at the appropriate places below. 
And also the condictiones causa data and causa data causa non secuta. 
Most importantly, that of the Appellate Division in B & H Engineering v First NaJional Bank of 
SA Ltd 1995 (2) SA 279 (A). For a detailed discussion, see p 216 ffbelow. 
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A more recent analogous case is that of Minister van Justisie v Jaifer,271 which 
was discussed above.272 That was the case where Hoesein (B) deposited bail with the 
registrar of the court pending a peti tion brought by his brother. He then instructed the 
registrar (A) to pay the sum in question to his (B's) creditor C.2?3 A paid C as 
instructed, but it turned out that B was not entitled to reclaim the bail as his brother was 
still at large. The case is only analogous in that it appears that there was a valid 
Anweisung in the absence of any enforceable underlying right to the payment.274 
Although the court did not give it special emphasis, it appears that the intention of the 
performing party was important.275 The judgment turned on the nature of the instruction 
in question and the court finally decided that the Minister's condictio indebiti against 
Jaffer (C) would fail because the payment by A to C had legally been made to Hoesein 
(B): a condictio indebiti could thus only lie against B, and not against C. 
(b) Payment in terms of a revoked instruction 
The practical situation to be considered in this section is the following: B instructs A to 
pay his (B's) creditor C. Prior to payment, B withdraws this instruction but A pays C, 
notwithstanding B's revocation of his instruction. For example, Bowes C R3 000 as 
rental to be paid monthly in advance in terms of a valid contract of lease. By writing a 
cheque in C's favour B instructs his bank (A) to pay R3 000 to C in respect of next 
month's rent. Before the bank makes the payment, B countermands the cheque, because 
he wants to pay another debt that is more pressing. Despite the valid countermand, B's 
bank (A) pays C. To sum up, the relationship, such a contractual or other obligation, 
between Band C is valid, and B initially issued a valid instruction to A, but later 







At p 175 ff. 
See the judgment at 281 G-H. 
In other words, there was a contract between A and B (deposit) but whether it was refimdable or 
not depended on whether B's brother went back to jail when his appeal failed . As B's brother 
was not in jail at the time when B made the instruction to A, A had no duty to pay B, and B had 
no right to claim payment. 
See the judgment at 280A-C and at 280D-E, where the court says '[a]s dit blyk dat die betaling 
bedoel was om die skuld aan Hoesein te delg .. . .' ('If it appears that the payment was intended to 
settle the debt to Hoesein . . .. ' - my translation). 
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In both German276 and South African law,277 the countermand of a cheque is 
regarded as the revocation278 of an instruction by a client to his bank.279 In other words, 
there is a valid and effective instruction (Anweisung in Germany, or mandate - or 
possibly delegatio solvendi - in South Africa),28o which is later withdrawn. The 
revocation operates ex nunc: it is only effective from the moment of revocation 
onwards,281 and has no retroactive effect. In certain circumstances, however, a 
revocation will not have any effect. For instance, in South African law, it seems that a 








Meier (1999) 58 Cambridge Law Journal 567 at 573; LDewenheim Bereicherungsrecht 39, 42; 
Koppensteiner and Kramer Bereicherung 34. 
Countermand ofa cheque, like the receipt of notice of the client's death or his insolvency, will 
amount to a revocation of the bank's 'duty and authority' to pay a cheque: s 73 of the Bills of 
Exchange Act 34 of 1964. The actual wording of the section reads as follows: 'The duty and 
authority of a banker to pay a cheque drawn on him by his customer are determined by - (a) 
countermand of payment; (b) receipt of notice of the customer's death; (c) receipt of notice of the 
customer having become insolvent.' 
See, e g, the wording of the heacling to s 73 of the Bills of Exchange Act 34 of 1964 but cf Malan 
and Pretorius Bills of Exchange 387 who refer to 'termination'. Also see B & H Engineering v 
First National Bank of SA Ltd supra at 288G-H, where the judge of appeal says that 
'[ c ]ountermand terminates the duty and authority of a banker to pay a cheque drawn on him by 
his customer.' If the instruction is regarded as a mandate, and therefore as a contract, then 
termination would be the correct term; if on the other hand, it is regarded as a unilateral 
instruction (as in delegatio solvendi), then revocation would be the correct term. 
As opposed to the termination of the banker-client contract: From Malan and Pretorius Bills of 
Exchange 386: The termination of the drawee bank's duty to pay a cheque must be distinguished 
from the termination of its (banker-client) contract with its client. The latter may be terminated 
either unilaterally (summarily by the client but only after reasonable notice has been given by the 
bank) or by agreement. (Or it may be terminated where the client is sequestrated, liquidated, 
placed under judicial management, dies or where the bank or a client which is only a legal person 
is dissolved. The contract will, on the other hand, not be terminated if the client becomes insane 
or otherwise loses legal capacity but his cheques will lack any legal effect). Once it has been 
terminated, all rights and duties come to an end, except for the bank's duty to treat certain 
information regarding its erstwhile client as confidential. 
Cf the discussion above at p 175 ff. 
Provided that the countermand is effective, the bank will thereupon acquire a duty to refuse to 
pay the cheque: Malan and Pretorius Bills of Exchange 386 ff. The requirements for an effective 
countermand are: 'notice must be given to the branch of the drawee on which the cheque is 
drawn, must unequivocally refer to the cheque which is being countermanded and come to the 
notice of the drawee bank': Malan and Pretorius Bills of Exchange para 214 and the English 
cases cited there. As was done in Govender v Standard Bank of SA Ltd 1984 (4) SA 392 (C) (see 
the judgment at 407), the drawee bank' may contract validly that, if it inadvertently pays a 
countermanded cheque, it may nevertheless debit the account of the drawer with the amount of 
the paid cheque': Malan and Pretorius Bills of Exchange para 214. 
Malan and Pretorius Bills of Exchange para 214: in such a case, a purported countermand would 
be ineffective i e the bank would remain liable. 
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Whom the bank can sue depends, in Gennan law, on whether the payee was 
aware of the countennand or not.283 This awareness is significant for at least two 
reasons. The first relates to the detennination of the perfonning party's intention (the 
Leistungsbestimmung).284 Secondly, the awareness of the payee is relevant in weighing 
up the relative interests of the parties; a payee who is aware of a countennand is 
arguably less worthy of protection than one who accepted payment in ignorance of the 
countennand. As these factors may also be useful for the analysis of South African law, 
the discussion that follows will be divided along Gennan lines (i e cases where the payee 
was aware of the countermand will be discussed separately from those where the payee 
was unaware of the countermand). 
(i) Payee was aware of the countermand 
In the leading case in Gennan law,285 B sent C a cheque for DM20 000 drawn on bank 
A. The next day B countermanded the cheque. Whether C knew about the countennand 
or not was disputed.286 C nevertheless presented the cheque at the bank, which 
honoured it by mistake. It then debited B's account in the amount ofDM20 000 but a 
few days later reversed this.287 When B later closed his account, the bank deducted the 
DM20 000 from his balance, alleging that he had been enriched in this amount: by 
virtue of the bank's honouring the cheque, he had been freed from a liability to C, at the 
bank's expense.288 The client then sued the bank for this amount. 
According to the court,289 assuming that the payee knew that the Anweisung had 
been revoked, he knew that he was receiving the money onJy because the revocation had 
been overlooked. He was accordingly aware that the bank was no longer allowed to 








Loewenbeim Bereicherungsrecht 42. 
Bearing in mind that this is determined from the point of view of the recipient (i e the 
EmpJangerhorizont): see the discussion in Chapter One at p 40 ff above. 
BGHZ 87, 393. 
See the facts at 394 of the report. CfLoewenbeim Bereicherungsrecht 39. 
See the report at 394. Also see Loewenbeim Bereicherungsrecht 39 ff; Medicus Biirgerliches 
Recht 509-10; Markesinis et al (n 8) at 734-5; Koppensteiner and Kramer Bereicherung 35. 
See 394. 
At 398. Also see Loewenbeim Bereicherungsrecht 40-41. 
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Anweisung.290 From his point of view as recipient,291 therefore, the bank's payment did 
not represent a performance (Leistung) to him by B.292 Thus, contrary to the normal 
rule, the payment cannot be attributed to B.293 The court therefore held that the bank 
should proceed directly against C.294 
The court then went on to consider the interests of the parties. It was of the 
opinion that the bank's client (B) had an interest in not being prejudiced by the bank's 
paying a third party notwithstanding his valid retraction of his original instruction, and 
that this interest was worthy of protection?95 It held that the bank alone had to carry the 
risk resulting from this kind of mistake, at least in the event that its client informed the 
payee of the countermand and thereby did everything to protect himself from the 
consequences of a mistaken payment. 296 In such circumstances, according to the court, 
the bank could sue the payee directly, whether or not the payee had a claim to this sum 
arising from his legal relationship to B/97 because the recipient's reliance would not 
deserve any protection in such a case?98 The court added that the recipient knew that 
the payment was made by mistake and should not be allowed to take advantage of this 
error.299 
The majority of writers agree that where C knows that he is receiving something 
on the basis of an Anweisung that has been revoked, A cannot sue B, but must proceed 













It should be remembered that the direction of the performance (Leistung) in German law is 
decided from the point of view of the recipient - see the discussion of the EmpJangerhorizont in 
Chapter One at p 40 ff above. 
At 398. 
At 398. The court went on to say that it was not important whether the payment to C was a 
Leistung or whether C had received the payment 'in sons tiger Weise', as it was clear that the 
bank had a direct enrichment claim against C. 
Also at 398. Also see the references cited there. 
See 398-9. 
399. 




See, for example, Koppensteiner and Kramer Bereicherung 35. Both according to the majority 
opinion and according to the BHG: on the latter see Jauernig/SchJechtriem § 812 marg note 38 
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Markesinis et al remark that it seems that 'the Bundesgerichtshof attaches more 
importance to whether or not the recipient was mala fide rather than to the person who 
was performing from;he perspective of the recipient. ,302 
There has been some discussion whether the enrichment action in question would 
be a Leistungskondiktion or a Nichtleistungskondiktion. The court did not decide the 
question/03 but the weight of opinion seems to be that it (the action against the payee) 
could not be a Leistungskondiktion because the bank did not intend to fulfil an obligation 
to C, but rather intended to perform to its client, B.304 Moreover, the bank's payment 
does not amount to a performance by the drawer to the payee because the detennination 
of performance (Leistungsbestimmung) that was originally effective is now removed vis-
a-vis the payee.305 In other words, the bank's original purpose is to perform, in 
accordance with his instruction, to its client. In the normal course of events (i e where 
the cheque has not been countermanded), this purpose would be fulfilled by the bank's 
payment to the payee. The bank would therefore have performed vis-a-vis the client. 
As this performance (Leistung A-B) is in accordance with the bank's purpose, it would 
not be entitled to an enrichment claim. If, however, the instruction has been revoked 
with the payee's knowledge, then this decision to perfonn is also removed and the bank 
cannot be seen to have performed to the payee on its client's behale06 For all these 








and the cases cited there. 
See, e g, Medicus Biirgerliches Recht marg note 676: the countermand is thus effective in the 
Aufienverhaltnis ('outer/external relationship') to the recipient. Medicus ibid: C should be 
exposed to the action because he acted in bad faith. Jauernig/Schlechtriem § 812 marg note 38: 
this takes into account the protection of the bonafide recipient's reliance interest, and the 
interests of the instructing party (B) that are worthy of protection; ifhe timeously informed the 
payee of the countermand, then the latter cannot rely on retaining payment in terms of the 
Valutaverhaltnis. Jauernig/ScWechtriem § 812 marg note 37: The instructing party has to prove 
this knowledge (BGH 87, 400). 
At 735. 
See the judgment at 398. 
See Medicus Burgerliches Recht marg note 676. 
Loewenheim Bereicherungsrecht 41. 
Loewenheim Bereicherungsrecht 42. Also see Jauernig/Schlechtriem at § 812 marg note 37, 
where he says that countermand, or any other supervening invalidity of an Anweisung can only 
change the route of the performance in question if the payee knew about the countermand. 
Loewenheim Bereicherungsrecht 41. Despite the subsidiarity principle: Loewenheim 
Bereicherungsrecht 41, 42. 
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This Durchgriff(direct action A_C)308 is not confined to situations involving 
cheques. It has thus been extended to payments made in terms of standing orders 
(Dauerauftrdge) that have lapsed or been revoked309 and orders to transfer money 
.. . 310 
(Uberwelsungsauftrdge) that have been revoked. It has also been suggested that a 
direct action should be brought where C did not actually know but should have known 
that a mistake had been made,311 for example where the amount transferred was 
obviouslyexcessive.312 
The only South African case concerning payment by a bank in contravention of a 
countermand, where the payee was aware of such countermand, is Natal Bank Ltd v 
Roorda.313 Acting through an agent, Roorda concluded a contract for the sale of two 
plots of land to Cohn. Cohn handed the agent (Schirtel) a cheque in payment. The agent 
deducted his commission from the original amount and drew another cheque in his own 
name in Roorda's favour. This was then handed to Roorda. On the same day, before the 
cheque was presented for payment, Cohn repudiated314 the contract of sale and asked 
Schirtel to stop payment of the cheque. Schirtel thereupon instructed the bank (Natal 
Bank Ltd) to stop payment of the cheque and wrote to Roorda, informing him that he 








When German lawyers speak of a Durchgriffskondiktion, they are not referring to a special 
category of enrichment remedy (alongside the Leistungskondiktion, or a Riickgriffskondiktion, for 
example), but they are merely indicating that in a triangular situation, A may sue C directly (with 
whichever Kondiktion may be appropriate in the circumstances). In other words, the expression 
Durchgrif.f(which literally means 'grasping through') just emphasises that recourse is directed 
against C, and not 'via the triangle' (i e A-B-C). 
See, e g, Loewenheim Bereicherungsrecht 41; BGHZ 89, 376: Dauerauftrag i e standing order 
for recurring remittances by bank transfer. 
Oberweisungsau!trtige are written instructions handed to the instructing party's bank rather than 
the payee. These instruct the bank to pay the designated recipient with money from the 
instructing party's account, and are in very common use in Germany (e g a doctor will send an 
Oberweisungsauftrag to a patient along with a bill for treatment. The patient must then sign it 
and hand it in to his or her own bank, which will then transfer the money to the doctor's bank 
where it will be credited to his or her account). See, e g, BGHZ 87, 249: carrying out ofa 
countermanded order to transfer money. 
See Koppensteiner and Kramer Bereicherung 35n47: by way of analogy to § 173 BGB. 
See BGH NJW 87, 186, which dealt with a transfer of too much. 
1903 TH 298. See the pleadings at pp 298-300 and the judgment at 301-302 for the facts 
summarised in this paragraph. 
As the contract had been cancelled, it might be argued that this case should be dealt with as a 
case of Doppelmangel. For a case to fall into that category, however, the underlying contract 
between A and B (rather than the Anweisung) would have to be invalid. 
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payment. A couple of weeks later, however, Roorda went ahead and did exactly this 
and, because the ledger clerk had not been infonned of the countennand, the bank 
erroneously paid Roorda the amount on the face of the cheque. Schirtel repaid Cohn the 
amount originally received from him. Upon realising that the cheque had been paid, 
Schirtel claimed, and received, a refund from the bank. The relevant parties were thus 
Natal Bank (the instructed party, A), Schirtel (the instructing party, B)315 and Roorda 
(the payee, C). 
The bank (A) then sued Roorda (C) directly for recovery of this amount. In other 
words, using the Gennan tenrunology, A sued C with a Durchgriffskondiktion.316 The 
first point to note is that the court impliedly rejected the possibility that the bank's 
enrichment action should be directed against the drawer (i e A-B), as is shown by this 
sentence? 17 
When Schirtel discovered that his cheque had been cashed he at once 
claimed a refund of the amount from the Natal Bank, with which, of 
course, the bank was bound to comply, and it now seeks to recover the 
amount from the defendant. 
The court thus seems to regard it as obvious that the drawer should not have to 
compensate the bank for its loss and in turn sue C, and that the bank should seek 
recourse from the payee. 
Various arguments were raised by defendant's counsel, for example that the bank 
had acted negligently and that the defendant had acted malafide. The court chose, 
however, to base its decision on 'mistake of fact' and the English case of Kelly v 
Solari. 318 Although it never mentioned it by name, the court presumably had the 






Acting on behalf of Cohn. 
See note 308 above. 
At p 302. 
(1841) 9 M & W 54 (152 ER 24), and also Divisional Council of Alnval North v De Wet 7 SC 
232 and Van Leeuwen 4.14.4. 
See Govender v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd supra at 397H and 398C; First National Bank 
of SA Ltd v B & H Engineering supra at 44C-D; and B & H Engineering v First National Bank of 
SA Ltd supra at 284G-H, where the court says that the court in Roorda's case suggested that it 
was a condictio indebiti at 303 and then says that this was disapproved of in Govender's case on 
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bank on seeing the cheque thought that it had the authority of Schirtel to pay the money, 
whereas in fact it had not, having, on the contrary, received his express instructions not 
to pay'),320 the court allowed the plaintiffs claim. 
While the court conceded that the bank had acted negligently,321 it held that it 
'fail[ed] to see any such gross negligence on the part of the bank as would disentitle it to 
succeed with this action .... 322 Moreover, such negligence as there was seemed to have 
been outweighed in the judge's mind by the fact that 'the defendant ought not to have 
presented the cheque'. 323 The court thus implied, ftrst of all, that only gross negligence 
would exclude such an enrichment claim.324 This aspect of the decision has been 
criticised on the grounds that a condictio indebiti should not be allowed to a plaintiff 
who has been negligent. 325 The negligence of the bank in a case like this would surely 
be inexcusable, or 'so slack that [it would] ... not in the Court's view deserve the 
protection of the law ... .'326 It is not at all clear, however, that the action to be brought in 
such circumstances would be a condictio indebiti. In fact, more recent pronouncements 









the ground that it should be a condictio sine causa - this was also the decision of the court a quo 
and agreed with by the judge in AD. This may also be seen from the fact that it was mentioned 
by the defendant's advocate, J de Villiers: see p 301. Eiselen and Pienaar prefer the 
classification of this action as a condictio indebiti, notwithstanding the decision in B & H 
Engineering (see the first edition of their Unjustified Enrichment at 207 and 2 ed at 180). 
At P 302 of the judgment. 
Atp303. 
At P 303. 
Atp303. 
Cf Covender v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd supra at 403F-G, where the court agreed with 
the Roorda decision that the bank would be allowed an action despite its negligence, as it was 
'not of so gross a degree as to preclude recovery by the bank.' It should, however, be borne in 
mind that the court in that case regarded the appropriate action would be a condictio sine causa. 
See the discussion of this case at p 216 ffbelow. 
C-J Pretorius 'Payment by a bank on a countermanded cheque and the condictio sine causa: B & 
H Engineering v First National Bank of SA Ltd 1995 2 SA 279 (A)' (1995) 58 THRHR 733 at 
734: 'the court relied on the English decision in Kelly v Solari ... and allowed the enrichment 
claim of the bank based on the condictio indebiti regardless of possible negligence on the part of 
the bank, which should preclude reliance on this action (cf Divisional Council of Aliwal North v 
De Wet supra at 234; Union Government v National Bank of SA Ltd 1921 AD 121 at 126).' 
Willis Faber Enthoven (Pty) Ltd v Receiver of Revenue and Another 1992 (4) SA 202 (A) at 
224E-F. 
See Govender v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd supra at 398D-403C; First National Bank of 
SA Ltd v B & H Engineering supra at 44C-D; B & H Engineering v First National Bank of SA Ltd 
supra at 284G-H. But cf Pretorius (1995) 58 THRHR 733 at 735, where the author mentions that 
some older jurists and some modern writers still prefer the view that it is a condictio indebiti. 
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which case error (and the excusability thereof) would be irrelevant.328 
The judgment implies, secondly, that the conduct of the banker and that of the 
payee should be measured against objective standards (i e the banker: culpa; the payee: 
bona fides) and that the conduct of each ofthe parties should then be compared with that 
of the other. Awareness of the countermand (mala fides) on the part of the payee would 
apparently weigh more heavily in the scales than negligence on the part of the bank, and 
would expose the payee to a claim by the negligent bank.329 Although the court did not 
deal with the plaintiffs allegation that the defendant had acted mala fide in those 
terms,330 the defendant's awareness of the countermand clearly influenced the judge's 
d .. 331 eClslon. 
It seems, therefore, that the South African court not only came to the same result 
as its German counterpart, but that its decision was influenced by similar factors: the 
conduct of the instructing party (i e whether he took steps to inform the payee of the 
countermand and whether the performance should be attributed to him); and the third 
party's bona fides (and hence his worthiness of protection). In so far as the judge 
suggested that gross negligence on the part of the bank would playa role, however, the 
approach of the South African court332 does not tally with the German approach. This 






Eiselen and Pienaar, for example, preferred this view in the first edition of Unjustified 
Enrichment (at 207) and maintain the view in the second edition (at 180). 
See, in particular, the views expressed by Rose-Innes J in Govender's case supra, outlined at p 
225 ffbelow. 
Although there is also a slight suggestion that any detriment on the part of the payee should also 
enter into the enquiry: see p 303, where the judge, in remarking that the bank had apparently not 
acted grossly negligently, said that the payee had also apparently suffered no detriment. 
But cf Malan and Pretorius Bills of Exchange 363: 'No special significance was attributed by the 
court to the fact that the payee knew that the cheque had been countermanded or that the bank 
might have been negligent. ... ' 
See, for example, p 302: 'It is abundantly clear that long before he paid the cheque into his own 
bank in order that it might be presented to the Natal Bank, the defendant was aware that Schirtel 
had stopped payment of the cheque, and he had been directed by Schirtel not to present it for 
payment.' Later on the same page, he said' lilt is clear to me that presentment should not have 
taken place, the defendant having been informed that the payment of it had been stopped', and 
'his proper course was to have sued Schirtel for the amount and not to have presented a cheque 
which he knew Schirtel had directed the bank not to honour.' Also see p 303: ' ... the defendant 
oUght not to have presented the cheque'. 
Also see the comments regarding Govender's case supra in footnote 324 above. 
that the bank's negligence is irrelevant, is justified not only on the basis oflegal 
doctrine, but also in terms of policy. Finally, it is interesting to note that both courts 
used an approach which weighed up the interests of the parties (although this was not 
made explicit in Roorda's case), and that this leads to exactly the same results in both 
systems. The approach of the German court, however, is to be preferred in that the 
balancing of the parties's interests was discussed openly and in detail. 
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While there is no other reported case where a bank has paid a mala fide payee in 
contravention of a countermand, various obiter comments may be found in more recent 
decisions. Some of these relate to the identification of the remedy in such cases, as 
mentioned above, and have to some extent been superseded by the approach 
recommended in the McCarthy Retail decision.333 Other comments are more significant, 
however. For example, the significance of the payee's awareness of the countermand 
was discussed in Govender v Standard Bank o/South Africa Ltd.334 The court said that 
the awareness of the payee made Roorda's case 
an a/ortiori case. To present a cheque for payment aware that payment 
had been stopped is mala fide and fraudulent, since it amounts to a 
representation to the bank that the drawer has ordered the bank to pay the 
money, knowing that the drawer has instructed the bank not to do so. We 
have no doubt that a bank in those circumstances is not precluded from 
reclaiming the payment despite carelessly overlooking the countermand 
of payment, since it was led into the error by the fraud of the payee and to 
fall into a trap of that kind is not gross negligence.335 
The court thus implied that the mala fides of a payee in such circumstances would 
automatically rule out gross negligence on the part of the bank. This clearly suggests 
that the payee's awareness of the countermand is the decisive factor, as in German 
law.336 Characterising the payee's presentation of the cheque in such circumstances as a 
fraudulent misrepresentation muddies the waters, however, as it implies that the bank 





McCarthy Retail Ltd v Shortdistance Carriers CC 200 1 (3) SA 482 (SCA). This was reiterated 
by Schutz JA in First National Bank of Southern Africa Ltd v Perry NO and Others supra at 
969H-1. AJso see Chapter One at p 15 above. 
1984 (4) SA 392 (C). 
At 403G-L 
Cf the comments of Markesinis et al (n 8) at p 212 above. 
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enrichment. This aspect of the judgment has drawn criticism. According to Stassen,337 
for example, it is not clear that the payee would be making a fraudulent 
misrepresentation in these circumstances as the agreement between the drawer and the 
payee envisages that the payee present the cheque to the bank for payment, and this 
agreement is not terminated by the countermand. 338 
One other judicial observation of Roorda's case warrants attention. In B & H 
Engineering v First National Bank o/SA Ltd,339 the Appellate Division remarked that 
the question whether the payee had been enriched was not discussed by the court in 
Roorda's case.340 As pointed out above, this is one of those early decisions where the 
court applied English law and then, almost as an afterthought, added that' [t]he 
principles of the Roman-Dutch law are similar,.341 The relevant question, according to 
the judge, was therefore whether there had been a mistaken money payment, and not 
whether the payee's net fmancial position had been increased thereby. Even if the judge 
had applied the traditional requirements of the condictio indebiti, he would not have had 
to ask whether there was 'enrichment' in the modem sense, but merely whether there 
was a datio viz a payment of money or transfer of other property. The bank had clearly 
given money to Roorda,342 and that was sufficient. Were such a case to arise now, 
however, it would have to be approached differently. 
The weight of authority suggests that the remedy to be used in such cases is the 







] C Stassen 'Countermanded cheques and enrichment - some clarity, some confusion' 1985 
Modern Business Law 15 at 20. 
For further discussion of this point, see Stassen op cil. 
Supra. 
See the judgment of the Appellate Division at 294B: 'Roorda's case supra, which also dealt with 
a claim against a payee for return of money paid by a bank in the face of a countermand, did not 
consider the question whether the payee had been enriched. It is consequently of no assistance 
for present purposes.' Also see the discussion of this case at p 247 ff below. 
See the judgment at 303, where the court cites Van Leeuwen 4.14.4 and Divisional Council of 
Aliwal North v De Wet supra as authority. 
Via his bank. The court apparently did not find that there was any reason to regard A's act of 
performance to C as constituting dationes A-B and B-C. Cfthe comments regarding the 
recipiens of a payment at p 207 above. Also see Phillips v Hughes, Hughes v Maphumelo 1979 
(1) SA 225 (N) and Bowman, De Wet and Du Plessis NNO and Others v Fidelity Bank Ltd 1997 
(2) SA 35 (A). 
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current approach of the Supreme Court of Appeal is to ask two questions: was C 
enriched and, if so, was the enrichment sine causa?343 In order to decide whether C is 
enriched, it is thus necessary to establish whether the bank's payment discharged B's 
liability to C, assuming that such liability existed at the time of the payment. 
In Roorda's case, B and C were linked by a contract of sale. The purchaser was 
therefore obliged to pay the purchase price to Roorda, and Roorda was to transfer 
ownership of the plots ofland. As the contract of sale had been 'repudiated' (and 
presumably cancelled) before the bank paid Roorda, the case could arguably be dealt 
with as a case of Doppelmangel. It has been discussed in this section, however, because 
there was at least initially a valid contract between B and C, and because the existence or 
absence of a contractual relationship between B and C was not taken into account by the 
judge. The reasoning of a modern court faced with a factual situation analogous to that 
of Roorda's case would probably run as follows: ifC had not yet transferred ownership 
of the land to B, B would not be liable for the purchase price (unless the contract 
stipulated otherwise );344 as C would therefore have no right to the purchase price, the 
bank's payment would not extinguish any obligation;345 C would therefore be enriched 
by the payment; and such enrichment would be sine causa because A had no duty to 
make the payment (whether directly to C or via B) and C had no right to receive it. On 
the other hand, if C had already made counter-performance to B, B would be liable for 
the purchase price; the bank's payment would discharge this obligation;346 C would 
therefore simultaneously receive the money and lose the claim against B and would 
therefore not be enriched; the enriched party would thus be B. 
Would the fact that B breached the contract of sale (by repudiation in Roorda's 
case) have any significance? If B breached the contract of sale and countermanded the 





And the court tends to focus on the first question. See, e g, p 247 ffbelow. 
According to the nonnal rules of contract, the duty to pay the purchase price is conditional upon 
delivery of the goods in terms ofa contract of sale. 
In other words, the acquisition of the money would not be 'cancelled out' by the loss ofa claim. 
See the discussion of B & H Engineering v First National Bank of SA Ltd supra at p 247 ff 
below. 
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contract and to sue for contractual damages for any loss suffered. In such 
circumstances, it might be argued that C would have a right against B, which could be 
discharged by the bank's payment (i e the acquisition of the money would be 'cancelled 
out' by the loss of a claim against B). This is doubtful, however, because the obligation 
to pay damages for breach of contract is not the same as the obligation to make 
performance in terms of that contract, and a bank's payment cannot discharge any 
obligation other than the one that the drawer originally intends to discharge. The fact 
that the bank is paying in contravention of a countermand should not make any 
difference. What should therefore happen in such circumstances is that A should sue C 
for enrichment (provided that counter-performance had not been made), and C should 
sue B for breach. 
Applying the enrichment-requirement in this fashion leads to the same result as 
in German law and Roorda's case, without having to enquire into the mala fides of the 
recipient, or the negligence of the bank. It remains to be seen, however, whether a 
modem South African court seised of such a matter would choose to balance the 
interests of the parties, or to use the more mechanical approach described in the previous 
paragraph. 
(ii) Payee was not aware of the countermand 
It is more likely that a payment will be made in accordance with an already revoked 
instruction to a recipient who is unaware of such revocation. What follows is a slightly 
simplified version of the facts of one such case that arose in Germany. In payment of a 
debt, B handed C a cheque for DM80 000 drawn on bank A.347 Before C cashed the 
cheque, differences arose between himself and B, on account of which B instructed bank 
A in writing to stop the cheque. Later on the same day, A confirmed that the cheque had 
been stopped. C, apparently unaware of the countermand,348 presented the cheque for 
347 
348 
BGHZ 61, 289 (this is a slightly simplified version of the facts). For the facts contained in this 
paragraph, see the report at 289-90. For discussion of this case see, e g, Medicus Burgerliches 
Recht marg note 676; Loewenheim Bereicherungsrecht 39 ff; Koppensteiner and Kramer 
Bereicherung 34. 
This does not appear from the recital of the facts at the beginning of the report, but from the 
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payment at the bank several days afterwards. The cashier overlooked the countermand 
and paid C DM80 000. 
The bank brought an enrichment claim against C for the amount of the cheque. 
The court held that such a direct action would not be allowed, and that the bank would 
have to sue its client (B). The majority of writers agree that in such circumstances the 
bank will only have a claim (a Leistungskondiktion) against its client.349 First of all, the 
bank's payment represents a performance by the drawer (B) to the payee (C) which 
extinguishes the drawer's obligation to the payee.350 The drawer is thus no longer 
obliged vis-a-vis the payee and has therefore been enriched351 by being freed from this 
obligation. (It would be different if C knew of the countermand, as he would then not be 
under the impression that the payment of the cheque constituted a performance of B, 
who had stopped the cheque, and the debt would therefore not be extinguished.) In other 
words, if C has a due and effective claim against B, B will be freed from this obligation 
by the bank's payment and is to this extent enriched. IfC has no such claim, it will 
arguably be a case of Doppelmangel, which will be discussed below. 352 
Secondly, with regard to the LeistungsbegrifJ, the court assumes that the 
existence of a countermand would not change the bank's purpose in honouring the 
cheque; in paying the cheque, the bank intends to perform to its client, and if it honours 
the cheque by mistake in contravention of a valid countermand, its purpose will still be 
performance to its client. The bank's Leistung vis-a-vis B took place without legal 
ground (the original Anweisung, which would have provided a legal ground for the 






Moreover, from a policy perspective, the bank's error in overlooking the 
judgment itself: see, e g, pp 294-5 of the judgment. 
See, e g, Loewenheim Bereicherungsrecht 42; Koppensteiner and Kramer Bereicherung 34. 
Loewenbeim Bereicherungsrecht 41. 
In other words, he 'received something', as required by § 812 BGB. 
See section 3 below. Briefly, either B will have a Leistungskondiktion against C which the bank 
can claim from B (Kondiktion der Kondiktion), or the bank can sue B for the value of the claim. 
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cOWltermand is 'rooted' in the legal relationship between the bank and its client; it has 
nothing to do with the payee. The cOWltermand happened Wlbeknownst to him and he 
presented the cheque in good faith. The bank's error should therefore not affect him 
adversely in exposing him to a possible enrichment action. From his point of view, the 
payment of the cheque appears to be the payment of B, and his reliance on the regularity 
of the payment should be protected.353 
B, on the other hand, deserves less protection, because he did not inform C of the 
cOWltermand.354 As Kondgen points out, the risk that a bank might overlook a 
countermand is a risk that must be borne by the client, and not by the payee.355 
Two of the most discussed356 South African cases dealing with the question of 
cheques in the context of enrichment fall into this category viz Govender v The Standard 
Bank of South Africa Ltcf57 and First National Bank v B & H Engineering. 358 These 
judgments will be considered in detail in order to assess the merits of the different lines 







Loewenheim Bereicherungsrecht 41. 
Loewenheim Bereicherungsrecht 41. 
See Koppensteiner and Kramer Bereicherung at 34. According to Kupisch, if one considers the 
case of an Anweisung in the broad sense from an economic point of view, it does not present any 
problem because the economic value moves from the bank A to the payee C via the drawer of the 
cheque and not directly from A to C. Consequently, by the bank's payment to C, B is freed from 
his obligation to C and is thus enriched. His account at the bank (i e his claim against the bank) 
is credited and so he is simultaneously impoverished by the same amount. In other words, his 
enrichment and impoverishment cancel each other out. The bank, A, is also freed from its 
obligation to B and is thus enriched. A has paid out the equivalent amount of money so is 
impoverished (i e its enrichment and impoverishment cancel eachother out). C receives the 
payment and is correspondingly enriched. At the same time, however, C loses his claim against 
B and is thus impoverished. Again, his enrichment and impoverishment cancel eachother out. 
So nobody is ultimately enriched. See B Kupisch 'Die Bankgarantie auf erstes Anfordern im 
Dickicht des modemen Bereicherungsrechts - zum ungerechtfertigten Vorteil des 
Garantienehmers? - Vom dogmatischen Nutzen einer wirtschaftlichen Betrachtungsweise fUr das 
Dreipersonenverhliltnis' [1999] 48 Zeitschrift/ur Wirtschafis- und Bankrecht 2381. 
See, e g, June D Sinclair and Coenraad Visser 'Law of negotiable instruments' 1984 ASSAL 377 
at 384-5; Cowen (1983) 16 CILSA 1 at 10 and 17-18; Stassen 1985 Modern Business Law 15; C J 
Nagel and M Roestoff 'Verrykingsaanspraak van bankier na betaling van afgelaste tjek' (1993) 
56 THRHR 486 at 494: 'Dit is inderdaad 'n Medusa-agtige probleemaangeleentheid waar die 
oplossing van een probleemaspek maar net 'n volgende kop laat uitsteek.' (,It is indeed a 
Medusa-like problem where the solution of one problematic aspect simply causes yet another 
head to protrude. ') 
Supra. 
Supra and B & H Engineering v First National Bank a/SA Ltd supra. 
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conclusions. 
Govender v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd'59 
The facts which gave rise to Govender v Standard Bank were as follows: 36o Saaiman 
and Govender entered into a contract in terms of which Govender agreed to provide a 
bus and a driver to transport passengers to a funeral. Saaiman was to pay initially and 
the passengers were to reimburse him, at least partially, for the hire of the bus. After 
Saaiman had paid Govender by a cheque drawn on the Standard Bank, one of the 
passengers managed to hire a bus more cheaply elsewhere. He accordingly untruthfully 
told Saaiman that he had cancelled the contract with Govender and that Saaiman should 
stop payment of the cheque. Saaiman, who believed that the contract had indeed been 
cancelled, accordingly countermanded the cheque. He did so by completing and signing 
a form which said '1 shall be pleased if you will kindly stop payment of the 
undermentioned document, on the understanding that I have no claim against the bank in 
the event of such document being inadvertently paid by the bank.'361 On the appointed 
day, Govender's bus and driver awaited the passengers, but they never arrived.362 
Govender was unaware that the cheque had been stopped363 and deposited it in his 
account at Barclays Bank.364 Apparently due to an error of one of its employees, 
Standard Bank paid Govender the relevant amount (via his bank) and debited Saaiman's 
account correspondingly.365 When Saaiman queried this, the bank reversed the debit and 
asked Govender's bank to reverse the payment and the credit to Govender's account. As 
his bank refused to do so, Standard Bank sued Govender for repayment. 366 The bank's 
claim was upheld in the Magistrate's Court367 and Govender took the case on appeal to 
the Cape Provincial Division of the Supreme Court. 
359 Supra. 
360 See the judgment at 393-395J. 
361 See the judgment at 394H-I. 
362 395D. 
363 See 395C-D. 
364 See 395D-E. 
365 See 395E-G. 
366 See 394G-H and 395H-J. 
367 See 393H. 
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The first question considered by Rose-Innes J368 was whether the bank's claim 
was a condictio indebiti or a condictio sine causa.369 The relevance of this question is 
obviously that proof of an excusable error is required for a condictio indebiti but not for 
the other condictiones. 370 The judge was of the opinion that the condictio sine causa 
would be the more appropriate remedy in cases such as these.371 His reasons for 
deciding that the facts of this case did not 'fit comfortably,372 within the parameters of 
the condictio indebiti related mainly to the content and nature of the error requirement. 
Regarding the content of the error, he stated that the plaintiff (the bank) must 
have mistakenly believed that it owed the payment to the recipient (the payee, 
Govender).373 In other words, party A must have paid C in the erroneous belief that he 
and C were linked by an obligation.374 According to the judge, the bank is not liable to 
the payee and the bank knows that it owes nothing to the payee.375 He went on to say 
that if there was any debt to the payee376 - as there was in this case - it was owed by the 
drawer, and not by the bank.377 He added that, while the bank is obliged to honour its 
client's cheques in tenus of its underlying contract with its client, the bank has no such 
obligation vis-a.-vis the payee.378 The judge concluded that, as the bank did not 
mistakenly believe that it owed the payment to Govender, the condictio indebiti could 
not lie.379 In passing, he also rejected the suggestion that 'a bank in paying a cheque is 














Cf the advocates, who both assumed that it was indeed a condictio indebiti (see 396B-C). Their 
arguments thus revolved around the question whether the bank had been negligent or not. 
See the judgment at 396C, 400D-G. The whole question of categorisation of cases according to 
the traditional scheme of remedies is now not as crucial as it once was, in the light of the case of 
McCarthy Retail Ltd v Shortdistance Carriers CC supra. Also see 396D ofthe Govender case 
supra: 'A formalistic approach ... should be avoided where possible.' 
See, e g, 400B-C, 403C, 404A-B. 
398D. 
At 398H. 
In other words, that he had a duty to pay C and that C had a right to claim that payment. 
In other words, there is no obligation A-C. See the judgment at 398D. 
And he pointed out that there may be circumstances in which there is no obligation to pay the 
payee at all (i e where neither the bank nor the drawer is obliged - vis-a-vis the payee - to pay 
the payee) e g where the drawer wants to make a donation to him: see 398H in fin. 
In other words, if anybody had an obligation vis-a-vis C, it would be B (i e B-C). See the 
judgment at 398E. 
In other words, the bank's only obligation is to B (i e A-C). See the judgment at 398G-H. 
At 399C-D. 
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it is discharging the debt' (i e that this is the type of situation considered in Chapter Two 
of this thesis) on the grounds that, more often than not, 'a bank neither knows nor is 
concerned to know nor gives any thought to whether or not there is a debt owing by the 
drawer to the payee of the cheque' .380 
Regarding the nature of the error, the judge considered the requirements that the 
payment be made due to an error of fact and that the error should be neither supina nec 
a./fectata. He held that although the bank had made an error of fact,381 such error did not 
cause the payment of an indebitum because the payment would have been made indebite 
whether or not the cheque had been stopped, as the bank had no debt vis-a.-vis the 
payee.382 He then discussed the question of negligence, as it relates to the rule that a 
party will not be entitled to a condictio indebiti ifhe acted supina aut a./fectata.383 Much 
of what he said in this regard has been superseded by Willis Faber Enthoven (Pty) Ltd v 
Receiver of Revenue and Another384 and need not concern us. What is of interest for our 
purposes, however, is that after outlining certain principles of English law concerning 
payments made due to negligent errors, the judge remarked that they were' not 
inconsistent with the relief which is afforded by a claim for which the condictio sine 
causa is the appropriate remedy. ,385 During the course of his judgment, Rose-Innes J 
repeatedly stated that the appropriate remedy in this case was a condictio sine causa 
specialis. Rather confusingly, however, he kept reverting to arguments concerning the 
condictio indebiti.386 For instance, he held that for the purposes of the condictio sine 








See the judgment at 399A-C. 
399G: the mistake of fact was 'that the cheque was a subsisting order to pay, whereas it had been 
countermanded.' Cfthe judge's earlier comment that' lilt is difficult to understand how the bank 
... laboured under an error offact causing a belief that it was discharging a debt' (at 399D) 
because the bank knew that the cbeque had been stopped prior to payment. The judge was of the 
view that the error lay in the fact that the bank had forgotten or 'overlooked that the cheque had 
been stopped' (at 399F) and that the facts were analogous to those of Kelly v Solari supra. 
See 399J-400B. 
See pp 400-403. 
1992 (4) SA 202 (A). 
At 403C. 
Perhaps because the arguments of counsel had focused on this remedy. See, e g, the discussion 
of the English cases mentioned above, and his remarks at 403J-404A. 
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unreasonable' ,387 but went on to cite with approval the view expressed in Roorda's 
388 h th 1· . th ' f case t at e neg Igence III at case was not 0 so gross a degree as to preclude 
recovery by the bank. ,389 In view of his conclusion, however, these remarks appear to 
be obiter. 
The judge fmally decided the case according to the requirements of the condictio 
sine causa specialis. He held that, with this remedy,390 
money which has come into the hands or possession of another for no 
justifiable cause, that is to say, not by gift, payment discharging a debt, or 
in terms of a promise, or some other obligation or lawful ground for 
passing of the money to the recipient, may be recovered to the extent that 
the recipient has thereby been enriched at the expense of the person whose 
money it was. 391 
He accordingly identified the two main requirements as being that the defendant must 
have been enriched by the payment (taking into account whether he made a counter-
performance which was 'juridically connected' with the payment of the money or 
whether the payment was gratuitous) and that such enrichment be sine causa.392 
Applying these rules to the facts of this case, the judge held that Saairnan had 
owed Govender payment in terms of their contract,393 (that Govender had tendered 
counter-performance),394 and that the bank's payment had discharged this debt.395 There 
was some confusion regarding the question of the bank's performance ofSaaiman's 
obligation. The judge quoted the following passage from Pothier as authority for the 












At 403F-G: 'Our conclusion in the circumstances is the same.' 
Citing the following authorities: Grotius 3.30.18; De Vos Verrykingsaanspreeklikheid 2 ed at 69; 
Trahair v Webb and Co 1924 WLD 227. Regarding the latter case, he said (at 397E) that there 
was 'a close enough analogy between the claim for recovery of money paid by way of a loan 
where the recipient had no authority to borrow and the present claim of the bank for recovery of 
money paid by way of payment of a cheque which the bank had no authority to pay since 
payment was countermanded .... ' 
At 397F. He adds the proviso that the circumstances must be such that the condictio indebiti 






Chapter Two-type situation):396 
It is not essential to the validity of the payment, that it be made by the 
debtor, or any person authorised by him; it may be made by any person 
without such authority, or even in opposition to his orders, provided that 
it is made in his name, and in his discharge, and the property is 
effectively transferred; it is a valid payment, it induces the extinction of 
the obligation, and the debtor is discharged even against his will .... 397 
The judge was then faced with the difficulty that a bank does not intend to 
discharge its client's debt,398 as he himself had pointed out earlier in the judgment. He 
brushed this aside, however, stating that 
[w]here ... a cheque is drawn and given by the drawer by way of 
conditional payment of a debt, then the payment of the cheque by the 
bank upon whom it is drawn without doubt, in our opinion, renders the 
payment by the cheque an absolute and [mal payment which discharges 
the debt of the drawer, even if the bank in honouring the cheque is not 
concerned whether or not that is the effect. 399 
Significantly, he added that from Govender's point of view, the bank's payment was 
payment of Saaiman's debt,400 echoing the German view that the purpose of the 
performing party (Leistungsbestimmung) is determined from the recipient's perspective 
(Emp!dngerhorizont).401 
The court accordingly held that, as the payment had discharged a debt, 
Govender's receipt of the money was 'juridically connected' with his counter-
performance.402 The money had not been acquired sine causa because it had discharged 
an obligation.403 Moreover, said the court, Govender had not been enriched by the 









See the discussion by D H van Zyl 'Unauthorised payment and unjust enrichment in banking 
law' 1998 TSAR 177 at 192-3. 
See the judgment at 4051, quoting from the fonnulation in Commissioner for Inland Revenue v 
Visser 1959 (1) SA 452 (A). 
See 4051-406A. 
406B and also see 405G-H. 
406C-D. 





Finally, the court considered the question whether the bank had been 
impoverished by the payment to Govender. The form that Saaiman had filled in when 
countermanding the cheque indemnified the bank if it inadvertentll05 paid the 
countennanded cheque. In other words, the bank was entitled to debit Saaiman's 
account in the amount of the cheque, even though it paid the cheque in contravention of 
a countermand. The bank was consequently not impoverished by the payment to 
Govender;406 the impoverished party was the drawer of the cheque.407 The court 
accordingly held that the bank could not argue that it was impoverished by the payment 
to Govender, seeing that it elected not to rely upon the indemnity, and reversed the debit 
ofSaaiman's account.408 The court therefore dismissed the appeal. 
The academic reception of this judgment was mixed. Some hailed it as a 
'landmark decision,,409 while others rued its effects and called for legislation to clarify 
matters.410 It was criticised for leaving this area of law in 'a state of grave 
uncertainty' ,411 for ignoring the academic literature on the topic,412 for not weighing up 













Which the judge interpreted as synonymous with 'negligently': see 407G-I. Also see Van Zyl 




Stassen 1985 Modern Business Law 15. 
See Sinclair and Visser 'Law of negotiable instnunents' 1984 ASSAL 377 at 384. CfNagel and 
Roestoff(1993) 56 THRHR 486 who comment at 494 that this call would probably not be heeded 
by the legislature. 
Sinclair and Visser 1984 ASSAL 377 at 384. 
Stassen 1985 Modern Business Law 15 and Sinclair and Visser 1984 ASSAL 377 at 384. At that 
stage, academic opinion was fairly evenly balanced between those for and against giving the 
bank a claim against the payee: Sinclair and Visser 1984 ASSAL 377 at 384; Nagel and Roestoff 
(1993) 56 THRHR 486 at 487. 
Sinclair and Visser 1984 ASSAL 377 at 384, and by implication, Pretorius (1994) 57 THRHR 332 
at 336. 
Sinclair and Visser 1984 ASSAL 377 at 385: the court says no proof of negligence necessary for 
condictio sine causa but judgment 'contains a statement that seems to contradict this proposition 
(at 403C).' CfStassen 1985 Modern Business Law 15, who seemed to ignore this contradiction 
and to regard the judgment as one of the 'welcome clarifications of a hitherto obscure part of the 
law ... .' (at 15). 
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proof.415 
As far as the substance of the judgment went, most of the criticism focused on 
the court's finding that A's payment to C discharged B's obligation to C. For example, 
Sinclair and Visser argued that the debt owed by B to C was not discharged by the 
bank's payment416 because the bank paid in its own name, in the execution of its 
mandate from its client, and not in the client's name.417 The debt B-C was accordingly, 
in their view, 'as irrelevant as the fact that the payee might have been owed money by 
any other person.,418 Secondly, while they agreed that B's payment to C by cheque was 
conditional upon the bank's payment, it would only become final (i e unconditional) 
when the bank paid in terms of its mandate.419 They therefore concluded that the money 
had been paid and received sine causa and the bank should be entitled to recover the 
payment from c.420 (They added the rider, however, that '[t]he bank's right to recover 
... may well have to be qualified in cases where a contractual right exists in the bank's 








Stassen, on the other hand, agreed with the court's view that the bank's payment 
Practical problems in that in order to prove that C was enriched sine causa, the bank would have 
to prove stuffre internal relationship between B and C. Pretorius (1994) 57 THRHR 332 at 334-
5; Sinclair and Visser 1984 ASSAL 377 at 385. 
This was also the view of Van Zyl 1998 TSAR 177, who argued (at 192-3) that the court had 
misinterpreted Pothier's views. Cf Stassen 1985 Modern Business Law 15 at 17. 
See Sinclair and Visser 1984 ASSAL 377 at 387 and the following at 385: 'The drawee bank, it is 
submitted, was not purporting to discharge an indebtedness owed by the drawer to the payee. Its 
(mistaken) purpose was merely to obey its mandate. It paid in its own name, not as the agent of 
the drawer. This being so, the payment did not fall within the rule in Froman v Robertson 1971 
(1) SA 115 (A) that a payment without authority but in the name of the debtor and in his 
discharge induces extinction of the obligation.' CfD J Joubert 'Verhandelbare dokumente: die 
verrykingsaanspraak van die betrokkene bank' (1993) 9 De Jure 76, who argued that the bank is 
the so/yens (at 81) and does not pay as the agent of the drawer (at 82), and therefore that the bank 
must recoup its loss from the payee and may not debit the drawer's account even if the bank's 
purpose in making the payment was to debit the drawer's account and not to pay its own debt. 
The only circumstances in which he felt that the bank sould have a claim against the drawer are 
where the bank's payment resulted in the payee's loss of a claim against the drawer (at 83). 
At 387. Also see 385. 
At 385. Cf Stassen 1985 Modern Business Law 15 at 17, who seems to regard payment as 
becoming final once the bank pays, whether or not it does so in terms of a mandate from its 
client. 
See 385, 387. 
At 387. Also see p 237 below. 
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discharged B's debt to C,422 but argued that this did not result in C's enrichment. He 
pointed out that, if the bank's payment extinguished the liability B-C, C's acquisition of 
the money would be cancelled out by his loss of a contractual right against B.423 In 
Stassen's view, the court was incorrect to take into account Govender's tender of 
counter-performance in detennining whether and to what extent he was enriched. He 
contended that such counter-performance (C-B) was not a detrimental side-effect of the 
bank's payment (A-C), and that it was therefore irrelevant. 424 
While there were also differences of opinion regarding the interpretation of the 
indemnity clause,425 there seems to have been general agreement amongst the 
commentators that if the clause were interpreted as meaning that the drawer would have 
no claim to compel the reverse of the debit, it would enable the bank to avoid the risk of 
loss.426 Sinclair and Visser agreed with the court's finding that the bank 'brought about 
its own loss' by deciding to reverse the debit of the drawer's account notwithstanding 
the existence of the indemnity, and therefore that the bank's enrichment claim against C 
should be affected by its contractual relationship with the drawer.427 They were of the 
view that '[i]n the light of the difficult balance that has to be struck in avoiding over-
readiness to give effect to the bank's prima facie right to recover a payment made under 
a mistake of fact, on the one hand, and an unjust denial of recovery, on the other, the 
court's decision on this particular issue seems fair.' Their view thus seems to be that, as 
a matter of policy, A should be able to sue C, unless B has indemnified A for mistaken 







Because of the conditional agreement between the drawer and the payee: see his article at 17. 
At 17. Also see J C Stassen and A N Oelofse 'Terugvordering van foutiewe wisselbetalings: 
geen verrykingsaanspreeklikheid sonder verryking rue' 1983 Modern Business Law 137 at 140, 
143, and 145-6. 
Stassen 1985 Modern Business Law 15 at 17-18, where he also raised the problems that might 
arise where the actual value of the counter-performance was at issue. Stassen agrees with De 
Vos that one must imagine that the enriching-event had not occurred, and whichever losses 
would also not have occurred, may be regarded as 'detrimental side-effects', which may be 
subtracted from the amount of the enrichment. Here, he says that Govender would still have 
tendered counter-performance even if the bank's payment had not occurred, so the counter-
performance cannot be regarded as a side-effect of the bank's payment. (It was a consequence of 
Saaiman's banding over the cheque). Cf Joubert (1993) 9 De Jure 76 at 83. 
Sinclair and Visser 1984 ASSAL 377 at 386 cf Stassen 1985 Modern Business Law 15 at 19-20. 
See, e g, Sinclair and Visser 1984 ASSAL 377 at 386; Van Zyl 1998 TSAR 177 at 192. 
At 386. 
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balance between the competing interests of the bank and the recipient of the payment'428 
seems strange. This approach seems to me to tip the balance too much in favour of the 
bank (which would in principle always be entitled to an action to recover the loss caused 
by its own mistake) and to put the payee at an unfair disadvantage (as his legal position 
would be dependent upon a clause that mayor may not have been included in a contract 
between the drawer and his bank).429 
First National Bank of South Africa vB & H Engineerinl30 
The opportunity arose for the courts to consider some of these views less than ten years 
later, in the case of First National Bank of SA Ltd vB & H Engineering.431 The legal 
dispute concerned a payment by cheque in terms of a contract between Sapco and B & H 
Engineering. According to the contract, Sapco owed B & H payment for goods 
manufactured and delivered by B & H. In settlement of this debt, Sapco gave B & H a 
cheque for R 16 048 (dated 2 December 1988), drawn on its account with First National 
Bank. B & H accepted the cheque in payment of the debt.432 On the same day (2 
December), acting bonafide, B & H deposited the cheque in its account at Standard 
Bank. Later on the same day, Standard Bank requested special clearance from First 
National Bank and sent the cheque to the automated clearing bureau, which 
subsequently forwarded the cheque to First National Bank. Neither B & H433 nor 
Standard Bank was aware that the cheque had already been countermanded by Sapco 434 









In other words, if the payee were sued by the bank, his best defence would be to show that the 
drawer had indemnified his bank against such mistaken payments, and that the bank's action 
should therefore fail. In Govender's case supra, the payee was fortunate in that the indemnity 
was stated on the fonn that contained the countermand, so the bank presented it in evidence. If, 
however, the indemnity were contained in the general underlying banker-client contract, the 
payee would be hard pressed to provide evidence thereof. In such a case, practically speaking, 
the bank's action against the payee would not be subject to the limitation suggested by Sinclair 
and Visser 1984 ASSAL 377. Cf also the view expressed by Nagel and Roestoff that such 
indemnifications may no longer be possible: see Nagel and Roestoff (1993) 56 THRHR 486 and 
Pretorius (1995) 58 THRHR 733 at 736-7. 
1993 (2) SA 41 (T). 
Supra and see B & H Engineering v First National Bank o/SA Ltd supra. 
See the judgment of the Appeal Court at 284C-D. 
See the judgment of the Appeal Court at 284E. 
The trial judge found that notice of the countermand had reached First National Bank prior to 
presentment of the cheque: see the TPD judgment at 42D-E. 
232 
the relevant employees of First National Bank, the cheque was honoured despite the 
countermand.435 In honouring the cheque, First National Bank 'acted bonafide but 
negligently.,436 On 6 December, B & H was informed that the cheque had been paid on 
2 December. 
First National Bank sued B & H Engineering in the Transvaal Provincial 
Division of the Supreme Court on the basis of unjustified enrichment. Referring to 
Natal Bank v Roorda437 and Govender v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd,438 as well as 
various academic writings,439 the court a quo (per Preiss J), agreed that the appropriate 
enrichment action in such a case would be the condictio sine causa.440 It seems from the 
judgment, however, that the judge regards the condictio sine causa as being synonymous 
with a general enrichment action, as he only asks whether B & H was enriched and 
whether such enrichment was unjustified.441 
The judgment focuses on the first question viz whether B & H was enriched,442 
and more particularly on the relevance of the fact that, as in Govender's case, the payee 
(B & H) had a valid claim against the drawer (Sapco). B & H argued that it had not 
been enriched by the payment, which had merely extinguished Sapco's obligation to pay 










For the facts stated in this paragraph, see 42E-43J of the TPD judgment and 284D-F of that of the 
AD. 
284E-F of the AD decision. 
Supra. 
Supra. 
Sinclair and Visser 1984 ASSAL 377 at 384-5; F R Malan 'The rule in Price v Neal' (1978) II 
CILSA at 276; Cowen (1983) 16 CILSA I at 10 and 17-18; Stassen 1985 Modern Business Law 
15. 
441 of the TPD judgment. This aspect of the judgment was approved of by writers such as Nagel 
and Roestoff (J 993) 56 THRHR 486 at 488. 
The judge, in citing the terms of the stated case, says (at 44B-D) that the relevant 'questions are: 
(a) Whether the defendant was unjustifiably enriched and (b) Whether the payment to the 
defendant was sine causa.' These questions are, with respect, badly stated. If the answer to the 
first question is that the defendant was unjustifiably enriched, then there is no need to ask the 
second question; 'unjustifiable' means 'sine causa'. The first question thus conflates two 
separate enquiries (viz: (a) was the defendant enriched? (b) is this enrichment unjustified/sine 
causa?) and renders the second question redundant. This may seem pedantic, but stating the 
questions clearly and unambiguously helps one arrive at clear and unambiguous answers. 
It seems just to be assumed (and not expressly stated) that, ifB & H was enriched, it was at the 
expense of First National Bank. 
44A of the TPD judgment. 
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case for holding that the payee had not been enriched in such circumstances because he 
had tendered a counter-performance which had a juridically relevant connection with the 
enrichment.444 'He argued that the cambial relationship between the parties to the 
cheque is too far removed from the contractual relationship in respect of which the 
cheque was furnished. ,445 The judge implies that this argument is supported by Sinclair 
and Visser,446 and cites their view (with reference to Govender's case) that the bank's 
purpose in making the payment was not to discharge the drawer's debt to the payee, but 
to 'obey its mandate'. In other words, as mentioned above,447 Sinclair and Visser's 
argument is that in such cases the bank's intention is to fulfil its own obligation to its 
client and not to fulfil its client's obligation to the payee.448 They state that the bank (in 
Govender's case) 'paid in its own name and not as the agent ofthe drawer. This being 
so, the payment did not fall within the rule in Froman v Robertson 1971 (1) SA 115 (A) 
that a payment without authority but in the name of the debtor and in his discharge 
induces extinction of the obligation. ,449 
The judge goes on to consider the judgment of Goff J (as he then was) in the 
English case of Barclays Bank Ltd v W J Simms Son & Cooke (Southern) Ltd and 
Another450 in which, according to Preiss J, the facts were essentially the same.451 In that 
case, the bank was entitled to recover its payment (from the recipient) as it had been 
made under a mistake of fact. Preiss J attaches particular importance452 to the following 
statement taken from the judgment of Goff J: a claim to money paid under a mistake of 










See the judgment at 45C. 
See the judgment at 45D. 
He says that '[i]n this regard counsel fInds himself in good company.' See the judgment at 45D-
E. 
At p 229. 
Also see Stassen 1985 Modern Business Law 15 at 16 and D P Visser 'Unjustified enrichment' 
1993 ASSAL 229 at 232. 
See Sinclair and Visser 1984 ASSAL 377 at 385 and the judgment of Preiss J at 45G-H. 
[1979] 3 All ER 522 (QB). 
See the judgment of Preiss J at 45H-1. Also see Van Zyl1998 TSAR 177 at 186 tHor a concise 
summary of the facts and a consideration of the court's findings. 
Cfthe comments of Preiss J at 45J-46A: '1 have been careful not to pay unde regard to this 
decision of the English Court in a situation where the condictio sine causa, foreign to English 
law, has to be considered. Nevertheless, the judgment contains a valuable indication in my view 
as to the precise legal nature of an inadvertent payment by a bank despite the stop instruction.' 
See Nagel and Roestoff (1993) 56 THRHR 486 at 490. 
the payment is made for good consideration, in particular if the money is 
paid to discharge and does discharge a debt owed to the payee (or a 
principal on whose behalf he is authorised to receive the payment) by the 
payer or by a third party by whom he is authorised to discharge the 
debt.453 
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In other words, A cannot reclaim a mistaken payment to C if such payment discharges a 
debt A-C, or a debt B-C where there is a valid authorisation B-A. Preiss J, however, 
goes slightly futher and interprets the statement as meaning that' [p ]ayment will defeat a 
bank's claim where it has been made under authority to discharge the debt or in the 
name of the debtor' (myemphasis).454 This implies that there are two instances where a 
payment (or other performance) made by the payee would block a claim for restitution 
of the payment to the payee (i e where the payment to the payee would not be regarded 
as having enriched him): (a) where the payment to the payee had been made by a third 
party in the name of the debtor, and (b) where the payment to the payee had been made 
by a third party who had been authorised to make this payment by the debtor. This is 
just another way of stating the circumstances in which the 'performance' of a third party 
will extinguish the debt of another: category (a) corresponds to the situations dealt in 
Chapter Two of this thesis (sometimes called the Pothier rule, or the rule in Froman v 
Robertson)455, and category (b) to the Anweisung situation or one where the third party 
acted as B' s agent. 
He then goes on to state that Goff J does not regard a bank's payment in 
contravention of a countermand as a 'payment in the name of the debtor' .456 (In other 
words, it is not a Chapter Two-type situation.) Immediately following this statement,457 







since the drawer had in fact countermanded payment the bank was acting 
without mandate and so the payment was not effective to discharge the 
drawer's obligation on the cheque. From this it follows that the payee 
See Barclays Bank Ltd v W J Simms Son & Cooke (Southern) Ltd and Another supra at 535E-G 
and the judgment of Preiss J at 46C. 
See his judgment at 46D. 
Supra. 
At 46E. 
At 46E-F of his judgment. 
gave no consideration for the payment and the claim cannot be defeated 
on that ground.458 
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Here, Goff J is clearly referring to the second category mentioned above (i e where a 
third party is authorised to pay the debt of another). In other words, what Goff J is 
saying is that the payment (A-C) did not discharge the debt B-C because it was neither 
authorised by the drawer (B)459 nor did it fall within the scope of the rules allowing a 
third party to perfonn in tenns of the obligation of another. 460 It is not clear whether 
Preiss J cites the passage from Goff J' s judgment as support for his statement that a 
bank's payment is not 'payment in the name of the debtor' (i e conflating the two 
categories) or whether he (correctly) cites it in contrast, as the passage is cited without 
comment.461 
Also without comment, Preiss J then462 quotes a passage from Malan's Bills of 
Exchange, Cheques and Promissory Notes in South African Law,463 in which the author 
sets out the English law in much the same tenns as Goff J but adds that 
[h ]owever, it is suggested that in our law the drawee bank should be 
entitled to recover the amount of a forged, unauthorised or 
countennanded cheque from the payee only if both the payment and the 
acquisition of the instrument and receipt of its proceeds by the payee 
were without legal ground.464 
Preiss J goes on to quote Cowen's opinions465 of the Barclays Bank case at 










At 542e-g of the judgment of Goff 1. 
In other words, A did not act as B's agent or mandatary. 
In other words, A did not discharge B's debt to C in terms of the English equivalent of the rule 
discussed in Chapter Two at p 65 ff above. 
Cf Nagel and Roestoff (1993) 56 THRHR 486 at 491, where they state that the judge cited this 
passage with 'klaarblyklike goedkeuring'. 
At 46G-I of his judgment. 
The 1983 edition at 282. 
Cf the aside in Nagel and Roestoff (1993) 56 THRHR 486 at 491, where the authors point out that 
the judge apparently did not realise that Malan and De Beer thus proposed a 'double causa-
requirement', and that this had been called into question by, inter alia, Stassen and Oelofse 1983 
Modern Business Law 137 at 140. 
Expressed in his article in (1983) 16 elLSA 1 at 23-24 and 37. 
From 461 to 471. 
236 
cheque it pays as the customer's agent' (Cowen's emphasis).467 If one accepts this, it 
follows that if the bank had been properly authorised by its customer, its payment would 
be payment as agent and hence extinguish its customer's debt and, if it had not been so 
authorised, the bank would not be acting as its customer's agent, its payment would not 
extinguish its customer's debt, and the bank would be entitled to restitution. In Cowen's 
opinion, however, the bank neither acts as its client's agent,468 nor intends to discharge 
its client's debt (according to the rules adopted by our courts in Froman v Robertson).469 
He agrees with Stassen that a conditional payment (B-C) by cheque discharges the 
customer's debt to the payee when the condition is satisfied by the bank's payment (A-
C), not because the bank acts as the customer's agent, but because the customer and his 
creditor enter into an agreement in terms of which payment is subject to the condition 
that the 'order in the cheque will be obeyed by the bank. Accordingly, when the bank 
pays the cheque, in compliance with its duty to its customer, the condition is satisfied 
and the debt is discharged.' He goes on to argue that where 'no valid order to pay exists 
(e g where the "cheque" is a forgery), there can be no fulfilment of the "condition" upon 
which the "cheque" was taken. In the result, the debt owed by the customer to the payee 
remains undischarged, and the receipt of the money by the payee is sine causa. ,470 
In other words, where a bank (A) gives money to a payee (C) in terms of a 
validly drawn cheque, Cowen does not regard the 'payment' by the bank to the payee as 
the payment of the drawer (B) by virtue of a relationship of agency between the drawer 
and the bank (B-A). He also does not consider the case as one where the bank (as a 
third party) pays the debt of another (i e as in the situations dealt with in Chapter Two). 
He rather focuses on the instrument itself; when B hands the cheque to C, B and C 
impliedly agree that this payment is conditional upon the bank's honouring the cheque. 





Cowen (1983) 16 CILSA 1 at 23. See the judgment of Preiss J at 47A. 
Cowen (1983) 16 ClLSA 1 at 23: 'I cannot agree that a bank, when paying its customer's 
cheques acts as its customer's agent when paying a duly drawn cheque. The ba~ although it 
acts pursuant to the order ("mandate" in one sense of that ambiguous and misleading term) 
contained in a cheque, pays or "honours" the cheque as a principal.' See Preiss 1's judgment at 
47C. 
Supra. See Cowen (1983) 16 ClLSA 1 at 24 and Preiss J's judgment at 47D. 
Cowen loc cit. 
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and B's debt to C is discharged. If the bank does not honour the cheque, however, the 
condition fails and the cheque will not extinguish the debtor's obligation. 
If, on the other hand, the bank mistakenly gives money to the payee in 
circumstances where there is no valid cheque, Cowen is of the view that the condition 
implied in B's handing the (invalid) 'instrument' to C471 cannot be fulfilled, B's 
payment to C cannot become [mal, and B' s debt to C will not be discharged. In such 
circumstances, C will still have a claim against B, C will therefore be enriched by the 
bank's 'payment', this enrichment will be sine causa, and the bank will be entitled to its 
recovery (whether or not it acted negligently). 
Preiss J regards Cowen's analysis as 'incontrovertible,472 and accepts that the 
bank's payment on the 'countennanded cheque was not payment effected in its capacity 
as the drawer's agent'473 and that the bank's payment also did not operate to discharge 
Sapco's debt to B & H in tenns of the Froman v Robertson rule.474 He then rather 
inconsequentially refers to the bilateral nature of payment in our law, without 
comrnent.475 Finally, he refers to Sinclair's view that the correct reason why the bank in 
Govender's case should not have succeeded in its claim was that it had chosen not to 
exercise its indemnification against inadvertent payment.476 He distinguishes this from 







The judge concludes that 'the perfonnance rendered by the defendant was [not] 
In other words, the condition that 'the order in the cheque will be obeyed by the bank': Cowen 
(1983) 16 elLSA 1 at 24. 
At 47J. 
At 47J. Again this is ambiguous: is he implying that the bank was the drawer's agent but that 
payment in contravention of a countermand fell outside that authority, or is he excluding the 
agency-analysis altogether? It seems that he is doing the latter, but the wording is unclear. See 
Nagel and Roestoff(1993) 56 THRRR 486 at 492: 'Such bank is a solvens in its own right and 
does not act as the agent of its client (the drawer). The payment of the bank is therefore sine 
causa.' (My translation). 
At 48A-C. 
At 48C-D. 
Confusingly, the judge says (at 48D-E) 'the bank should fail because it had received an 
indemnification from the drawer which he chose not to exercise.' (My emphasis). 
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juridically connected with its receipt of the money,477 and declines to follow the 
judgment in Cavender's case. Although he does not say so explicitly, he apparently 
concludes that the debt had not been discharged.478 He accordingly holds that the 
requirements of the candictia sine causa had been met.479 In other words, the bank's 
claim against the payee succeeded. In German terms, the court granted a 
Durchgriffskondiktian (A-C).48o 
This case also evoked a mixed response from academics. On the one hand, it 
was welcomed in view of the paucity of case law in this area, 481 and even lauded as 
constitutirlg 'a huge stride forward,482 and 'a refreshingly new insight into a hitherto 
somewhat nebulous sphere oflaw'. 483 On the other hand, it was criticised for 
compounding the uncertainty regarding a legal question that is of enormous practical 
significance both for commercial banks and also the broader public,484 by followirlg an 
approach that was 'diametrically opposed' to that of the Cape court in Cavender's case 










At 48E-F. In other words, he goes even further than the plaintiff's lawyer, who argued that the 
relationships were too far removed from one another (at 45D); the judge suggests that there is no 
connection at all. See Nagel and Roestoff (1993) 56 THRHR 486 at 492: 'Any perfonnance by 
the payee as a consequence of the underlying relationship is not juridically relevant to the receipt 
of the payment by the bank - it can therefore not be seen as a detrimental side-effect of any 
possible enrichment at the expense of the bank which can be brought into the equation against his 
"enrichment".' (My translation.) 
Nagel and Roestoff (1993) 56 THRHR 486 at 492: 'the payment by the bank has no influence on 
the underlying relationship between the drawer and the payee, in other words neither the drawer's 
duty to perfonn nor the payee's claim is extinguished.' (My translation). 
At 48F-G. 
And C would have to seek recourse (in terms of the law of contract) against B: see Nagel and 
Roestoff (1993) 56 THRHR 486 at 492: 'The logical consequence of the above is that the payee, 
who must compensate the bank, will usually have to proceed against the drawer for payment on 
the merits in tenns of the underlying relationship.' (My translation.) Regarding the meaning of 
'Durchgriffskondiktion', see note 308 above. 
See, e g, Nagel and Roestoff(1993) 56 THRHR 486 at 487; Visser 1993 ASSAL 229. 
VanZyl1998 TSAR 177 at 193. 
Van Zyl1998 TSAR 177 at 194. 
On the cornrnercial importance of the issue, see for example, Visser 1993 ASSAL 229; Nagel and 
Roestoff (1993) 56 THRHR 486 at 487; Sinclair and Visser 1984 ASSAL 377 at 384. 
Nagel and Roestoff(1993) 56 THRHR 486 at 487; Pretorius (1994) 57 THRHR 332 at 333; idem 
(1995) 58 THRHR 733 at 734. Cf Visser 1993 ASSAL 229, who was of the view that the case 
confirmed the Govender approach because '[a]lthough the court did not allow the action in 
Govender's case, it clearly would have done so if it had found that, on the facts, the defendant 
had been enriched and the plaintiff impoverished.' Also see Nagel and Roestoff op cit at 493 
where they argue (by applying the rules to a hypothetical case) that although the approaches of 
the Transvaal and Cape courts follow different routes, they arrive at the same practical 
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there was a call for the courts to take policy considerations into account.486 
The case also revived the debate as to which enrichment action would be more 
appropriate in these circumstances. For example, while D P Visser approved of the 
judgment in general (and agreed that the bank should sue the payee),487 he suggested, on 
policy grounds, that it would be preferable for the bank to sue the payee with the 
condictio indebiti rather than the condictio sine causa.488 In his view, the effect of 
allowing banks to use the condictio sine causa in such cases is to treat banks differently 
from other plaintiffs who have made mistaken payments (who would normally have to 
use a condictio indebiti): whereas banks can reclaim payments made due to 
unreasonable mistakes, other plaintiffs would be barred from reclaiming such 
payments.489 
He also expressed the opinion that the argument 'that the condictio indebiti is not 
applicable in this situation because the bank knows that it is not a debtor of the payee 
and therefore does not mistakenly believe that it owes a debt to the payee, distorts the 
elements of the condictio indebiti. ,490 His argument ran as follows: the original 
rationale for the condictio indebiti was that there was no causa for the retention of a 
performance if there was a failure of the purpose of that performance, and he suggested 
that an example of such a purpose would be the payment of a debt.491 The South 







destination (viz the bank is afforded relief and the other two parties are left to deal with problems 
arising from their underlying contract between themselves) except in cases where another party is 
involved eg where the payee negotiated the cheque to someone who bonafide gave value for the 
cheque and satisfied all the requirements for reelmatige houerskap (was a holder in due course?). 
See, e g, Pretorius (1994) 57 THRHR 332 at 336: 'Ultimately and apart from anything else, in 
determining whether the recipient's peformance was juridically connected with its receipt of the 
bank's money, the court may have to take policy considerations into account. The fact that a 
contract existed between the recipient and drawer of the cheque does not automatically mean that 
this is juridically relevant as far as the bank's enrichment claim against the recipient is concerned. 
The question is: what policy considerations may sway a court to prefer one of these conflicting 
decisions above the other?' Unfortunately, he does not answer this question. 
See Visser 1993 ASSAL 229 at 235: 'the judgment of Preiss J is, in my view, correct.' 
See Visser 1993 ASSAL 229 at 230-33. Also see Pretorius (1995) 58 THRHR 733 at 734-36. 
Visser 1993 ASSAL 229 at 233. 
Visser 1993 ASSAL 229 at 233. 
In other words, if such debt exists, the purpose is fulfilled and no condictio will be available; on 
the other hand, if such debt did not exist, the purpose would be frustrated and there would be no 
causa retinendi: see Visser 1993 ASSAL 229 at 230-1. 
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necessarily a performance to the payee. ,492 Following the lead of German law, he 
pointed out that the bank's purpose in paying C is to fulfil the terms of the banker-client 
contract and its 'performance' is thus directed towards B, not C.493 'In a regular 
situation the bank, by paying a cheque drawn on it, achieves the purpose of this 
performance and therefore cannot claim with the condictio indebiti. ,494 In an irregular 
situation, on the other hand, the purpose of the bank's performance to the customer is 
frustrated and the bank can therefore bring a condictio indebiti against the payee.495 He 
finally concluded, however, that 'even though an argument can be made out for the 
condictio indebiti as the appropriate vehicle for the bank's claim in certain 
circumstances, it is clear that the application of the condictio sine causa is not so 
inappropriate that it must be rejected out of hand. ,496 
Finally, there was disagreement amongst the commentators as to the correctness 
of the court's fmding that the bank's payment had failed to discharge the debt owed by 
Sapco to B & H. D P Visser, while he took issue with the court's defmition of 
'payment' ,497 approved of its conclusion that the debt had not been extinguished.498 In 
his view, 
in order for the payment of a cheque to have the effect of discharging a 
debt, there must be a continuing intention to pay the debt. If the drawer's 
intention to pay the debt falls away (as manifested by the countermand), 
there is no intention to pay the debt on anyone's part, because the bank 
never has the intention to pay a debt when honouring a cheque.499 
What the author seems to mean by 'continuing intention' is that there must be an 
intention to discharge the obligation at the moment when the bank pays C. Therefore, as 
neither the bank nor the drawer intended to discharge B's obligation at the time when the 










Visser 1993 ASSAL 229 at 23 1. 




Visser 1993 ASSAL 229 at 234-5. 
See Visser 1993 ASSAL 229 at 234 and 235. 
Visser 1993 ASSAL 229 at 234. For support of this point of view, see Van Zyl 1998 TSAR 177. 
Although the drawer originally intended to discharge his debt to the payee by means of a cheque, 
he changed his mind when he countermanded the cheque. 
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Coenraad Visser, on the other hand, regarded the court's decision that the debt 
(B-C) had not been discharged as incorrect because 
the effect of the bank's payment on the underlying obligation [i e B' s 
obligation to C] is determined exclusively by agreement between the 
drawer and the payee. Where the agreement provides that the obligation 
be discharged by payment by cheque, the countermand is irrelevant: 
where the cheque is paid on presentment, the obligation is discharged. 
Accordingly, the bank's claim in B & H Engineering should have failed 
on the basis that the recipient of payment had not been enriched by the 
bank's payment of the cheque - payment by the bank simultaneously 
brings the amount of the cheque into the recipient's estate and 
extinguishes his contractual claim against the drawer, so that the end 
result is that his estate is no better off after payment has taken place than 
it was before. 501 
The main difficulty that I have with some of the views expressed above is that, 
with respect, they look at the problem too narrowly.s02 It is like trying to make sense of 
one or two unconnected (and particularly cryptic) pieces of a jigsaw puzzle when what 
one should really do is collect together all the pieces, sort them into categories, work out 
how they relate to each other, connect them up, and only then look at the big picture. It 
might be useful, therefore, before considering how the Appellate Division approached 
the matter, to restate the relevant rules in simple terms. 
The first thing to bear in mind that these rules are drawn from various areas of 
law: contract, property, negotiable instruments and unjustified enrichment. Secondly, 
while no one relationship should be seen in isolation, it helps to sort the relevant rules 
into those applicable to relationships between A and C, A and B, and Band C, before 
looking at the broader context to see how they all fit together. 
501 
502 
Coenraad Visser 'Payment systems and unjustified enrichment: a survey of recent developments' 
1993 Annual Banking Law Update 109 at 122. Cf Van Zyl 1998 TSAR 177 at 194n 1 05: 'This is 
clearly erroneous since it takes no account of the relationship between the bank and customer and 
the legal effect of countermanding a cheque.' 
Cowen and Coenraad Visser, for example, focus mainly on the relationship between the drawer 
and the payee. D P Visser seems to emphasise the intention in the 'relationship' between the 
drawee and the payee. Cf Cowen, on the other hand, who considers all the relationships in the 
context of the others. 
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The relationship A-C: When A gives money to C by honouring B's cheque, 
ownership of that money will either be transferred to C by commixtio (e g if C cashed 
the cheque at a branch of A) or by a book entry (e g if C deposited the cheque in an 
account held at a collecting bank).503 The money therefore goes directly from A to C (or 
his agent). This transfer will take place whether or not the cheque has been 
countermanded. 
A and C are not linked by any contract or by any other obligation. A accordingly 
owes nothing to C, and C has no right to claim anything from A. The crucial question is 
what effect the transfer A-C has on the other two relationships. 
The relationship A-B: A and B are linked by a contract, in this case a banker-client 
contract. IfB instructs A to pay a cheque, A 'performs' to B by doing so (and A's 
intention is accordingly directed towards B, regardless who actually receives the 
money). In exchange, B pays A the relevant bank charge for honouring a cheque and A 
is authorised to debit B's account for the amount of the cheque. 
The banker-client contract does not allow A to give money to a third party in B's 
name without B's authorisation, and, in general, it does not allow A to debit B's account 
in the amount of any payments not validly authorised. Therefore, if B makes out a 
cheque in C's favour and then withdraws the instruction by countermanding the cheque, 
the bank has no authorisation to give money to C (or anyone else) in B's name, nor to 
debit B's account (unless there is a specific contractual provision to this effect, as there 
was in Govender's case). 
If the bank pays C despite B's countermand, the bank's performance cannot be 
regarded as having taken place in terms of the underlying contract with B, and such 
performance would accordingly be unowed vis-a-vis B. 
The relationship B-C: In the situation presently being considered, B and C are linked 
503 See First National Bank o/Southern Africa Ltdv Perry NO and Others supra at 967H-J. 
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by reciprocal obligations, e g those arising from a contract. C504 performs to B in terms 
ofthis contract (by providing transport in Govender's case505 and by delivering materials 
in the case of B & H Engineering). 506 Such performance discharges C's obligation to B. 
In exchange, B is to perform to C by paying for the transport or the materials. It 
is clear that this performance could be made by B himself, by someone else whom he 
has appointed to make the payment on his behalf, or by someone else acting without 
authorisation. In other words, the first three ways in which B's obligation to C will be 
extinguished are: 
a. B himself pays C (e g where B gives C the relevant amount in cash). In other 
words, B performs to C in terms of the obligation B-C. 
b. B appoints an agent to make the payment on his behalf (e g where B asks his 
brother A to give C the relevant amount in cash). In such circumstances, A's 
handing the money to C would legally be regarded as B's 'performance' to C in 
terms of the obligation B-C. 
c. The obligation B-C would also be extinguished if a third party (X) pays the 
relevant amount to C in the circumstances outlined in Chapter Two above (i e 
where X intends to extinguish B's obligation to C, without any authorisation by 
B, and it is not a case of persona delectae.) Here, A's handing the money to C 
does not legally constitute B's performance to C, but is a performance by A 
which nevertheless has the effect of extinguishing B's obligation to C. This has 
sometimes been called the 'Pothier rule' or the 'rule in Froman v Robertson. 
The fust two cases are legally regarded as performance by B himself, while (c) is 
regarded as performance by a third party. 
Clearly, B's obligation to C will also be extinguished ifB pays C by cheque, C 
agrees to accept a cheque instead of cash, and B's bank (A) honours the cheque (i e A 




Or his agent, or mandatary, or some other authorised person, provided that personal performance 




The first question is whether this falls into one of the three categories just 
outlined, or whether it occupies a further category. 
Firstly, when a bank pays a cheque, it does not pay as a third party. To 
extinguish B's obligation to C on this ground, A would have to intend to settle B's 
debt.507 As pointed out by the judge in Govender's case and by Sinclair and Visser, the 
bank does not intend to settle B' s debt (and it might not even know whether B has a debt 
at all). Payment by cheque therefore does not fall into category (c). 
As pointed out in the introduction to this chapter, B also does not appoint the 
bank to pay as his agent: 'The bank, although it acts pursuant to the order ("mandate" in 
one sense of that ambiguous and misleading term) contained in a cheque, pays or 
"honours" the cheque as a principal.' 508 It does not pay C as B's representative. 
In this situation, although B hands C a cheque in payment (and intends thereby to 
pay C), this cannot - at least at that moment - be regarded as the equivalent to payment 
by cash509 because it does not constitute fmal performance by B to C, as C does not 
immediately receive the money.510 Payment by cheque is thus conditional upon the 
payee's receiving the money from B's bank.5Il If the cheque is honoured, the condition 
is fulfilled, and B's debt to C is discharged. In other words, a legal fiction comes into 
play: if the cheque is honoured, it is as ifB performed to C (i e it is as ifthe cheque was 
cash). If, on the other hand, the cheque is not honoured (i e A does not give any money 
to C), the debt is not discharged, and C may sue B for breach of contract, or C may sue 
B on the cheque itself, as it is a liquid document. In other words, the fiction does not 






Cf Chapter Two above. 
Cowen (1983) 16 CILSA 1 at 23. 
Does the cheque nevertheless represent an asset in the hands of the payee? It does not usually 
confer on the payee any claim against the bank, as the bank is under no legal obligation to the 
payee to honour the cheque. It could be said to be an asset, however, in that it is a liquid 
document that entitles the payee to sue the drawer if it is not honoured. 
And may never receive the money. 
Cf the discussion, at p 37 in Chapter One, of the German notion of a Leistung erfollungshalber. 
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the bank honours the cheque, payment by cheque is conditional, and thus does not seem 
to fall into category (a). If is later honoured, it becomes unconditional, and then, at least 
fictionally, it would retrospectively fall into category (a). 
Alternatively, one can argue that a bank's paying a cheque does not fall into any 
of these categories, but that there is another category of cases in which a third party's act 
can extinguish B's obligation to C. As suggested in the first part of this chapter, there 
should be a fourth category (d), namely that B's debt to C can be extinguished ifB 
unilaterally 'delegates' the perfonnance he owes to C to a third party A (who may in 
turns owe a perfonnance to B), without necessarily appointing that person as his 
agent. 512 In other words, B can authorise A to make his (B's) perfonnance to C. If the 
relationships between A and B, on the one hand, and B and C, on the other, are valid,513 
the bank's handing over of the money to C would simultaneously constitute two 
perfonnances: 514 the perfonnance of A's duty to B, and the perfonnance ofB's duty to 
C (and it would accordingly discharge these two duties). The causae for these 
perfonnances are accordingly the contracts between A and B, and B and C.515 This last 
statement has several implications. 
First of all, where A hands money to C in accordance with B' s instruction and all 
the underlying contractual relationships are valid, A's handing the money to C cannot be 
seen as having been unowed, even though A has no obligation vis-a-vis C. A owed the 
perfonnance, not to C, but to B. The money was owed to C, not by A, but by B. 
Secondly, each of the perfonnances and its counter-perfonnances, if any, must 
be seen in the context of the contractual relationship that constitutes the causa for such 





See Honore 1958 Acta Juridica 135 at 138, where he suggests that, in Roman law, one could 
perform by appointing a delegate. 
In other words, B validly owes payment to C, A and B have a valid banker-client contract, and B 
has validly instructed A to perform to C 
See the discussion of 'performance' in Chapter One at p 31 ff above. 
The reason for the deflection of A's performance (i e so that the money is handed to C rather than 
B) is B's instruction (in the fonn ofa cheque) to his debtor to give the money to his creditor. I 
think that such reason cannot, on its own, constitute a causa, as it would be meaningless were 
there not to be an underlying contract between the parties. 
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(in terms of a contract of sale), the handing over of the cheque by B and delivery of the 
goods by C must be seen as performance and counter-performance. C's delivery cannot 
be seen as the counter-performance to a third party (A) (even though the money was 
received from A). 
To use a slightly ridiculous analogy, imagine that Craig makes lamps and sells 
them at a craft market. Bill admires the lamps and says that he would like a black one. 
Craig does not have a black one at his stall but says that he has some at home. The 
rather foolhardy Bi1l agrees to buy one and sends Craig Rl 000 cash by courier, Alan. 
Upon receipt of the money, Craig delivers a black lamp to Bill's house. Craig's delivery 
of the lamp must be seen as the counter-performance to Bill's payment of the money and 
it cannot be seen as counter-performance vis-a-vis Alan, who actually handed the money 
to him. 
Another hypothetical example illustrates the same point: Belinda lends R2 500 
to her sister, Anne, to be repaid on 30 August. In the last week of August, Belinda has 
wall-to-wall carpets installed by Comfy Carpets Cc. In terms of their contract, Belinda 
agrees to pay R2 500 to Comfy Carpets by 30 August. On 30 August, Belinda tells 
Anne not to give her the money directly, but rather to hand it to Comfy Carpets. When 
Anne hands over the money, she must be seen as performing her obligation under the 
loan (i e the loan of the money and the repayment thereof are performance and counter-
performance). It is as if Belinda has said to her 'you can discharge your obligation to 
me by giving the money to Comfy Carpets'. Similarly Belinda's successful redirection 
of the money to Comfy Carpets must be seen as performance of her obligation in terms 
of their contract (i e the installation of the carpets and payment of R2 500 are 
performance and counter-performance). Anne's handing over the money, and Comfy 
Carpets installation of the carpets cannot be seen as performance and corresponding 
counter-performance. 
Against this background, what happens when B hands C a cheque, countermands 
it, C presents it and the bank gives the relevant amount to C? In other words, when a 
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bank pays in contravention of a countermand (i e without authorisation), does such 
payment discharge B's obligation to C? Does such a payment discharge B's obligation 
on one of the grounds mentioned above, does it discharge B's obligation to C on some 
other ground, or does it fail to discharge B's obligation to C? In Covender's case, it was 
held to discharge the obligation B-C, whereas the opposite was held by the Transvaal 
court in B & H Engineering. 
Clearly, in such circumstances, the bank does not perform in terms ofB's 
obligation to C as a third party acting without authorisation (in the sense envisaged in 
Chapter Two above i e the Pothier rule, or the rule in Froman v Robertson). Nor was the 
bank authorised (whether contractually or by way of delegatio solvendi) to make the 
payment on B's behalf. 516 The question517 is then whether the bank's payment 
nevertheless legally constitutes B's own performance to C in that his conditional 
performance was rendered £lnal by the bank's unauthorised payment, or whether there is 
some other legal basis for the extinction of B' s obligation to C by a countermanded 
payment. 
B & H Engineering v First National Bank of South Africa Ltt/IS 
This was essentially the question considered by the Appellate Division when B & H 
Engineering appealed against the decision of the Transvaal Provincial Division. After 
recounting the facts,519 the higher court agreed that the appropriate enrichment remedy 






In other words, A's banding; over of the money to C does not legally constitute B's performance 
to C. 
What if we think of an analogous situation, which does not concern a cheque? I give my creditor 
a letter instructing my debtor to pay my creditor. Then I withdraw that instruction but my 
creditor hands over the letter and my debtor pays my creditor anyway. In making the payment 
the debtor is not acting as my agent, or in tenus of my Anweisung. Whether his payment would 
discharge my obligation to my creditor in terms of the rules in Chapter Two would depend on the 
circumstances and on my debtor's intention in making the payment. If one assumes that he did 
not intend to extinguish my obligation, on what other ground would that obligation be 
extinguished? 
Supra. 
See the judgment at 284D-F. 
And not the condictio indebiti because the mistaken belief of the paying party concerned, not the 
existence or otherwise of a debt to the payee, but the existence of a mandate from the drawer: see 
the judgment at 284H. (The court did not refer to the view ofD P Visser in this regard.) Also see 
248 
attempting to outline the scope of this remedy, this court also decided the matter on the 
basis that all that had to be proven was that B & H was enriched 'by receiving payment 
of the cheque' and that such enrichment was sine causa.521 
Regarding the issue of enrichment, the court (per E M Grosskopf JA,522 the same 
judge who delivered the judgment in Jaffer's case )523 correctly identified the main 
question as whether or not Sapco's debt to B & H had been discharged by the cheque 
payment.524 If the debt had been extinguished by this payment, said the COurt,525 then B 
& H would have lost its right to claim payment from Sapco, its net position would not be 
affected and it would accordingly not be enriched. If, on the other hand, the debt had 
not been discharged by the payment, then B & H would have acquired the amount of the 
cheque payment and also retain its claim against Sapco, its net assets would have 
increased, and it would thus prima facie be enriched. 526 
The crucial question, therefore, was whether the handing over of money by a 
bank in contravention of a countermand serves to discharge the debt of its client. The 
court answered this question by examining the contractual relationship between Sapco 
and B & H, and the legal effect of payment by cheque.527 
The view of the court was that when someone pays by cheque, he usually intends 
such payment to discharge the debt, and not novate it.528 According to the court, our law 
holds that delivery of the cheque itself, and not the bank's subsequent transfer of the 
money, constitutes payment of the original debt but that this payment is conditional 










the judgment at 285B regarding the distinction between the condictio sine causa generalis and 
the condictio sine causa specialis. 
285C. 




See the judgment at 285E. 
See 285F and 286H. 
At 2851. 
At 286B, following English law: 286C-F. 
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his money from the bank, 'the purpose of the agreement to accept a cheque has been 
achieved. ,530 The court then posed the question why it should 'matter, as between 
debtor and creditor, what the arrangements were between the bank and the debtor, and 
whether the bank has complied with these arrangements?,531 
In answering this question, the court considered what it called 'the debt-
extinguishing agreement' concluded by the parties532 (at least impliedly) when a creditor 
accepts payment by cheque rather than by cash. 533 This agreement is that payment by 
cheque is accepted on condition that the bank subsequently pays or honours the 
cheque. 534 When the bank does so, the condition falls away and payment is deemed to 
have taken place on the date of delivery of the cheque (and not on date of the bank's 
payment).535 if, on the other hand, the cheque is dishonoured, the original debt would 
not be discharged. 536 The payee (creditor) could then choose to enforce this debt or to 
sue on the cheque itself. The payee 'would nonnally sue on the cheque, which would 
provide him with procedural and other advantages. ,537 
Counsel for the bank argued that the condition involved in the debt-extinguishing 
agreement relates to the bank's obeying its customer's order to pay, and this order must 
accordingly be in existence at the time of payment. 'In other words, payment by the 
bank would only satisfy the condition if such payment was, at the time of payment, 
authorised by the debtor (drawer).538 If, as in the present case, there was a countennand 
before payment,539 the condition could accordingly not be satisfied, and payment by the 
bank could not extinguish the original debt'. 540 The court said that this would 














In other words, the debtor/drawer and the creditor/payee. 
See the judgment at 287 A. 
286B and 287A-B. 
See the judgment at 286B-C. In other words, the delivery of the cheque itself, and not the bank's 
transfer of the money, constitutes payment of the original debt: see 286B. 
287B. 
286A. 
Cfthe argument of Sinclair and Visser 1984 ASSAL 377 discussed above at p 229. 
In other words, payment by the bank. 
See the judgment at 287B. 
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superimposed on the debt-extinguishing agreement between the debtor and the 
creditor' .541 The drawer's debt to the payee would accordingly only be discharged 
where the bank: was entitled to make the payment in tenns of its relationship with its 
client.542 
The court rejected this argument and held that when a cheque is paid543 by a 
bank, the drawer's debt to the payee is discharged, whether or not the bank: was acting 
within a mandate given by its client. 544 In coming to this conclusion, the court fust 
examined the interests of the payee.545 It stated that if one accepted the bank's 
argument, the payee's risk would be increased. He would not only bear the risk that the 
bank might not pay,546 but would also bear the risk that the bank might pay without 
having been authorised to do SO.547 Secondly, the court was of the view that the payee 
should not be 'drawn into' the matters between the drawer and his bank.548 The court 
said that the payee is not aware of the arrangements between the drawer and the bank, 
and should not have to bear the risk that there might be a dispute between those 
parties. 549 Thirdly, said the court, if it were accepted that only an authorised payment by 
the drawer would extinguish the debt to the payee, the payee would be in a worse 
position than if the cheque were dishonoured: he would have parted with the document 
and would therefore not have the chance to sue on the cheque itself, as he would in the 
case of dishonour, 550 and would have to fall back on his contractual claim against the 
drawer.551 Fourthly, the court took this point even further, holding that not only would 
the payee have to fall back on his main claim against the drawer because he no longer 














Or 'honoured'; the court did not accept that there was any significant distinction between these 
words: see 286F-G. 
289E. 
See the judgment at 287 ff. 
In the court's view, while the risk that a cheque might be dishonoured was inherent in the nature 
of payment by cheque, the risk that a cheque might be paid without authority was not. 
See the judgment at 287F. 
See 287G-H. 
Together with the attendant uncertainty and delays: 287H-1. 




discharged by the bank's payment in due course.552 In other words, the payee not only 
parts with the document but also with the rights under the cheque.553 The payee would 
thus lose the advantages conferred by the cheque's nature as a liquid document. 554 
The court was convinced that accepting the bank's argument would thus upset 
the balance of the interests of the relevant parties afforded by the general rules regarding 
cheque payments. It explained that when a payee agrees to accept payment by cheque 
(rather than insisting on a cash payment), he runs the risk that the cheque might not be 
honoured.555 This risk is counterbalanced, to some extent, by the fact that his possession 
of the cheque affords him a second source of liability in that the cheque constitutes a 
liquid document. This means that he can choose to enforce the main debt or to sue on 
the cheque itself. If payment by cheque were not to have the effect of discharging the 
drawer's debt to the payee, the payee would lose this advantage of being able to sue on 
the liquid document. There would accordingly be no counterweight to the risk inherent 
in accepting payment by cheque rather than insisting on a cash payment. According to 
the court, '[i]t would be contrary to the very essence of such a debt-extinguishing 
agreement if circumstances could arise in which the payee loses the benefit of his liquid 
document before his debt has been paid.'556 It accordingly held that 'it is highly 
desirable from the payee's point of view that his debt be regarded as paid when he 






The bank argued that, upon countermand, the cheque no longer constituted an order to pay, 
within the meaning of the law of negotiable instruments, but that it became an order not to pay. 
The court disagreed. It held that countermand did not alter the cheque as a document and that it 
would remain a bill of exchange, notwithstanding the countermand. The court found that 
countermand only changed the rights between the drawer and drawee in that countermand 
dispensed with the need for notice of dishonour: when a cheque is countermanded, it need not be 
presented but if it is, it will be dishonoured and no notice of such dishonour is necessary. In 
coming to this conclusion, the court rejected the views expressed in the English cases of Cocks v 
Masterman (1829) 9 B & C 902 [1824-34] All ER Rep 431 (KB) and Barclays Bank Ltd v W J 
Simms Son & Cooke (Southern) Ltd and Another supra as irrelevant: see the judgment at 288-
289E. 
In other words, both the underlying debt B-C and the cheque are discharged by the bank's 
payment. 
See the judgment at 291C-F. 
In other words, 'he has sacrificed the certainty of cash for the uncertainty and delay of a cheque': 




The court also considered the interests of the bank.55& Grosskopf J A pointed out 
that, in terms of the relationship between the bank and its client, the bank was not 
entitled to pay the cheque for it had 'no proper authority' to make the payment.559 It 
therefore had no contractual right to repayment by its client or anyone else. 56o 'This 
results from its own default and does not seem unfair', said the COurt.561 The court went 
on, however, to suggest (obiter) that the bank would 'usually have a claim based on 
unjustified enrichment against either the drawer or the payee. ,562 Later in the judgment, 
however, the court expressed the opinion that the bank had no claim against the payee in 
these circumstances,563 but that the bank would in principle be entitled to sue the drawer 
(Sapco) on the grounds that the bank's payment to the payee's creditor (B & H) had 
discharged its obligation to B & H and had therefore unjustifiably enriched the 
drawer. 564 The court referred to the suggestion of Stassen and Oelofse that the 
appropriate remedy in such circumstances would be the actio quasi negotiorum 
gestio.565 Without deciding whether the rules of this remedy would be 'strictly and 
literally applicable to facts such as the present', the court said (also obiter) that even if 
they were not, 'this case is so closely analogous, and the need for equitable relief so 
clamant, that an action on the grounds of unjustified enrichment should lie .... ,566 The 
judge went on to say that this would not necessarily imply that the bank would always 













Enrichment is always a matter of fact. Thus a bank might have paid a debt 
which was on the point of being prescribed, or it might have paid while the 
parties were negotiating to reduce the debt, etc. Moreover, in exceptional 
See the judgment at 291 F. 
At 29 1I-292 A. 
See the judgment at 284F and 2911. 
See 2911. It was accordingly not entitled to debit Sapco's account in the relevant amount. 
At 292A. 
293A. (My emphasis.) Also see 295A. 
Meaning, presumably, a situation where B in fact owed a debt to C. As the court points out later, 
the situation would be different ifB did not owe anything to C. 
295A-B. 
At 295B. See Stassen and Oelofse 1983 Modern Business Law 137 at 145. The latter author 
was, incidentally, one of the advocates representing B & H Engineering in this case. 
295C-D. 
295D-E. 
circumstances the drawer may have an interest in not having the debt paid. 
In such cases a court may conceivably hold that, even if the drawer were 
enriched, the bank would not in equity be entitled to restitution.568 
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As the court did not consider this to be one of those exceptional cases, it expressed the 
view that the bank had aprimafacie case against Sapco 'because the payment to the 
payee has discharged the underlying debt' .569 It pointed out, however, that the bank's 
position would be different if the payee had no valid claim against the drawer. 'A bank 
is consequently in the difficult position that it may not know which of the drawer or 
payee has been enriched until it ascertains the facts concerning their circumstances and, 
in particular, their relationship. ,570 The court therefore suggested that the drawer and 
payee should be sued as co-defendants in difficult cases.57l 
Regarding the interests of the drawer/debtor, the court said that, asswning that 
the drawer indeed owes a debt to the payee,572 and pays by cheque, he concludes a 
binding 'debt-extinguishing agreement'. This agreement amounts to a contract.573 
Stopping the cheque constitutes an attempt 'unlawfully and unilaterally ... to frustrate 
the debt-extinguishing agreement.' 574 If the bank obeys the countermand, the agreement 
will accordingly have been breached. Should the bank pay the debt notwithstanding the 
countermand, however, there will have been performance in terms of the debt-
extinguishing agreement despite the drawer's attempt to breach the agreement.575 The 
judge repeated that, in such a case, '[t]he debt-extinguishing agreement achieved its 
purpose. The creditor (payee) received his money. There is no need or justification in 
my view for the law to discountenance this result.' 576 
The court accordingly rejected the bank's main argument viz that the condition 
in the debt-extinguishing agreement can only be fulfilled by payment in accordance with 
568 See 295E. 
569 At 295G. 
570 295G. 
57l At 295H. 
572 See the judgment at 291 G. 
573 29lH. 
574 See 291H-1. 
575 29lH. 
576 At 291I. 
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an authorisation of the drawer that existed at the time of payment. 577 It also rejected the 
argwnent that this case fell within the scope of what it called the 'Pothier argwnent,'578 
in other words, that this was an instance of a third party paying the debt of another. The 
court held that' [i]n our case the debtor is paying his own debt through the 
instrumentality of the banle. ,579 Its reasoning ran as follows: 
It is common cause on both sides of the controversy that the bank is not 
the drawer's agent, but a neutral payment functionary. It is consequently 
correct that the acts and intent of the bank, by themselves, cannot result in 
the payment of the debt owed to the payee. However, the acts and intent 
of the bank fonn only a part of the picture. They must be seen in the light 
of the debt-extinguishing agreement between the debtor and creditor. It 
is that agreement which defines the purpose for which the cheque is 
given, and for which payment is to be received from the bank. If that 
agreement provides that any payment by the bank, even an unauthorised 
one, would discharge the debt as between debtor and creditor, such an 
agreement would be valid inter partes. The fact that the bank does not 
know or care what the purpose of its payment is does not matter. Its 
function is neutral, almost mechanical. It perfonns the act which the 
parties have agreed would serve to complete the payment of the debt. 580 
In conclusion, the court held that as the bank's payment had extinguished 
Sapco's debt to B & H, the latter had not been enriched and the bank's enrichment 
action should accordingly have failed. 581 B & H's appeal was thus allowed. 582 
Analysis 
Two issues were dealt with by the court in this case. The first concerned discharge of 







At 292C-E. Refer to the judgment at 286J-287B for a fuller version of the bank's argument. 
Which the court stated thus (at 293A-B): 'Where a bank. pays a cheque in the face of a 
countermand it acts without the authority of the drawer. If it pays a creditor of the drawer's, it 
consequently does not do so as the drawer's agent. Neither does the bank purport to pay the 
specific debt in the name of the debtor (the drawer). The bank is a neutral payment functionary. 
It does not even know for what reason the cheque was given to the payee .... The payment by the 
bank therefore cannot serve to discharge the underlying debt.' It cited the following as 
supporters of this argument: Cowen (1983) 16 elLSA I at 37 and Sinclair and Visser 1984 
ASSAL 377 at 385. In rejecting the argument, on the other hand, the court referred to Stassen 
1980 Modern Business Law 77 at 82, idem 1985 Modern Business Law 15 at 17 and Stassen and 





enrichment. Each of these will now be evaluated. 
Discharge of obligations 
As said above, the court's decision that a bank's payment of a countennanded cheque 
discharges the drawer's debt to the payee was, to a large extent, the outcome of 
weighing up the relative interests of the parties.583 The judgment is commendable in 
that it explicitly sets out the underlying policies that influenced the court's decision. 
Several aspects ofthis interests-based analysis have met with criticism, however. 
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Like the Gennan courts, our court gave most weight to the interests of the 
payee.584 Concerns have been expressed about the court's view that the payee should 
not have to bear the risk that the cheque might be paid in contravention of a 
countennand. Pretorius thus argues that the payee would not be greatly prejudiced by 
carrying this risk because he would still be able to enforce his contractual rights against 
the drawer/debtor.585 In support of his opinion that the payee should bear this risk, he 
also says that the payee carries other risks anyway.586 With respect, I find this particular 
argument unconvincing - the court is not suggesting that the payee should not carry any 
risk at all, but that it does not want to place an additional risk on the payee, as this would 
upset the balance between the interests of the parties that the law seeks to maintain. 
Another of Pre tori us's points, however, is more compelling. He says that the 
payee should bear this risk because' [i]n most instances cheques are countennanded 
because of some or other contractual dispute between the parties and very often, as a 
result of this, the payee is either infonned by the drawer that the cheque has been 
countennanded or he reasonably should foresee in the circumstances that the cheque will 






Cf the German approach above. 
This accords with the approach of other areas of German law, whkh tends to protect the interests 
of bona fide third parties e g transfer of ownership. 
Pretorius (1995) 58 THRHR 733 at 738. 
Pretorius (1995) 58 THRHR 733 at 738. 
Pretorius (1995) 58 THRHR 733 at 738. He adds that should the payee be unaware of his 
enrichment and such 'belief is reasonable in the circumstances', he would only be liable to the 
extent to which he was actually enriched i e he would not be liable for any lost enrichment. 
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cases where the payee is aware of the countermand and those where he is not. I agree 
that the payee who banks a cheque with the knowledge that it has been countermanded 
should forfeit the protection otherwise provided by the law. It should be borne in mind 
that neither of the modem cases dealing with payment of countermanded cheques 
(Govender588 and B & H Engineering) 589 concerned a payee who knew of the 
countermand. The question of awareness is not raised by the writers,590 who generally 
refer to Roorda's and the other cases as being of the same mould, and this seems also to 
be the approach of the courts. For example, Preiss J, delivering the TPD's decision in B 
& H Engineering, 59 1 does not seem to attach any special significance to the fact that the 
payee in this case was unaware of the countermand.592 There are convincing reasons for 
distinguishing a case ofa malafide payee from cases such as B & H Engineering, and it 
is hoped that a court faced with such a matter would take this into account. 
Another aspect of the judgment that has been criticised is the court's view that 
the payee should not be detrimentally affected by defects in the relationship between 
the debtor and his bank (B-A). It has been argued, for example, that the contract 
between B and C is the causa for the 'cambial obligation (derived from the delivery of 
the cheque)' and that, because the latter cannot exist in a vacuum, 'this inescapable link 
between these two obligations implicates the creditor to a far greater extent in the 
arrangements between the debtor and his bank ... than the court was willing to 
accept.,593 Similarly, Van Zyl argues that when Band C agree on payment by cheque, 
the bank is necessarily involve~ particularly when the underlying agreement B-C is 










Stassen 1985 Modern Business Law 15 at 15, Sinclair and Visser 1984 ASSAL 377 at 384. 
Supra. 
For instance, in referring to Roorda's case supra, he does not mention that the payee was aware 
of the countermand, and just mentions the ignorance of the payee in Govender's case supra in 
passing: see his recital of the facts of that case at 44F-G. 
Pretorius (1995) 58 THRHR 733 at 737. CfMalan and Pretorius Bills of Exchange 18, where the 
authors say, on the one hand, that the underlying contract is the causa for the cambial obligation 
but, on the other, that the cambial obligation is 'abstract'. Also see Visser 1994 ASSAL 217 at 
221 where he suggests that the court made this decision based on commercial convenience but 
may have been 'overstating the commercial convenience of its own approach'. 
See Van Zyl 1998 TSAR 177 at 195: 'the bank of necessity becomes involved and its mandate 
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There is merit in these arguments, particularly as far as payees who are aware of 
the countermand are concerned, but it should again be borne in mind that this case 
concerned a bonafide payee (who was accordingly unaware of the countermand, let 
alone any possible dispute between the drawer and his bank). Unlike a situation where 
a cheque has not been properly completed, or where a signature has been forged etc, 
there is nothing on the face of the cheque to indicate that it has been countermanded. 595 
Provided that the drawer has not informed the payee of the countermand (or where he 
should reasonably have foreseen that it has been countermanded), the payee deposits 
the cheque in good faith. The bank does not have to - and should not - pay this cheque 
but if it does, why should the payee suddenly be asked by the bank to repay the money? 
As far as the payee is concerned, he has received payment from his debtor, and this 
cheque has been honoured by the bank, as normally happens. The court effectively 
opted for protection of the bonafide payee's reliance interest, over the rather technical 
objections outlined in the previous paragraph. Again, the court may take a different 
view when faced with a malafide payee. 
Another thread running through the judgment of the court is commercial 
convenience. While it has been suggested that the court may have overstated 
commercial convenience596 in relation to the interests of the payee, one should look at 
this issue from a broader perspective. The effect of the court's fmding that the drawer's 
debt was discharged by the payment in question is to say that payment by cheque in 
595 
596 
comes into operation .... If the drawer should decide to breach its obligation towards the payee 
by stopping payment for whatever reason, good or bad, the payee cannot compel the bank to 
disregard the countermand and to honour the cheque in order to have payment effected in spite 
of the drawer's decision no longer to perform. The "arrangements" between the drawer and the 
bank are, therefore, particularly relevant in the context of the parties' decision to make use of 
payment by cheque for purposes of effecting performance by the drawer of his obligations in 
terms of the underlying agreement.' The author adds that 'the countermand as such is an 
unambiguous indication of the drawer's intention no longer to make performance to the payee 
and hence to breach the underlying agreement. It cannot simply be ignored.' The author's point 
that 'payee cannot compel the bank to disregard the countermand ... ' is confusing, as it lends 
support to the court's view that the relationship A-B is no concern of C's, rather than the 
author's argument to the contrary. 
It may be asked whether the judgment opens the door for the defence that a cheque is 'valid on 
the face of it'. 
Visser 1994 ASSAL 217 at 221. 
-
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such circumstances is final. 597 Of course there is always a danger that a cheque might 
be dishonoured (eg for forgery or lack of funds or because the bank is heeding a 
countermand) but the court is effectively saying that apart from these unavoidable or 
inherent risks, a cheque is practically equivalent to cash.598 In other words, the court 
declined to increase the already-existing practical differences between cheques and cash 
payments. It could even be argued that the effect of this judgment is ultimately in the 
bank's favour in that it does not further discourage the use of cheques (by imposing on 
a payee the risk that he would have to disgorge funds handed over by a bank in 
contravention of a countennand) and thus encourage cash payments or the reliance on 
credit. Both cash and credit599 involve risks that the bank has to insure against, so I am 
not convinced by the argument that this judgment effectively increases the bank's 
insurance costs (which would then be passed on to the bank's customers). 
As far as policy is concerned, I therefore agree with the approach of the court, 
with the caveat that malafide payees should not be afforded as much protection as bona 
fide payees. Another aspect of the court's judgment, however, presents a difficulty not 
of policy but of principle. 
The court held that the bank does not pay as a third party in such circumstances. 
In other words, it correctly distinguished this situation from that treated in the previous 
chapter, on the grounds that the bank does not intend to perform the obligation of 
another, but to discharge its own obligation to its client. Neither does the bank act as 
the drawer's agent in such circumstances, said the court. I think that this conclusion is 
also correct, because neither the bank nor its customer intend to create a relationship of 





What other grounds for extinction are there? Either B must have made the 
Once the payee receives the money from the banle 
Cfthe origins of paper money, which originally represented a promise by the reserve bank to pay 
an equivalent amount of gold to the bearer. 
E g handling and transporting cash is expensive and risky, especially in view of the high crime 
rate in South Africa. 
E g when the customer writes a cheque, the bank might never receive it (i e no consensus). 
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performance himself, or the court must have created a further category.601 The court 
held that the bank acted as a 'neutral functionary' in this situation. This presents at 
least one difficulty. The expression 'neutral functionary' suggests that the bank merely 
acted as a channel for the act or intention of its customer.602 In other words, it implies 
that the bank did not 'exercise its mind' in making the payment, that it did not act of its 
own accord (i e that it had no discretion in the matter, and that it just obeyed orders). 
With respect, while I can accept the argument that someone acting under orders might 
act as 'neutral functionary', I find the notion that someone can act as a neutral 
functionary in disobeying orders somewhat peculiar. 
What is perhaps more important for present purposes, however, is that the court 
implies that the act of the bank (payment) can legally be seen as the act of its customer 
(i e that, by way of a legal fiction, B made the performance himself). This resembles a 
relationship of agency, as far as the consequences are concerned, but the court clearly 
said that the bank did not act as its client's agent. The court accordingly seems to have 
created (or identified) an additional means of settling a debt. The notion of delegatio 
solvendi provides a means of explaining this: by way of the legal fiction first conceived 
by an ancient Roman lawyer, 603 A's act of performance to C is not only regarded as its 
own performance to B; the same act is attributed to B and is thus regarded as B's 
performance to C. 
Unjustified enrichment 
Regarding the question of enrichment in this context,604 the court clarified a number of 
issues. First, the court held (obiter) that if the debt B-C is not extinguished by a 
payment A-C, then C will be enriched and A can sue C directly with a condictio sine 






See the discussion at p 243 above. 
In other words, like a 'conduit pipe' - see D P Visser 'Unjust enrichment' 2000 ASSAL 273 at 
276, where the author uses the expressions 'neutral functionary' and 'conduit pipe' as synonyms. 
Celsus: see note 84 above. 
It is artificial to separate the court's interests-analysis regarding the enrichment and settlement of 
debt issues as the analysis straddles both. 
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Secondly, the court confmned that if a debt B--C is discharged by a payment A-
e, e is not enriched because the loss of his claim (against B) and the acquisition of the 
money cancel each other out. Although the court did not deal with this question 
explicitly, it implied that, in these circumstances, B could not bring a condictio indebiti 
(and maybe none of the other condictiones either) against e, because the purpose of the 
debt-extinguishing agreement between Band e had achieved its purpose if the payment 
had extinguished B' s debt to C. Another way of putting this is that there is no place for 
an enrichment claim between Band e because they are linked by a valid obligation B-
e and any performance by B to e is therefore justified. 
More importantly, the court held (obiter) that where a debt B--C is extinguished 
by A's 'payment' to e, A can in principle sue B for emichment with the actio quasi 
negotiorum gestorum, unless B's debt to e was about to prescribe etc. I think that it is 
correct that B would have been enriched at the expense of A if B' s debt to e was 
extinguished. But would the actio quasi negotiorum gestorum be the appropriate 
remedy? This is clearly not a situation of true negotiorum gestio because the bank was 
not carrying out the affairs of another; it intended to fulfil its own obligation to B, and 
not to settle B's debt to c.60S It could therefore, at most, be a situation of quasi 
negotiorum gestio. As the bank was managing what it thought were its own affairs 
(which coincidentally benefitted B), it arguably acted as a bonafide gestor. The 
problem is that the bank clearly acted domino prohibente. Although the court did not 
discuss it in detail, there is authority for the bank to bring an actio quasi negotiorum 
gestorum in analogous circumstances: Standard Bank Financial Services Ltd v Taylam 
(Pty) Ltd.606 
The facts of Taylam's case will not be recited again here,607 but it will be 
remembered that Taylam instructed his bank to pay certain sums of money to his 




Within the meaning of Froman v Robertson supra or the circumstances covered in Chapter Two. 
1979 (2) SA 383 (C). Also see the discussion in Chapter Two and at p 180 above. 
For the facts, see pp 384-387 of the judgment and Chapter Two above. 
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to pay upon presentation of a certificate and warned the bank that, if it paid, it would be 
doing so 'at its own peril' .608 The bank disregarded Taylam's warning and made the 
payment because it believed that it was bound to pay. It then claimed this amount from 
Taylam, on the basis that Taylam was unjustifiably emiched at its expense. The facts of 
this case are clearly analogous to those in the Govender and B & H Engineering cases: 
in all three cases, B instructed A to make a payment to C and then withdrew that 
instruction, but A paid C nevertheless. The main differences between Taylam's case and 
the others are that Taylam's instruction to the bank did not take the form of a cheque, the 
document to be presented to the bank by C (upon which payment was to take place) was 
not a cheque and, finally, it is not clear whether C was aware that Taylam had 
withdrawn the instruction to pay. 
The court in Taylam's case held that, in principle,609 the bank could sue Taylam 
with an extended actio negotiorum gestorum, provided that it could 'prove 
circumstances that would make it just for it to have acted in contravention of [the 
dominus's] ... expressed wishes.,6Io The court's proviso was echoed by the Appellate 
Division in B & H Engineering in the strange passage cited above.611 It seems 
contradictory to state that' [e ]nrichment is a matter of fact' and then to suggest that 
notwithstanding the fact of enrichment, liability might involve an element of discretion 
h b . f . 612 on t e aslS 0 eqUIty. 
It is also perhaps questionable whether the actio quasi negotiorum gestorum 
would be the appropriate remedy in such circumstances. From a purely technical 






At 386A and 386G ofthe judgment. 
The case just dealt with an exception on the part of the bank, and it is not clear whether the case 
ever went to trial- no report of a trial is contained in the SALR. 
See that judgment at 395C. 
See p 253 above. For convenience, the passage is repeated here: 'Enrichment is always a matter 
of fact. Thus a bank might have paid a debt which was on the point of being prescribed, or it 
might have paid while the parties were negotiating to reduce the debt, etc. Moreover, in 
exceptional circumstances the drawer may have an interest in not having the debt paid. In such 
cases a court may conceivably hold that, even if the drawer were enriched, the bank would not in 
equity be entitled to restitution.' 
Cfthe criticism of the proviso in Taylam's case cited in Chapter Two at p 125. 
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someone performed in the mistaken belief that his performance was due: A thought 
that it was bound to perform to B by honouring its cheque, whereas there was no such 
obligation as the cheque had been countermanded. The case also seems to fall outside 
the province of negotiorum gestio: the gestor, whether bona or ma/ajide613 or neither, 
has to administer the affairs of another, and the Appellate Division explicitly held in the 
B & H Engineering case that this is not an instance of performance of another's 
obligation.614 
What about considerations of policy? Requiring the bank to rely upon the 
condictio indebiti would have the effect of making the bank bear the risk of loss 
resulting from its own negligence. It has been suggested that the bank's error in such 
cases would almost always be inexcusable and that the bank would therefore effectively 
be without a remedy. Consequently, it is argued, the banks would have to insure 
themselves against this loss, and the cost of the increased premiums would ultimately 
devolve upon the banks' customers. On the other hand, it could be argued that there 
could indeed be circumstances where the bank might be able to show that its error was 
excusable,615 and that the role of the law of enrichment is not to protect parties from the 
results of their own negligence. Moreover, the practical consequence might be that 
banks put procedures in place to ensure that such (rare) negligent mistakes are even less 
likely to occur.616 
The practical result of allowing the actio quasi negotiorum gestorum in such 





In other words, someone who manages the affairs of another for his own benefit. 
Cf the arguments of Niall R and Deon van Zyl 'Unauthorized management of affairs (negotiorum 
gestio)' in Reinhard Zimmermann, Daniel Visser and Kenneth Reid (eds) Mixed Legal Systems in 
Comparative Perspective: Property and Obligations in Scotland and South Africa (2004) 366 at 
394 ff. 
E g someone draws a cheque on A Bank's Clanwilliam branch, and hands the cheque to a 
creditor in Clanwilliam. Prior to the bank's payment of the cheque, the drawer then enters A 
Bank's Pofadder branch and completes a form instructing the bank to stop the cheque. Due to an 
electricity failure, the Pofadder bank's computer system shuts down and notice of the 
countermand does not reach the Clanwilliam branch before payment has already occurred. (Cf 
the facts of Nedcor Bank Ltd v ABSA Bank and another 1995 (4) SA 727 (W), discussed below at 
p 276.) More probably, see the facts of Taylam's case, where the bank apparently did not act 
negligently. 
As mentioned above (see e g footnote 132), only three such cases have reached the Law Reports 
over the last hundred years. 
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its negligence. 617 As pointed out above, the courts have sought to protect the interests 
of the drawer by stipulating exceptional circumstances in which the bank would not 
succeed.618 This is problematic because it requires a decision on the basis of equity,619 
and because it places the onus on the drawer. This shifts the balance too much in 
favour of the banks, in my opinion. I am accordingly of the view that the appropriate 
action would be the condictio indebiti. 
(c) Situations where there was no valid instruction 
In this section, cases where A never received a valid Anweisunl20 will be considered. 
For example, B purports to instruct A to make a performance to B's creditor, C.621 A 
makes the 'performance' (e g payment), unaware that the instruction was defective or 
absent.622 B could have lacked legal capacity at the time he made the instruction,623 or 
he might have signed the cheque under compulsion (vis absoluta)624 or he might not 










Bearing in mind, of course, that the law of enrichment is not punitive and its function is not to 
compensate for hann negligently caused. 
In Taylam's case at 393A and in B & H Engineering's case supra at 295E. 
Cf the general distaste of the courts for open-ended questions of equity and fairness e g the 
court's rejection of a criterion of unfairness in the law of contract. Cf the discussion at p 128 ff 
in Chapter Two of ways in which this criterion may be given a more definite content. 
Either because there was a purported instruction but it was defective, or because there was 
instruction at all (whether purported or otherwise). These two categories of cases are commonly 
treated together. See e g Munchener KommentarfLieb § 812 marg note 46; Medicus 
Burgerliches Recht marg note 677; Medicus Schuldrecht II marg note 729; Loewenheim 
Bereicherungsrecht 35 ff. 
CfKoppensteiner and Kramer Bereicherung 31: here we are concerned with cases where the 
underlying causal relationship (i e the underlying banker-client contract) is valid but the 
Anweisung itself is invalid. They point out (also at 31) that the important factor is that there was 
neither a valid Anweisung nor one that can be attributed to B in terms of the rules regarding 
protection of reliance (Rechtscheinhajtungsprinzipien). 
See, e g, Munchener KommentarfLieb § 812 marg note 45: A performs to C in the 'erroneous 
belief that there was an Anweisung. Otherwise the case would be covered by § 814 BGB. A 
also does not intend to perform B's obligation to C in terms of § 267: see Koppensteiner and 
Kramer Bereicherung 31. 
BGHZ 111,382; The Standard Bank of South Africa Ltdv Haskins supra. Regarding the position 
of a minor, see Larenz and Canaris Schuldrecht IU2 227 ff. 
Koppensteiner and Kramer Bereicherung 31. 
BGHZ 66,362 (cheque bore fum's rubber stamp instead of the necessary signature). 
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include cases where a bank mistakenly carried out the same transfer twice,626 where a 
bank mistakenly transferred the wrong amount to the correct recipient,627 where a bank 
mistakenly transferred the correct amount to the wrong recipient,628 and where a bank 
made a transfer without having been given any instruction by its client at al1.629 Or the 
account-holder's signature might have been forged. 63o 
Thorny questions 
Although such cases arise less often than those where there was a valid instruction that 
was subsequently revoked,631 they have generated ample litigation and academic 
discussion in Germany.632 Two questions in particular have provoked debate. The first 
is whether A should sue B or whether he would have a direct action against C. In other 
words, should cases where there is no valid Anweisung should be treated in the same 
way as cases where there is no valid underlying contract between A and B? In short, 
who should sue whom? The second question is whether the recipient's knowledge or 
ignorance of the invalidity or absence of an Anweisung should playa role in answering 
the first question. Larenz and Canaris's comment that answering these questions is 'not 
simple' is an understatement, particularly regarding cases where a fourth party is added 
to the dramatis personae as a forger or thief.633 
The first question was initially answered with reference to the further question 
whether the Anweisung or the underlying contract between A and B provides the causa 
for A's handing over to C. This question is important for a number of reasons, which 









KG NJW-RR 1992,816; OLG Hamburg NJW 1983, 1499. See Larenz and Canaris Schuldrecht 
//12226. 
BHG NJW 1987, 185 and African Diamond Exporters (Pty) Ltd v Barclays Bank International 
Ltd supra (which both concerned overpayments of approximately ten times the instructed 
amount). 
BGHZ 66, 372. 
LG Stuttgart, NJW 1994, 2626. For these and other examples see Loewenheim 
Bereicherungsrecht 35 ff; Larenz and Canaris Schuldrecht II/2 226. 
Koppensteiner and Kramer Bereicherung 31. Larenz and Canaris Schuldrecht II/2 also mention 
(at 226) the example of a bank carrying out an instruction after the insolvency of the instructing 
party. 
Medicus Biirgerliches Recht marg note 677. 
See, e g, Munchener KommentarfLieb § 812 rnarg notes 45 ff. 
Larenz and Canaris Schuldrecht JII2 at 227. 
I 
which prompted the litigation in the South African case of First National Bank of 
Southern Africa Ltd v East Coast Design CC and Others.634 
265 
In this case, a Mr Roux concluded a contract with East Coast Design (C), a finn 
of interior designers, in tenus of which the firm undertook to redecorate his penthouse 
apartment. Roux paid the non-refundable deposit due under the contract with certain 
cheques that he had stolen from BP (B) and forged. The cheques were subsequently 
presented to BP's bankers, First National Bank (A). East Coast Design knew that Roux 
was not employed by BP, and did not investigate the validity of the cheques.635 The 
bank honoured the cheques in the knowledge that there was a contract between Roux 
and East Coast Design. In addition, the bank was cessionary ofRoux's rights in tenns 
of this contract, and had infonned East Coast Design of the cession.636 There was also 
no contract between the bank and East Coast Design. At the time when the cheques were 
drawn, BP did not owe anything to East Coast Design.637 
If the causa for the bank's payment is to be found in the Anweisung, the parties 
at the points of the triangle would be the bank, Roux (the instructing party), and East 
Coast Design (the payee).638 If the causa for the bank's payment lies in the underlying 
banker-client contract, on the other hand, the three relevant parties would be the bank, 
BP and East Coast Design. In the first case, there would be an invalid relationship 
between the instructing party and A and a valid relationship between the instructing 
party and C; in the second, there would be a valid relationship B-A, and no relationship 
at all between B and C. Needless to say, this question of categorisation is unimportant 
in itself, but as the Gennan writers suggest different solutions for each category of cases, 
reflecting variations in the interests of the parties, one must be clear as to exactly which 










For the facts, see tbejudgment from 140F-141F. 
Of course, there can only be a valid causa if the relationship in question - whether it be the 
Anweisung or the underlying contract - is valid. 
Cf the comments at p 192 if above. 
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It should also be borne in mind that the current approach of the majority of 
Gennan writers and the courts is that cases ofmuHi-party enrichment should be solved 
- at least partly - by reference to the 'causal relationships' between the parties.64o It is 
thus essential that there is clarity as to whether the Anweisung or the underlying contract 
between the parties provides the legal ground for a payment under instruction. As there 
are two possible 'causal relationships' (i e between BP and the bank, on the one hand, 
and between Roux and the bank, on the other), the notion of a 'causal relationship' 
seems to hit the same sort of obstacle that sank the LeistungsbegrifJ(viz that there can 
potentially be more than one Leistung in a particular situation).641 
This question also implies that only a particular causa, or particular causae, will 
be relevant in detennining whether an enrichment action is pennissable or not. In other 
words, in order to show that something had been acquired 'without legal ground', one 
has to be clear which possible legal ground or grounds have the potential to scupper an 
enrichment claim. This issue will be discussed further below. 
German answers 
According to von Caemrnerer,642 the Anweisung itself provided the justification or 
'basis' (Geschiiftsgrundlage) for the transaction A-C, and if there were no valid 
Anweisung B-A (and hence no causa for the payment to C rather than B), A should have 
an enrichment claim against c.643 
This was disputed by Pfister,644 however, who focused on the position of C. He 






Reflecting the relevant policy factors, and the relative interests of the parties. 
This may also have a bearing on the question of enrichment. The SCA's approach in B & H 
Engineering v First National Bank o/SA Ltd suggests that the court regards enrichment as being 
the most important criterion for identifying the parties to an enrichment action in South African 
law. In other words, the existence of a claim in the relationship between B and C helps to 
identify who was enriched, so one must be clear who 'B' is: the party who made the purported 
instruction, or the bank's client. 
Also see BGHZ 50, 227 (NJW 1968, 1822). 
See Ernst von Caemmerer Gesammelte Schriften 1(1969) 328 ff; Koppensteiner and Kramer 
Bereicherung 31. 
B Pfister 'Zum Bereicherungsanspruch im Dreiecksverhaltnis bei Fehlen einer Anweisung' 1969 
JR 47. 
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valid Anweisung than whether A and B had a valid underlying relationship and that there 
was therefore no clear reason why one rather than the other should be treated as the 
causa.645 He thus concluded that cases where the Anweisung was invalid or absent 
should be treated in the same way as cases where the underlying contract A-B was 
defective;646 A should thus sue B in such circumstances. He cited commercial 
convenience647 and his view that the balance of the interests of the parties was the same 
as in cases where there was no valid underlying relationship. 
Although Pfister's views attracted some support, Canaris's views won the day. 
He regards the relevant parties as being the bank, its client and the payee (to use banking 
terminology). In other words, the causal relationship is the underlying contract between 
A and B, and not the Anweisung, whoever makes it. In analysing the relative interests of 
the parties, Canaris focused on B's perspective rather than C's.648 He argued that the 
law should not accept that B's debt to C was validly extinguished by A's erroneous 
payment and that A could sue B for enrichment. To do so, he maintained, would put B 
at a disadvantage, which was unwarranted seeing that there was no reason why A's 
'performance' to C should be attributed to B. He cited, as examples of the kind of 
disadvantages that B would suffer if he were faced with an enrichment claim, the 
possibility that C's claim against B might have been about to prescribe,649 or that he 
would lose the possibility of set-off or any rights of retention which he could have raised 
against the Ruckgriffskondiktion that A could bring against him.650 The bank would not 
be greatly disadvantaged by having to sue C rather than B because, had it been allowed 
to sue B, it would have been in a relatively weak position anyway, because it would only 







Also see Koppensteiner and Kramer Bereicherung 31-32. 
At49. 
In other words, that the Anweisungsverkehr ('Anweisungs-traffic) would be disrupted if the 
effectiveness of payments depended on whether or not there was a valid Anweisung. 
Canaris (n 8) 824-5. 
And now he would be faced with an enrichment claim with a thirty year prescription period: see 
Canaris (n 8) at 825. 
Canaris (n 8) at 824-5. In this regard it should be borne in mind that he would be entitled to the 
protection drawn, by analogy, from the law of cession: see Larenz and Canaris Schuldrechl JII2 
at 226; Chapter Two at p 129 above; §§ 404 and 406 ffBGB. Larenz and Canaris loc cit point 
out, however, that he should not have to enter into arguments with the bank as to the availability 
of these defences and the existence - or otherwise - of his debt vis-a-vis C. 
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B's possible claim against C).651 
Following Canaris's lead, the majority ofwriters652 now hold that although the 
'causal relationship' lies between A and B,653 A can bring an enrichment action (a 
Nichtleistungskondiktion)654 directly against C in the circumstances outlined above.655 
The currently accepted reasoning behind this is that, without an effective instruction,656 
the conduct of A cannot be attributed to B. 657 B should therefore not be affected by the 
'unravelling' of the relevant relationships in tenns of the law of enrichment: 658 he 
should be left out of the picture entirely. In other words, the protection ofB takes 
priority over the protection of any reliance on C's part.659 It is considered that C's 
position is sufficiently protected by the rules concerning loss of enrichment.660 The 
practical results are that C's claim against B would not be extinguished661 and the bank 













Larenz and Canaris Schuldrecht JII2 227. Also see Chapter One above. 
Munchener KommentarlLieb § 812 marg note 46: 'gam uberwiegend'. See e g Medicus 
Burgerliches Recht marg note 677. 
See Larenz and Canaris Schuldrecht JII2 at 229: it is not correct to call the Anweisung itself the 
legal ground as it does not, on its own, say whether the transferred money was due to the 
recipient or not. In other words, the Anweisung cannot provide C with a ground for retention vis-
a-vis A. 
In the form of an AuJwendungskondilaion: see p 272 below. 
Medicus Burgerliches Recht marg note 677; Medicus Schuldrecht II marg note 729; Loewenheim 
Bereicherungsrecht 37 ff. Koppensteiner and Kramer Bereicherung 33; Munchener 
KommentarlLieb § 812 marg note 46. In other words, A can sue C directly even if the 
performance was not gratuitous (and therefore covered by the direct action afforded by § 822 
BGB). Regarding the notion of a 'causal relationship', and the conclusion that it lies in the 
underlying contract between A and B, see Chapter One at p 46 ff and the introductory part of this 
chapter. 
For it was merely apparent, and therefore not legally relevant: Munchener KommentarlLieb § 
812 marg note 46. 
Whose interests are 'also worthy of protection': Zimmermann and Du Plessis 1994 Restitution 
Law Review 14 at 34; Larenz and Canaris Schuldrecht 11/2226 (i e the payment A-C cannot be 
seen as performance B-C; Canaris (n 8) 820 ff. 
Medicus Burgerliches Recht marg note 677; Medicus Schuldrecht II marg note 729. 
In other words, the law does not afford C any protection based on his (possible) belief or reliance: 
Larenz and Canaris Schuldrecht JII2 227; Munchener KommentarlLieb § 812 marg note 46: 'for 
this reason [viz the fact that A's conduct is not attributable to B] any protection of legal 
appearances [Rechtsscheinschutz] is excluded.' 
§ 818 (3) BGB. See Canaris (n 8) 825-6; Medicus Burgerliches Recht marg note 677. 
Larenz and Canaris Schuldrecht JII2 226; Koppensteiner and Kramer Bereicherung 32: C cannot 
keep money received in terms of his relationship with B, or raise any defences arising from this 
relationship against the bank. 
Koppensteiner and Kramer Bereicherung 32. 
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Should it make a difference whether C was aware that A handed over the 
performance in error (and therefore that it did not represent a performance by B)? 
Larenz and Canaris say no; they argue that it does not matter whether C knew or ought 
to have known that there was no valid Anweisung, and that the decisive factor is rather 
that A had not been 'authorised' by B.663 
The question of locating the enrichment has also surfaced in this context.664 
Thus it has been asked whether A's claim against C depends on whether C had a valid 
claim against B in the Valutaverhaltnis and whether the debt B-C was extinguished by 
the payment at issue.665 The answer given by writers such as Medicus, Larenz and 
Canaris is that an apparent performance by A to C should also not be allowed to 
extinguish any obligation that B might owe C.666 In other words, if we deny that there is 
any link between A and B for the purposes of emichment, we must also deny that there 
is any link for the purposes of extinction ofB's obligation to c.667 Or, as Larenz and 
Canaris put it, any debt owed by B to C cannot be extinguished without a valid 
Tilgungsbestimmung (i e intention to discharge).668 They and Medicus thus say that C 
should pay A back even if he has a claim against B. 669 Whether or not there is a valid 
claim in the relationship between B (the bank's client) and C is therefore immateria1.67o 
Cases where, for example, B validly owes money to C and gives him an unsigned 
cheque as 'payment' would be treated in the same way as cases where, for example, X 
steals B' s cheque book and forges B' s signature on a cheque which he then uses to settle 
his own debt (i e X-B): in both cases, the bank may sue the recipient, C. The 









Who was therefore only apparently an 'instructing party'. 
See, e g, Munchener KommentarfLieb § 812 marg notes 45 and 57 ff. 
Munchener KommentarfLieb § 812 marg note 45. 
Medicus Burgerliches Recht marg note 677; Larenz and Canaris Schuldrecht JII2 226 and 228. 
A's performance can also not be regarded as a performance in terms of § 267 BGB (see Chapter 
Two) because A would not have the necessary intention: he intended to perform to and for B, not 
to settle B' s debt as a third party. 
See Chapter One at pp 34-5. 
Medicus Burgerliches Recht marg note 677. 
In other words, cases where there is no Anweisung and no valid legal relationship between B and 
C would not be treated as cases of Doppelmangel. As soon as there is a valid underlying contract 
between A and B, the case will not be one of Doppelmangel. The importance oftbis point is that 
the majority of German writers suggest a different solution for Doppelmangel situations: see 
section 3 below 
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cannot argue that he has not been enriched where such a claim does exist, but also that 
he cannot raise a contract between himself and B (or X) as a legal ground which would 
justify his receipt. Larenz and Canaris also justify their view by pointing out that C 
should not be forced to engage in arguments with the bank as to whether or not he had a 
valid claim against B. 
After some initial hesitation,671 the courts have also come to approve of a direct 
claim A-C.672 Numerous examples could be cited.673 In one case,674 for instance, B 
bought a business from C. C, with the collaboration of one of the employees of bank A, 
forged a document purporting to be an instruction by B to the bank to transfer part of the 
purchase price to C. In accordance with this apparent instruction of B, A made the 
transfer to C. B then sued C for the relevant amount. The court said that A's payment to 
C could not be regarded as a performance by A to B and by B to C, because there had 
been no valid instruction by B, and C had been aware of this. The court accordingly 
held that B had not 'performed' to C in the sense required by the law of enrichment, and 
neither had A to B. It therefore concluded that in such a case A should sue C directly. 
Similar reasoning was employed in a case675 where B gave X certain blank 
cheques, drawn on bank A, in respect of building society loans. Instead of filling in the 
appropriate amounts, X inserted amounts totalling DM 80 000, and sold the cheques to 
C for cash. C cashed the cheques, X committed suicide and B sued C for DM 80 000. 
In yet another case,676 however, the court emphasised, not the Leistungen 








See, e g, Loewenheim Bereicherungsrecht 37. 
See, e g, BGHZ 66, 362 (where a bank mistakenly paid its client's creditor C in terms of a cheque 
drawn by its client (a firm B), bearing B's stamp, rather than the appropriate signature. The 
cheque was thus invalid. The court held that the bank could claim directly from the payee.) (See 
discussion by Loewenheim Bereicherungsrecht at 35). 
See, e g, Munchener KommentarlLieb § 812 marg notes 52 ff; Loewenheim Bereicherungsrecht 
37 if. 
BGH NJW 1994,2357. See Loewenheim Bereicherungsrecht 35 for a summary of the facts, and 
37-8 for a discussion of the court's reasoning. 
BGH, NJW 1995,3315. 
BGHZ 66, 362. For discussion of this case see, e g, Loewenheim Bereicherungsrecht 37. 
Loewenheim Bereicherungsrecht 37. 
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relevant Anweisung in this case also took the fonn of a cheque, but here it was defective 
in that bore the stamp of the bank's client, a fIrm (B), and not the required signature. 
The cheque was therefore void for non-compliance with the fonnal requirements for 
validity.678 The bank (A) nevertheless paid the relevant amount upon presentation of the 
cheque by the recipient (C). A subsequently sued C for this amount. The court held that 
C did not deserve protection because anyone who consciously cashed an unsigned 
cheque would also know that the bank would not be allowed to honour it. The court 
thus said that C should not derive any advantage from the bank's error, and that he had 
no reliance that warranted protection. Turning to B's position, the court said that the 
client of a bank, on the other hand, should be entitled to rely on his bank's not honouring 
an unsigned cheque. If the bank were to do so nevertheless, the court continued, the 
payment to C would not be attributable to B, who had not caused the ill-fated payment. 
Because the recipient was aware of the defect in question, the court considered it 
justifIable that the perfonnance of the bank should not be attributed to its client.679 
Because this and other early cases all concerned recipients (C) who were aware 
that there had been no valid instruction,68o it was uncertain what the court regarded as 
decisive: this knowledge,681 or the distinction between an instruction that was merely 
defective, and one which was completely absent.682 It was thus unclear whether the 
court was prepared to grant A a direct action against C merely because, from his point of 
view, A's handing over did not represent a perfonnance (Leistung) B-C.683 This implied 
that, if C were unaware that there was no valid Anweisung, A might not be allowed a 
direct action against C on the grounds that his belief (or reliance) that A's handing over 








Viz Art 1 No 6, Art 2 I ScheckG: see Loewenheim Bereicherungsrecht 36. 
See Loewenheim Bereicherungsrecht 37. 
In other words, they were not acting in good faith: Miinchener KommentarlLieb § 812 marg note 
53. 
Medicus Schuldrecht II marg note 729: the direct action was at first only given because the payee 
knew that there was no valid Anweisung. 
Medicus Biirgerliches Recht marg note 677. 
Miinchener KommentarlLieb § 812 marg note 53. 
Miinchener KommentarfLieb § 812 marg note 53. 
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Later cases, however, suggest that the recipient's belief is irrelevant,685 and that 
his reliance will not be protected, even if he is unaware of the absence of a valid 
Anweisung.686 The crucial question is now whether the handing over by A to C can be 
attributed in any way to B.687 Ifit cannot be attributed to B (i e where there is no valid 
Anweisung),688 the bank can bring an enrichment claim against the payee. The approach 
of the courts is thus now in line with that of the majority ofacademics.689 
As mentioned above, assuming that A is to proceed against C and not B in such 
circumstances, he must do so with a Nichtleistungskondiktion: 69o the bank's purpose is 
not to perform (in the sense required in terms of the Leistungsbegrif.l) to C, but to 
perfonn to its client B by carrying out his purported instruction.691 Or, put differently, 
there is no performance-relationship between A and C, but merely a factual hand over. 692 
As there was no Leistung A-C, A's claim against C cannot be a Leistungskondiktion. 
The particular species of Nichtleistungskondiktion to be used by A is the 
AujWendungskondiktion.693 It will be recalled from the discussion in Chapter Two that 
this is the action afforded to what we would call a mala fide gestor (i e in cases of the 
type of unechte Geschtiftsfiihrung ohne Auftrag called Geschti/tsanmafiung).694 
South African law 
As said above, cases belonging in this category are those where A (typically, a bank) 











BGHZ Ill, 382 at 386. This approach has been followed in subsequent cases such as BGH ZIP 
1990, 1126; BGH NJW 2001, 1855; BGH NJW 2001,2968; OLG Koln ZIP 1996, 1376; OLG 
DUsseldorf ZIP 2003, 897. See Larenz and Canaris Schuldrecht ///2 228 regarding the question 
of lack of capacity. 
BGHZ 135, 307 at 313 and 315. Also see Larenz and Canaris Schuldrecht 1112 228: C's reliance 
cannot result in A's performance being attributed to B. 
See, e g, BGHZ 111, 382 at 386. 
See Larenz and Canaris Schuldrecht ///2228: this applies to all cases of 'attributability errors'. 
See, e g, BGH ZIP 2001, 781 ff. 
Medicus Burgerliches Recht marg note 677; Medicus Schuldrecht II marg note 729; Loewenheim 
Bereicherungsrecht 38, 39, 42; Palandtrrhomas §812 marg note 52a; Munchener 
KommentarfLieb § 812 marg note 56; StaudingerfLorenz § 812 marg note 51; Larenz and Canaris 
225 ff; Wieling Bereicherungsrecht 94; cf Munchener KommentarfLieb § 812 marg note 51. 
Medicus Burgerliches Recht 677. Also see Larenz and Canaris Schuldrecht 1112 at 228-9. 
Loewenheim Bereicherungsrecht 38. 
See Larenz and Canaris Schuldrecht I/I2 at 229. 
See Chapter Two at p 103. 
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The approach of our courts will now be illustrated by a description of several cases, with 
minimal comment, and an analysis will follow. 
Bank's client purports to instruct bank to pay C but instruction defective 
Let us begin with one of the 'easier' cases, i e one where the bank's client (B) himself 
purports to instruct the bank (A) to pay C, and the bank pays C without a valid 
instruction. African Diamond Exporters (Pty) Ltd v Barclays Bank International Luf95 
was a case of an overpayment by a bank. 696 
The dispute in this case arose from dealings between a 'dealer in and exporter of 
polished diamonds,' African Diamond Exporters, and a finn based in the United States 
of America called Antwerp Distributing Co. African Diamond Exporters sent a 
consignment of diamonds to Antwerp Distributing. Payment was to be effected via 
Barclays Bank International (based in London). An offtcial working in Barclays' 
London offtce accordingly made out a telegraphic transfer order, instructing Barnat in 
Johannesburg to pay African Diamond Exporters the relevant amount less bank charges. 
The forms used for such purpose were made of self-carbonated paper. While the 
original order was made out for the correct amount, an impression made on the original 
caused a mark to appear on the copy used for the transmission of the money. This mark, 
which looked like a figure 1, changed the $18 860,88 that appeared on the original form 
to $188 601,88 on the copy. Barnat in South Africa transferred the latter amount to 
Nedbank (African Diamond Exporters' bankers in Johannesburg) for the credit of 
African Diamond Exporters. African Diamond Exporters thus received approximately 
ten times more than it should have done. Shortly thereafter, African Diamond Exporters 




In other words, there was no instruction to pay the excess. Another case concerning an 
overpayment is the criminal case of S v Graham 1975 (3) SA 569 (A). In this case '[a] certain 
private company, crippled by illiquidity, hampered by mismanagement, and beset by creditors as 
claimant as its debtors were quiescent, unexpectedJy received through the post a cheque for 
R3 7 153,88, obviously sent in error because the drawer had already paid the debt.' (See the 
judgment per Holmes JA at 571E-F). The managing director had it deposited into the company's 
overdrawn bank account. He was later found guilty of theft. The judgment is interesting because 
of the judge's view that the parties had not concluded a valid 'debt-extinguishing agreement' 
(thOUgh he did not call it that): see 574A-D. 
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further consignment to Antwerp Distributing, and it retained $55 385 as payment 
therefor. The head of Antwerp Distributing Co disappeared, along with the chances of 
recovering the $100 000 and the diamonds. Barclays brought an enrichment action (a 
condiclio indebili) against African Diamond Exporters, and the balance still held by the 
latter was returned to Barclays after institution of the action.697 
To summarise the core facts with the labels used in the rest of this thesis, B 
(Antwerp Distributing Co) had a contract with C (African Diamond Exporters). B 
instructed A (BarclayslBamat) to pay C. A paid C too much. C evidently regarded 
itself as enriched at B's expense, and sent $100 000 of the excess back to B. A brought 
an enrichment action against C. Various questions could have been raised. Who should 
have sued whom on the basis of unjustified enrichment? Did C correctly give the money 
'back' to B, or should it rather have given the money to A? Was A correct in suing C, or 
was it confmed to an enrichment claim against B? 
The judge only touched on these questions tangentially, as the case centred on 
the defence of loss of enrichment.698 In other words, it was apparently assumed that it 
was appropriate for A to direct its action against C and that it should be a condiclio 
indebili, and the only question was whether C had a valid defence (loss of enrichment) 
against A's claim. C argued that, as it had sent $100 000 back to B, $55 385 of the 
remainder had been retained as payment for the next consignment of diamonds, and the 
residue had been given to A, it was no longer enriched.699 A argued that C could not 
rely on this defence because it had immediately realised, upon receiving the money, that 
it had received too much.7oo C's response was that the defence ofloss of enrichment 
would still be available to a defendant who acted bona jide in disposing of the 
enrichment.701 The court decided that C had not acted negligently and was bonajide702 







For the relevant facts, see the judgment at 703E-705F. 
For a discussion of this aspect of the judgment, see D P Visser 'Responsibility to return lost 






back to A, but that it had to hand back whatever portion of the $55 385 constituted profit 
on the transaction in question (i e the sale of the further consignment by C to B).703 
A argued that C should not have returned any money to B, but that it should 
rather have given it all back to A.704 '1 cannot agree', said the judge. 70S His reasoning 
ran as follows: B had told C that the mistake had been made by its agent (another bank) 
and that its agent had debited B's account. C thus believed that B ('as principal,)706 had 
suffered a loss that corresponded to C's enrichment. The judge accordingly held that, as 
C believed B and was not negligent in returning the money to A, 'there can be no 
objection to the refund of the overpayment direct to [B].' 707 The court thus seems to 
have regarded C's initial perception that it had been enriched at B's expense as 
mistaken. In the judgment, there is no suggestion at all that B was entitled to sue C, and 
that A should have sued B. In other words, although there was no discussion of the 
underlying policy factors, the South African court arrived at the same result (regarding 
the direction of A's claim against C and not B) as has emerged in German law from a 
close analysis of the interests of the parties. 708 
The court's findings thus suggest that it is possible for C, in a triangular 
situation, to counter A's emichment claim by proving that it (C) bonafide disposed of 
the enrichment to B. In other words, C's loss or disposal of emichment to his contract 
partner, B, may be used as a defence against A. Before considering this question in 
more detail, I would like to look at cases where there was no contract between B and C. 
Stolen and forged cheques 
Typically, where a cheque has been stolen or forged, and used to pay a debt, there will 












It is also interesting to note that the defence of loss of enrichment is apparently seen as providing 
sufficient protection to C, as is suggested by Canaris (n 8) at 825-6; Larenz and Canaris 
Schuldrecht //12 at 227. 
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cheque was drawn). As said above, such cases have an added layer of complexity, in 
that they involve four or more parties: the bank (A), its client (B), the payee (C) and the 
thief/forger (X). These cases are therefore complicated by the fact that the bank's client 
made no instruction at all; the instruction usually emanated from x.709 Several such 
cases have come before South African courts. I would like to consider three of these in 
particular: Nedcor Bank Ltd v ABSA Bank and Another,710 which focused on the 
question whether C was enriched; Standard Bank of SA Ltd v ABSA Bank Ltd and 
Another,711 which focused mainly on the relationship between C and his collecting bank 
in determining who was enriched by A's payment, and the East Coast Design case712 
which focused on the sine causa requirement. The first two judgments were handed 
down within a few months of each other, in a year of mixed fortunes for ABSA Bank. 
The facts that gave rise to Nedcor Bank Ltd v ABSA Bank and Another713 were as 
follows: ETS, a partnership, sold certain electronic goods to Ntamakunsi. The parties 
agreed that the seller would deliver the goods to to Ntamakunsi when he deposited the 
purchase price in ETS's bank accOlUlt, held at ABSA. A blank bank cheque was stolen 
from Nedcor Bank, and was made out in ETS' s favour for the exact amount of the 
purchase price, and the appropriate signatures were forged. It was then deposited in 
ETS's ABSA account, was presented for payment, and Nedcor transferred the stated 
amount to ABSA for ETS's account. ETS was told that the money had reached its bank 
account and accordingly delivered the goods to Ntamakunsi. It subsequently withdrew 
most of the funds, and Nedcor applied to court for an urgent order compelling ABSA 
and ETS to keep the remaining funds in the account until it had brought suits against 






The applicant argued, inter alia, that it was entitled to relief in terms of the 
But cf John Bell & Co Ltd v Esselen supra, where the bank's client, John Bell & Co, ostensibly 
made out a valid cheque, signed by the appropriate signatories, but one of the signatories used it 
to settle his private debt without the knowledge of the company. Also see Commissioner for 
Inland Revenue v Visser 1959 (1) SA 452 (A). 
Supra. 
1995 (2) SA 740 (T). The case was taken on appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal: see ABSA 




condictio sine causa.714 The judge said that B & H Engineering v First National Bank of 
SA Ltd715 required that enrichment of the defendantls had to be proven. He held that 
neither ETS nor ABSA had been enriched by the payment. He said that the increase in 
ABSA's assets was negated by its incurring a 'corresponding obligation' to ETS, and 
that the increase in the balance ofETS's bank account extinguished its claim against 
Ntamakunsi. The court accordingly held that' [t]he patrimony of both respondents has 
been left neutral by the payment' and that the only party who was enriched was 
Ntamakunsi. 
Nedcor's counsel fell back on a call to equity. The judge's reasons for not 
heeding this call concern the interests of the parties: 'There is no suggestion that either 
of the respondents was party to the fraud. If there is to be a loss I do not see why it 
should be shifted from the applicant to other equally innocent parties who have not been 
enriched.,716 The judge accordingly dismissed the application. 
In this case the instruction apparently emanated from Nedcor itself, in that the 
stolen cheque was a bank cheque. Nedcor (A) sued ABSA and ETS together. The judge 
focused on the question of enrichment, and held that neither ABSA nor ETS had been 
enriched.717 The court's finding that ABSA had not been enriched by the payment 
seems unproblematic: in collecting the funds it had indeed incurred a 'corresponding 





It also asked for relief on the basis of the actio Pauliana. The judge held that the actio Pauliana 
was not an appropriate remedy for these circumstances. The actio Pauliana, said the judge, 
'is a remedy to set aside a disposition of assets which a debtor had made for the purpose of 
avoiding the assets falling into his estate on insolvency and thereby becoming available for 
distribution to his creditors. The party to whom the disposition was made can be made to restore 
the property for the benefit of creditors ifhe colluded in the disposition or ifhe received the 
property gratuitously.' (At 729B.) As the funds in this case had never fallen into the ownership 
(or even the possession) of Ntamakunsi, this was not a case of a debtor trying to get rid of his 
assets in order to defraud his creditors and the actio Pauliana was therefore not relevant. This 
part of the judgment is generally seen as correct, and has not given rise to controversy. 
Supra. 
See the judgment at 730E-F. 
This aspect of the judgment gained the approval of F R Malan and J T Pretorius 'Enrichment in 
triangular situations, interest and the in duplum rule, and personal liability and company names' 
(1996) 8 South African Mercantile Law Journal 399 at 400. But cfD P Visser 'Unjustified 
enrichment' 1995 ASSAL 225 at 230. 
II 
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deposit, and fmally credits the client's account.718 It holds the funds and the client has a 
personal right to claim those funds from it. What is problematic, however, is the other 
part of the judge's legal mathematics, namely his conclusion that the increase in the 
balance ofETS's bank account extinguished its claim against Ntamakunsi (X), and that 
ETS was therefore not enriched. This would only be so ifX's payment in terms of their 
contract (X-C) was a valid one, i e one which would discharge the debt X-C. The judge 
seems to assume that it was a valid payment, as he says that Ntamakunsi was enriched 
(implying that his debt to ETS had been discharged). Again, as in the African Diamond 
Exporters case, the judge seems to allow C to defend itself against A's claim by saying 
that A's payment had extinguished C's claim against someone else (in the African 
Diamond Exporters case, C's claim lay against B; in this case, it lay against X). In other 
words, in this case the judge allowed C to raise against A a defence that arose from its 
(C's) relationship with X. He does not discuss the question ofloss of enrichment as he 
assumes ETS was not enriched in the ftrst place. 
This judgment may be contrasted with the decision of the Transvaal Provincial 
Division in Standard Bank of SA Ltd v ABSA Bank Ltd and Another,719 which also 
concerned a cheque that had been stolen720 and forged. 721 The cheque in question 
appeared to have been made out by Unitrans Bulk (Pty) Ltd (drawn on its bank, 
Standard Bank), in favour of Horn.722 Hom deposited the cheque for R150 000 in his 
current account held at ABSA Bank.723 The cheque was then presented by ABSA, 
Standard Bank paid ABSA R150 000, and ABSA credited Hom's account in the 
relevant amount.724 R8I 843,94 ofthis sum was swallowed up by Hom's overdraft, so 









See the discussion of ABSA Bank Ltdv Standard Bank a/SA Ltd supra at p 282 ffbelow. 
Supra. 
See the TPD judgment at 7421. 
See the TPD judgment at 7421-1. 
See the TPD judgment at 742 and the SeA judgment at 250E-F. 
See the TPD judgment at 742 and the SeA judgment at 250F. For the purposes of this discussion 
the defendant/appellant will be referred to as ABSA, even though the actions in question had 
been undertaken by its predecessor in title, Volkskas. 
See the TPD judgment at 742H and that of the SeA at 250F-G. 
See SeA 250G. 
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Believing that there was nothing wrong with the cheque, Standard Bank debited 
Unitrans's account. 726 Within a week, however, it was discovered that the signatures on 
the cheque had been forged, and Standard Bank accordingly apprised ABSA of this 
fact. 727 Standard Bank thereupon reversed the debit ofUnitrans's account728 and 
obtained a court order against ABSA. ABSA accordingly paid Standard Bank 
R64 149,09, being the funds still in Hom's ABSA account.729 Standard Bank then 
demanded that ABSA repay the balance of the R150 000 originally transferred to it (i e 
R85850,91).730 ABSA refused to do so,731 and Standard Bank accordingly brought a 
suit based on W1justified enrichment (a condictio sine causa) against ABSA.732 
(Standard Bank wanted to sue Hom as second defendant but it seems that he had 
disappeared and it was not possible to serve a summons on him.)733 The parties 
subsequently agreed that Standard Bank should only claim R81 843,94, being the 
amount of Hom's overdraft on the date of ABSA's payment to Standard Bank.734 
In other words, X (who was not identified) used B's (Unitrans's) cheque to 
instruct A (Standard Bank) to pay C. C's bank, ABSA, collected the money and some of 
it was credited to C's account, and some of it was used to extinguish his overdraft to 
ABSA. The parties, and the court, seem to assume that the amount which was credited 
to C's account that was not swallowed up by the overdraft constituted an unjustified 
enrichment at A's expense, and it was accordingly given back. In this case, the 
complicating factor was neither the relationship between C and B (as in the African 
Diamond Exporters case),735 nor the relationship between C and X (as in the Nedcor 












See the judgment of the TPD at 742H-I and 743A and that of the SCA at 250H. 
See the TPD judgment at 7430-H and that of the SCA at 2500. 
See the TPD judgment at 743B-C. 
See the SCAjudgment at 250H-I and the TPD judgment at 743D-F. 
SCA 2501-1. 
See the TPD judgment at 743I. 
See Standard Bank of SA Ltd v ABSA Bank Ltd and Another supra. 
See the TPD judgment at 742D and the SCA judgment at 251 B-C. 




Standard Bank argued that the cheque was a nullity,737 and therefore that the 
money had been transferred to ABSA sine causa. ABSA agreed with these allegations 
but argued that, although it had received the money physically, it had not done so as 
recipiens. In other words, legally speaking, it had not received the payment. It had 
merely collected the funds on behalf of its client as his agent, and '[ u ]pon receipt of the 
money, ... [Horn's] indebtedness to [ABSA] was extinguished ex lege by way ofa set-
off.,738 It accordingly alleged that it was not enriched at Standard Bank's expense. 
The court agreed that the appropriate action in such circumstances would be a 
condictio sine causa739 and said that the requirements for this action are that there must 
have been a 'transfer of assets or payment or delivery of money ... made to the 
defendant sine causa' and the defendant must have 'thereby [been] unjustifiably 
enriched at the expense of the giver or payer.,740 The judge went on to say that '[t]he 
fact of the payment sine causa is per se prima facie proof of unjustifiable enrichment. 
That the payment of the money by the plaintiff to [ABSA] ... occurred ... sine causa, 
gives rise to a duty of rebuttal, which rests upon the recipient.' 741 
The court then went on to consider ABSA's argument that it had received the 
payment as its customer's agent. During the course of his discussion of the legal nature 
of the relationship between banker and client, however, the judge switched his focus 
from the position of the collecting bank to that of the paying bank. He began by 
distinguishing this case from that of Freeman v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd,742 
mainly on the grounds that latter case did not deal with a stolen or forged cheque, and 
rejected a dictum from that case dealing with the relationship between a collecting 
banker and its client. He said that a 'stolen and forged cheque can never be "the 








According to s 2 of the Bills of Exchange Act 34 of 1964: see the TPD judgment at 744B-C. 
These arguments are outlined in the TPD judgment at pp 744-5. Also see 749F-G. 
At 745C-D, where he said that the condictio indebit was ruled out because there was no 
excusable error of fact. 
At 745E. 
At 745F-G. 
1905 TH 26. 
At 746E-F. 
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He then considered various opinions as to the relationship between banker and 
client and ended this discussion of the law by saying that he was accordingly 'not 
persuaded by the argument that the only way to characterise or typify the right 
relationship between a banker and its customer is by resorting to agency.' Instead of 
then considering the legal relationship between the collecting bank and its client (i e 
ABSA and Hom), however, the court turned to the relationship between Standard Bank 
and Unitrans. 744 
He held that Standard Bank had not acted as the agent ofUnitrans and that it was 
because the Standard Bank had made payment without authorisation745 and the cheque 
was a 'nullity' that it had had to reverse its debit ofUnitrans's account. 746 In support, he 
quotes long passages from Malan's and Cowen's works, dealing with the question of a 
bank paying without valid authorisation by its customer.747 Finally coming to the 
relationship between a collecting bank and its client, he stated that he was not convinced 
that ABSA had acted as Hom's agent in collecting the R150 000. He added that, even if 
this conclusion was incorrect, ABSA would not be entitled to the R150 000 because it 
could not have acquired any greater right than Hom would have had as principal, and he 







I take the view that the cheque was vitiated; the collection of the 
proceeds thereof was a nullity as it was not a cheque at all. Flowing 
from its irregular collection there could be no credit which was lawfully 
due to ... [Hom]. It follows that [Hom] ... could not properly and 
lawfully receive the proceeds of the cheque and this limitation must 
surely apply to [ABSA] ... , ifhe were to be characterised as the mere 
agent of ... [ABSA]. 749 
He held that there was no set-off as the sum in question was not legally due to 
See the judgment at 746-7. 
At 747F, where he said that 'the plaintiff had no mandate to effect payment inasmuch as Unitrans 
had not authorised the plaintiff to effect payment.' Cfthe introductory part of this chapter. 
At 747F-G. 
See 747-748, quoting from the 1983 edition of Malan's Bills a/Exchange, Cheques and 
Promissory Notes in South African Law (at 282) and Cowen and Gering (n 127) (at 23-4 and 37). 
See the judgment at 7481-J. 
See the judgment at 749A-B. 
Hom. Finally, he rejected the argument that ABSA (the first defendant) was not 
unjustifiably enriched (as it was not the recipiens of the money) in these terms: 
Once the money had reached the fust defendant qua bank, albeit 
illegally, ... such money became the property of the first defendant. 
Against such money, at the best for him, the second defendant [Hom] 
had a proprietory right or interest, although it had in fact become the 
property of the fust defendant. The fust defendant in this matter chose 
to extinguish the indebtedness, that is the overdraft of its customer, the 
second defendant, and to retain same on account of set-off. As I have 
indicated earlier, such an approach is simply unacceptable and in fact 
there is no question about the fact that the first defendant was 
unjustifiably enriched on account of retaining the amount of R81 823,94 
by way of a discharge of the second defendant's indebtedness to the first 
defendant. 750 
He accordingly gave judgment for Standard Bank. 
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The judgment attracted a mixed response from academic commentators. Thus 
Visser said that it was 'sound in all respects and adds an important illustration of the 
proper application of the principles of the condictio sine causa.' 751 Malan and 
Pretorius/52 on the other hand, were critical of the judgment. Echoing German law, they 
said that payment of the cheque constituted 
performance by the drawee to the drawer, and performance by the drawer 
to the payee .... It can also be, depending on the agreement between the 
parties, performance or discharge by a customer of his debt to his bank, 
the collecting bank.... Where a cheque is accepted by a collecting bank 
partly in discharge of its customer's overdraft, as in the present case, the 
overdraft is discharged to that extent and consequently no question of 
enrichment of the collectin9 bank can arise: the bank has received what was due to it, suum recipit. 53 
ABSA then took the case to the Supreme Court of Appeal. 754 The appeal court 
stated that' [i]t was common cause in the Court a quo that because the cheque was for 







D P Visser 'Unjustified enrichment' 1995 ASSAL 225 at 232. 
Malan and Pretorius (1996) 8 South African Mercantile Law Journal 399 . 
At 400. 
ABSA Bank Ltd v Standard Bank of SA Ltd Supra. 
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pay the amount thereof, payment to the appellant had been made sine causa.' 755 It was 
also common cause that the onus fell upon ABSA to prove that it had not been enriched 
by the payment. The court accordingly said that the only question at issue was whether 
ABSA had been enriched by the amount of Hom's overdraft. 756 In order to answer this 
question, continued the court, it first had to be decided whether Standard Bank's 
payment had discharged Hom's debt to ABSA.757 
The appeal court agreed with the lower court's rejection of the argument that 
ABSA had not been enriched by the payment as it had merely acted as Horn's agent in 
receiving the payment, and that Horn was thus the enriched party.758 According to Van 
Heerden DCl, the collecting bank acts as its customer's agent in presenting a cheque to 
the drawee bank, 'but once the amount in question is effectively credited to the payee's 
account there is no longer any question of an agency relationship.' 759 This is because of 
the relationship between the payee and the collecting bank. When the amount in 
question is reflected against the payee's account, said the judge, the payee either 
acquires a claim against the bank for this amount (if his account has a positive balance) 
or the bank's claim against him is reduced by this amount or extinguished (if his account 
has a negative balance). 760 
Thus, for example, if someone has an account with a positive balance of R 1 000 
and he deposits a cheque for R600 in that account, the cheque is presented and honoured 
and his account is credited with R600, he will a claim against the bank for Rl 600. If, 
on the other hand, his account had been overdrawn to the amount of R 1 000, the 
payment ofR600 into the account would reduce the bank's claim against him to R400. 
So if a bank receives a payment from a drawee bank, and this is credited to a customer's 
account, the bank's net position remains the same: it receives the money from the 







See the SCA judgment at 251 C-O. 




See the judgment at 251 F. 
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corresponding liability to its customer or a claim against the customer is correspondingly 
reduced or extinguished. 
The Supreme Court of Appeal also dismissed the argument that the payment had 
extinguished Hom's overdraft by way of set-off. The court said that 
set-off did not enter the picture at all. When a customer pays a cash 
amount equal to the debit balance of his overdrawn account into that 
account, there is no question of set-off operating. He simply pays the 
amount owing to the bank. The position is no different if the customer 
deposits a cheque drawn on another bank into his account. If his bank 
collects payment and effectively credits his account, the debt is likewise 
paid (or partially paid).761 
The crucial question, therefore, was whether the payment discharged Hom's debt 
to ABSA.762 ABSA argued that the payment had done so, and that it had correspondingly 
lost its claim against Hom (represented by the overdraft), so its fmancial position was 
unaffected by the payment: it had thus not been enriched.763 Van Heerden DC] 
responded that '[t]he cornerstone of the submission is the premise that the amount of the 
cheque had been unconditionally allocated to Hom's account. If that premise is unsound, 
the edifice which counsel endeavoured to construct on it comes tumbling down.' 764 
The court found that the cheque payment had only provisionally been credited to 
Hom's account, that the forgery came to light before the clearing period elapsed, and that 
the' provisional credit never became a final one.' 765 The edifice thus crumbled, and 
ABSA failed to discharge the onus of proving that it had not been enriched.766 
The ratio of the judgment may be summarised thus: where a bank (D) presents a 
forged cheque to the drawee bank (A) and receives payment from A, bank 0 (the 
collecting bank) will be liable for unjustified enrichment unless the amount in question 








See the judgment at 251 H. 
See the judgment at 2511 in fin. 
At 252A. 
See the judment at 252B-F. 
See the judgment at 252F-G. 
payment on a cheque, a collecting bank acts as its client's agent until the cheque has been 
finally credited to its client's account; if, therefore, the client (C) would be unjustifiably 
enriched by this payment, the collecting bank will be unjustifiably enriched while it is 
still acting as his agent. 
The facts of this case are not exactly analogous to those in the Nedcor case, where 
C had no liability (e g in terms of an overdraft, as in ABSA Bank Ltd v Standard Bank of 
SA Ltd) 767 to the collecting bank. A case with facts that are closer to those in the Nedcor 
case is First National Bank of Southern Africa Ltd v East Coast Design CC and 
Others.768 The facts have already been sketched above: briefly, blank cheques were 
stolen from BP (B) and forged by Roux, who used them to pay a non-refundable deposit 
to his interior designers, East Coast Design (C). The interior designers did some of the 
work, and made some of the purchases stipulated in their contract with Roux.769 BP's 
banker, First National Bank (A), honoured these cheques in error and sued C for recovery 
of the amount thus paid to C.770 It seems that Roux ceded the 'benefits' of his contract 
with East Coast Design to A.77I 
The first point to note is that the court (per Kondile 1) did not even consider the 
possibility that First National Bank should rather have brought an enrichment action 
against BP. Indeed, the judge seems to regard it as self-evident that A should not sue B: 
'Because no mandate was given by BP to [First National Bank] ... in respect of the 
payment, the loss became the [bank's] ... and not BP'S.,772 
The only question considered was whether A should sue C in such 
circumstances. A's first claim was based on the condictio sine causa. Again, the court 
framed the requirements for this remedy along the lines of the general requirements for 









See the judgment at 141A-F. 
See the judgment at 140-1, and the summary at p 265 above. 
See the judgment at 141 B. 
See the judgment at 140E-F. 
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the plaintiff and that such enrichment be sine causa).773 
The court began by rejecting the plaintiff's argument that, according to ABSA 
Bank Ltd v Standard Bank of SA Ltd,774 'in determining whether the payment ... was 
made sine causa, the existence of a contract between Roux and [East Coast Design] ... 
is irrelevant; that the decisive question remains whether a causa existed between [First 
National Bank] ... and [East Coast Design] .... ' The judge said that the ABSA case had 
turned on the question of enrichment, and could thus not be cited in support of these 
arguments. He proceeded to hold that East Coast Design had indeed been enriched at 
the expense of First National Bank.775 The main focus of the judgment was accordingly 
the question whether such enrichment was sine causa. 
In answering this question, the court went slightly further than previous courts, 
defining the sine causa requirement as the absence of a causa retinendi.776 The judge 
cited with approval the view expressed by Visser that this requirement necessitates an 
evaluation of all the other requirements of the condictio, looked at together.777 
The court then proceeded to consider these requirements again in more detail. In 
discussing whether East Coast Design had been enriched, the judge mentioned that East 
Coast Design, relying on Govender's778 and B & H Engineering's779 cases, had argued 
that the cheques had extinguished a liability 'and that it was unnecessary that there must 
h~ve been some contractual duty by the payer towards the payee.' 780 The court 









Cfthe approach of the Appellate Division in in B & H Engineering v First National Bank o/SA 
Ltd supra. Also see the comment of Sieg Eiselen 'Fraudulent cheque payments and unjustified 
enrichment - confusion reigns' (2001) 118 SAL! 415: 'The court deals ... with the sine causa 
requirement as if it is a specific requirement of the condictio sine causa specialis and not one of 
the general requirements that must be proved to found enrichment liability.' 
Supra. 
141I-J. 
Referring to Visser's contribution to Hutchison (ed) Wille's Principles 634-5. See D P Visser 
'Unjustified enrichment' (2000) ASSAL 273 at 277. 
At 142A-C. Cf criticism of this approach by Eiselen (2001) 118 SAL! 415 at 416. See Visser's 
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that they dealt with countermanded, and not forged, cheques, and that the drawers and 
payees in those cases had concluded 'debt-extinguishing agreements', whereas there was 
no such agreement between BP and East Coast Design in this case.781 The judge said 
that '[t]he bank here, unlike in the B & H Engineering case, is "paying somebody else's 
debt." ,782 
The court also considered the possibility that East Coast Design could be 
regarded as having lost the enrichment. The plaintiffs lawyers argued that East Coast 
Design had no right to the full contract price for the services it had rendered in terms of 
the contract, as the services in question were not worth the contract price. 783 The judge 
said that the contract between Roux and East Coast Design had to be looked at in its 
entirety and all the surrounding circumstances had to be taken into account.784 Thus he 
gave attention to the fact that East Coast Design turned away other profitable 
opportunities in order to carry out its contractual duties to Roux,785 the fact that the 
deposit was non-refundable, and the interior designers' willingness to perform in terms 
of the contract. 786 
This led the judge to conclude that 'the fact that [East Coast Design] ... made a 
bargain and profit and has been enriched in the sense of gaining as a result of the terms 
ofthe contract does not give rise to a condictio sine causa, or any condictio, since its 
enrichment is contractual and justified and no obligation arises from justifiable 
enrichment.,787 Putting it slightly differently, he held that East Coast Design 'acquired 
the money ex causa onerosa and therefore it cannot be considered to have been 













See Visser 2000 ASSAL 273 at 274, where he remarks that by suggesting that such 'detrimental 
side effects' should be taken into account, the court had followed a similar approach to that 
currently espoused by English law. 
See the judgment at 143E-J. 
At 143J-144A. 
At 144C-D. At 144B, the judge quoted the following sentence from Govender's case supra: 
, ... [W]here a plaintiff sues for recovery of his property or money which has come into the hands 
of a defendant who received it from another, the defendant is not obliged to make restitution 
• 
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To sum up then, the court reasoned as follows: BP (B) owed no debt to East 
Coast Design (C) and did not conclude any debt-extinguishing agreement with East 
Coast Design. The payment of the cheques had accordingly not extinguished any debt 
owed by B to C. B was therefore not enriched in the circumstances. The judge 
effectively held that although C was enriched, A's action against C could not succeed 
because C's enrichment was not sine causa as C had given some performance to X in 
exchange for the payment. 
Analysis 
The first point to note is that the more recent decisions suggest that the appropriate 
action would be a condictio sine causa.789 The courts state that the requirements ofthis 
action are twofold: there must be enrichment, and it must be sine causa. The approach 
of the appeal court in a banking context is to concentrate on the issue of enrichment, so I 
will begin with that requirement. 790 
Enrichment 
The first question is therefore who was enriched by the bank's payment. This in turn 
raises the question whether any debt to C was discharged by A's payment where A 
received no valid instruction (whether this is called an Anweisung, a delegatio solvendi 
or a mandate) to make the payment. In my view, this may be answered in the negative. 
Firstly, in order for an obligation to be extinguished by a cheque payment, the 
parties (the drawer and the payee) must conclude a valid 'debt-extinguishing 
789 
790 
under the condictio sine causa where he acquired it ex causa onerosa, i e for value .... The reason 
is that, although there was no contract or debt as between plaintiff and defendant ... he is not 
considered to have been unjustifiably enriched .... ' The court went on to consider whether 
members of East Coast Design would be liable to First National Bank in terms of the law of 
delict (based on the condictioJurtiva, which is, in South African law, regarded as a delictual 
remedy.) The judge held that this claim had been abandoned by the plaintiffs and he therefore 
did not decide the case on this basis: see his judgment at 146B-C. 
See the judgments discussed above, and (obiter) Commissioner oJCustoms and Excise v Bank oj 
Lisbon International Ltd and Another 1994 (1) SA 205 (N) at 214-15. 
As in B & H Engineering v First National Bank oJSA Ltd and ABSA v Standard Bank This 
approach was followed by the Witwatersrand court in Nedcor Bank Ltd v ABSA Bank and 




agreement,.791 In cases where B pays C by cheque and then countermands it, the parties 
clearly conclude a valid and binding debt-extinguishing agreement.792 If the drawer 
countermands the cheque, and the bank obeys the countermand, the drawer will have 
breached his debt-extinguishing agreement with C. According to the judge of appeal in 
the case of B & H Engineering, if the bank did not obey the countermand, and paid the 
cheque, '[t]he debt-extinguishing agreement achieved its purpose. The creditor (payee) 
received his money. There is no need or justification in my view for the law to 
discountenance this result. ' 
There may, however, be reasons for discountenancing such a result in cases 
where the bank paid C where it had not received any valid instruction to do so. It can be 
argued that any debt-extinguishing agreement concluded by the parties where there was 
no valid instruction to A must surely be invalid for the same policy reasons that underlie 
the invalidity of the cheque. Thus, ifB draws a cheque on bank A and uses it to pay his 
creditor C, and the cheque is invalid due to non-compliance with formal requirements, 
the debt-extinguishing agreement between B and C must also be invalid, otherwise the 
formal requirements would be pointless. (For example, if B paid C with an unsigned 
cheque, and their debt-extinguishing agreement were valid, the debt would be 
extinguished notwithstanding the requirement that cheques must be signed.) Similarly, 
ifB's signature on a cheque is forged, and X uses the cheque to pay his own debt to C, 
there is clearly no debt-extinguishing agreement between Band C,793 and any debt-
extinguishing agreement between X and C must surely be void for illegality; otherwise 
the debt X-C could be extinguished and X could achieve the illegal result he was aiming 
for. 794 Where the bank makes an overpayment, there would arguably be a valid debt-






Alternatively, one could argue that even if the debt-extinguishing agreement 
See B & H Engineering v First National Bank of SA Ltd supra. 
See B & H Engineering v First National Bank of SA Ltd supra at 291 H. 
See Eiselen (2001) liS SAil 415 at 416. 
Thus the court's decision that Ntamakunsi was enriched by the bank's payment in the Nedcor 
case must be incorrect. 
Because the parties (B and C) did not agree to this. In this regard, see S v Graham supra at 574. 
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were regarded as valid, the condition contained in that agreement (i e that payment by 
cheque is accepted on condition that the bank subsequently pays or honours the cheque) 
should not - on policy grolU1ds - be fulfilled by the bank's erroneously honouring the 
cheque. 796 
In other words, if the bank pays C in circumstances where it has not received a 
valid instruction to do so, any debt-extinguishing agreement concluded by the relevant 
parties797 might achieve its purpose but this result cannot be countenanced, for reasons 
of public policy. Otherwise there would be a situation where payments by means of 
lU1signed cheques, or forged cheques, might have the same effect as cash payments, and 
the law would apparently condone violations of rules that are there to protect banks, 
their clients, and the payees of cheques. To accept that forged or stolen cheques could 
validly discharge a debt would also be to facilitate money-lalU1dering schemes.798 
The finding of the Appellate Division, in the case of B & H Engineering, that a 
bank's payment will discharge the drawer's debt to the payee whether or not the bank 
was acting within a mandate given by its client must therefore be interpreted only to 
apply to cases of countermand.799 
The court came to its conclusion in that case by considering the relative positions 
of the parties. The argument that a bank's payment should not discharge a debt where 
the bank had never received a valid 'mandate' for such payment can similarly be 
justified by a comparison of the interests of the parties, as is done in German law. 
Thus one can argue that B (the bank's client) should not be involved at all. As 
he had given no valid instruction to his bank, there is no reason why the bank's payment 






See the views of Cowen (1983) 16 ClLSA 1 discussed above at p 236 ff. 
In other words, the drawer/client (B) and C or, in the case of theft or forgery, X and C. 
For such a scheme, see First National Bank of Southern Africa Ltd v Perry NO and Others supra. 
Cfthe distinction drawn by Kondile J in East Coast Design at 142E-143B. 
It will be remembered that, in the case of B & H Engineering v First National Bank of SA Ltd, the 
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court rejected the argument that A was paying as a third party 
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reason to attribute A's performance to B. Or, to put it differently, there are no grounds 
for concluding that B should be regarded as the legal recipiens of A's payment: Cis 
thus both the factual and the legal recipiens of the payment. 801 In addition, as suggested 
above, B arguably did not conclude any valid debt-extinguishing agreement with C for 
the amount in question. The South African judgments cited above all agree that B 
should be left out of the picture:802 in each case the court clearly regarded it as 




So, who should bear the risk that a bank might honour a cheque that was not 
and rather held that it acted as a 'neutral functionary' and that 'the debtor [paid] ... his own debt 
through the instrumentality of the bank.' See the judgment at 293G. Also see the discussion of 
the effect of A's performance on the relationship between Band C in terms of German law at p 
183 above. 
In other words, there was no datio to B. This can be compared with the thinking behind the 
Leistungsbegriffin German law. 
Also see National Bank of Southern Africa Ltd v Perry NO and Others supra at 968A-B: 'When 
FNB [A] became aware of these facts it credited KwaZuJu [B] with the amount of the forged 
cheque, as it had had no right to have debited its account in the first place.' See further Kunneke 
v Eerste Nasionale Bank van Suidelike Afrika Bpk 1997 (3) SA 300 (T) at 307B-C. 
But cf the older case of John Bell & Co v Esselen supra. In this case, Tucker (X) and Grimbeek 
were the secretary and manager of John Bell & Co (B). As such, they were authorised 'jointly to 
sign and issue cheques on its behalf in the ordinary course of business and payment of such 
amounts of money as might be owing to its various creditors from time to time.' (See the 
judgment at 150B.) Tucker concluded a contract, in his personal capacity, in terms of which he 
agreed to purchase a farm from Esselen, and to pay to pay a deposit of £275. Tucker paid this 
amount by means of a cheque signed by himself and Grimbeek 'for and on behalf of lohn Bell & 
Company Limited'. (See 150B.) The cheque was subsequently met by the company's bankers. 
To summarise therefore, the bank honoured a cheque which was signed by the appropriate 
signatories of company B, but which was not authorised by the company as it had been signed 
and used for an improper purpose. The court was not prepared to impute the knowledge of 
Tucker and Grimbeek to the company. The recipient, C, also acted bonafide and received the 
cheque in settlement of a valid debt, owed not by B but by Tucker. B's claim against C failed. 
The court held that the condictio furtiva would not lie, as C had not been party to the fraud (see 
the judgment at 15IF-152A). The condictio indebiti also failed, because the court said that this 
was 'not a case where a person knowingly makes a payment in a mistaken belief of fact that the 
payment is due: in such a case the condictio indebiti will lie. In this case the position is that [X] 
... in fraud of and without the knowledge of [B) ... handed its cheque to [C] ... in payment of his 
own debt.' The court held that B had no recourse against C because the English doctrine of 
conversion does not apply in our law (at 153). Although it did not discuss it in these terms, the 
court seemed to assume that B's debt to C had been extinguished by the debt (and it said that C 
had given value for the cheque). This case can be distinguished from those discussed in the text 
in that the bank was not the plaintiff; the cheque had, from the bank's point of view, been validly 
completed. This case can also be compared with the more recent case of First National Bank of 
Southern Africa Ltd v Perry NO and Others supra, where the Supreme Court of Appeal (per 
Schutz JA) seemed to assume that C would be liable vis-a-vis A for enrichment: see the 
judgment at 9661-J, 968H-I and 971H-1. (In this case there were at least two triangles and, in 
each ofthem, A had an enrichment claim against C). Also cf Firstrand Bank Ltdformerly First 
National Bank of SA Ltd v ABSA Bank Ltd 200 I (I) SA 803 (W). 
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validly drawn by its client: the payee or the bank itself? 
The bank's position is much the same in this case as it would be in the case of 
countermand. It has made a payment by mistake. It has accordingly breached its 
underlying agreement with its client and must reverse any debit made in consequence of 
the payment. It could justifiably be argued that the bank should have to bear the risk 
that its employees may make mistakes, and that it should therefore carry the loss caused 
by any such mistake. It should be borne in mind, however, that the primary function of 
the law of enrichment is to reverse unjustified gains, and not to allocate liability based 
on fault. 804 
Let us consider the position of the payee. A creditor always bears the risk that 
his contract partner might not pay at all, and accepting payment by cheque carries with it 
the risk that the cheque might be dishonoured. These are normal risks that a contractant 
takes upon himself. It is reasonable for him to bear such risks because he has a chance 
to assess the creditworthiness and honesty of his contract partner when entering into the 
contract. 
Would the conclusion that a bank that mistakenly honoured a cheque could claim 
back its payment be unjustifiably adding to the risks borne by the payee, as was held in 
case of countermand in the B & H Engineering case?805 In that case, the court 
considered that allowing the bank an enrichment claim would increase the payee's risks 
because the payee would be in a worse position if the bank honoured the cheque and 
then reclaimed its payment than if the cheque were immediately dishonoured, because 
he would lose his right to sue on the cheque and thus lose the advantages of the cheque's 
being a liquid document. The factors to be taken into account in the case where there 
was no valid instruction by the client at all are slightly different. Thus, if the cheque was 
forged or unsigned, for example, the payee could not sue on the cheque anyway. As 
804 
805 
See, e g, see Reinhard Zimmermann 'Unjustified emichment: the modern civilian approach' 
(1995) 15 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 403 at 404. 
See that judgment at 287F. 
293 
Moseneke J said in Standard Bank of SA Ltd vABSA Bank Ltd and Another,806 it would 
be a 'nullity'. Having parted with the document would thus not cause the payee any 
disadvantage. Similarly, he would not lose any rights under the cheque that he would 
otherwise have had. Likewise, if a bank makes an overpayment, the payee clearly 
cannot sue for the excess on the cheque. The argument that the balance of risks would 
be upset by regarding the bank's payment as not having discharged any debt B-C 
therefore does not apply in this context. 
(Bearing in mind that it was dealing with a bona fide payee) the court in B & H 
also held that the payee should not be drawn into matters between the drawer and the 
bank. I think that there is perhaps adequate justification for doing so in this case. For 
example, a payee who accepts payment by cheque should look at the document and 
refuse to accept it ifit is unsigned, or if the name printed on the cheque is not the same 
as that of the signatory.807 Thus alann bells should have rung in the minds of the 
employees of East Coast Design when they received a BP cheque from Roux. Similarly, 
a payee should realise that there has been a mistake when he receives more than he 
should, as happened in the case of African Diamond Exporters. In other words, as the 
German lawyers argue, C's reliance on the validity of the cheque is not worthy of 
protection in such cases.808 
This raises the question whether the awareness, or bona fides, of the payee 
should playa role, as it does - at least in German law - in cases of countermand. For 
example, if C receives a forged cheque from X, should the fact that he is not aware of 
the fraud make any difference? The weight of authority in Germany says that the bona 
fides of the payee is irrelevant to the question of enrichment. This is not only the 
conclusion of academic writers but also of the courts. In my view, this approach should 




Supra, at 744B-C. 
This may be contrasted with the situation of a countermanded cheque, where there is nothing on 
the face of the cheque to indicate that it has been countermanded: see p 257 above. 
This was, in effect, the result in the African Diamond Exporters case. In Nedcor's case, A should 
thus have succeeded with an action against C (ETS). 
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validity of cheques outweigh the protection of C's reliance interest. 809 Thus, for 
example, it is more important that fraud is not seen to be condoned; that parties take care 
to write their cheques carefully, complying with the formal requirements for validity; 
that banks' clients do not have their accounts debited for payments made without valid 
. . d 810 InstructIOn; afl so on. 
This is, in result, what was decided by the Supreme Court of Appeal (per Schutz 
JA) in the case of First National Bank of Southern Africa Ltd v Perry NO and Others. 811 
The facts of this case, which concerned a money-laundering scheme, are extremely 
complicated. Any attempt to illustrate them in a diagram results in something 
resembling the famous map of the London underground. Essentially, there were two 
'enrichment triaflgles'. In the fust, a blank cheque was stolen from the government of 
KwaZulu-Natal (BI) and someone entered the name of Frankel Pollack Vinderine (a 
fum of stockbrokers, CI) as payee. First National Bank (AI), the drawee of the cheque, 
paid the amount in question to C 1. A 1 debited B l' s account, discovered the forgery afld 
reversed the debit. 812 lne court seemed to accept that this was correct, and that Al was 
entitled to recover the amount in question from C 1. Instead of suing C I for enrichment, 
however, Al took cession of an enrichment claim held by CI that arose from the second 
triaflgle. 813 
This second triangle concerned Frankel Pollack Vinderine (now A2), its client, 
Dambha (B2), 'who was alleged to have been associated with a fraud, of which the 
forgery of the cheque formed a part' ,814 afld Nedbank (C2). In this triangle, B2 
instructed the stockbrokers, A2, to pay some of the funds received from First National 
Bank in terms of the forged cheque to various recipients (C2). (This instruction was 
presumably also tainted by the fraud afld therefore defective.) One of these recipients 







Bearing in mind that, in many cases, he should be aware of the invalidity or absence of an 
instruction, as said above. 
These factors also outweigh the argument that cheque payments should be regarded as flnal. 
Supra. 
For these facts, see the judgment at 965F-966D. 
See the judgment at 9661-967 A. Cf the German notion of a Kondiktion der KondikJion. 
At 964D-E. 
295 
question from A2. The account-holder was insolvent, and the question was whether A2 
had a valid enrichment claim against Nedbank (C2) (which would be held by Al in 
terms of the cession). The court accepted that the money passed to Nedbank815 and that 
it was enriched because the account-holder in question had no corresponding claim to 
the money.816 The court held that, in principle, A2 had a valid enrichment claim (a 
condictio ob turpem vel iniustam causam) against C2. It is significant that the judge 
took great pains to expand the scope of this remedy precisely in order to hold that its 
requirements would be met even if the defendant was not aware of the turpitude at the 
time when it received the enrichment.817 He therefore held that, for the purposes of this 
condictio, it was sufficient that Nedbank subsequently became aware of the illegality. 
What is important about this judgment for present purposes is that it confirms 
that A can sue C for enrichment, and it holds that C would be liable - under the 
condictio ob turpem vel iniustam causam - despite its (C's) initial ignorance of the 
invalidity of the cheque. When the Supreme Court of Appeal recognises a general 
enrichment action, it may not be necessary even to require subsequent awareness of 
illegality. 
The better view is thus that a bank's payment to C in the absence of any valid 
instruction by its client should not discharge any debt owed to C,818 whether or not C 
was aware of the absence of such a valid instruction. This is not to say that C' s potential 
bona fides has no relevance at all. Our law is sirnilar to German law in that it allows the 
defence of loss of enrichment. In German law, the defence can be raised by a party who 
was initially enriched but who subsequently loses or disposes of the enrichment. 
Although there is some uncertainty as to the scope of the defence in South Africa, 819 it 
seems clear that a bonafide recipient would be entitled to raise such a defence in the 








See 971, particularly D-E: 'I consider that this is a case in which we may and should extend the 
operation of the condictio in order to cope with modem conditions.' 
By B or anyone else, ega thief or forger (X). 
In this regard, see Visser 1992 Acta Juridica 175. 
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Exporters case.820 
To swn up, A's payment to C should not discharge any debt owed to C;821 C 
would thus be enriched by A's payment822 (whether or not C or his contract partner had 
perfonned in terms of their contract); and C's good faith should be relevant only to the 
question of loss of enrichment. The payee should bear the normal risks of dishonour or 
non-payment, and, in addition, the risk that he might have to return a mistaken payment 
to the bank and thus fall back on a suit for breach of contract against his contract partner. 
The bank should bear the risk that the payee might bona fide lose or dispose of the 
enrichment. The bank's client should bear no risk that his bank might make a payment 
without his valid instruction. This seems a fair balance of the interests of the parties. 
Against this background, some further observations about the cases may be 
made. In Nedcor case, A's action against C failed because C was regarded as not having 
been enriched; the court concluded (obiter) that X had been enriched by A's payment. 
For the reasons explained above, this decision must be incorrect. 
Although the court focused on the sine causa requirement in the case of East 
Coast Design, it made several findings regarding the requirement of enrichment. Thus 
the court held that payment by means of a forged cheque did not extinguish an 
obligation between B (BP) and C because these parties did not conclude a debt 
extinguishing agreement.823 This is the same conclusion arrived at in German law: a 
payment resulting from a defective or non-existent Anweisung should not be allowed to 
extinguish any debt between Band C. 
The judge in the East Coast Design case distinguished this case from B & H 
Engineering on the grounds that this case did not concern a countermanded cheque and 





Supra. Also see First National Bank of Southern Africa Ltd v Perry NO and Others supra 
(obiter) at 972E-F. Cf, in result, Trahair v Webb & Co supra. 
Whether by B (the account-holder) or anyone else. 
ill other words, C would be the recipiens legally as well as factually. 
See Eiselen (2001) 118 SALJ 415 at 416 for approval of this aspect of the judgment. 
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Coast Design) in this case. That much is clear and quite unobjectionable. But it does 
not answer the question whether the payment by A to C extinguished the obligation that 
it was intended to extinguish, i e the obligation X-C. In other words, did the payment 
extinguish Roux's obligation to East Coast Design? Kondile J did not answer this 
question directly. He said that '[t]he bank here, unlike in the B & H Engineering case, is 
paying "somebody else's debt"', 824 which implies that the bank's payment indeed 
extinguished X's debt to C. This cannot be so. Clearly the bank did not pay as a third 
party (i e this is not a Chapter Two - or Froman v Robertson-type - situation): the bank 
neither intended to settle X's debt to C, nor did it say to C that it was paying X's debt in 
its own right. As this was neither an authorised payment by a bank, nor payment by a 
third party, it did not extinguish X's debt to C. 
This conclusion can also be explained by saying that any debt-extinguishing 
agreement concluded by X and C would surely have been void for illegality, or that the 
cheque in question was a 'nullity', as suggested above. Thus the Supreme Court of 
Appeal in ABSA v Standard Bank assumed that the forged cheque was a nullity, and the 
only question was whether C or his bank was enriched by A's payment. This suggests 
that payment by means of a forged cheque will not extinguish any obligation. This is, in 
effect, what Kondile J decided in the East Coast Design case. Notwithstanding his 
statement that the bank was paying the debt of another (which would suggest that X, and 
not C, was the enriched party),825 the judge came to the conclusion that C was enriched 
by A's payment.826 
The case of ABSA v Standard Bank827 turned on questions concerning the 'route' 
taken by the funds in question: had Hom (C) been enriched and some of the funds used 
to settle his debt to his bank (D); or was ABSA the recipient (C) and the question was 






As dealt with in Chapter Two. 
As said above, this conclusion can be supported by reference to underlying policy considerations: 
to allow a forged cheque to extinguish a liability would be to allow the forger to achieve his 
illegal purpose. Eiselen approves of the finding of the court that Roux's debt to East Coast 




effectively given some back to ABSA to settle his overdraft? The appeal court 
effectively held that Hom had never been enriched as the payment had never been 
unconditionally reflected against his account. Thus the money had never reached Hom's 
estate and the money therefore remained in ABSA's hands. In other words, ABSA was 
legally the recipient of the payment, and it had not lost its enrichment by provisionally 
crediting its client's account. 
Loss of enrichment 
As suggested above, C should be able to raise his bona fide loss or disposal of the 
enrichment as a defence to A's claim. Thus, in the case of African Diamond Exporters, 
C was enriched, but subsequently bona fide disposed of the enrichment. In that case, 
African Diamond Exporters (C) gave some of the enrichment to B (in terms of a 
subsequent contract). 
Eiselen states that loss of enrichment was one of the issues in the case of East 
Coast Design, although the court did not discuss it in these terms.828 He criticises the 
court for taking into account the fact that the payment to East Coast Design was 'non-
refundable' and that it had turned down further work.829 He says that the first factor is 
'entirely irrelevant' and that the second 'must be carefully considered as it may indicate 
a widening of the scope of the defence of non-enrichment' .830 
I agree that the fact that the deposit paid by Roux to East Coast Design was non-
refundable was irrelevant: this was a term of the contract between Roux and East Coast 
Design, and could not be raised against the bank. 83 1 I think that the fact that East Coast 
Design turned down alternative work should not be taken into account in determining 
whether it was initially enriched by the payment. In my view, East Coast Design was 





See Eiselen (2001) 118 SAil 415 at 416. 
Eiselen (2001) 118 SAU 415 at 417. 
Eiselen (2001) 118 SAil 415 at 417. He uses the tenn 'non-enrichment' to refer to loss of 
enrichment. Cf criticism of this terminology by Visser 1992 Acta Juridica 175 at 197. 
m addition, it could be argued that the bank was not asking for the refund of a payment validly 
made in accordance with its client's instruction, but for the reimbursement of funds that had 
mistakenly been transferred to East Coast Design without any instruction by a client. 
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bona fide disposed of the enrichment. 
In answering this question, any perfonnance made in tenns of the contract 
between C and X in exchange for the cheque payment is also entirely irrelevant. In 
other words, even though it seems that East Coast Design did the work and made the 
purchases (after receiving payment) for Roux in good faith, such performance should not 
have been raised as a defence to the bank's claim. As Eiselen says, 'East Coast could ... 
not raise its perfonnance in tenns of the contract as a defence to the enrichment claim in 
this case, as it still had its full contractual claim for payment from Roux, the other 
contractual party.' 832 
Although the cases of African Diamond Exporters and East Coast Design seem 
similar in that C received a payment and then made a bonafide perfonnance - owed in 
tenns of a contract - to the party who had apparently made the payment, they are 
distinguishable. In the first case, C's perfonnance was not made in tenns of its original 
agreement with B, but in tenns of a subsequent contract. In other words, the 
perfonnance by which C lost some of the enrichment was not made in exchange for the 
payment which seemed to emanate from B. In the case of East Coast Design, on the 
other hand, the perfonnance made by the designers (C) was owed in terms of their 
original contract with Roux, i e it constituted counter-perfonnance to his handing over of 
the cheque. Such a counter-perfonnance can only possibly be relevant to the question 
whether B owed the payment to C or not. It cannot be regarded as a loss of enrichment 
because it is an integral part of the enquiry as to whether C was unjustifiably enriched in 
the first place. If the law recognises that payment by a bank in tenns of a non-existent or 
invalid cheque does not discharge B's or X's obligation to C, C is enriched and remains 
enriched whether or not he has made a perfonnance or subsequently makes a 
perfonnance to B or X833 in exchange for the cheque, as he retains his contractual right 
832 
833 
Eiselen (2001) 118 SAL! 415 at 417. 
The case of King v Cohen Benjamin & Co supra (at 649 ff) implies that the defence ofloss of 
enrichment may be raised against the party who has caused the enrichment in the first place. In 
this case, B was apparently interested in becoming a tenant in a 'tenant ownershlp scheme' of a 
block of flats. The scheme was to be run, and the building to be built, by a company which was 
to be set up by X. Before the company had been established, B handed a cheque to X, as a 
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against B or X.834 
To sum up, C will be enriched by the bank's payment but will only have to return 
the enrichment (assuming that the other requirementis of the enrichment action are met), 
if he is still enriched, or if - where he is no longer enriched - he acted mala/ide in 
disposing ofthe enrichment. 
Sine causa 
The second requirement posed by the courts for the condictio sine causa in this context 
is that the enrichment be sine causa.835 As said above, the approach of our highest court 
over the last decade has been to focus on the question of enrichment in cases involving 
cheque payments.836 In the case of East Coast Design, however, the court partly based 
its decision on the sine causa requirement: C was held not to be liable as it was enriched 
cum causa. 
This raises several points of interest. Firstly, the fact that courts dealing with 
matters of enrichment in the context of cheque payments do not pay much attention to 
the sine causa requirement is not surprising. In cases where the alleged enrichment took 




deposit, with the instruction that it should be held in trust by a fum of accountants, C, whom X 
had apparently mentioned as the prospective trustees of the scheme. C, however, did not hold the 
cheque in trust for B, but instead endorsed it over to X. The court held that at the time of receipt 
of the cheque, C was unaware ofX's intentions and acted bonafide in diverting the cheque to X 
(see the judgment at 648A-E). B brought a claim against C for repayment of the amount of the 
cheque. B argued that the amount was claimable on the basis of the condictio indebiti, as it 
constituted payment of an unowed sum under the 'mistaken belief ... that they were the trustees 
under the tenant ownership scheme, when in fact they were not' (at 648F). The court rejected 
this argument on the basis of that C was not enriched (at 650B in fin). 
In other words, C may only raise the defence of loss of enrichment if he bonafide concludes 
another contract (with B, or X, or anyone else) in terms of which he disposes of or loses his gain. 
See, for example, Govender v Standard Bank o/South Africa supra at 404D-405C; First National 
Bank o/South Africa v B & H Engineering supra at 44B-D; B & H Engineering v First National 
Bank o/South Africa supra at 285C. J C Sonnekus 'Ongeregverdigde verryking en 
ongeregverdigde verarming vir kondikering in drieparty-verhoudings' 1996 TSAR 1 says (at 8) 
that this requirement is of importance in limiting the number of claims based on unjustified 
enrichment and it also takes into account the fact that the law of enrichment forms part of the law 
of obligations. 
As in B & H Engineering v First National Bank o/SA Ltd supra and ABSA Bank Ltd v Standard 
Bank o/SA Ltd supra. Also see Visser (n 13) at 541. 
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extinguished necessarily entails looking at the contract - or other causa - from which 
that liability arose. The two requirements go hand in hand in such cases. If the liability 
is extinguished, the creditor is not enriched (his receipt of the promised performance is 
cancelled out by his loss of the claim thereto), and whatever he received is received cum 
causa (as it must have corresponded with the terms of the obligation for that obligation 
to have been extinguished). Where a debtor's liability is extinguished by his bank's 
payment, he will be enriched, and whether his enrichment is sine causa or not depends 
on his relationship with the bank. 
If, on the other hand, the liability is not extinguished by the bank's payment, the 
creditor is enriched (as he has received something and retains his claim against the 
debtor), as argued above. Whether his enrichment is sine causa or not can potentially 
lead to difficulties, however. In this context, it has been held that once enrichment has 
been proven, it will be assumed that it was sine causa and the defendant bears the onus 
of rebutting this presumption.837 (This can probably be explained by the difficulty 
involved in proving a negative). Practically speaking, therefore, it seems that the 
defendant has to prove a legal ground for his enrichment, i e to show that it took place 
cum causa. 838 The problem is that, in the factual circumstances presently under 
consideration, the defendant may have had a contract with someone other than the 
bank's client. 
In which relationship must there be a valid causa for the enrichment to be 
justified according to South African law? For enrichment to be sine causa, must there 
be no valid obligation at all, or must it just be established that there was no valid 
obligation between two parties in particular? If so, who are these parties? In the case of 
837 
838 
See Standard Bank o/SA Ltd v ABSA Bank Ltd supra at 745F-G. This point was apparently not 
challenged on appeal. 
Cf Sonnekus 1996 TSAR 1 at 3, and at 9 where he says that 'die onus om iedereen van die 
vereistes van 'n vordering gebaseer op ongegronde verryldng te bewys [rus] op die eiser. Hy 
moet dus ook bewys dat die vermoenverskuiwing sine causa plaasgevind het.' (' [T]he onus to 
prove anyone of the requirements of a claim based on unjustified enrichment rests on the 
plaintiff. He must therefore also prove that the shift of assets took place sine causa.' My 
translation.) Eiselen (2001) 118 SAU 415 says (at 416) that ' [a] causa in this context could be 
something like a contractual or delictual obligation to make perment or perform or a legal 
obligation to perform in terms of some statutory obligation such as income tax.' 
I 
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East Coast Design, the court sought, and fOW1d, a causa for C's enrichment in C's 
relationship with X: C's enrichment was held to be cum causa because C was entitled to 
payment in terms of a contract with X. In ABSA v Standard Bank,839 on the other hand, 
the Supreme Court of Appeal seemed to look for the causa for the payment A-C in the 
bank's relationship with its client (B-A): it effectively held that the bank paid sine 
causa because it had no valid mandate from its client. Can someone raise a contract 
with B or X as a defence against an enrichment action brought by A? Would such a 
contract provide a causa for the shift of assets?840 
If one analyses the interests of the parties, and the policies at play in situations 
where a bank makes a payment in terms of a stolen and forged cheque, the approach in 
First National Bank v East Coast Design (i e that the causa for the payment A-C can be 
found in the relationship between X and C) cannot be supported. Effectively, the court's 
finding opens the door for the recipient of a forged cheque to defeat the enrichment 
claim of the drawee bank by citing his contract with the thief or forger, i e the party who 
made the fraudulent instruction and thus caused the drawee bank to hand over the money 
in the first place. This seems unfair to the bank in that the very reason why it has lost 
money is used as a defence against its claim. It is, as it were, hit over the head with its 
own weapon. To accept such an approach would upset the balance of interests sketched 
above. 841 
But can this position be explained by reference to legal principles? In this 
regard, German law, which places more emphasis on the sine causa requirement than 
South African law,842 should be considered. As explained above, German law regards 
the relevant 'causal relationship' for A's payment as being the underlying contract 






That the location of the causa is an important issue is shown by the fact that there has been so 
much debate in German law as to whether the underlying contract between a bank and its client, 
or the Anweisung, constitutes the 'causal relationship' for the bank's payment. 
For example, it is fair for C to bear the risk of the dishonesty of his contract-partner, whose 
character and creditworthiness C had an opportunity to assess at the time of contracting. 
This is probably partly because of the wording of § 812, which requires merely that someone 
'receive something', and not that he be enriched. 
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payment to C must generally be sought in the underlying relationship between A and B. 
This means that A's enrichment action must generally be directed against B. In cases 
where there is no valid Anweisung, however, A will have an enrichment claim directly 
against C, and not against B, because A's payment cannot be attributed to B. In such 
cases, any contract (or other obligation) between B and C is irrelevant. 843 
Analogous reasoning may be found in South African case law. It has been 
repeatedly stated that an enrichment action844 can only lie between the solvens and the 
recipiens of a payment. This implies that the only relevant causa would be one lying 
between these two parties. Our law recognises, however, that someone other than the 
party who actually received ownership may be regarded as the recipiens. 845 Similarly, 
someone other than the party who actually transferred ownership may be regarded as the 
solvens.846 For this to happen, there must be some ground for attributing the 
performance in question to this other party.847 In the circumstances presently under 
consideration, A's handing over would not be attributed to B: here, A is the solvens and 
C is the recipiens of A's payment, and therefore the only causa that could defeat A's 
enrichment claim should be one linking A and C. 
Another way of explaining this is that, because there is no valid Anweisung in 






Because, even if there is such an obligation, it will not be extinguished by A's handing over to C. 
A condictio indebiti, but the same reasoning can be applied in this context. 
See, e g, Phillips v Hughes, Hughes v Maphumelo supra at 228A: 'The recipiens is not 
necessarily the person into whose hands the money was actually put when it was paid. He is the 
one who must be considered, in all the circumstances of the case, truly to have received the 
payment. Whenever a payment is made to an agent with authority to accept it, for instance, the 
recipiens is the principal, not the agent. A conduit through whom payment passes is likewise not 
its recipiens. Instead he who obtains payment by such means is.' Also see Licences and General 
Insurance Co v Ismay supra and the discussion at p 203 ff above. 
Cf Bawman, De Wet and Du Plessis NNO and Others v Fidelity Bank Ltd supra, where the 
Appellate Division rejected the argument that the parties who had made the payment (i e the 
datio) were not the same as those who were now suing with the condictio indebiti. The court 
held that there was ample authority in our law for the fact that a party who stood in a fiduciary 
relationship to the party who actually made the unowed payment is entitled to bring a condictio 
indebiti to reclaim this overpayment. It is not a very big step from this to accepting that someone 
who has given a mandate, appointed a delegate, or made an Anweisung can also claim -
especially in a banking context, as the relationship between banker and client has various 
fiduciary aspects. 
Such as a relationship of agency, or a fiduciary relationship. 
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performs to Band B performs to C) does not apply. Because B does not create this 
notional triangle by making an Anweisung, A's performance to C is in law what it is in 
fact: a handing over from A to C. The situation only involves two parties, and the 
enrichment action lies between A and C. If it is accepted that a payment by a bank in 
accordance with its client's instruction is a case of delegatio solvendi, the same 
reasoning can be used in our law. The Roman fiction that a datio by A to C can be 
regarded as two dationes (A-B and B-C) does not come into play where B has not 
validly instructed or authorised A to perform to C. Because there is no valid instruction 
or authorisation, it is not a case of delegatio solvendi at all, but a simple two-party 
situation. A's datio is to C; A is the solvens and C is the recipiens. 
Similarly, an instruction made by a fourth party, such as a forger or thief, caJmot 
call the fictional triangle into being. His instruction is a 'nullity', as was held in ABSA v 
Standard Bank. There is no justification, therefore, for regarding A's payment to C as a 
datio by A to X, and a datio by X to C. Again, it is not a case of delegatio solvendi but a 
two-party situation: A must therefore sue C directly.848 
This line of reasoning implies that, where there is no valid instruction at all, the 
only relevant parties are A and C. This in tum suggests that the only relevant causa 
would be one lying between A and c. 849 In other words, it could be argued that C 
cmmot raise a valid contract with B or X as a defence against an enrichment claim 
brought by A, where A paid C in the absence of a valid instruction by B. Following this 
reasoning, a valid underlying contract between A and B would also be irrelevant: A 
might have owed the money850 to B (in terms of their banker-client contract),85 1 but there 
was no valid legal justification for A to divert this to C. There might thus have been a 





See Eiselen (2001) 118 SAil 415 at 418 : 'in the instant case we are not dealing with a multi-
party situation. East Coast, the enriched party, received the money or value directly from FNB 
without any legally recognized cause existing for the transfer of such money. . .. East Coast 
remained enriched in that the contractual obligation with Roux and all the attendant remedies 
remained intact, whereas there was no legal foundation for the transfer of value between FNB 
and East Coast or the retention of such value.' 
As implied by Eiselen (2001) 118 SAil 415 at 415 and 416. 
Or other performance, in contexts other than banking. 
Or any other contract, iftbe notion of delegatio solvendi is accepted in our law. 
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perfonnance to c.852 This leads to the same practical result as the widely-accepted view 
that A should sue C because his perfonnance is not attributable to B. 
Even if our law does not recognise the notion of delegatio solvendi, the 
conclusion that A can sue C directly, and that the only relevant causa would be one 
lying between A and C can be justified by other means. For example, one can argue that 
because the rights arising from a valid contract are personal (and therefore merely 
relative), the right to payment under a contract only applies vis-it-vis one's contract-
partner. C can therefore only raise his right to payment by X against X.853 
In the case of East Coast Design, therefore, the judge erred in regarding a 
contract between X and C as providing a causa for A's payment to C. This aspect of the 
judgment raises another interesting point, however. Referring to Govender's case,854 
the judge held that East Coast Design' acquired the money ex causa onerosa and 
therefore it cannot be considered to have been unjustifiably enriched. ,855 The relevant 
passage of the judgment in Govender's case856 reads as follows: 
... [W]here a plaintiff sues for recovery of his property or money which 
has come into the hands of a defendant who received it from another, the 
defendant is not obliged to make restitution under the condictio sine 
causa where he acquired it ex causa onerosa, j e for value .... The reason 
is that, although there was no contract or debt as between plaintiff and 
defendant ... he is not considered to have been unjustifiably enriched 
857 
This, in turn, raises the issue of the traditional requirements for the condictio sine causa 
specialis. 
The condictio sine causa specialis 







Cf the views of von Caemmerer described at p 266 above. 
The same reasoning would apply if the obligation in question arose from a delict, for example. 
Supra. 
At 144C-D. 
Supra at 405A. 
In this regard, cf Commissioner ojCustoms and Excise v Bank oj Lisbon International Ltd and 
Another 1994 (1) SA 205 (N) at 214-215. 
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simply called the condictio sine causa) is available in several situations.858 It can be 
brought against someone who has bonafide disposed of or consumed (a) the property of 
another where he came into the possession thereof through a negotium between himself 
and the owner, or (b) money received ex causa lucrativa where there was no such 
negotium.859 Or it can be used as a condictio ob causam finitam, i e where there is a 
causa for transfer but it later falls away. Finally, it can be used to reclaim money or 
other property transferred to another sine causa, in circumstances where none of the 
other condictiones would be applicable.86o 
In a note on the East Coast Design case, 861 Visser suggests that the form of 
condictio sine causa used in these banking cases is the last one; the condictio sine causa 
in its guise as a catch-all or 'rag-picker'. 862 He implies that Kondile J treated the 
condictio sine causa in this case as if it fell into the fIrst category, however, in that he 
asked whether the payment was received ex causa onerosa. Eiselen makes a similar 
point by saying that the fIrst category of the condictio sine causa is designed for 
'enrichment chain' type situations (although he does not call them thiS)863 and there was 
no enrichment chain here.864 
This raises the question whether these rules should be extended to the 'rag-
picker' -type condictio sine causa specialis. Should we follow the German approach of 









See Chapter One at p 9 ff. 
See J G Lotz 'Enrichment' LA WSA vol 9 (revised by A de W Horak), First reissue (1996) para 88 
and Visser 2000 ASSAL 273 at 275; Hutchison (ed) Wille's Principles 638. 
See Chapter One at p 9 ff. 
2000 ASSAL 273 at 275 ff. 
Zimmermann Law a/Obligations 871; Grotius 3.30.18. See Visser 2000 ASSAL 273 at 276; 
Hutchison (ed) Wille's Principles 639. 
See Eiselen (200 I) 118 SAlJ 415, where he calls such situations 'third-party enrichment' (at 
417). It is clear that he is referring to enrichment chains, however, as (at 418) he refers to them 
as 'situations where the property in question has moved down a chain of recipients and where 
there has been no direct dealing between the impoverished party and the enriched party.' 
Eiselen (2001) 118 SAL! 415 at 417-18. As said in footnote 848 above, he goes even further and 
says (at 418) that 'in the instant case we are not dealing with a multi-party situation. East Coast, 
the enriched party, received the money or value directly from FNB without any legally 
recognized cause existing for the transfer of such money.' 
Regarding enrichment chains, see Chapter One above. 
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follow the pattern A-B-C unless there are exceptional circumstances)866 and applying 
them by analogy to so-called 'triangular situations'? As has been pointed out, cases 
dealing with the condictio sine causa in a banking context generally state that the only 
requirements are that the defendant was enriched (at the expense of the plaintiff) and 
that this enrichment was sine causa.867 Thus the courts seem to equate the requirements 
for this species of condictio sine causa with the general requirements for enrichment 
liability.868 The rules developed in this context might therefore be extrapolated to apply 
in other situations once the court recognises a general enrichment action. Should these 
('enrichment' and absence of a causa) be the only requirements for this form of the 
condictio sine causa or the general action?869 
Visser is apparently of the view that the requirements that property be acquired 
via a negotium or money be acquired ex causa lucrativa should not be extended beyond 
cases of bonafide disposal or consumption.870 Thus he says that these rules are not 
appropriate for cases where a bank pays money to another, because crediting the account 







Such as where C received something gratuitously: § 822 8GB. 
See p 300 above. 
See Eiselen (2001) 118 SAL! 415, where he says that, in the East Coast Design case, the court 
dealt with 'the sine causa requirement as if it is a specific requirement of the condictio sine causa 
special is and not one of the general requirements that must be proved to found emichment 
liability. ' 
De Vos, for example, requires that the emichment take place directly at the expense of the 
plaintiff, as is required by German law for the Nichtleistungskondiktionen: see De Vos 
Verrykingsaanspreeklikheid 339-53. 
See Visser 2000 ASSAL 273 at 276 and (impliedly) Eiselen (2001) 118 SAL! 415 at 418. Also 
see Eiselen and Pienaar Unjustified Enrichment 76-8, where they say that the negotium 
requirement should not be resuscitated. 
2000 ASSAL 273 at 275-6. He explains the reasoning behind these rules as follows: 'The 
underlying idea seems to be that a person who comes into possession of the property of another, 
as a result of dealings between them, knows that she is not the owner. Therefore she should 
ordinarily also know that she cannot legitimately dispose of or consume the property. If the 
property is nevertheless disposed of or consumed (bona fide, and perhaps because of a 
misunderstanding), the possessor cannot be heard to complain about returning the value which 
remains in her estate and which is not covered by a causa such as a contract, for instance .... If, 
however, a person comes into possession of the property of another without there having been 
dealings between her and the owner, and she gives value in exchange, the chances are very good 
that she might not realise that she is dealing with the property of another and that she should not 
consume or destroy it. ... In these circumstances it would not be inequitable for [her] ... to have 
to return the value which remains in her patrimony to the owner. However, if the possessor has 
not given any value in exchange for the property, then she cannot complain ifshe has to return 
the value remaining in her estate.' He goes on to say (at 276) that these rules 'are not really 
II 
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It should be noted, however, that these two concepts (a negotium and a causa 
lucrativa) bear a striking resemblance to certain principles of German law that are 
appJ icable in situations of multi-party enrichment. As explained in Chapter One, the 
parties to an enrichment action in German law are, generally speaking, the parties who 
are linked by a 'causal relationship' .872 In other words, in enrichment chains and 
triangular situations, A must generally sue B, and B must sue C: they must proceed 'via 
the triangle' or along the chain. 
This idea of a 'causal relationship' is reminiscent of the Roman notion of a 
negotium, which was required between the parties to a condictio sine causa,873 and 
which could have served a valuable purpose in limiting the pool of potential parties to an 
enrichment action. 874 The word 'negotium' seems to have had various meanings in 






capable of application in a case such as the one under discussion. After all, the money paid over 
by the drawee bank to the payee can hardly said to be consumed or alienated by the payee when 
it is paid into his or her account.' 
This does not mean that the enrichment of one party and the impoverishment of the other must be 
causally linked in that one is the result of the other. (CfHutchison (ed) Wille's Principles 634: 
'A causal link between the defendant's enrichment and the plaintiffs impoverishment'.) It 
merely refers to some sort ofrelationship between the parties that would have provided a causa 
had it been valid, ega defective contract. See Chapter One at p 46 ff. 
See, e g, De Vos Verrykingsaanspreeklikheid 34-5,54 and 60. It should be noted, however, that 
De Vos regards it as something which 'went hand in hand with the transfer of ownership or 
possession' (at 34 - my translation). He interprets it as requiring a direct transfer of ownership or 
possession from the owner or his agent to the defendant. 
See J P Dawson Unjust Enrichment: A Comparative Analysis (1951) 52 (regarding the views of 
Julian): 'His reason, the absence of any direct dealing between plaintiff and defendant, expressed 
a practical limitation, the kind of working rule that kept the remedy manageable though it could 
be breached occasionally where reasons were good.' Regarding the condictio incerti, he says 
'the requrrement of a prior negotium between the parties was used to confine this expanded 
remedy within acceptable limits.' He goes on to say that' [t]he instances are rare indeed in which 
a condiction was awarded in the absence of an antecedent "giving" by the plaintiff to the 
defendant or else of a prior agreement between the parties whose correction or enforcement was 
sought.' Regarding the limitations consequent on this requirement, also see Zimmermann Law of 
Obligations 874. But cfDe Vos Venykingsaanspreeklikheid Ill, where he says that it created 
more problems than benefits. 
See M de Villiers 'Negotium in Roman Law' (1928) 45 SALJ223: 'The original form of the 
word negotium was nec otium, the negation of inactivity, hence it was used to denote active 
employment. ' 
See De Villiers (1928) 45 SALJ223: 'On the other hand, negotium acquired a wider meaning in 
the case of contract as denoting that transaction itself, especially when in the making, and a better 
meaning may be it comprised a "reciprocal agreement of some sort".' (My emphasis). See 
Dawson (n 874) at 51 and 52 for the translation as 'direct dealings'. 
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modem South African law, the word has been interpreted to refer to 'dealings,877 or 'an 
antecedent legal relation,878 between the parties.879 In other words, it can be seen as 
referring to a link between the parties that falls short of a valid contract. 880 A 
relationship between the parties that could have resulted in a causa for the enrichment -
but did not - is what German lawyers would call a 'causal relationship'. This 
relationship, which can be translated as an 'invalid obligatory act', 881 would most 
commonly be a defective contract (i e where the negotiations, or even the agreement, 
between the parties did not receive the stamp of legal validity). 
The negotium was apparently abandoned as a general requirement for the 
condictio sine causa in Roman-Dutch law,882 and is now confrned to cases of bonafide 
consumption or disposal of property. 883 I think that the idea of a negotium could also 
fulfil a useful function in banking cases, and in other situations where the more general 








See, e g, Visser 2000 ASSAL 273 at 276. 
But see Eiselen and Pienaar Unjustified Enrichment 76. 
See Van Zyl Negotiorum Gestio IIn34: 'The basic meaning of the concept did not change in 
Roman-Dutch or, for that matter, early South African law .... ' He goes on to say that the word 
negotium 'continues to indicate any kind of action or activity which may give rise to an 
obligation. ' 
See Zimmermann Law o/Obligations 854: 'Some of them .. ' experimented with the concept of 
negotium contractum; a condictio, they claimed, could be instituted only if the datio had been 
based on a cooperation between giver and recipient, supported by the intention of both of them to 
enter into a transaction.' Also see Sir John G Kotze Causa in the Roman and Roman-Dutch Law 
o/Contract (1922) at 66, where, regarding the views ofUlpian, he says that '[b]y this he intends 
to convey that the convention or agreement partakes somewhat 0/ the nature 0/ a contract 
(negotium} .... ' (My emphasis.) The word was apparently sometimes used to refer to a valid 
contract in Roman and Roman-Dutch law. (See, for example, De Villiers (1928) 45 SA1J223, 
where, referring to Huber and to Damhouder, he says that '[p]ost-Roman commentators on the 
law also sometimes used the word negotium to denote an agreement amounting to a contract. 
Thus Huber refers to a negotium habile ad obligationem producendam, a contract capable of 
establishing an obligation (thUS a causa obligationis), as was rightly held by DE VILLIERS, J., in 
the case of Conradie v Russouw (1919), App. Div., 314 [i e Conradie v Rossouw 1919 AD 314]. 
For facility of proof the Roman law required that in a written acknowledgement of debt the 
antecedent negotium or transaction which had occasioned the liability should be expressed. 
(Cod4.30.13; Digest, 22.3.25, sec. 4).' Also see Kotze op cit at 35 and 55.) The word cannot be 
understood to carry this meaning in the modem law of unjustified enrichment, however, as it is 
accepted that a contract excludes enrichment liability. In this regard, see for example Sonnekus 
1996 TSAR 1 at 8. 
See Zimmermann and Du Plessis 1994 Restitution Law Review 14 at 32. 
De Vos Verrykingsaanspreeklikheid 76-7. (But see note 873 above for the meaning apparently 
attached by De Vos to the word negotium.) 
See Visser 2000 ASSAL 273 at 275. 
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to give the sine causa requirement some sort of positive content and it could play the 
same sort of role that the notion of 'causal relationships' plays in German law, viz to 
help to identify the parties to an enrichment action. 884 
It should be emphasised, however, that the idea that an enrichment action should 
lie between the parties to a 'causal relationship' should be regarded as a guideline rather 
than an inflexible rule.885 It is merely one of the factors to be considered when assessing 
policy factors and the relative interests of the parties. Thus Canaris886 refers to 'causal 
relationships' but this concept is, in a sense, merely the lens through which he focuses 
on what is really important: the interests of the parties, and general legal values and 
norms. German experience has thus shown that there are situations where the 
underlying policies and the interests of the parties suggest that an enrichment action 
should lie between parties who are not linked by such a 'causal relationship'. 
In exceptional circumstances, therefore, an action will lie directly between A and 
C. In German law, the most important exception - which is contained in § 822 BGB - is 
the situation where C acquires the enrichment gratuitously, i e ex causa lucrativa.887 
(Again, this is an echo of one of the requirements for the condictio sine causa specia/is 
in our law.) German law accepts that there are other exceptions, however, such as the 
one presently being considered, i e where a bank paid C in the absence of a valid 
instruction by its client. There is clearly neither a 'causal relationship' nor a negotium 





Another argument in favour of interpreting a 'negotium' in this way, and using it as a general 
requirement relates to the relationship between the law of contract and the law of unjustified 
enrichment. The Roman' law' of unjustified enrichment reflected the Roman law of (specific) 
contracts. It was developed to hug the boundaries of contractual liability. Attempts to substitute 
a general basis for enrichment liability (or a 'general enrichment action') partly reflect the 
cbanges in our law of contract. It does not make sense to have a law of enrichment that still 
largely bears the strange outline determined by Roman contract law, when we have general 
principles of contract. It is particularly strange that we have abandoned one of the most 'general' 
of the common-law requirements (viz that there was a negotium between the parties) and that we 
keep more specific requirements. 
Cfthe comments ofCanaris (n 8) at 857. 
(n 8). 
For example, where B intended to make a donation to C. According to the herrschende Meinung, 
performance in terms of a void contract would not be regarded as a gratuitous performance: see 
Jauernig/Schliechtriem § 822 marg note 5. 
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should sue C on the basis of unjustified enrichment. 
In his comment on the East Coast Design case, Visser asks whether 'the payment 
of a cheque (drawn on a bank by its client) to a payee amounts to "dealings" between the 
bank and the payee. ,888 He interprets the judgment in the East Coast Design case as 
answering this question in the negative because the judge 'applied the rule that when 
value is given the condictio sine causa is excluded - a rule which is relevant only to a 
situation where no dealings took place between the plaintiff and the defendant. ,889 
Approving of this conclusion, he adds that 'the kind of dealings relevant to the condictio 
sine causa are those as a result of which the transfer of money or property takes 
place.,89o He concludes that the bank's payment did not result from any dealings 
between itself and East Coast Design,891 as the bank had merely acted as a 'conduit for 
discharging Roux's debt to East Coast Design. ,892 
I agree that the dealings generally required for the condictio sine causa are those 
which led to the transfer of money or other property and that were no dealings between 
the bank and East Coast Design. I do not agree that this means that the condictio sine 
causa should fail; this should be regarded as an exceptional situation in which an action 
will lie despite the absence of such dealings.893 We already have one exception, namely 
the situation where money was received ex causa lucrativa. As argued above, an 
analysis of the interests of the parties suggests that a bank, which paid C without 
receiving any valid instruction or authorisation for that payment from its client, should 







2000 ASSAL 273 at 276. 
2000 ASSAL 273 at 276. 
2000 ASSAL 273 at 277. 
He points out (2000 ASSAL 273 at 277) that there were some dealings between the parties, as 
East Coast had ceded its rights against Roux to the bank, but does not consider these relevant 
because the payment had not resulted therefrom. 
2000 ASSAL 273 at 277. 
I also cannot agree that the bank acted as a 'conduit' (or a 'neutral payment functionary', as 
stated by EiseJen (2001) 118 SAL! 415 at 416). As was suggested in my discussion of the B & H 
Engineering case above, regarding the bank as a mere 'neutral payment functionary' or a 
'conduit' is not objectionable where the bank was acting in terms of a valid instruction, but it is 
strange to think of it in this way where it was disobeying a countermand, or where no valid 
instruction had been given. With respect, I find it is particularly strange to regard the bank as 
acting as a conduit for the performance by a forger to his creditor, as Visser suggests . 
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payment ex eausa luerativa is not the only circumstance in which an enrichment action 
will lie in the absence of a negotium between the parties. It could even be argued that 
this case is analogous to a receipt ex eausa luerativa because the payment was not owed 
by A to C. 
To conclude, A should be able to bring an enrichment action - the eondietio sine 
eausa - directly against C in circumstances where A made a payment to C in the 
absence of a valid instruction by B. 
3 Both the relationship between the instructing party and the recipient (the 
Valutaverhiiltnis) and the underlying contract between the instructing and 
instructed parties (the Deckungsverhiiltnis) are defective 












Now situations of Doppelmangel ('double-fault') within this context must be considered. 
For example, B instructs A, whom he erroneously thinks is his debtor, to perform to C, 
whom he erroneously thinks is his creditor. Similarly unaware of the invalidity of the 
agreements,894 A makes the performance to C, intending thereby to fulfil his (supposed) 
contract with B.895 Such a case rrught arise, for instance, ifB was insane when he 
purported to conclude contracts with A and C. 8% In such a case, the parties would not 
be linked by any valid contractual relationships, and yet C would have received 





In other words, § 814 BGB will Dot be applicable. 
See, e g, Koppensteiner and Kramer Bereicherung 27. 
Cfthe facts of The Standard Bank a/South Africa Ltd v Haskins supra. 




In tenns of Gennan law, this would be regarded as a case of so-called Doppelmangel 
('double fault'). While it is now accepted that A must sue B, and B in tum must seek 
recourse from C,898 the old view was that, if both legal relationships899 were invalid, a 
Durchgriff would be possible.90o In other words, A would be able to sue C directly on 
the basis of unjustified enrichment. Arguments in favour of this approach were that it 
was straightforward, that it was consistent with the law's general emphasis on the 
purpose of the performing party,901 and that it would save expense in that only one 
action would have to be brought, rather than twO.902 Moreoever, it was pointed out that 
in such circumstances, it was clear that C had been enriched, but not so clear that B had 
been enriched by A's payment to C, as he would not have thereby been released from 
any obligation.903 
What countervailing arguments then convinced the vast majority ofwriters904 to 








See, e g, Medicus Biirgerliches Recht marg note 675; Koppensteiner and Kramer Bereicherung 
27-8; Loewenheim Bereicherungsrecht 33; Wieling Bereicherungsrecht 101. Wieling loc cit 
says that this also corresponds to the intention of the legislators, and quotes Von Klibel: 'Hat 
jemand an den GIaubiger eines Dritten fUr Letzteren geleistet, urn damit eine Verbindlichkeit 
gegen den Dritten zu erftlllen, so kann er, auch wenn diese Verbindlichkeit nicht bestand [i e 
Valutaverhiiltnis], das Geleistete von dem Empfl10ger nicht zurtlckfordem, ausgenommen wenn 
dieser das Nichtbestehen der Verbindlichkeit und die Absicht des Leistenden, solche zu erftlllen, 
gekannt hat.' (' I f someone perfonned to the creditor of a third party on behalf of the third party, 
in order to fulfil an obligation against the third party, he cannot claim back from the recipient 
whatever was performed, even if this obligation did not exist, except if the recipient knew of the 
non-existence of the obligation and the intention of the performing party to fulfil it. My 
translation) Wieling adds that the wording of the provision also covered the case where A had no 
obligation vis-a-vis B (i e Deckungsverhiiltnis) but that the First Commission axed the provision 
as it regarded it as self-evident, and the Second Commission did not change the position. 
In other words, contracts or other obligationary legal relationships on the basis of which payment 
was made. 
Canaris (n 8) 801; Loewenheim Bereicherungsrecht 33-4; Koppensteiner and Kramer 
Bereicherung 27. Also see note 308 above. 
Koppensteiner and Kramer Bereicherung 27 (where they add that the more roundabout route was 
not seen as being in accordance with the 'Zweckstrebenden Natur der Rechtsordnung' i e the 
'striving for purpose of the legal system'); Loewenheim Bereicherungsrecht 33. 
See, e g, Loewenheim Bereicherungsrecht 34. 
Koppensteiner and Kramer Bereicherung 27. They argue that this argument 'amounts to a petitio 
principii, because it is immediately questionable whether B would not be enriched by the 
payment of A in so far as he can now bring a Leistungskondiktion against c.' CfWieling 
Bereicherungsrecht 101. 
Koppensteiner and Kramer Bereicherung 28: 'ganz [herrschende Literatur]" 'nach 
iiberwiegender Ansicht'. 
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circumstances?905 The answer will by now be a familiar one: that if a Durchgriff(a 
direct action A-C) were allowed, C would not be able to raise any defences,906 rights of 
retention, or possibilities of set-off that he might have against B, and A would be 
exposed to the defences of C.907 These interests would only be protected if the parties 
were forced to proceed 'via the triangle'. A further argument in favour of this solution is 
that it also allocates the risk of insolvency in such a way that each party only has to bear 
the risk that his supposed contract partner might go insolvent.908 In other words, a 
plaintiff only has to reckon with the possibility that his claim might come to naught due 
to the insolvency of someone whom he had sought out as a contract partner, and not 
because of the insolvency of an extraneous third party. So, to use our banking example, 
the bank (A), which only has a (supposed) legal relationship with its supposed client, B, 
should only be exposed to the risk ofB's insolvency, and not to the danger that B's 
supposed contract partner, C, might go insolvent.909 
But what about the arguments raised in favour of the Durchgriff? While the need 
to distribute the risks fairly amongst the parties might outweigh arguments in favour of 
simplicity and prevention of legal costs, the third point (i e what has B 'received' in such 
circumstances?)910 is not as easily dismissed. It is important to prove that B has received 
something ('erlangt etwas'), not only in order to satisfy the requirements for an 










The fust proposal for circumventing this problem was to argue that Chad 
See, e g, Medicus Biirgerliches Recht marg note 675; Loewenheim Bereicherungsrecht 33; 
Canaris (n 8) 801; Wieling Bereicherungsrecht 101 (where he also says, in relation to an example 
where B buys a table from C, pays by cheque and then countermands it, that it would make no 
difference whether C delivered the thing to B before or after receiving the purchase price). 
IfC had made a counter-performance to B, as in Wieling's example (see previous footnote), then 
C has thereby (i e by making the reciprocal counter-performance) secured himself against all 
risks, and should therefore not be burdened with the risk that he might be sued by A: Wieling 
Bereicherungsrecht 10 l. 
See, e g, Koppensteiner and Kramer Bereicherung 28; Loewenheim Bereicherungsrecht 34. 
See, e g, Koppensteiner and Kramer Bereicherung 28. 
See, e g, Loewenheim Bereicherungsrecht 34. 
See, e g, Loewenheim Bereicherungsrecht 34; Koppensteiner and Kramer Bereicherung 28. 
Cfthe wording of § 812 BGB: see Appendix A. 
Loewenheim Bereicherungsrecht 34. 
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received the payment without legal ground and was therefore liable for enrichment, and 
that what B had received was this enrichment claim against C.9i3 A's claim against B 
would therefore be a 'Kondiktion der Kondition' (a condictio condictionis or 'an 
enrichment claim to an enrichment claim,).914 If the action against B succeeded, then B 
would have to cede to A his claim against c.91S This argwnent wilted under the glare of 
Canaris's criticism.916 He argued that such a solution would result in A's having to bear 
an unjust accwnulation of riskS.917 Because a debtor (C) may raise against the 
cessionary (A) any defences he would have had against the cedent (B),918 A would be 
faced not only with any defences arising from his relationship with B, but also with C's 
defences against B, arising from the cession.919 He would also have to carry the risk of 
the insolvency of the person who instructed him (B), as well as of the person who 
became his debtor by virtue of the cession (C).920 
Canaris accordingly suggests that, asswning that B receives an enrichment claim 
against C in this situation,921 one need not require that he cede the claim to A, but rather 











Loewenheim Bereicherungsrecht 34. 
See the discussion of 'enrichment chains' in Chapter One at 57 ffabove. 
And the defences afforded by the law of cession would therefore also be available: see 
Koppensteiner and Kramer Bereicherung 28; Loewenheim Bereicherungsrecht 34. 
See Canaris (n 8) 811-12. 
Canaris (n 8) 811: 'Kumulierung samtlicher Risiken'. He criticises the then herrschende 
Meinung for 'absurdly' purporting to base their argwnents on an attempt to allocate the risks of 
insolvency and the existence of defences appropriately, and then 'completely failing' in this 
attempt: loc cit. He says that while the Durchgriffskondiktion allocated risk incorrectly, it at 
least did not result in an accumulation of all the risks in one party and can therefore be seen as 
'the lesser of two evils': op cit 811-12. Cf J Esser and H-L Weyers Schuldrecht 11 Besonder Teil 
Teilband 2383 who ask whether this solution really would lead to unacceptable hardship. Also 
see Medicus Burgerliches Recht marg note 673, where he points out, inter alia, that B (not A) 
would have had to bear the risk, had the Anweisung been valid. 
According to § 404 BGB: 'Der Schuldner kann dem neuen Glaubiger die Einwendungen 
entgegensetzen, die zur Zeit der Abtretung der Forderung gegen den bisherigen Glaubiger 
begrilndet waren.' ('The debtor can raise against the new creditor those defences that were valid 
against the previous creditor at the time of the cession.') 
Canaris (n 8) 811. Also see, e g, Loewenheim Bereicherungsrecht 34. 
Canaris (n 8) 811; Loewenheim Bereicherungsrecht 34. 
See Canaris (n 8) 811: ' ... die Bereicherung des Anweisenden [liegt] lediglich in seinem 
Bereicherungsanspruch gegen den AnweisungsbegUnstigten, denn er ja letztlich nur einen 
Anspruch gegen diesen erhalt.' Cf Loewenheirn Bereicherungsrecht 34, where he argues that A 
should proceed against B because B has received, not the claim against C, but the thing itself 
(' ... die geleisterte Sache selbst'). In other words, B should return either the thing or its value. 
In tenns of § 818 (2) BGB: '1st die Herausgabe wegen der Beschaffenheit des Erlangten nicht 
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is rendered useless by C's disappearance or insolvency.923 This is the only way to avoid 
a situation in which A would be affected by circumstances that lie in the 
Valutaverhaltnis (i e the relationship between B and C), and therefore solely within the 
sphere of risk of his supposed contract partner. 924 This solution means that only B 
would have to carry the risk of C's insolvency or potential defences.925 
This proposal has also met with criticism.926 The main objection arises from 
§ 818 (3) BGB, which states that the obligation to give up the object or its value is 
excluded to the extent that the recipient is no longer enriched.927 IfB's claim against C 
is worthless because C has disappeared or become insolvent, then how can B be said still 
to be enriched?928 As Koppensteiner and Kramer point out, no claim for restitution of 
value can arise independently of possible defences.929 
Notwithstanding criticisms such as this, and notwithstanding the fact that the 
court still uses the Kondiktion der Kondiktion,930 the view that A should sue B for the 
value of his enrichment claim against C seems to be the most accepted opinion today. 
It is also agreed, however, that in various931 exceptional circumstances A may 
bring an enrichment action directly against C (i e a so-called Durchgrijfskondiktion).932 











moglich oder ist der Empfanger aus einem anderen Grunde zur Herausgabe auJ3erstande, so hat er 
den Wert zu ersetzen.' ('If it is not possible to give up what bas been received, or if the recipient 
is unable to give it up for some other reason, he must replace its value.') See Canaris (n 8) 812; 
Medicus Biirgerliches Recht marg note 673; Koppensteiner and Kramer Bereicherung 28. 
Also see Koppensteiner and Kramer Bereicherung 28. 
See Canaris (n 8) 819. Also see Koppensteiiler and Kramer Bereicherung29. 
See Loewenheim Bereicherungsrecht 34. 
See, e g, Medicus Biirgerliches Recht marg note 673; Koppensteiner and Kramer 
Bereicherung 29. 
Die Verpflichtung zur Herausgabe oder zum Ersatze des Wertes ist ausgeschlossen, soweit der 
Empfanger nicht mehr bereichert ist. (The obligation to restore or to replace the value is 
excluded in so far as the recipient is no longer enriched.) See Appendix A for the context of this 
provision. 
See, e g, Loewenheim Bereicherungsrecht 34. 
Bereicherung 29. 
See Medicus Biirgerliches Recht marg note 673. 
But cfMedicus Biirgerliches Recht marg note 675: only § 822 BGB; Koppensteiner and Kramer 
Bereicherung at 28 (where they mention § 822 'vor aHem', but they give no other examples). 
See note 308 above. 
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envisaged by § 822 BGB,933 namely where C received the perfonuance gratuitously.934 
This paragraph stipulates that if B is enriched, and passes on the enrichment gratuitously 
to C, then C is liable for enrichment. It will be recalled that when A hands something to 
C in tenus of an Anweisung from B, then A is regarded as performing to B (and B to C), 
rather than directly to C. In circumstances where there is no valid relationship between 
A and B, and A hands a sum of money to C, and this payment is gratuitous, the bank can 
proceed directly against C.935 
It should also be borne in mind that A will have a direct action against C where 
there was no valid Anweisung.936 This applies whether or not there was a valid 
relationship between Band C.937 As said above, this point of view is justified as 
follows: fustly, there are no grounds for attributing the perfonnance to B in such a 
situation as he gave no instruction at all and, secondly, C does not deserve protection 
because he did not receive the amount due to anything that B did but rather due to a 
mistake on the part of A. 938 
One may summarise the Genuan position thus: if the relationships between A 
and B, and B and C, are both void, A will generally have to sue B, who must either cede 
his claim against C, or pay A the value of that claim. If, however, C received the 
perfonuance gratuitously, or where B had not validly instructed A to make the 







See Appendix A. 
See, e g, Koppensteiner and Kramer Bereicherung 28. 
It could be argued, however, that if there is a contract of donation between B and C (or an 
interest-free loan of money, or some other gratuitous transaction: see Jauernig/Schlechtriem § 
822 marg note 5), the case would not be one of Doppelmangel (as there would be a valid legal 
ground between B and C). According to the majority view, the absence of"a legal ground 
between B and C is not the same as a gratuitous transaction, for the purposes of § 822: see 
Jauernig/Schlechtriem loc cit. 
See section 2 (c) above. AJso see Meier (1999) 58 Cambridge Law Journal 567 at 571-2; 
Medicus Schuldrecht 11 marg note 729; idem Burgerfiches Recht 510 marg note 677; 
Zimmermann and Du Plessis 1994 Restitution Law Review 14 at 34. There being no 'specific 
purpose in terms of the Leistungsbegriff' on the part of the bank vis-a-vis the payee, the claim 
would be some sort of Nichtleistungskondiktion rather than a Leistungskondiktion: Zimmermann 
and Du Plessis 1994 Restitution Law Review 14 at 35. 
See the text to note 670 above. Cases where there is no valid relationship between B and C, and 
no valid Anweisung B-A should strictly not be regarded as cases of Doppelmangel if there is a 
valid underlying contract between A and B. 
Meier (1999) 58 Cambridge Law Journal 567 at 572. 
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unjustified enrichment. 
South African law 
Cases of Doppelmangel are understandably rare in practice. In the absence of 
appropriate South African case law, we can learn from German experience. The three 
approaches that have been favoured by German law at different stages are that A should 
sue C directly, that A should sue B for cession of his enrichment claim against C, and 
that A should sue B for the value of his enrichment claim against C. The third approach 
is regarded as the best way to achieve an equitable balance of the interests of the parties. 
Which, if any, of these approaches is followed by South African law? 
If one applies the general principles of enrichment liability in South African law, 
one is led to the conclusion that A must sue C in cases of Doppelmangel. In such a 
situation, C would be enriched by A's payment. B, on the other hand, would not be 
enriched thereby, as he neither acquires an asset nor loses a liability. C would be 
enriched at A's expense: A, and not B, would be impoverished by the payment. There 
is no valid justification for A's payment to C, so C's enrichment would be unjustified. 
This line of reasoning may be illustrated by the unreported case of The Standard 
Bank v Haskins, which was referred to above.939 In this case, there was a valid contract 
between A and B, but there was neither a valid instruction B-A nor a valid contract B-
e. It thus strictly falls into the category of cases dealt with in section 2 (c) above. 
Certain aspects of the judgment are pertinent in this context, however. 
As will be recalled, this case concerned Haskins (B), who made various 
transactions while insane. It appears that he was sane when he opened an account with 
Standard Bank, but that he became insane before entering into various agreements (B-C) 
and instructing Standard Bank (A) to make payments to e. The court held that the 
contracts with C and the instructions to A were invalid. On the question of his liability 
for enrichment, the court confirmed that a 'person who lacks contractual capacity 
939 At pp 179. 
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because he is at the time of contracting of unsound mind may, if the other party to the 
void contract performs, nevertheless become indebted to another on the ground that he 
has been unjustly enriched at the latter's expense.'940 
The judge (Conradie J, as he then was) applied the general requirements for 
enrichment liability rather than any of the traditional remedies. His approach was 
similar to that of the Appellate Division! Supreme Court of Appeal in cases such as B & 
H Engineering941 and ABSA v Standard Bank,942 in that he emphasised the enrichment-
requirement. 943 He said that B could only be enriched if the payment via the bank 
discharged a valid obligation to C (i e in such a case B would be enriched by losing a 
debt). If, however, the debt B-C is invalid, continued the judge, then C, and not B, 
would be enriched. He held that in this case B's debt to C was invalid because, if the 
instruction B-A was invalid due to B's insanity, then the debt B-C must have been 
invalid for the same reason. 
Significantly, the bank's counsel argued that B was enriched by acquiring a right 
to sue C for enrichment. In other words, he employed an argument analogous to the 
German Kondiktion der Kondiktion (although he did not suggest that B should cede to A 
his claim against C) or to the German notion that B can be enriched by the value of a 
claim against C. The judge rejected this argument on the grounds that any enrichment 
requires a corresponding impoverishment and that one cannot argue that in such 
circumstances B was impoverished because '[h]e had no liability to the trader [C] and 
paid none'. The judge accordingly concluded that '[t]he creditor [C] was enriched at the 
expense of the applicant [AJ. The applicant is the one who was impoverished by acting 






At P 4 of the typewritten judgment, where the judge cited the following authorities for this rule: 
Phil Morkel Bpk v Niemand 1970 (3) SA 455 (C) at 456F; Grotius lnleidinge 3.30.3; Van 
Leeuwen Censura Forensis 1.4.3.2 and Van der Keessel Praelecliones 3.30.3. 
Supra. 
Supra. 
Thus the question whether there were any valid obligations between A, B and C seemed to be of 
relevance only to the question of discharge (and therefore enrichment); the judge did not 
mention the sine causa-requirement. 
See p 6 of the typewritten judgment. 
II 
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In other words, the judge held that A could not sue its client, B, because the 
client was not enriched in that the bank's payment neither increased his assets nor 
extinguished his liabilities. He held, obiter, that in such circumstances it would be C 
who was emiched by the payment. The judge thus seemed to favour a direct action (A-
C) in such circumstances. 
Obviously, it should be borne in mind that this is not really a true case of 
Doppelmangel,945 but rather a case of a defective Anweisung. As was explained above, 
even Gennan law agrees that A should have a direct action against C in such cases. As 
such, the case of Haskins cannot be regarded as authority for the view that A cannot sue 
B (and should sue C) in cases of Doppelmangel. It is significant, however, that the court 
met with the same sort of difficulties regarding the enrichment-requirement as those 
encountered in Gennan discussions of Doppelmangel. It is indeed difficult to argue that 
A should sue B - according to our general principles of enrichment liability - in any 
situation where A's perfonnance does not extinguish any obligation between B and C. 
The argument that A should sue B for the value of his claim against C would also 
encounter the same sort of objections raised in Gennan law, e g that A would have no 
claim against B ifB's claim against C (assuming that he had one) had become worthless. 
It is also noteworthy that the court explicitly rejected the idea that B could be 
enriched by the acquisition of an enrichment claim against C. The flaw in this argument, 
from the perspective of the general principles of emichment liability in South African 
law, is that B was not impoverished. In other words, C was not enriched at B's 
expense.946 B therefore did not acquire an enrichment claim against C, according to the 
judge's reasoning, so it cannot be argued that B was enriched in this way. This puts paid 
to the argument that A should sue B for cession of an enrichment claim against C (the 
945 
946 
In other words, a situation where there is no valid underlying contract between A and B (although 
there might be a valid Anweisung), and no valid contract between B and C. In this case, there 
was a valid banker-client contract between A and B, but no valid instruction in tenns thereof. 
See De Vos Verrykingsaanspreeklikheid 2, as cited by the judge on p 4 of his judgment, and 
Chapter One at p 13. De Vos apparently adopted the 'at the expense of requirement from 
Gennan law (see Verrykingsaanspreeklikheid 339n1), which confIDes this requirement to 
Nichtleistungskondiktionen, and does not apply it across the board. In this regard, see p 42 
above. 
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Kondiktion der Kondiktion) and to the argument that A should sue B for the value of any 
such claim. 
In McCarthy Retail Ltd v Shortdistance Carriers CC,947 the Supreme Court of 
Appeal suggested that if our law adopts a general enrichment action, such an action will 
have a subsidiary nature.948 In other words, it will probably not displace the traditional 
enrichment remedies, in their updated form. Let us imagine that Mr Haskins was insane 
when he opened a bank account at Standard Bank and concluded a contract with C, but 
that he recovered his sanity and then drew a cheque in C's favour, i e a true case of 
Doppelmangel. Or we could imagine that a bank terminates its contract with a client 
without giving the client the required notice, and the client writes a cheque in favour of a 
supposed creditor. Would the bank succeed with any ofthe traditional remedies? 
The first remedy that comes to mind is the 'rag-picker' form of the condictio sine 
causa specialis. It was suggested above that this condictio should generally lie between 
parties linked by a negotium, except where something was received ex causa lucrativa 
or where A handed something to C in accordance with an instruction by B which was 
invalid. This would reflect the current German position (which in turn reflects Canaris's 
interest-based analysis): A can only sue B, and C can only be sued by B, unless C's 
acquisition was gratuitous (or there was no valid Anweisung B-A), in which case A 
would be able to sue C directly. The difficulty is that our courts tend to define the 
requirements of this condictio along the lines of the general requirements for enrichment 
liability, with the emphasis on the enrichment-requirement. This remedy would 
therefore fall prey to the same sort of objections that rule out a general action between A 
and B. 
It seems, however, that the bank might have more success suing B with the 
condictio indebiti. A would have to prove that it made a datio to B, i e that it was the 




2001 (3) SA 482 (SCA). 
See Chapter One at p 15. 
See Licences and General Insurance Co v Ismay supra. 
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implies that A made a datio to B and that B made a datio to C in such circumstances, 
notwithstanding the fact that A actually handed the money directly to C. In other words, 
B's instruction to A to pay C (if free from defects ),950 calls the fictional triangle with its 
double-dationes into being, and makes B the solvens and C the recipiens in respect of 
one datio, and A the solvens and B the recipiens of the other datio. This would imply 
that, provided that a delegatio solvendi can be valid in the absence of a valid underlying 
contract A_B951 and that the error-requirement is satisfied, A would have a condictio 
indebiti against B,952 and B would be entitled to a condictio against C: both A's datio to 
B, and B's datio to C would be indebite in cases of Doppelmangel. The traditional 
remedy avoids. the obstacle faced by the general principles of enrichment liability, viz 
proof of enrichment and impoverishment - like the German Leistung, it focuses on the 
performance rather than the result thereof. 
Another potential obstacle is the rule that the condictio indebiti only lies for the 
value of the recipient's enriclunent where the recipient has parted with possession of 
what he received.953 According to the analysis suggested above, however, B does not 
part with what he has (fictionally) received. Provided that the delegatio solvendi is 
valid, A's payment to C in accordance with B's instruction constitutes two simultaneous 






To sum up, then, it seems that South African law can accommodate two of the 
In German law, as said above, the principles of separation and abstraction apply to the 
Anweisung. In other words, there can be a valid Anweisung in the absence of a valid underlying 
obligation. There is at least one situation in South African law where a bank is obliged to honour 
a cheque even though there was no valid underlying banker-client contract viz where a bank 
terminates its client's contract without giving due notice. See p 190 above. 
As implied by Ismay's case supra. 
See p 203 ff above, Licences and General Insurance Co v Ismay supra and Minister van Justisie 
v Jaffer supra. 
De Vos Verrykingsaanspreeklikheid 364 ff. See Chapter One at p 8. 
This may best be explained by an example where all the legal relationships are valid. If lowe my 
landlord R3 000 and he instructs me to pay this sum directly to his creditor, C, and I do so, my 
payment to C constitutes two perf~rmances : performance in terms of my obligation to my 
landlord, and performance in terms of his obligation to C. It does not constitute one performance 
that is received by my landlord and then redirected to his creditor. The landlord thus cannot be 
seen as having 'parted with' my performance. 
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three Gennan solutions mentioned above.955 According to the general principles, A 
should sue C. This is certainly the most straightforward approach, and the fact that it 
obviates the need for two actions might carry more weight in South Africa than in 
Gennany, as our courts are already overburdened and litigation is ruinously expensive. 
On the other hand, it can also be argued that A could bring a condictio indebiti against 
B, and that B could similarly sue C. The advantage of this approach is that it confines 
parties to their 'causal relationships', with the result that nobody may be sued by, or 
exposed to the possible insolvency, defences, rights of retention or possibilities of set-off 
of someone with whom he has had no prior contact. 
On balance, although our highest court is open to arguments based on policy956 
and policy factors suggest that A should sue B and that B should sue C in cases of 
Doppelmangel, the current approach of the courts in banking cases957 suggests that a 
South African court is more likely to allow A to sue C directly than to require A to go 





While the legal relationship between the instructing and instructed parties 
(A-B) is valid, the relationship between the instructing party and the 
recipient (B-C, i e the Valutaverhiiltnis) is defective: 








The only one of the three possible solutions mooted in German law that we cannot accommodate 
is the Kondilaion der Kondilaion, which Canaris regards as the worst from a policy perspective 
because it concentrates all the risks on one party (A). He says that the direct action A~ 
previously espoused by the majority allocated the risks incorrectly but at least it did not result in 
a cumulation of all the risks in A: Canaris (n 8) 811, 
As in B & H Engineering v First National Bank Ltd supra, 
For example, the court's emphasis on the enrichment-requirement, its preference for the condictio 
sine causa (rather than the condictio indebitl) in banking cases, and its definition of the 
requirements of this condictio as merely being that there must be enrichment that is sine causa. 
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In the situation to be considered in this section, the only defect958 lies in the legal 
relationship between the instructing party (B) and the 'recipient' of the 'performance' 
(C).959 As is shown by this diagram, the legal relationship960 between A and B has no 
defects. In short, A perfonns to C in accordance with B's instruction, in circumstances 
where B does not owe anything to C. 
For example, B pays C by means of a cheque (drawn on Bank A, which 
accordingly debits B's account) in circumstances where an agreement between Band C 
is void. In tenns of South African law, the agreement could be void on account of 
illegality, uncertainty, impossibility (ofC's counter-performance), non-compliance with 
fonnalities, or because of iustus error or the absence of reasonable reliance on the 
appearance of consensus.961 For example, after lengthy negotiations, B and C purport to 
conclude a contract in terms of which B pays R15 000 (by means ofa cheque drawn on 
Bank A) for the purchase ofC's horse, Dobbin. Unbeknownst to B and C, at the time of 
contracting, Dobbin had already died due to an equine virus. The contract is therefore 
void due to initial objective impossibility of performance.962 
Or B could give a cheque to C, thinking that he has a statutory obligation 
towards C, where no such obligation exists. For instance, due to an error in a 
municipality's accounting department, B receives an account incorrectly stating that he 
owes the municipality R2 000 for outstanding rates. Unaware of the error, B writes a 
cheque for R2 000 and delivers it to the municipal offices. A honours the cheque and 






In the sense that the relationship between B and C is either totally absent (see, e g, Bonitas 
Medical Aid Fund v Volkskas Bank Ltd and Another 1992 (2) SA 42 (W)), void or voidable. 
The words 'recipient' and 'performance' are used loosely here, merely for want of more accurate 
terminology; as was explained above, B could also be regarded as the recipient of a performance 
by A. For example, when A delivers something to C on B's instruction, A is regarded as 
performing simultaneously to B (in accordance with B's instruction) and to C (in terms ofB's 
obligation to C). As one and the same act embodies two performances, there are accordingly two 
recipients. 
Or 'relationships', if one regards the underlying contract and the instruction arising from it as two 
notionally distinct legal transactions. 
See Van der Merwe et al Contract 38 ff, 170 ff, 175 ff, 203 ff. CfGerman law, in terms of which 
a contract based on error will be voidable rather than void - see § 119 BGB. 
It should be noted that this example would not be appropriate as an illustration of the German 
law: see the discussion of initial impossibility in Chapter Four. 
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Common sense suggests that because payment takes place without any hitch, 
there is no need to distinguish this case from one where the payment (B-C) was made in 
cash, and that it should be treated in the same way as an uncomplicated two-party 
relationship: the bank need not enter the arena and the only parties to be considered 
would be B and C. Both Gennan law and South African law seem to reach this 
conclusion, albeit via different routes. 
Regarding Gennan law, it will be remembered that, because § 812 BGB only 
requires that the defendant 'receive' something (i e not that he be enriched in the South 
African sense ),963 and does not require the plaintiff to prove that he was impoverished, 
the range of possible parties to an enrichment claim is potentially wider than it would be 
in tenns of South African law. It is therefore necessary to consider the position of all the 
parties, and to assess the merits of possible claims 'along each side of the triangle'. 
Gennan lawyers say that the Deckungsverhaltnis (A-B) is insignificant in 
situations like the one presently being considered: A has achieved the purpose of his 
perfonnance (Leistungszweck) in his relationship with B.964 In other words, no claim 
will lie between A and B. It is as if B had himself perfonned to C and, therefore, the 
view of the majority of Gennan enrichment lawyers is that only B can bring an 
enrichment claim965 against c.966 A direct action A-C is accordingly not allowed:967 
because the bank's (A's) intention was to perfonn to its client, the drawer (B), it cannot 
be said that it perfonned to the payee (C) and it therefore cannot claim directly from the 
payee.968 To allow such a claim (A-C) would also fly in the face of Canaris's first 
principle viz that nobody should be able to rely on the invalidity of a 'causal 







See, e g, King v Cohen Benjamin & Co supra at 650. 
See Koppensteiner and Kramer Bereicherung 26-7. 
A Leistungskondiktion: Miinchener KommentarfLieb § 812 marg note 37 
Munchener KommentarfLieb § 812 marg note 37; Zimmennann and Du Plessis 1994 Restitution 
Law Review 14 at 33; Loewenheim Bereicherungsrecht 35. 
Except in the circumstances covered by § 822 BGB. 
Wieling Bereicherungsrecht 84-5; Visser (n 13) 540. In general, not only a Leistungskondiktion 
but also the Nichtleistungskondiktionen would be denied. 
I 
is not a party to the transaction.969 In other words, A cannot use the invalidity of the 
contract between B and C as a reason for suing C himself. 
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These arguments may be illustrated with the following example: if Alan owes 
Bill R150 and Bill asks Alan to give it to his (Bill's) creditor Craig, and Alan does so, 
and it then turns out that Craig was not really Alan's creditor, there is no reason why 
Alan should sue to get his performance back. There is also no reason why Alan should 
bear the risk that Bill's obligation to Craig was merely putative. Alan did what he was 
validly obliged to do, and he should not have to bear the risk of possible legal expenses, 
or of C's disappearance. After all, he did not contract with Craig and therefore never 
had the opportunity to assess his creditworthiness. Craig is only worthy of protection in 
that he should not be exposed to possible actions by two parties (Alan and Bill). 
The conclusion that B should sue C would be reached by a South African lawyer, 
applying the general principles of enrichment liability. No enrichment claim would lie 
between A and B: A is neither enriched nor impoverished97o so could neither sue nor be 
sued on the basis of enrichment in these circumstances. There is also no question of a 
claim between A and C. Although C is enriched (having received a performance to 
which he was not legally entitled), A is not impoverished. The only impoverished party 
would be B, whose account at Bank A would be validly debited in the relevant amount. 
In other words, B would suffer either a loss of assets (assuming that his account had a 
positive balance) or an increase in liabilities (if the amount in his account was 
insufficient to cover the payment).971 
Could A sue C with one of the traditional remedies, such as a condictio? It might 
be possible to argue that A made a datio to C, in that it actually transferred the money to 




Also see Wieling Bereicherungsrecht 84-5. 
Assuming that A was a bank and B its client, A would have a claim against B in respect of the 
amount paid to C - A woul.d thus debit B's account. Moreover, no claim could lie between A 
and B because they are linked by a valid causa ega banker-client contract. 
In other words, the payment resulted in the overdrawing of his account, or the increase ofan 
already existing overdraft, or the bank granted him some other sort of credit. 
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incorrect. In identifying a so/vens or a recipiens (and therefore the 'route' of the datio), 
one cannot look at the parties in isolation.972 To say that A transferred ownership of 
something (in this case, money) and is therefore the so/vens, is to look at only part of the 
picture. As explained above, our law recognises that the recipiens may be someone 
other than the party who actually physically receives payment. 973 In these 
circwnstances, C (and not the collecting bank) is legally regarded as the recipiens 
because the collecting bank was acting as C's agent. It would be strange if the law were 
to accept that the recipiens could be someone other than the person who actually 
received the datio, and not that the so/vens could be someone other than the person who 
actually made the transfer. Here, A made the transfer of money on B's behalf, under his 
instruction, and B should therefore be regarded as the performing party (the so/vens) in 
law.974 The datio must therefore have been made by B to C, and A cannot sue C with 
any of the condictiones for which a datio is a requirement.975 
This is not to say that C would not be liable in terms of a condictio. If we regard 
B's handing over of the cheque to C as a datio by B to C, as suggested above, then B 
should be able to bring one of the condictiones against C. Which one would be 
appropriate would depend upon the circumstances, including the reason for the 
invalidity of a purported contract between B and C. 
If B gave the cheque to C in terms of a contract that was void, the payment 





See, e g, King v Cohen Benjamin & Co supra at 650; Trahair v Webb & Co supra, particularly at 
232 and 234. 
See, e g, Licences and General Insurance Co v Ismay supra; Minister van Justisie v Jaffer supra; 
Phillips v Hughes, Hughes v Maphumelo supra and the discussion above at p 203 ff and p 303 ff. 
See Bowman, De Wet and Du Plessis NNO and Others v Fidelity Bank Ltd supra and note 846 
above. 
In other words, the condictiones indebiti (see Lotz (n 859) para 79), causa data causa non secuta 
(para 85), ob turpem vel iniustam causam (Lotz (n 859) para 83) and the condictio sine causa 
except where someone 'bona fide disposed of or consumed the property of another if ... he 
obtained possession otherwise than through [a dati0975 between himself and the owner] ... and 
the property consisted of a sum of money which was received ex causa lucrativa.': see Lotz (n 
859) para 88; Trahair v Webb & Co supra; Commissioner of Customs and Excise v Bank of 
Lisbon International Ltd and Another 1994 (I) SA 205 (N). 
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could prove that he made the-payment due to an excusable error.976 As mentioned 
above, the contract could be void on the basis of a iustus error, a lack of reasonable 
reliance upon consensus, initial objective impossibility of any counter-performance (i e 
performance by C), vagueness, or non-compliance with formalities. 977 
If the contract between B and C were an illegal one, then B could sue C with a 
condictio ob turpem vel iniustam causam, provided that his claim would not be barred 
by the par delictum rule.978 Imagine, for example, that B is a pensioner who takes 
expensive medication for a chronic illness. He is unaware that new rules regarding 
medicine prices have made it illegal for a pharmacist to continue charging him so much 
for the drugs, and he accordingly gives a pharmacist C a cheque for much more than the 
legal maximum. Assuming that the illegality would taint his contract with C, he could 
sue C with a condictio ob turpem vel iniustam causam. If, however, he knew that the 
price had been brought down and colluded with the pharmacist to defraud his medical 
aid scheme, for example, then he and the pharmacist would arguably be acting in pari 
delicto and his claim would be barred. 
The condictio causa data causa non secuta would be available to B if, for 
example, he gave a cheque to a property developer (C) as a deposit, on the assumption 
that C would obtain planning permission to build a house for B, and that permission did 
not materialise. 979 The condictio sine causa, on the other hand, would be the appropriate 







This condictio would also be available to B ifhe and C had a valid contract 
For the requirements of the condictio indebiti, see Lotz (n 859) para 79. Also see Chapter One at 
p 8 above. 
Apart from non-compliance with the formal requirements of the Alienation of Land Act 68 of 
1981, which provides its own enrichment remedy: see Chapter One at pp 11-12. 
See Lotz (n 859) para 83 and Chapter One at p 8. 
Or if the payment was made as a consequence of a modus which was 'disregarded or frustrated': 
see Lotz (n 859) para 85 and Chapter One at p 8. 
In other words, 'a false assumption relating to a fact concerning the past or present': see Lotz (n 
859) para 88. 
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which subsequently fell away.981 B might also be able to sue C with a condictio sine 
causa where, for example, C had come into possession of cheque made out by B, other 
than by way of a datio by B, and had bona fide disposed of it, provided that C had not 
made any counter-performance therefor and provided that a cheque would be regarded 
as 'money' for the purposes of this action.982 
While this all seems quite straightforward, the kind of complications that arise in 




See Lotz (n 859) para 88 for the circumstances in which this condictio would be available. Also 
see Chapter One at p 9. 
Cf P 305 ff above. 
Supra. Also see Bonitas Medical Aid Fund v Volkskas Bank Ltd and Another supra. In this case, 
Bonitas, a medical aid fund with a healthy bank balance, wished to invest R2 000 000 in 
Volkskas Bank. The appropriate Bonitas employees therefore drew a cheque for this amount on 
the fund's bank, Nedbank. The cheque was made out to Volkskas, it was crossed and marked 
'not transferable', and the printed words 'or bearer' were deleted. A Mr Adams, presumably 
acting as the agent ofa company called Euro Trust, managed to persuade one of Bonitas's 
employees to allow him to convey the cheque to Volkskas. On its way to Volkskas, the cheque 
took a little detour via the offices ofEuro Trust. One ofEuro Trust's employees filled in a 
deposit slip on which she listed several cheques (presumably made out to Euro Trust) and she 
included Bonitas's cheque in favour ofVolkskas in this list. The cheques and the deposit slip 
were handed in at a branch ofVolkskas Bank on the same day. The teller stamped the date on 
the cheque and sent it on its way. Euro Trust's account was credited with the R2 000 000 and the 
cheque arrived at the automated clearing bureau. Because the inter-bank agreement between 
Volkskas and Nedbank stipulated that cheques bearing the date stamp of the collecting bank were 
to be accepted as having been correctly negotiated, Nedbank paid Volkskas, and debited 
Bonitas's account accordingly. The 'fillancial adventures' of the mastennind behind Euro Trust 
having drawn to a close, the company was liquidated. (For the facts, see the judgment at 43-6.) 
In other words, B (Bonitas) had a valid underlying contract with its bank A (Nedbank), and 
validly instructed A by means of a cheque to pay R2 000 000 to Volkskas. The money was, 
however, paid into the account ofC (Euro Trust) held at Volkskas. So the relationships between 
A and B were valid but the relationship between Band C (the Valutaverhiiltnis) was 'defective' 
in that Bowed C no obligation at all. The case concerned the delictual liability ofVolkskas, 
whose employees had all ignored the various protective measures taken by Bomtas (the crossing 
etc). (See the judgment at, e g, 468, 46C-D, 47F and 48A.) The judge stated that 'Volkskas 
ignored the fact that it was the payee of the cheque. It acted throughout as the agent ofEuro 
Trust. In my view it was at all times therefore acting as the collecting banker and its liability 
must be determined in the light of this fact.' (See 47F-G.) The court went on to hold that 
'[b]ecause Volkskas did not accept the cheque as payee, ... [Bonitas], as the drawer, remained 
the true owner of the cheque' (at 47G-H). The court held that the bank's employees had 
'constructive knowledge that the proceeds of the cheque were being applied to the credit of a 
person not entitled thereto in teans of the instrument itself and that a breach of trust had 
therefore been committed. (See 49C-E) The actions ofVolkskas's employees were held to be 
the cause of Bonitas's loss and the Volkskas bank was accordingly found liable in terms of the 
law of delict. At 49-50, the court held that there was no contract between Bomtas and Volkskas 
and that Bonitas could not sue Volkskas for unjustified enrichment as Volkskas had not been 
enriched. As far as the law of enrichment is concerned, Bomtas should have had an enrichment 
claim against Euro Trust as it was unjustifiably enriched at Bonitas's expense. Such a claim 
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Visser (B), a shoemaker from Parow, was told by his bookkeeper (Van Zyl) that 
he owed a sum of money to the Receiver of Revenue (C). Visser accordingly drew a 
cheque for this sum on his bank (A), in favour of C, and handed it to his bookkeeper for 
delivery to the offices of the Receiver. Visser in fact did not owe the Receiver anything 
at all. Van Zyl then used the cheque to pay an amount owed to C by one of his other 
clients, Ras, and was reimbursed for this payment by Ras's wife. Visser sued C with a 
condictio indebiti. The court a quo decided that Visser had paid the amount in question 
to the Receiver of Revenue 'in respect of a debt he did not owe' and granted his 
claim.984 
In other words, the court treated the case as one where there was a valid 
Deckungsverhdltnis (between Visser and his bank) but an invalid Valutaverhdltnis 
(between Visser and the Receiver): the defect in question lay in the relationship 
between B and C in that B did not owe the money to C. Because there was no defect in 
the relationship between A and B, the fact that payment was made by cheque was 
irrelevant. B's underlying contract with the bank was valid, the cheque was validly 
made out, and A performed properly in accordance with the instruction from its client 
embodied in the cheque. 
The Commissioner for Inland Revenue appealed against this decision. The 
Appellate Division, per Hoexter lA, held that '[t]he payment which took place was a 
payment by van Zyl of the £1,713 lOs. Od. actually owed by Ras to the defendant._ Th~re 
was therefore no payment by the plaintiff of his own supposed debt and the money 
received by the defendant from van Zyl was not indebiturn. ,985 
The court thus did not regard the payment as being a payment by Visser to the 
Receiver. It was considered to be a payment by Van Zyl to the Receiver, in settlement 
of Ras' s debt to the latter. In other words, it appears that the court regarded this as a 
984 
985 
would have been useless in the circumstances, however, as Euro Trust had been liquidated. 
See the judgment at 457F. 
See 457H. 
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Chapter Two-type situation, i e a situation where someone paid the debt of another of his 
own accord: Van Zyl paid the debt owed by Ras to the Receiver.986 As Ras did owe the 
amount in question, the court said that the payment was not made indebite. For these 
reasons, the court held that Visser's condictio indebiti against the Commissioner for 
Inland Revenue should fai1. 987 
The court's analysis rests on the conclusion that Van Zyl's delivery of the cheque 
extinguished Ras's liability to the Receiver. The court thus assumes that payment by 
means of a stolen cheque can validly extinguish a debt. This assumption cannot be 
supported, for reasons of public policy. As was suggested above, payment by means of 
a stolen or forged cheque should not have the effect of extinguishing a liability.988 It 
may be convenient to regard the delivery of a stolen cheque989 as valid payment, and 
such an approach protects the payee's reliance interest. These factors are, however, in 
my view, outweighed by the need to protect the drawer's interests and the fact that the 
law should not be seen to condone fraudulent payments.990 
I accordingly prefer the decision of the court a quo. Van Zyl's delivery of the 
cheque should not have extinguished Ras's debt and the Commissioner should therefore 
have retained its claim against Ras. The payment by Visser's bank was attributable to 
Visser as it took place in accordance with his valid instruction. Visser thus paid a non-
existent debt in error and I think that his condictio indebiti against the Commissioner 
should have succeeded. The Commissioner should have been able to claim payment by 
Ras, and Ras should have had to sue Van Zyl for the amount by which he was enriched. 
In conclusion, therefore, where a contract B-C is void, B should be able to bring 






According to this analysis, Van Zyl (A) acted as a malafide gestor by settling Ras's (B's) debt to 
C for his own benefit. A thus had a claim to the amount by which B was enriched (i e the amount 
of the debt that had been settled). B accordingly handed thus sum to A. 
458B-C and 459E. 
See p 289 above. 
Like the delivery of stolen cash. 
Cfp 290 above. In result, the case of East Coast Design supra suggests that payment by means 





A NOTE ON VOIDABLE CONTRACTS 
In German law, there is no difference between a voidable contract that has been avoided 
by the aggrieved party and a contract that is void ab initio.991 In other words, rather than 
attracting contractual or delictual remedies, a voidable contract, once avoided, would be 
treated in exactly the same way as a contract which was void from the outset: a party 
who has performed may reclaim such performance in terms of the law of unjustified 
enrichment. 
In South Africa, on the other hand, if the contract between B and C were 
voidable (eg on the basis of fraudulent misrepresentation) and the aggrieved party chose 
to avoid the contract (with retrospective effect), this would be followed not by an 
enrichment claim but by restitutio in integrum. Whether he affirmed or rescinded the 
contract, he would be entitled to a claim for delictual damages to the extent that he had 
still suffered a loss and provided that the misrepresentation, duress or undue influence 
was fraudulent or negligent.992 
The same rules would apply if the underlying contract between A and B were 
voidable, or if both contracts (A-B) and (B-C) were voidable. The parties would be 
confined to seeking recourse against their contract partners and there would be no claim 
to restitutio in integrum between A and C. 
CONCLUSION 
What, then, can one conclude about enrichment in the context of an instruction? The 




See pp 19-20 in Chapter One above. 
For criticism of the rather anomalous exclusion ofthe restitutio in integrum from the law of 
unjustified enrichment, see S Hutton 'Restitution after breach of contract: Rethinking the 
conventional jurisprudence' 1997 Acta Juridica 201. 
In this section, unless indicated otherwise, the word 'perfOimance' will not be used in a technical 
sense i e to refer to a Leistung. 
A makes that performance to C without realising that there is a defect in his (A's) 
relationship with B. 
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Assuming that there was no underlying contractual relationship between A and 
B, German law would say that A can bring an enrichment claim against B for the value 
ofthe his claim against C. In an analogous case in South Africa,994 it has also been held 
that A can sue B for his enrichment. In that case, the judge distinguished such cases 
from the type of situation dealt with in Chapter Two and, importantly, he extended the 
notion of a datio by holding that although a payment had factually been made to C, it 
legally constituted a payment to B. In other words, where B instructs A to perform to 
his creditor, C, and A does so thinking that he owes this performance to B, A should sue 
B, and not C, for enrichment. Using its traditional remedies, South African law thus 
arrives at the solution that German law has derived from a close analysis of the interests 
ofthe parties. 
Next, I discussed the law concerning payments made by A to C despite B's 
revocation of his instruction. German law distinguishes between cases where the payee 
was aware of the countermand, and those where he was not. It is suggested that we 
adopt this valuable distinction. 
In cases where the payee was not aware of the countermand, both German and 
South African law only allow A to bring an enrichment claim against B. This 
conclusion can be explained on technical grounds. For example, A's payment to C 
constitutes B's performance in terms of his obligation to C and, as the obligation B-C is 
thereby extinguished, B is enriched. It can also be justified by an analysis of the interests 
ofthe parties. In result, the bonafide payee's reliance interest is protected by both legal 
systems in such cases. 
If, on the other hand, the payee was aware of the countermand, A can bring an 
enrichment action directly against C. Both German law and South African law have 
994 Licences and Genera/Insurance Co v Ismay supra. 
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arrived at this conclusion by considering the interests of the parties. Thus, for example, 
the bank should carry the risk that it might make such a mistake, the recipient's reliance 
is not worthy of protection as he knew that he was not entitled to the performance in 
question, and so on. 
According to the view now accepted by the majority in Germany, A can also 
bring an enrichment claim directly against C where there was no valid instruction for the 
payment A-C. This conclusion, too, is supported by an analysis of the interests of the 
parties: B is deemed to be more worthy of protection than C in such cases, whether or 
not C was aware of the absence of a valid instruction. The payment should not be 
imputed to B (in the absence of a valid instruction B-A), and should therefore not 
extinguish any debt owed by B to C. In cases where there is no valid instruction B-A, it 
is therefore irrelevant whether B owed anything to C or not. 
South African courts apparently agree that A should not be able to sue B in such 
circumstances. There is authority for the proposition that A should sue C in cases where 
the instruction was defective (e g where too much was paid, or where the cheque was 
forged). On the other hand, there is also authority for the view that A should direct an 
enrichment claim against the forger of a cheque. An analysis of the interests of the 
parties and the relevant policy factors leads one to the conclusion that, as in German law, 
a payment made by A to C in the absence of a valid instruction by B should not 
extinguish any debt owed by B to C, whether or not C was aware of the absence of such 
an instruction. C should thus be regarded as being enriched by A's payment. As in 
German law, C's interests are sufficiently protected by the rules regarding loss of 
enrichment. 
If only the Valutaverhdltnis is defective, B will have an enrichment claim against 
C in terms of German law. It was suggested in this chapter that this is also the basic 
approach of South African law. 
Cases of Doppelmangel (i e where both the relationships between A and B, and 
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Band C are defective) have led to controversy in German law. The currently-accepted 
view is that claims should lie between A and B, and Band c.995 This results in the most 
equitable allocation of risks. It is agreed that A may sue C directly, however, where C 
received the performance gratuitously.996 It appears that South African law, on the other 
hand, would more readily grant A a direct action against C. According to the general 
principles of enrichment liability, A would have to sue C, as B was arguably not 
enriched in such circumstances. It may be possible, however, for A to sue B with one of 
the traditional remedies (the condictio indebiti), although a South African court is 
presently more likely to allow A to sue C. 
In the next chapter, performances in the context of an actual or purported cession 
will be considered. Whereas, in this chapter, the factor reSUlting in the 'deflection' of 
A's performance from B to C lay between A and B, the next chapter deals with situatons 
where that factor lies between B and C. 
995 
9% 
Medicus Burgerliches Recht marg note 675; Meier 58 Cambridge Law lournal567 at 571. 
In other words, in circumstances covered by § 822 BGB. But in the case of the complete absence 
of an effective instruction, there could be a direct claim between A and C: see Medicus 
Schuldrecht II 355 marg note 729; idem Burgerliches Recht marg note 677. Tbere is also 
authority to suggest that there could be such a direct claim where a bank has not obeyed an 
instruction to stop a cheque: Medicus Burgerliches Recht marg note 676. These cases will be 
discussed in detail later. 
CHAPTER FOlTR 
UNJUSTIFIED ENRICHMENT IN THE CONTEXT OF AN 
ACTUAL OR PURPORTED CESSION 
The second chapter of this thesis dealt with situations where A performs in terms of 
B's obligation to C without having been instructed or otherwise obliged to do so. 
For example, A pays her sister's debt to C in order to bring her back from the brink 
of bankruptcy. In the next chapter, we discussed situations where A performs in 
terms ofB's obligation to C on the instruction ofB. Thus, for instance, on the 
instruction of its client (B), a bank (A) pays C. Now we have to examine the 
potential patterns of liability that emerge when A 'performs' to C in terms of a debt 
previously owed by A to B, but now owed by A to C. This situation would arise if, 
for example, A owed B a performance in terms of a contract and B ceded or 
purported to cede his claim against A to C. 
Looking at this picture from a slightly different angle, Chapter Two covered 
situations where A acted on his own initiative in 'performing' I to C, whereas in 
Chapter Three A was prompted to 'perform,2 to C by B's instruction. In this chapter, 
on the other hand, we will consider situations where A is prompted to 'perform' to C 
by B's cession3 to C of his claim against A. 
Following the pattern of previous chapters, the South Africao4 and Germans 
The word 'perfow' is used here in an non-technical sense, to denote situations where A 
either gives something (datio) to C or does something (factum) for him, as we have no word 
that exactly corresponds to the German' zuwenden' or 'Zuwendung', which covers both a 
datio and afactum: see the discussion in Chapter One at p 39 above. 
It should be emphasised again that this word is being used in an untechnical way (i e not as a 
translation of the German 'leisten') as it will be remembered that the Zuwendungen and 
LeislUngen do not necessarily coincide: cf the discussion in Chapter Three, where it was 
pointed out that a Zuwendung A-C in accordance with an Anweisung B-A is regarded by 
German law as a Leistung A-B (and a simultaneous Leislung B-C). 
Or his purported cession. 
See, generally, Scott Cession; Hutchison (ed) Wille's Principles 491 ff; D J Joubert General 
Principles of the Law of Contract (1987) 190 ff; De Wet and Van Wyk Kontraktereg 251 ff; 
Van der Merwe et al Contract 419 ff; P M Nienaber 'Cession' LA WSA vol 2, First Reissue 
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law of cession in general will first be compared, to provide a background for an 
analysis of the particular instances of emichment liability which arise in this context. 
CESSION: A BRIEF COMPARISON 
In essence, the ways in which the two legal systems treat cession are remarkably 
similar. In both systems, cession6 constitutes an act oftransfer7 of an incorporeal 
object8 by a cedent to a cessionary. Analysis of the legal transactions involved in a 
cession may be facilitated by comparing cession to the other type of legal transfer 
recognised by the two legal systems, namely a transfer of corporeal property.9 
Two requirements must be met in order for a transfer of ownership of 
corporeal property to take place, the first being physical delivery of movable 
property or registration of immovable property. The second requirement, which is 
not as immediately apparent, is the coincidence of the parties' intentions to pass and 
6 
7 
(1993) paras 129 ff. On the historical background of cession in both systems, see 
Zimmermann Law of Obligations 58 ff. 
§§ 398 ff BGB. 
Cf 'assignment', which in South African law is the means by which a third party acquires not 
only rights but also duties and which is effected by the consent of all three parties, i e by the 
conclusion of an entirely new contract: Hutchison (ed) Wille's Principles 497. Also cf 
delegation and subrogation: Van der Merwe et al Contract 422. Although the word 
'cession' is sometimes erroneously used in practice to denote a simultaneous cession and 
delegation, the two concepts are legally distinct (see, e g, Pangbourne Properties Ltd v Gill 
& Ramsden (Pty) Ltd 1996 (1) SA 1182 (A) at 1187, referring to a written contract (' ... in 
spite of its title, it is not a cession but rather a contract of substitution incorporating a cession 
of rights and a delegation of obligations. '); Milner v Union Dominions Corporation (SA) Ltd 
and Another 1959 (3) SA 674 (C) at 676-7. One of the important facets of this distinction is 
that while the debtor need not consent to the cession of a claim against him, 'obligations may 
not be delegated by a debtor without the consent of the creditor': Milner v Union Dominions 
Corporation (SA) Ltd and Another supra at 676F. 
In Afrikaans: 'oordragshandeling'; in German: 'Verfiigungsgeschlift'. See, for example, 
Johnson v Incorporated General Insurances Ltd 1983 (1) SA 318 (A) at 330H infin-331A; 
Standard General Insurance Co Ltd v SA Brake CC 1995 (3) SA 806 (A) at 814J; HearBeigh 
Private Hospital (Pty) Ltd t/a Rand Clinic v Soller & Manning Allorneys and Others 2001 
(4) SA 360 (W) at 366G-H. 
In other words, a rea) or personal right: Hutchison (ed) Wille's Principles 491. Cf Van der 
Merwe et al Contract 419 who only refer to a personal right in their definition of cession. 
Note that while the type of right most commonly ceded is a personal right, real rights are also 
capable of being ceded: see Nienaber (n 4) para 226 (and see, e g, the comments in Banjo v 
Sungrown (Pty) Ltd 1969 (1) SA 401 (N) at 408B-C) but cf Scott Cession 7,8 and 16 ff. A 
servitude, or a right in terms of a mortgage, or even ownership (see, e g, Van Zyl v Credit 
Corporation of South Africa Ltd 1960 (4) SA 582 (A) at 587C but cf Nienaber (n 4) para 
230n5) may thus be ceded. 
See e g Van der Merwe et al Contract 421: '[CJession is akin to delivery, by which transfer 
of ownership in a corporeal asset is effected'. See, e g, Johnson v Incorporated General 
Insurances Ltd supra at 330-1. 
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to receive ownership.lo This so-called 'real agreement' is distinguished from any 
underlying ('obligationary') agreement in terms ofwbich the transfer takes place, II 
such as a contract of sale or donation. The two agreements are also independent of 
each other in the sense that the validity of the real agreement is not dependent on the 
validity of the obligationary agreementY Ownership of a car, for example, may thus 
be validly transferred even if the underlying contract of sale is void. 
If the parties want to transfer a personal right, on the other hand, there can be 
no physical delivery as the object of the right (namely a performance) is 
incorporeal. 13 All that is therefore required for the transfer of rights other than 
ownership, in both South Africanl4 and German law,15 is agreement. 16 This 
agreement (the 'transfer agreement', i e the coincidence of the animus cedendi and 










C G van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 306. 
Thus both systems apparently apply the 'separation principle' (Trennungsprinzip). In this 
regard, see Chapter One above. 
Both the South African and German legal systems thus generally apply the principle of 
abstraction (Abstraklionsprinzip): On South African law: Commissioner o/Customs & 
Excise v Randles, Brothers & Hudson Ltd 1941 AD 369, especially at 398-9 and 411; Trust 
Bank van Afrika Bpk v Western Bank Bpk en Andere NNO 1978 (4) SA 281 (A), particularly 
at 301 H-3021 (where the judge very clearly states that the transfer of ownership is 
independent of any underlying contract); Air-Kel (Edms) Bpk h/a Merkel Motors v 
Bodenstein en 'n Ander 1980 (3) SA 917 (A); Rabinowitz and Another v De Beers 
Consolidated Mines Lid and Another 1958 (3) SA 619 (A); Van der Merwe (n 10) 16 ffand 
306 ff; D L Carey Miller The Acquisition and Protection o/Ownership (1986) 124 ff and 167 
ff. On German law, see, e g, H Brox Allgemeiner Teil des BGB (22 ed 1998) marg notes 115 
ff (where the author says that it has been suggested that if the two agreements form an 
economic unity, the abstraction principle will not apply (rejected by Brox): marg note 120.) 
It appears that if the underlying agreement is tainted by fraud, the abstraction principle will 
also not apply in German law: see Chapter One at p 19 above. 
See Nienaber (n 4) para 227. 
On the South African law of cession, see the references cited in note 4 above. 
See §§ 398 ff BGB and the standard commentaries thereon. The first sentence of § 398 reads 
as follows: 'Eine Forderung kann von dem GUiubiger durch Vertrag mit einem anderen auf 
diesen iibertragen werden (Abtretung).' (A claim can, by contract with another, be 
transferred from the creditor to the other party (cession).) It should, however, be 
remembered that if the underlying agreement is subject to fraud or mistake or is contra bonos 
mores, the transfer agreement will also be thus tainted: see Chapter One at p 19 above. 
German law: Kropholler BGB vor § 398 marg note 3. South African law: see, e g, Hippo 
Quarries (Tv!) (Pty) Ltd v Eardley 1992 (1) SA 867 (A) 873E-F; Johnson v Incorporated 
General Insurances Ltd supra at 331 G-H; Muller NOv Trust Bank 0/ Africa Ltd and 
Another 1981 (2) SA 117 (N) at 125F-G; Nienaber (n 4) para 227; Hutchison (ed) Wille's 
Principles 491. It may be express or tacit: Van der Merwe et al Contracl428. 
In other words, the cedent's intention to cede and the cessionary's intention to receive. See, 
for example, Hippo Quarries (Tv!) (Pty) Ltd v Eardley supra at 873E-F; Johnson v 
Incorporated General Insurances Ltd supra, particularly at 331 G-H; Nienaber (n 4) para 
249; Van der Merwe el al Contract 428 and the authorities cited there in note 63. This 
transfer agreement corresponds to the 'real agreement' which, together with delivery or 
registration, effects transfer of corporeal property. 
See Uxbury Investment (Pty) Ltd v Sunbury Investments (Pty) Ltd 1963 (1) SA 747 (C) at 
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main result is that the recipient, the cessionary, takes the place of the original 
creditor, the cedent, in his legal relationship with the debtor.2o 
The cession itself can thus be seen as the conceptual parallel of transfer of 
ownership.21 As in cases where parties transfer corporeal property, at least in theory, 
the parties usuall;2 conclude two distinct, independent agreements: the agreement 
to cede (the 'obligationary contract')23 and the agreement of transfer (the cession 
itself).24 The first (e g a contract of sale or donation)25 gives rise to the obligation to 
effect a cession, and the cession itself constitutes the performance of this 









752A: 'A cession is a method of transferring incorporeal rights from one person to another'. 
Cf 'assignment', which in South African law is the means by which a third party acquires not 
only rights but also duties and which is effected by the consent of all three parties, i e by the 
conclusion of an entirely new contract: Hutchison (ed) Wille's Principles 497. 
See, for example, Nienaber (n 4) para 263; Hippo Quarries (Tvl) (Pty) Ltd v Eardley supra 
(also per Nienaber JA) at 877H-I: 'the cedent is succeeded by the cessionary as the holder of 
the right; and the cedent retains no interest in the right itself; Kotosopoulos v Bilardi 1970 
(2) SA 391 (C) at 396A and 398F-G; Scott Cession 128 ffand 221 ff. As far as 'absolute' 
cession is concerned,. see Hutchison (ed) Wille's Principles 495. He thus receives a right 
which is generally neither greater nor lesser than the cedent had; nemo plus iuris ad alium 
transferre potest quam ipse haberet. In the case of cession in securitatem debiti, according to 
the traditional approach, 'ownership' of the right is retained by the cedent whereas, according 
to the minority view, the cessionary receives the right but is obliged to transfer it back to the 
cedent if the latter pays the debt secured by the cession: Hutchison op cit 496. Regarding 
German law: § 398 BGB '[Abtretung] Eine Forderung kann von dem GIaubiger durch 
Vertrag mit einem anderen auf diesen Ubertragen werden (Abtretung). Mit dem Abschlusse 
des Vertrags tritt der neue GHiubiger an die Stelle des bisherigen GIaubigers.' (A claim can, 
by a contract with another, be transferred from the creditor to the other party (cession). With 
the conclusion of the contract, the new e g creditor steps into the place of the former 
creditor.) 
See, e g, the judgments of Joubert JA in First National Bank of SA Ltd v Lynn NO and Others 
1996 (2) SA 339 (A) at 345G and Johnson v Incorporated General Insurances Ltd supra at 
330H. 
In other words, assuming that the causa for the cession was a contract and not, for example, a 
testamentary disposition. 
Namely an agreement 'whereby one or more obligations are created, such as contracts of 
sale, lease and donation': Nienaber (n 4) para 228. In Afrikaans, 'verbintenisskeppende 
ooreenkoms'. It is sometimes referred to as a 'justa causa': see, e g, Johnson v IncorporaJed 
General Insurances Ltd supra at 331G-H; Headleigh Private Hospital (Pty) Ltd t/a Rand 
Clinic v Soller & Manning Attorneys and Others supra at 370C-D. 
In Afrikaans, 'oordragsooreenkoms'. In German law, it is regarded as an 'abstrakter 
Verfugungsgeschaft', i e it is analogous to the 'real agreement' that effects transfer of 
corporeal property. On the South African law, see e g Johnson v Incorporated General 
Insurances Ltd supra at 331G-H; Hippo Quarries (Tvl) (Pty) Ltd v Eardley supra at 877G. 
Some writers refer to this agreement 'whereby rights are transmitted' as a 'real' agreement: 
see Nienaber (n 4) para 228. 
Johnson v Incorporated General Insurances Ltd supra at 331H; Palandt § 398 marg note 3; 
Kropholler BGB vor § 398 marg note 2. The cession could also be made as a form of 
security analogous to a pledge of movables, in which case it would be a cession in 
securitaJem debiti: Hutchison (ed) Wille's Principles 496; Zimmermann Law of ObligaJions 
65; Zweigert and Katz An Introduction to Comparative Law 3 ed (1998) 445-6. 
Nienaber (n 4) para 230: '[T]he two types of juristic acts are distinct in function and can be 
so in time: by the former a duty to cede is created; by the latter it is discharged'. 
I 
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example, from a contract oflease), he may agree to 'sell' this right, or res 
incorporalis, to C. The agreement to sell the right would constitute an obligationary 
agreement to cede, and the envisaged performance would be the cession itself. The 
cession would occur once B and C have concluded an agreement oftransfer (i e once 
B's intention to cede and C's intention to accept cession coincide).27 
These two agreements may occur simultaneously or chronologically?8 
Because they often coincide and are often difficult to distinguish in practice,29 some 
South African authorities30 have tended to regard them as one legal act. 31 It now 
seems to be generally accepted, however, that, as in German law, they are at least 
conceptually distinct.32 The practical consequence of this theoretical distinction is 
that the validity of the two agreements may be assessed independently of one 
another, as is done in German law, which applies the principle of abstraction to 
conveyances of personal rights just as it does to conveyances of corporeal property.33 









If, for example, B in fact had no valid right against A (i e there was no incorporeal object to 
be ceded), the purported cession would have no effect (in German terms, it would 'gehen ins 
Leere', i e disappear into a void) and the underlying contract would thus not be fulfilled. The 
disappointed 'cessionary' would therefore be entitled to a claim for breach of contract. Cf 
Muller's case supra at 125H (regarding cession ofa spes): 'it is more correct to say that the 
obligationary agreement of cession can be entered into before the right of action has come 
into existence but not the real agreement of cession whereby effect is given to the 
obligationary agreement'. Also see the judgment at 128G. 
For example, see Johnson v Incorporated General Insurances Ltd supra at 331H; Muller's 
case supra per Thirion J at 126E: 'I can see no objection to the parties' entering into an 
agreement (the obligationary agreement) to cede a right not yet in existence but which may 
come into existence at some future date'. Also see Nienaber (n 4) para 230 and Scott 
Cession 8. 
See, for example, Kalil v Decotex (Ply) Ltd and Another 1988 (I) SA 943 (A) at 974H-I 
where the court seemed to accept that there was a distinction, albeit a fine one, between the 
cession and the agreement to cede, but did not distinguish them with regard to the facts of the 
case. They could both be embodied in the same document - see, e g, Standard General 
Insurance Co Ltd v SA Brake CC supra at 8141-1. 
See Muller's case supra at 125H-126A, where Thirion J mentions this di fference of opinion. 
He favours the view that the term 'cession' refers only to the transfer. 
The rules that a cession can take place for reasons other than that it has been contractually 
agreed upon, and that the parties can agree that a cession take place at a future date would 
seem to render this impossible. 
See, for example, Nienaber (n 4) paras 228 and 249; Scott Cession 8 ff, 24 ff and 59 ff. 
Kropholler BGB vor § 398 marg note 2; Zweigert and Kotz (n 25) 446. This is so unless the 
parties agree otherwise: Kropholler loc cit. 
Johnson v Incorporated General Insurances Ltd supra at 331 H (ambiguous); Sasfin (Ply) Ltd 
v Beukes 1989 (I) SA I (A). See Van der Merwe et al Contract at 326n32, where the authors 
dismiss apparent support of the causal system in these cases as not being authoritative and 
remark that Scott's comments this regard are misleading: 'Scott does not require a valid 
causa for the efficacy of the cession, but seems thereby to be making the point that an invalid 
causa may permit a cedent to undo the effect of a cession by means of an enrichment claim'. 
If there is an enrichment claim, then there is, by definition, no causa. 
I 
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of authority also favours the abstract approach.35 The transfer agreement is, 
therefore, like the real agreemene6 in the case of traditio, an abstract legal act.37 Its 
validity is thus, in general,38 independent of any underlying agreemene9 in tenns of 
which the cession takes place,4o unless the parties agree otherwise.41 
It took centuries for the ius commune to recognise the institution of cession.42 
When it eventually took this step, however, it did so boldly and decisively. Cession 
is not, as one might have expected, hedged around with unduly restrictive provisions; 
on the contrary, it is now remarkably easy for parties to cede rights in both Gennan 
and South African law. All that is required, apart from the agreement of transfer, is 
that the cedent holds a right capable of being ceded,43 and the satisfaction of the 
other requirements which apply to all agreements,44 such as capacity to act,45 













Lubbe and Murray Contract 649; Scott Cession 49-51; Van der Merwe et al Contract 326, 
327; Zimmermann Law of Obligations 65n229; Joubert (n 4) 192-3. Also see, e g, Headleigh 
Private Hospital (Pry) Ltd fla Rand Clinic v Soller & Manning Allorneys and Others supra at 
371l-J (obiter); Rabinowitz and Another v De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd and Another 
supra. For authority to the contrary, see Joubert (n 4) 193n62. 
Some writers, e g Nienaber (n 4) para 249 and J C De Wet and A H Van Wyk De Wet and 
Yeats: Kontraktereg en Handelsreg 4 ed (1978) 225, also refer to this transfer agreement as 
a 'real agreement' but cf Scott Cession 9 ff. 
In German, an 'abstrakter Verrugungsgesch1ift'. On the arguments for the application of the 
principle of abstraction to cession, see, for example, Scott Cession 79 ff, particularly 84 ff. 
Cf German law, in which there are various exceptions to the application of the abstract 
system viz if the underlying agreement was concluded on the basis of fraud or mistake, or is 
contra bonos mores: see Scott Cession 82n76. 
Or other causa, such as a provision in a will: see Nienaber (n 4) para 249. 
Nienaber (n 4) para 249; Joubert (n 4) 192-3; Rabinowitz and Another v De Beers 
Consolidated Mines Ltd and Another supra; Headleigh Private Hospital (Pry) Ltd tla Rand 
Clinic v Soller & Manning Attorneys and Others supra at 371I (obiter). For authority to the 
contrary, see Joubert (n 4) 193n62. Kropholler BGB vor § 398 marg note 2; Zweigert and 
Katz (n 25) 446. 
See Van der Merwe et al Contract 327n37. For the same idea in German law see Kropholler 
BGB vor § 398 marg note 2; Zweigert and Katz (n 25) 446. 
See Zimmermann Law of Obligations 58 ff. 
More precisely, the cedent must hold a right, and that right must be capable of being ceded. 
See, for example, Van der Merwe et al Contract 429,437; Nienaber (n 4) para 249 ('a right 
capable of being transferred'); Muller's case supra at 25H. This must be the consequence of 
the general rule nemo plus iuris ad a1ium transferre potest, quam ipse haberet. In South 
Africa, a conditional right, a right subject to a dies, and perhaps even a spes may be ceded: 
Hutchison (ed) Wille's Principles 493 and 495; Joubert (n 4) 197; Scott Cession 49 ff and 
170 ff; Nienaber (n 4) paras 230 and 242; Muller NO v Trust Bank of Africa Ltd and Another 
supra at 126E; but cf De Wet and Van Wyk Kontraktereg 254. 
Scott Cession 70 ff. 
Van der Merwe et al Contract 427-8. 
Both the cession and the underlying obligationary agreement must be legal: see Lubbe and 
Murray Contract 649; Scott Cession 45, 49-51; Van der Merwe et al Contract 427, 447 ff 
and the cases cited there. According to Van der Merwe et aI Contract, although the legality 
of the two agreements should be assessed separately (at 448-9), '[i]n some of the decisions 
involving champerty the abstract nature of cession is disregarded'. (at 449n21 0). 
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valid;48 there is no need for documentary evidence, for example, unless the parties 
have themselves made this a prerequisite for the validity of their cession.49 As a 
general rule,5o there is also no need to obtain the consent of the debtor,5l or even to 
inform him of the cession.52 He might, therefore, only become aware that there has 
been a substitution of creditors when the cessionary claims performance. 
To counterbalance the rules facilitating cession, both legal systems have 
provisions that safeguard the debtor. 53 The most fundamental protection is provided 









The content of the cession must be certain or at least ascertainable: see Van der Merwe et al 
Contract 429; Lubbe and Murray Contract 649. 
Hutchison (ed) Wille's Principles 492; Joubert (n 4) 193; See Nienaber (n 4) paras 246 and 
247; Wright & Co v The Colonial Government (1891) 8 SC 260; Kropholler BGB vor § 398 
marg note 4. Regarding the delivery of documents, if any, see Scott Cession 27 ff. It should 
also be noted that South African law requires compliance with formal requirements for 
validity of a cession in some exceptional circumstances (e g registration of a mortgagee's real 
right), and the parties themselves may stipulate that formalities be required: see Hutchison 
(ed) Wille's Principles 492, 493. 
There are also certain other exceptional circumstances in which formalities are required for 
the validity of a cession - see the previous footnote. 
His consent may be required in certain exceptional cases e g where the obligation to be ceded 
is of a personal nature (see, e g, Hammond, Harvey & Newton v Union Textile Mills Ltd 1949 
(3) SA 398 (E)). See also Hutchison (ed) Wille's Principles 493; Wessels Contract para 
1711, § 399 BGB. Regarding the impermissibility of cession in this case, see Kropholler 
BGB vor § 398 marg notes 5 and 6, and in the case where the parties have concluded a 
pactum de non cedendo, see Hutchison (ed) Wille's Principles 494). 
Implied by § 398 BGB; Zweigert and Katz (n 25) 445; Hutchison (ed) Wille's Principles 
491; Nienaber (n 4) paras 227 and 251; Scott Cession 7; Van der Merwe et al Contract 420; 
Van Zyl v Credit Corporation of SA Ltd supra at 588F-H; Milner v Union Dominions 
Corporation (SA) Ltd and Another supra at 676F. Cf also Johnson v Incorporated General 
Insurances Ltd supra at 330H infin. 
Hutchison (ed) Wille's Principles 492; § 407 BGB; Zimmermann Law of Obligations 66; 
Zweigert and K6tz (n 25) 446; Nienaber (n 4) paras 227 and 251; Van der Merwe et al 
Contract 452; but cf Scott Cession 95 ff. It is advisable, however, for the new creditor to 
give the debtor notice of the cession because if the debtor pays the cedent without being 
aware of the cession, his debt will be discharged. If, on the other hand, the debtor pays the 
cedent while aware of the cession, he will remain liable to the cessionary: see, e g, 
Headleigh Private Hospital (Pty) Ltd t/a Rand Clinic v Soller & Manning Attorneys and 
Others supra at 372G-H and see below at p 343. Also see Van der Merwe et al Contract 
453: good faith is more important than mere notice. Notice will obviously be a prerequisite 
for a valid cession, however, in those circumstances in which the parties have agreed that his 
consent is required. So much for notice to the debtor. Turning to the position of the creditor, 
on the other hand, in terms of German law, the former creditor is obliged to give the new 
creditor necessary information in order for the validity of the claim and to deliver to him the 
written document for the proving of the claim in so far as it is in his possession: § 402 BGB. 
Cf South African law, where the situation is uncertain: see, e g, Hutchison (ed) Wille's 
Principles 492. The cedent also has to issue an officially countersigned document regarding 
the cession to the new creditor on demand, the costs of which are to be borne by the new 
creditor. 
§§ 404 ffBGB; Zimmermann Law of Obligations 66. 
For example, by being exposed to a 'multiplicity of actions or increased costs': Van der 
Merwe et al Contract 449 ff. Also see Hutchison (ed) Wille's PrinCiples 495; Duke v Allen 
1953 (3) SA 702 (N) at 703E; De Wet and Van Wyk Kontraktereg 231-2,259; Nienaber (n 
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Thus, for example, the cessionary may not acquire a greater right than the cedent 
had: nema plus iuris ad alium transferre patest, quam ipse haberet.55 Flowing from 
the rule against the debtor being prejudiced by the cession are various other 
protective requirements.56 Should, for example, the debtor pay the cedent without 
being aware of the cession, his debt will be discharged.57 (If, on the other hand, the 
debtor pays the cedent having received notice of the cession, he will still be obliged 
to perform to the cessionary.)58 The ceded right carries along with it all its 
advantages and disadvantages.59 The debtor may therefore raise against the 







4) para 258; Scott Cession 192 ff. For statements of this rule in German law, see, for 
example, Munchener KommentarfLieb § 812 marg note 124b; Loewenheim 
Bereicherungsrecht 55. 
As in property law, therefore, the transferor (here the cedent) may not transfer a greater right 
than he himself holds. See, for example, Nienaber (n 4) para 263; Scott Cession 221; Van 
der Merwe et al Contract 427n58. 
For example, that 'the cession of part of a debt or a cession purporting to split the debt 
among a number of cessionaries, without the consent of the debtor, is invalid': Kotsoupolous 
v Bilardi supra at 396E-F. 
Illings (Acceptance) Co (Pry) Ltd v Ensor NO 1982 (1) SA 570 (A) at 578F; Hutchison (ed) 
Wille's Principles 492-3; Joubert (n 4) 194; Christie Contract 542; Zweigert and Kotz (n 25) 
445. As in Roman-Dutch law: Van der Merwe et al Contract 453 ('the debtor who paid the 
cedent in ignorance of the cession was immune from liability towards the cessionary' .). This 
is implied by § 407 (1) BGB: '[Leistung an den bisherigen GHiubiger] Der neue GHiubiger 
mu13 eine Leistung, die der Schuldner nach der Abtretung an den bisherigen GHiubiger 
bewirkt, sowie jedes Rechtsgeschaft, das nach der Abtretung zwischen dem Schuldner und 
dem bisherigen Glaubiger in Ansehung der Forderung vorgenommen wird, gegen sich gelten 
lassen, es sei denn, daB der Schuldner die Abtretung bei der Leistung oder der Vornahme des 
Rechtgeschafis kennt.' ('The assignee must give credit for an act of performance done by the 
debtor in favor of the assignor after the assignment, or any legal transaction entered into 
between the debtor and the assignor in respect of the principal debt after the assignment, 
unless the debtor knew of the assigment at the time of performance or of entering into the 
legal transaction'.) (trans I I S Forrester, S L Goren and H-M Ilgen The German Civil Code 
(1975)). 
Hutchison (ed) Wille's Principles 493; Sasfin (Pry) Ltd v Beukes supra at 6371; Van der 
Merwe et al Contract 453; Headleigh Private Hospital (Pry) Ltd tla Rand Clinic v Soller & 
Manning Attorneys and Others supra at 372G-H. This is also implied by § 407 (1) BGB. 
See, for example, Nienaber (n 4) paras 268 and 269; Scott Cession 223 ff. 
Hutchison (ed) Wille's Principles 495; Joubert (n 4) 197; Nienaber (n 4) paras 258, 269; Van 
Zyl v Credit Corporation of SA Ltd supra at 588F -H. In South African law at least, the 
debtor may only raise defences in rem and not in personam: e g defences which do not have 
to do with the cedent's personal capacities (e g prescription, set-off etc): Hutchison (ed) 
Wille's Principles 495. A counter-claim may usually not be brought against the cessionary in 
South African law: loc cit. This is because 'cession transfers rights but not duties': loc cit. 
Cfthe position in German law: § 406 BGB: '[Aufrechnung gegeniiber dem neuen 
GHiubiger] Der Schuldner kann eine ihm gegen den bisherigen Glaubiger zustehende 
Forderung auch dem neuen GHiubiger gegeniiber aufrechnen, es sei denn, daB er bei dem 
Erwerbe der Forderung von der Abtretung Kenntnis hatte oder daB die Forderung erst nach 
der Erlangung der Kenntnis und spater als die abgetretene Forderung fallig geworden isl' 
([Set-off against the assignee] The debtor may also set off against the assignee an existing 
claim which the debtor has against the assignor, unless he had knowledge of the assignment 
at the time of the acquisition of the claim, or unless the claim did not become due until after 
he had acquired such knowledge and after the maturity of the principal debt.) (Transl 
Forrester et al (n 57)). Also see Zweigert and Kotz (n 25) 448. 
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The position in both Gennan and South African law, assuming that all the 
transactions were validly effected, may be summed up with this example: A owes a 
performance to B. B then concludes a valid contract with C in terms of which, in 
exchange for payment by C, B undertakes to cede his claim against A to C. The 
cession validly takes place, C replaces B as A's creditor and B disappears from the 
legal picture. C can claim perfonnance from A,62 and A's performance to C will 
discharge his debt. Had A perfonned to B instead, his debt would only be discharged 
ifhe (A) had no knowledge of the cession. Ifhe knew about the cession, on the other 
hand, he would still be liable to C. 
ENRICHMENT LIABILITY 
Enrichment could occur within this context in either of two ways. Someone may 
either be enriched by the mere receipt of aright, 63 being an asset, or by receiving 
performance in tenns of a right which has in fact not been validly transferred to the 
recipient of the perfonnance. 
Assuming that B cedes or purports to cede a claim against A to C, and the 
debtor A consequently performs as required in terms of the claim to C, the first 
possibility which could arise is that it transpires that the claim that was purportedly 
ceded (B-A) was void. The question then would be whether A would have a claim 
based on unjustified enrichment against B or against C? For example, A is B's 
insurer. B cedes a claim against his insurer, based on damage to his factory, to C. A 
therefore pays this amount to C but it is subsequently discovered that B had no valid 





§ 404 BGB: '[Einwendungen des SchuldnersJ Der Schuldner kann dem neuen GHiubiger die 
Einwendungen entgegensetzen, die zur Zeit der Abtretung der Forderung gegen den 
bisherigen GJaubiger begrtindet waren.' (The debtor can raise against the new creditor those 
defences that were justified against the former creditor at the time of the cession); Krophol\er 
BGB vor § 398 marg note 11; Zweigert and Kotz (n 25) 447-8. 
And the claim could be met by a defence that A could previously have raised against B. 
For someone to receive a right sine causa, there must have been a valid cession in the 
absence of a valid underlying obligationary agreement. As was seen above, this is made 
theoretically possible by the operation of the principle of abstraction. In practice, however, it 
is much more likely that a performance in terms of the right (rather than the mere loss of a 
right) would prompt an enrichment claim. 
Cfthe facts ofBGHZ 105,365 and the discussion below at p 347 ff. 
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reclaim the payment directly from C or must he rather sue B? 
A second possibility is that, although B has a valid claim against A, and C 
against B (arising from their obligationary agreement), and A has handed the thing or 
the monel5 to C, the purported cession between Band C was invalid or non-
existent. For example, B purports to cede a valid claim against his insurer, A, to his 
creditor C, but the cession does not take place because of a reservatio mentalis on the 
part ofC. Or C fraudulently tells A that he has taken B's place as A's creditor as a 
result of a cession by B (which in fact had not taken place at all). Again, we must 
ask whether A, having mistakenly performed to C, will have an enrichment claim 
against B or C. 
It could also happen that merely the obligationary agreement underlying the 
cession is invalid or absent. Due to the application of the principle of abstraction in 
both systems, this invalidity will not have any influence on the validity of the 
cession: provided that the 'real agreement' exists between Band C (i e B intends to 
cede and C to receive the claim), the cession itselfwill be valid. This may be 
illustrated by the following example: B has a valid claim against his insurer A. B 
purports to enter into an obligationary agreement with C (a creditor in terms of a 
previous transaction) in terms of which B will cede his claim against A to C, but this 
is void for some reason.66 The cession takes place validly, however, due to the 
coincidence ofB's animus cedendi and C's animus recipiendi. The question is then 
whether A will be entitled to an enrichment claim against either of the other parties. 
Then there is the hypothetical case that the underlying transactions between 
both A and B, on the one hand, and Band C, on the other, are invalid: a case of what 
the Germans would call Doppelmangel (double-fault). So, for example, A performs 
to C, despite the fact that B has no valid claim against his insurer A, the purported 
cession of this claim is also invalid, and there is no valid obligationary agreement 
between Band C. Whom can A sue in terms of the law of unjustified enrichment? 
65 
66 
Next, the situation could arise in which the contract between A and B, the 
Or made any other performance e g afae/urn. 
E g ius/us error (in South African law but not in German law, as pointed out in Chapter One 
at p 20), or uncertainty as to the counter-performance. 
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claim arising therefrom, the obligationary agreement and the cession between Band 
C are all valid, but A simply pays C too much. So, for example, B cedes a valid 
claim against his insurer A in the amount ofR3 000 for damage to his house to the 
person who did the repairs (C) and A mistakenly pays C R8 000. Would an 
enrichment claim lie against B or C? 
Lastly, B might have a valid claim against A, which he validly cedes to X. 
He then fraudulently purports to cede the same claim to C. If A performs to C, what 
enrichment and other claims will be available? For instance, a businessman B is 
being hounded by creditors and his business is teetering on the brink of liquidation. 
He has a claim against his insurer A and cedes it to a creditor, X, in repayment of a 
loan. This placates X but another creditor, C, is still insistently demanding payment, 
so B purports to settle his debt to C by ceding the same claim against the insurer A to 
c. 
Each of these potential situations of enrichment liability will now be dealt 
considered: where B has no valid claim against A; where B has not validly ceded his 
claim against A to C; where neither claim exists; where both claims exist but A has 




The relationship between A and B (i e the claim which the parties 
purport to cede) is defective68 or absent 
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Or a multiple cession because, of course, there could be more than two purported cessions of 
the same claim. 
Note that this includes voidability but that, as mentioned in Chapter One above at p 20, once 
a voidable contract has been avoided in terms of German law, any remedies which arise will 
be enrichment rather than contractual remedies. The practical result, therefore, is the same 
regardless whether the underlying agreement is void or voidable, unlike South African law, 
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In the illustrated situation, the purported cession has no object: B purports to cede 
something to C that does not exist. Thus, for example, A and B might have 
concluded a contract in terms of which B would have a claim upon the fulfilment of 
a suspensive condition. It could happen that B, thinking that the condition has been 
fulfilled, cedes his 'claim' to C, and A, also labouring under this misapprehension, 
performs to C. What would happen if, in fact, the condition had not been fulfilled? 
Alternatively, A and B might have purported to conclude a contract that was void for 
illegality,69 or vagueness, or lack of compliance with formalities,70 or (in South 
African but not in German law)7l their contract might be void by reason of a material 
mistake.72 In these cases, there would be no valid underlying contract between A 
and B, and therefore no valid claim to be ceded. The question, again, is what would 
happen ifB had purported to cede this non-existent claim to C, and A had 
consequently performed to C?73 
German law 
Regarding German law, the first point to note is that if the claim which B purports to 
cede to C does not exist, the envisaged cession between Band C 'geht ins Leere' (i e 
literally, 'goes into the void,).74 Just as there can be no valid transfer of corporeal 
property that does not exist, there can be no valid cession of a claim that does not 








Ifthe underlying obligationary agreement between Band C is also invalid, 
as will be shown below. 
Note that, in German law, cases where the underlying agreement was contra bonos mores 
would be treated differently: see the discussion at p 386 below. 
See, for example, Hennie Siabbert MOlors (Pty) Lid v De Lange 1966 (3) SA 45 (T) and 
Koen v Goosen 1971 (3) SA 501 (C) and the discussion of these cases at p 368 ffbelow. 
Because, in German law, error leads to contracts being voidable, and not void: § 119 BGB. 
Regarding the contract between A and B, the other ground for voidness in South African law, 
viz impossibility, could only arise in such circumstances where only B's performance were 
initially objectively impossible; if A's performance were impossible, then A obviously could 
not have performed to C. Regarding the effect of impossibility on the contract between B 
and C, see p 348 ffbelow. 
It is extremely unlikely that A would perform to C in terms of a purported cession by B to C 
in the total absence of any contact at all between A and B. 
It is not clear to me whether there is any difference between 'going into the void' and 
Nichligkeil. It is not that one concerns a 'real' agreement or Erfollungsgeschiift and the other 
an ordinary obi igationary contract, because a real agreement can itself be void. The 
consequences are, in any event, the same. 
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we will be confronted with a case of DoppelmangeI. If, on the other hand, the 
underlying obligationary agreement between Band C is valid and enforceable, this 
will amount to a case of breach (of the lll1derlying agreement to cede), entitling C to 
remedies for breach of contract. 
Imagine, for example, that B insures his motor car with insurer A. B's car is 
subsequently stolen and B concludes a contract of sale with C, in terms of which B 
undertakes to cede his claim against A to C. Unbeknownst to Band C, B has no 
valid claim against A as he did not disclose certain information when applying for 
the policy. B then purports to cede this (non-existent) claim to C. 
In order to determine what sort of recourse C might have against B, we 
should ask whether their contract of saJe was valid or not. At first glance, a South 
African lawyer might think that a contract to cede a non-existent right would be void 
for impossibility. The general position in German law, prior to the reform of the law 
of obligations, was like South African law in that a contract would indeed be void if 
an envisaged performance in terms thereofwas initially objectively impossible.75 
There was, however, an exception to the rules of impossibility in that a contract for 
the sale of a non-existent right would be valid despite the fact that it was initially 
objectively impossible to make performance.76 In other words, in the example 
mentioned in the previous paragraph, the contract between Band C would be valid, 
and C could sue B for breach of contract. 
75 
76 
The current position in German law - since the statutory changes to the law 
See the old § 306 BGB. 
See Hans Brox Allgemeines Schuldrecht 27ed (2000) marg note 239: 'Obwohl der 
Kaufvertrag Gber eine nicht bestehende Forderung oder ein nicht existierendes Rech auf eine 
ursprGnglich objektiv unmogliche Leistung gerichtet ist, ergibt sich aus §§ 437,440 J, dass in 
Abweichung von § 306 der Vertrag giiltig ist; der Verkaufer haftet fur den rechtlichen 
Bestand auf das Erfiillungsinteresse .... ' See § 437 BGB: '[GewaruJeistung bei Rechtskauf] 
(1) Der Verkaufer einer Forderung oder eines sonstigen Rechtes haftet fUr den rechtlichen 
Bestand der Forderung oder des Rechtes.' (' [Warranty in case of purchase of a right] (1) 
The seller of a claim or any other right warrants the legal existence of the claim or of the 
right.') § 440 (1) reads as follows: 'Erfillit der Verkaufer die ihm nach den §§ 433 bis 437, 
439 obliegenden Verpflichtungen nicht, so bestimmen sich die Rechte des Kaufers nach den 
Vorschriften der §§ 320 bis 327.' (,If the seller does not fulfill the obligations imposed upon 
him by §§ 433 to 437,439, the rights of the purchaser are determined according to the 
provisions of §§ 320 to 327.') §§ 320 to 327 BGB contain general rules on reciprocal 
contracts. Another example in which the underlying obligationary agreement would be 
valid: at the time of conclusion of the agreement, B had a valid claim against A but it had 
prescribed before the purported cession took place: see Medicus Schuldrecht II marg note 
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of obligations - is that any agreement77 will be valid even if the performance in 
question is initially objectively impossible.78 If, for example, Band C had concluded 
a contract of donation rather than a sale, that contract of donation would now also be 
valid notwithstanding the impossibility of its performance.79 According to the new 
rules, however, contracts that are impossible of performance are unenforceable.80 In 
other words, if B agreed to cede his (non-existent) claim against A to C, the 
agreement between Band C would be valid, but C would not be able to claim 
specific performance of that agreement.81 Ifhe had made a counterperformance for 
the intended cession, however, C would be afforded a claim in terms of the new 
§ 326 BGB.82 
In other words, B can conclude a valid obligationary agreement to cede a 
non-existent claim to C. Any purported cession in terms thereof would, however, 
still come to naught. So, in terms of German law, there can be a situation where 
there is no valid relationship between A and B, on the one hand, but a valid (albeit 
unenforceable) obligationary agreement, though no cession, between Band C. 
In any case, A will be out of pocket if he has performed to C. According to 






150; § 438 (1) BGB. 
In other words, not just sales of rights. 
§§ 275 (1) (see note 81 below) and 311a BGB. § 311a BGB reads as follows: 
'[Leistungshindernis bei Vertragsschluss] (1) Der Wirksamkeit eines Vertrags steht es nicht 
entgegen, dass der Schuldner nach § 275 Abs. 1 bis 3 nicht zu leisten braucht und das 
Leistungshindernis schon bei Vertragsschluss voriiegt. ([Impediment to performance at the 
time of the conclusion of the contract] (1) The fact[s] that by virtue of § 275 (1) to (3) the 
obligor does not need to perform and [that] the impediment to performance already exists 
upon conclusion ofthe contract does not prevent the contract from being valid.') (Transl G 
Dannemann German Law Archive www.iuscomp.orgiglafstatutesIBGB.htm 5111104. A 
possible problem encountered here is that the leading cases involving a purported cession of 
a non-existent right were decided prior to the changes in the law regarding impossibility. 
The problem seems more apparent than real, however, because the writers who commented 
on such cases generally did not emphasise the presence or absence of any underlying 
agreement between B and C. 
Of course, the underlying agreement to cede could be invalid for some reason other than 
impossibility, in which case the case would be classified as one of Doppelmangel. 
It appears that this rule applies to cases of sale of a right that does not exist: see Medicus 
Schuldrecht II marg note 150 on p 74. It should be pointed out, however, that the new rules 
have introduced some lack of clarity regarding contracts of sale of rights generally: see 
Medicus op cit marg note 149 ff. 
§ 275 BGB '[Ausschluss der Leistungspflicht] (1) Der Anspruch auf Leistung ist 
ausgeschlossen, soweit diese fUr den Schuldner oder fUr jedermann unmoglich ist.' 
([Exclusion of the obligation to perform] (1) A claim for performance cannot be made in so 
far as it is impossible for the obligor or for anyone else to perfonn.') (Trans I Dannemann (n 
78). In other words, he cannot claim cession, in the set of facts presently being considered. 
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action.83 The crucial question, which has led to much controversy in Germany,84 is 
whether this action should be brought against B or directly against C. 
If one employs the Leistungsbegrifj, one arrives at the answer that A's claim 
should lie against c.85 A has, after all, not only factually but also legally performed 
directly to C,86 in the sense that he did so with the conscious purpose of performing 
to c.87 A, in making the performance, intends to perform to C and not to his 
(supposed) original creditor, B, and C would interpret A's performance as a 
performance to himself and not to B.88 The fact that B is in no way involved in this 
performance has led the devotees of the Leistungsbegriffto argue that this is not a 
case of three-party enrichment at all; once the cession has taken place, so their 
argument goes, B falls out of the equation and there remains a simple two-party 









With respect, this seems to overlook the rather obvious point that the cession 
Whereas under the old law he would have had an enrichment claim. 
Unless he performed in the knowledge that there was no claim against him (§ 814 BGB), or 
if he acted illegally or immorally in making the performance (in accordance with the German 
equivalent of the par delictum rule, § 817 BGB) in circumstances where the underlying 
contract was illegal or immoral. 
According to Medicus, this is the most controversial of the three-cornered enrichment 
relationships other than the Anweisung-cases: Medicus Schuldrecht II marg note 730. Also 
see Larenz and Canaris Schuldrecht III2 237; Loewenheim Bereicherungsrecht 54. 
See, for example, W Lorenz 'Abtretung einer Forderung aus mangelhaftem Kausalverhaltnis: 
Von wem kondiziert der Schuldner?' (1991) 191 AcP 279 at 295 and 297. 
Compare this with the discussion of the Anweisung-cases in Chapter Three above, where it 
was pointed out (e g at p 165 ff) that, even though A may physically hand something over to 
C, if he does so in accordance with an Anweisung from B this will regarded by the law as a 
performance via B to C. Larenz and Canaris Schuldrecht 1112 238 state that one cannot argue 
that the debtor A in any way 'performs' to the cedent B without a 'sacrificium intellectus'. 
They use this as a further argument to support their view that the Leislungsbegrilfis not able 
to bear the load placed upon it. This now seems to be the majority opinion, but cfBGHZ 
105,365 (at 369-70) and BGHZ 122,46 (at 48). 
But cf BGHZ !OS, 365 (369-70), where the court held that A's Leis/ung was to B. In this 
regard, see Lorenz (1991) 191 AcP 279 at 295, where he cites this judgment as evidence of 
the weakness of the Leislungsbegri.ff: whereas 'it would be difficult to deny that the debtor 
who pays in terms of a claim which has been transferred to the cessionary thereby 
consciously and directly increases the assets ofthe cessionary' ('es Ial3t sich wohl schwerlich 
leugnen, dal3 der Schuldner, der eine auf den Zessionar Ubergangene Forderung bezahlt, 
damit bewul3t und unmittelbar des sen Vermogen mehrt'), the court succeeds in using this 
very concept to justify a claim against the cedent by considering the situation objectively 
from the point of view of the cessionary. In BGHZ 122,46, the court a quo said that the 
payment of A should be regarded as if A performed to Band B to C (see p 47 of the BGH's 
judgment). See also p 357 ff below. 
On the LeistungsbegriJ! and the Empjtingerhorizont see Chapter One at pp 38 ff and 40-1 
above. 
Medicus Burgerliches Recht marg note 685a; Munchener Kommenlar/Lieb § 812 marg note 
122; Loewenheim Bereicherungsrecht 54; Reuter and Martinek Bereicherung 489 ff. 
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has in fact not taken place (as there was no claim to cede), so there has been no mere 
substitution of creditors and B has not disappeared from the picture. The argument 
that only two parties are involved has also been criticised on the grounds that the 
debtor's Zuwendung to C is intended to constitute performance of, firstly, the non-
existent claim (B-A) which B purportedly ceded to C and, secondly, the cessionary's 
claim against the cedent (C-B) in terms of the underlying obligationary agreement.90 
The 'performance' of this (non-existent) claim is therefore intended to 
simultaneously extinguish C's (supposed) claims against A and B, which 'justifies 
the inclusion of the cedent in the unravelling' .91 In other words, because the debtor's 
handing-over is intended to fulfil not only the cessionary's apparent claim against 
him, but also the cessionary's actual or supposed claim against the cedent, one 
cannot argue that only two parties are involved. 
Eschewing the Leistungsbegriffin such cases, therefore, and bowing to the 
demands of legal consistency and the need to balance the interests of the parties 
(particularly with regard to the allocation of risk),92 both the herrschende Meinung 
and the courts93 prefer the view that A should have a claim against B rather than 
directly against C.94 
The first argument in support of the solution favoured by the herrschende 
Meinung is that of consistency. Requiring A to proceed 'via the triangle' (i e to sue 
B instead of C) would accord with the solution proposed for the cases where there 
was an Anweisung but no valid underlying agreement between A and B.95 This is not 







Miinchener KommentarfLieb § 812 marg note 122. This forms the background to his 
argument that A should rather have a claim against B, which will be dealt with below. 
Miinchener KommentarfLieb § 812 marg note 122: The debtor has the intention to settle his 
debt in terms of the ceded claim; the cedent, in ceding the claim, intends to settle his debt in 
terms of the obligationary agreement. 
See, for example, Lorenz (1991) 191 AcP 279 at 295-6. Another important factor is 
Zurechenbarkeil ('attributability'): see Lorenz op cil at 296. 
Loewenheim Bereicherungsrecht 54-5; Werner Flume 'Der Bereicherungsausgleich in 
Mehrpersonenverh1iltnissen' (1999) 199 AcP 1 at 19; BGHZ 105,365; BGHZ 122,46 (51). 
See, e g, Loewenheim Bereicherungsrechl 54-5; Miinchener KommentarfLieb § 812 marg 
note 121. CfLorenz (1999) 199 AcP 1 at 19. 
See, for example, Larenz and Canaris Schuldrecht 1112237 (where it is clear that they are 
referring to this category of Arrweisung case as being similar to the cession of a non-existent 
right because they say' ... es sich urn einen (bloBen) Mangel im Deckungsverh1iltnis handeln 
wiirde.'). This line of argument has also been used by the courts: see Flume (1999) 199 AcP 
1 at 20; BGHZ 105,365 and BGHZ 122,46. For a contrary point of view, see Flume (1999) 
199 AcP 1 at 21, and the discussion of his views at p 353 below. 
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be extremely difficult to determine whether A's performance to C was made in 
response to a cession or a Anweisung.96 This difficulty is apparent, for example, if 
one compares a bank's payment in tenns of a cheque or other bill of exchange to a 
payment in response to a cession which has been symbolised by the handing over of 
documentary evidence thereof (an Urkunde). In both cases, A performs to C upon 
C's presentation of a document which he has received from B, which requires A to 
perform (in terms ofB's supposed claim against him) to C. 
An analysis of the relative interests of the parties also leads the majority of 
writers to conclude that A should proceed against B.97 First of all, if A had to bring 
his claim against C, he would bear the risk ofC's raising the defence of loss of 
enrichment,98 or of his disappearance or insolvency.99 While the law would have no 
objection to A's bearing the risk that B might have disposed of the enrichment or 
disappeared or been a man of straw, because A had the chance to sum up his 
character at the time of contracting, 100 C is an unknown quantity. The imposition of 
this risk would therefore fly in the face of the principle that the debtor's legal 
position should not be made worse by the cession,IOI which occurred without his 
participation.102 It would also be contrary to Canaris's third principle viz that the risk 
of a party's insolvency should only be imposed upon his original contracting partner, 









Larenz and Canaris Schuldrechtll12 237. 
See, e g, Larenz and Canaris Schuldrechtll12 237. But see, contra, Flume (1999) 199 AcP I 
at 24 and the discussion of his views below. 
In terms of § 818 (3) BGB. 
Larenz and Canaris Schuldrecht/112 237; Loewenheim Bereicherungsrecht 54. 
What this implies is that the creditworthiness and character of the creditor are at issue. 
Elsewhere in the law, it is the creditworthiness of the debtor that is important. For 
enrichment law, what is more important is the ability of the creditor to pay in terms of an 
enrichment claim. What is relevant, therefore, is not the creditor's ability to payor perform, 
but his ability to pay back or return a performance (see Manfred Lieb 'Zur 
bereicherungsrechtlichen Rtickabwicklung bei der Zession' (1990) 7 Jura 359 at 361). It 
thus implies that the debtor seeks out, not somebody undemanding, but somebody who will 
be willing and able to return what he has received should it turn out to have been received 
without legal ground. This argument thus presupposes that the debtor, in concluding his 
contract, is taking into account the possibility that his contracting partner might go insolvent 
and therefore not be able to pay back what he received unjustifiably. This seems rather far-
fetched. In a nutshell, what Canaris is saying is that once you have sought out a contracting 
partner, you have to stick to him, for better or for worse. 
Miinchener KommentarfLieb § 812 marg note 124b; Loewenheim Bereicherungsrecht 55 
(who points out that this rule compensates for the fact that the debtor cannot prevent the 
transfer to the cessionary of the claim against him (the debtor)); Palandt § 812 marg note 67. 
Larenz and Canaris Schuldrecht/112 237. 
Larenz and Canaris Schuldrechtll12 237; Miinchener KommentarfLieb § 812 marg note 
124b; Loewenheim Bereicherungsrecht 55. 
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claim should only lie between the parties to the defective causal relationship in 
question; because the defect originated in the relationship between the debtor A and 
the cedent B, any enrichment claim should be confined to these two parties. 104 
The view that enrichment claims should be directed 'via the triangle' (A-B-
C) may be supported by the majority of writers, but the majority is a narrow one. !Os 
One of the influential voices of dissent is that ofFlume.106 In his opinion, A should 
be allowed to sue C directly in such circumstances. 107 Regarding the argument that 
A should sue B because this would be consistent with the preferred solution in 
Anweisung cases, he says that this situation (i e where B purports to cede a non-
existent claim against A to C) is not comparable to the situation where there is an 
Anweisung in the absence of a valid underlying agreement between A and B. I08 He 
argues that, if one wants to compare this case to one of the Anweisung situations, the 
appropriate parallel would be the case where there was no valid Anweisung (in which 
case A would have a direct claim against C): in the case of cession of an invalid 
right, the notice of cession would be invalid, and such cases should therefore be 
compared with cases where an invalid cheque (or other Anweisung) was handed 
over. 109 
He also disputes the majority's analysis of the interests of the parties. First of 
all, he says that this is a matter for the law of enrichment, and not for the law of 
cession. llo He thus implies that the majority is incorrect in finding a solution to the 








Larenz and Canaris Schuidrechtlll2 237. The authors also justify this result by referring to 
the relationship between the Leistungskondiktion and the other remedies aimed at 'undoing' 
the contract between the debtor and the cedent. 
See Flume (1999) 199 AcP I at 19, where he tallies the numbers of supporters and 
opponents. Larenz and Canaris Schuldrechtlll2 also say (at 237) that there is a 'strong 
minority opinion' supporting a claim A-C. 
See, for example, his article in (1999) 199 AcP 1 (reprinted in Wolfgang Ernst (ed) Werner 
Flume: Studien zur Lehre von der ungerechtfertigten Bereicherung (2003) at 105 ff). 
See Flume (1999) 199 AcP I at 21. 
(1999) 199 AcP 1 at 21. 
See Flume (1999) 199 AcP 1 at 21. He points out that, in the case of an Anweisung, the 
instructing party 'adopts' the performance of the instructed party as his own and, if the 
Anweisung is invalid, the attribution of the performance A-C to B falls away. The notice of 
cession of a non-existent claim is invalid as it has no object, he says, and if the two cases are 
to be compared, the declaration of cession of a non-existent claim should be equated to an 
invalid Anweisung. 
See Flume (1999) 199 AcP I at 24. 
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to say, as Larenz and Canaris do, III that the position of the so-called debtor should 
not be made worse by a cession which took place without the debtor's co-operation, 
when he was in fact not a debtor and no cession took place. Flume goes on to argue 
that, in any case, the pseudo-cessionary is generally more solvent than the pseudo-
cedent and the position of the pseudo-debtor would thus not be worsened by 
requiring him to sue C rather than B.ll2 He concedes, however, that the pseudo-
debtor would be unjustifiably advantaged if he obtained a solvent cessionary as an 
enrichment debtor. I 13 It should also be noted that, as Medicus says, the risk that the 
cessionary might be less attractive than the cedent from the debtor's point of view (in 
that he is less able to return a performance than the cedent would be) is one of the 
risks imposed on the debtor by the law of cession in any event. 114 
Flume also makes the point that, generally-speaking, B's pseudo-cession to C 
will amount to a Leistung an Erfollungs Statt or a Leistung erfiillungshalber l15 in 
terms of the obligationary agreement between Band C. A could thus effect 
performance ofB's debt to C (as a third party in terms of § 267 BGB - the kind of 
situation dealt with in Chapter Two) and would then be entitled to sue B for 
enrichment. I 16 
Cases of cession of non-existent rights have come before the courts in 
Germany. While the Bundesgerichtslwfpreviously favoured the condictio against 
the cessionary,ll7 its present approach is now in accordance with the herrschende 
Meinung. 1l8 The leading case I 19 concerned an insurance policy taken out by GUnter 
M, who was the owner of firm B. In terms of this policy, his insurance company (A) 
insured his buildings against fire. After a warehouse and a workshop were burnt 










Schuldrecht 1112 237. 
Flume (1999) 199 AcP 1 at 24-5. Cfthe response of Larenz and Canaris that this would 
unjustifiably advantage the debtor: Schuldrecht 1112 at 237-8. 
Flume (1999) 199AcP 1 at 25. 
Medicus Biirgerliches Recht marg note 685a. 
For an explanation of these concepts, see Chapter One at pp 37-8. 
Apart from cases of insolvency or pledge: Flume (1999) 199 AcP 1 at 24. 
See Flume (1999) 199 AcP 1 at 19. Also see Lorenz (1991) 1 AcP 279 at 283 ff. 
As the court remarked in BGHZ 122,46, the leading case (BGHZ 105, 365) has received 
widespread approval. See, e g, Lorenz (1991) 1 AcP 279; Palandt § 812 marg note 67; 
Loewenheim Bereicherungsrecht 54-5; Lieb (1990) 7 Jura 359; Medicus Biirgerliches Recht 
marg note 685. 
BGHZ 105,365. Cfthe facts of the South African case Standard General Insurance Co Ltd 
v SA Brake CC supra. See note 179 below. 
that he had deliberately caused the fire, the insurance company rejected his claims. 
GUnter M thereupon sued the insurance company for payment of part of the original 
amount claimed. In the same month, he ceded certain of his insurance claims (in 
respect of the fire damage) to another firm (C) as security in exchange for an advance 
of credit. The insurance company, upon being informed of the cession of these 
claims, denied liability and apprised C of the legal proceedings brought by GUnter M. 
It transpired, however, that GUnter M actually won his case against the insurance 
company, which therefore paid C in respect of the claims it had received, expressly 
reserving its right to raise any defences in terms of § 404 BGB 120 in the future, and 
paid the rest to GUnter M. Much later, Gunter M's firm went insolvent and, ten years 
after the fire, it was finally established that he had in fact induced a friend to set the 
workshop alight. In due course, he received hisjust deserts in the form ofa longjail 
sentence for arson and insurance fraud, amongst other things. 
Against this background,121 the insurance company sued C, on the basis of 
unjustified enrichment, for repayment of the sums paid to it. C argued that the 
insurance company should rather seek recourse against GUnter M (for the 
replacement of his lost enrichment). The insurance company was unsuccessful in the 
local and regional courts so took the case on appeal to the Bundesgerichtshof 
The appeal court first reiterated the general points that enrichment cases 
involving more than two parties usually have more to do with economics than with 
formal black-letter law and that such cases cannot be decided mechanically 
according to some predetermined scheme, but have to be judged according to the 
particular facts of each case. It went on to confirm the decision of the court a quo 
that the insurance company (A) had to sue GUnter M (B) as its contracting partner 
and that there were no grounds for holding the cessionary (C) liable. The court 
justified this conclusion by appealing to the Leistungsbegrifj, the allocation ofrisk, 
the protection of reliance, the lack of special circumstances which would justify a 
claim against the cessionary, and the relative interests of the parties. 
120 
l21 
§ 404 BGB '[Einwendungen des Schulclners] Der Schulclner kann dem neuen GUiubiger die 
Einwendungen entgegensetzen, die zur Zeit der Abtretung der Forderung gegen den 
bisherigen Glaubiger begriindet waren.' ([Defences of the debtor] The debtor can raise 
against the new creditor any defences that lay against the former creditor at the time of the 
cession of the claim.) 
In other words, put succinctly, A had paid C in terms ofB's non-existent claim against it, 
which he had purported to cede to C. 
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More particularly, regarding the Leistungsbegrijf, the court held that the 
insurer intended to perform to GUnter M in fulfilment of its obligation arising out of 
the contract of insurance. 122 In other words, the insurer's Zweckbestimmung or 
intended purpose, and therefore its Leistung, was aimed at the cedent rather than the 
cessionary in this particular case. 123 Regarding the allocation of risk, the court 
agreed that the insurer must carry the risk of the insolvency of the insured in such 
circumstances. l24 In the ftrst place, the court argued, an insurance contract demands 
a higher standard of good faith than most other contracts and that the insurer created 
the reliance, on the part of its client,125 that the claim was valid and that the 
circumstances were not such that the insurer would deny the protection of the 
insurance. This, said the court, justified placing the risk of the insured's insolvency 
on the insurer, if it turned out that this reliance had not been justified. 126 The court 
went on to say that the cession of this supposed claim would not change this 
allocation of risk as the insurer's position would not thereby be worsened, and it 
would be able to raise its defences against the cessionary. There was also no 
justification, added the court, for the improvement of the insurer's legal position by 
the cession.127 The court also held that the fact that the cession had been made in 
exchange for credit was irrelevant, again because it did not worsen the insurer's legal 
position128 and because there was no reason why the insurer's position should be 
improved by the cession. Finally, the court held that the insurer should carry the risk 
of the insolvency of the insured rather than that of the cessionary, as it was the 









The court also suggested obiter that the debtor might, however, have a direct 
See the judgment at 369-70. Also see the judgment at 369 on the importance of the 
perfonning party's intention. 
In other words, on the facts of this case, A's Leislung was directed at B, but this might not be 
the case in other factual circumstances. The court also stated that GUnter M 'had not lost his 
character as the insured through the cession of his (supposed) claims to perfonnance' and 
supported this argument by reference to special rules of insurance law. 
At 37l. 
It should be pointed out, however, that the insured knew that he had set the fire and he should 
therefore have known that his claim against the insurer was invalid. It could also be asked 




Because he could, for example, raise his defences against the cessionary (§ 404 BGB): see p 
371 of the judgment. 
At 370-1. 
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claim against the cessionary in special circumstances, for example, where the 
cessionary had demanded payment from the debtor especially strenuously.130 This 
aspect of the case has been criticised by writers such as Medicus, with good reason; 
to base the allocation of liability on the intensity of the demand for payment is, as he 
. 131 says, mcorrect. 
The thrust ofthis decision was confirmed in a later case,132 which also 
concerned a fraudulent insurance claim. Here, B leased a BMW car from C. J33 In 
terms of the contract of lease, he was obliged to insure the car and to cede the rights 
in terms of the policy to the lessor C. The contract also made him liable for any loss 
or damage to the car, regardless of any fault on his part. He accordingly took out a 
comprehensive insurance policy with insurance company A and handed C a 
certificate as proof thereof. Several months later, B informed his insurance company 
that the car had been stolen and the lessor, as cessionary, thus claimed and received 
compensation of38 000 OM from the insurance company. It was later discovered 
that the theft had been a mere pretence. B's statement to the insurance company thus 
constituted a fraudulent misrepresentation. The insurance company retrieved the car 
and sold it but instituted an enrichment claim against the cessionary C, taking into 
account the proceeds of the sale and costs. 
The court a quo held that, while A's payment to C clearly had no legal 
ground, the enrichment claim should have been brought against B rather than C 
because the payment was intended as fulfilment of A's obligation to B in terms of the 
insurance policy and it should 'therefore [have] be[ en] regarded as ifthe plaintiff had 
performed to B on the basis of the contract of insurance, and as if B had performed to 






The court of appeal held that there was no independent legal relationship 
At 372. 
Medicus Burgerliches Recht marg note 685a. He agrees that the pseudo-debtor should have 
a claim against the cessionary, but argues that the reason for this is that, once an effective 
cession has taken place, there is really only a two-party relationship (between the debtor and 
the cessionary). Also see Flume (1999) 199 AcP 1 at 20 for criticism of the court's 
suggestion that the intensity of C's demand for payment might be relevant in determining the 
direction of A's enrichment claim. 
BOHZ 122,46. For a discussion of the case, see Flume (1999) 199 AcP 1 at 19. 
See BOHZ 122,46 at 47 for the facts. 
At 48. 
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between A and C in tenns of the law of insurance, and that the obligations arising out 
of the contract of insurance related to the original insured, i e B. It went on to 
confinn, expressly, the decision in the fire insurance case l35 and to hold that, as a 
general rule,l36 an insurer's enrichment claim should be directed against the insured 
if the insurer paid the [swn] to a cessionary in ignorance of circumstances which 
would free him from his obligation to perfonn. 137 
With regard to the Leistungsbegriff, the court held that what is relevant is the 
purposes envisaged by the perfonning party and the recipient of the payment at the 
time of the perfonnance and that one takes a purely objective approach (i e only 
considering the perfonnance merely from the viewpoint of the recipient of the 
payment) only if the intentions of both parties do not coincide. I38 Regarding the 
facts of this case, the court held that the parties had agreed that the insurer intended 
to fulfil his contract with the insured.139 
The court confinned its view that the claim should be directed against the 
insured by reference to the need to protect the reliance ofthe parties and the 
allocation ofrisk.140 The court said that the insurer had paid the relevant amount in 
reliance upon the insured party's allegation of theft of the car and held that 'this 
justifies burdening the insurance company with the risk of insolvency of the insured, 
if it later turns out that the reliance was not justified'. 141 It went on to hold that the 
insurance company's position was not worsened by the cession of rights arising from 
the insurance contract and the issue of a certificate of insurance, because the 
cessionary would not thereby receive any more extensive rights than those which 
were already available to the insured. On the other hand, the court stated that the 








See 50, where the court also lists writers who had approved of the decision. 
'[R]egelmlillig': at p 50 of the judgment. In other words, the court seems to go further than 
in the previous case, in that it does not merely confine this to the facts of this particular case 
but makes it into a general rule applicable in cases involving cession where payments are 
made in terms of insurance policies. But cfthe court's comments at 52-3, where it repeats 
the mantra that in enrichment cases involving more than two parties, any 'schematic solution' 
is forbidden, and the peculiarities of each case are to be taken into account. 
In doing so, it distinguished this type of case from one of a 'pure' cession and said that this 
type of case could not be decided according to the rules developed by the BGH in regard to a 
'pure cession': see the judgment at 50. 





the cessionary rather than the insured in such cases because the cessionary would 
typically be more creditworthy than the insured. The court therefore preferred the 
view that an enrichment claim should be directed against B rather than C because it 
does not disturb the allocation of the risks typical in insurance cases l42 and it 
confines the enrichment claim to the legal relationship in which the defect arose. It 
held that B is enriched by being freed from his obligation to compensate the lessor 
for any loss or damage in terms of the contract of lease underlying the cession. 143 
Analysing the interests of the parties, the court referred to the situation where 
there is an Anweisung but the underlying Deckungsverhdltnis is defective, which it 
regarded as the 'economically closest case'. The court said that the case here is like 
an angenommene A nweisung1 44 because a certificate of insurance had been handed 
over to the cessionary, which strengthened the legal position of the favoured party 
but which, in the opinion of the court, does not change anything regarding 
enrichment. The court also considered that the argument that third party insurance 
(Fremdversicherung) is a special kind of contract in favour of a third party did not 
carry any weight. 
The court also distinguished this casel45 from BGHZ 58, 184, in which a 
direct condictio against the third party was allowed in view of the requirement that 
the third party's right to claim should have its roots exclusively in the 
Deckungsverhdltnis between the promisor and promisee and be totally independent 
of the Valutaverhdltnis between the promisee and himself. J46 The ground for the 
distinction was that the economic focus of the perfonnance-relationship in this case 
was not the legal relationship between the parties to this action but the contract of 
insurance between A and B. 
At this stage, the German position may be summarised as follows: on the 
basis of the Leistungsbegriffand for other reasons,147 a strong minority opinion 







CfLorenz (1991) 1 AcP 279 at 299. 
At 52, where it cites Lieb (1990) 7 Jura 359 at 360 and Lorenz (1991) I AcP 279 at 299 ff. 
See pp 164-5 in Chapter Three above. 
At 53. 
See that judgment at 189 ff. 
See Flume (1999) 199 AcP 1, who supports a direct claim A-C but who does not justify this 
on the basis of the Leistungsbegriff 
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against A to C. By a narrow margin, however, the majority of writers are of the view 
that A should direct his enrichment claim against B. They justify this conclusion by 
reference to the relative interests of the parties and by drawing analogies with the law 
concerning Anweisung-cases. The Gennan courts agree with the majority opinion. 
Although some of the arguments raised in Gennan law will be discussed 
further when the approaches of the two legal systems are compared, several 
observations should be made at this stage. 
The first relates to the important question of consistency. It is, of course, 
essential that like cases are treated alike. Any conclusions as to who can sue whom 
in this context must therefore accord with the rules developed in the context of the 
Anweisung-cases. As said above, it can be difficult in practice to distinguish cases 
where A perfonns to C due to an Anweisung or due to a cession. 
The majority view is that this situation (i e where A perfonns to C following 
B's 'cession' of a non-existent right to C) is parallel to the situation where A 
perfonns to C on B's instruction (Anweisung) but the underlying relationship 
between A and B is defective. 148 There is undoubtedly merit in this argument. In 
both cases, after all, there is a defect in the relationship between A and B. In other 
words, the legal relationship that in a sense 'underlies' the cessioniAnweisung is 
defective. That the factual circumstances are very close can be illustrated by 
comparing the insurance cases just discussed with the facts of the South African case 
of Licences and Genera/Insurance Co v Ismay,149 which was considered in the 
previous chapter: B instructed A to perfonn to C, in circumstances where A and B 
were not linked by any valid legal relationship. In a sense, B's notice to the debtor to 
perfonn to C as a cession has taken place (when it has not, due to a defect in the 
underlying relationship between A and B) is parallel to B's instruction to A to 





1n other words, the situation dealt with in section 2 (a) of Chapter Three. 
1951 (2) SA 456 (EDL). 
Which would imply that a distinction should be drawn between cases where the notice was 
given to A by B and those where C notified A of the cession: cfCanaris's distinctions in 
cases where A performs too much - see p 384 below. 
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Flwne, on the other hand, argues that the appropriate parallel is the situation 
where A perfonns to C in response to a defective Anweisung. l5l In both the 
Anweisung-cases and those involving a cession, A perfonns to C rather than to B. In 
the first case, he perfonns to C because B has instructed him to do so. He could 
receive this instruction from B 152 or via c. 153 In the second case, A perfonns to C 
because he has been told that he is obliged to do so as B's claim has been ceded to C. 
Again, he could receive this infonnation from B or from C. The difference between 
the two situations relates to the fact that an Anweisung can be valid even if the 
underlying relationship (between A and B) is invalid. In other words, the principle 
of abstraction applies. There can thus be a situation where the underlying 
relationship between A and B is void, but B validly instructs A to perfonn to C. The 
abstraction principle applies in the context of cession in that B may validly cede a 
claim to C, even if the underlying obligationary agreement between Band C is void. 
Whereas there can be a valid Anweisung in the absence of a valid underlying 
relationship between B and A, however, there cannot be a valid cession in the 
absence of a valid claim between B and A (and, similarly, any notification to A 
would surely also' ins Leere gehen '). The debtor's notification of the cession also 
has no independent legal existence. When B or C tells A to perfonn to C (as a 
consequence of the purported cession), this notification is as legally insignificant as 
the void cession (or a defective Anweisung). I tend to agree with Flume, therefore, 
that the most similar case is the one where the Anweisung itself is defective. Thus 
cases such as these should be compared with situations where, for example, A pays C 
on the basis of an unsigned cheque. In both cases, the factor that prompts A to 
perfonn to C is invalid: in the first case, the Anweisung is invalid;154 in the second, 
the cession (and consequently A's notification thereof) is invalid. 
It will be recalled from the discussion in Chapter Three that, according to the 





In other words, the situation dealt with in section 2 (c) of Chapter Three. 
For example, in a banking situation, a client may directly instruct the bank to make a transfer 
to C. 
For example, in a banking situation, a client may embody his instruction to his bank in a 
cheque, which he hands to C, and which C presents to the bank (either directly or via a 
collecting bank) for payment. 
In such cases, that the Anweisung is invalid is the crucial fact - the fact that there might be a 
valid underlying relationship between A and B is irrelevant as the absence of an Anweisung 
means that A's performance is not attributable to B. B is accordingly left out of the picture. 
I 
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defective. 155 I agree with the minority view that A should thus be able to sue C in 
circumstances where B purports to cede a non-existent claim to C. 
A second point that may be mentioned at this stage is that the question ofB's 
enrichment is perhaps taken for granted by some writers. 156 In the car insurance 
case, B was enriched in that he was freed from his obligation to compensate the 
lessor (C) in tenns of the contract of lease (B-C) underlying the cession. What 
would B have 'received' (as required in tenns of § 812 BGB) ifno liability had been 
extinguished? Larenz and Canaris recommend, as a last resort, that the enrichment 
of the cedent should merely be assumed in such circumstances. 157 
Finally, it should be noted that the leading Gennan cases concern insurance. 
In both cases, the court emphasised the risks that are typical in an insurance context. 
It may be, therefore, that a court would allocate the risk differently in a context other 
than insurance. 
South African law 
How does South African law deal with situations like this? First of all, it should be 
borne in mind that, in tenns of South African law, unlike Gennan law, contracts 
which are void ab initio attract different remedies to those which are voidable. 158 
Thus, it can be expected that cases where a party (B) purports to cede a right that 
arises from a voidable contract (A-B) may be treated differently from those in which 
the 'right' in question supposedly stems from a contract (A-B) which was void from 
the outset. 
The first possible difference between the two categories of cases concerns the 
related question of the legal validity of the obligationary agreement between Band 




One way of explaining this is that the fiction (conjured up by a valid Anweisung) that, when 
A hands something to C, he performs to Band B performs to C does not apply. In the 
circlUTIstances presently under consideration, this fiction also does not apply. 
But cf Lieb (1990) 7 Jura 359 at 360 and Lorenz (1991) 1 AcP 279 at 299 ff. 
See Larenz and Canaris Schuldrecht Ill2 239: Es ware 'weitaus besser, die Bereicherung des 
Zedenten im Wege einer "normativen Als-ob-Betrachtung" zu fingieren, als wegen der 
Schwierigkeiten mit diesem Problem die allein der Interessenlage entsprechende Lasung der 
h.L. aufzugeben.' 
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According to South African law, any agreement that envisages a performance that is 
initially and objectively impossible will be void ab initio - and not merely 
unenforceable, as it would now be in terms of German law. 159 Provided, therefore, 
that the claim in question (B-A) was already void or otherwise non-existentl60 at the 
time of conclusion of the obligationary agreement (B-C), and that it was thus 
impossible for B or anyone else to cede it, the obligationary agreement between B 
and C would also be void. It follows that such cases would constitute instances of 
Doppelmangel, which will be dealt with below. 
There are certain situations, however, in which the obligationary agreement 
between Band C would be valid even if the object of the cession (the claim B-A) did 
not exist at the time of conclusion. Thus the agreement B-C would be valid where B 
either expressly or tacitly warranted the existence ofthe claim. 161 If, for example, B 
agreed to sell a claim against A to C, their contract of sale included a warranty 
stating that the claim was valid, and the claim was in fact invalid (and therefore 
legally non-existent), their contract of sale would nevertheless be valid. In such 
circumstances, B would be guilty of breach of the contract of sale, and C would be 
entitled to cancel the contract and claim restitutio in integrum and/or damages. 
B's obligationary agreement with C would also be valid ifB's claim against 
A did exist at the time of conclusion of B' s obligationary agreement with C, even if 
B's claim subsequently disappeared. 162 Thus, for example, ifB had a valid claim 
against A, and agreed to cede it to C, but the claim prescribed before the cession took 
place, the obligationary agreement would be valid and B's non-performance could 
constitute breach thereof. C would in theory therefore be entitled to cancellation 







See Chapter One above at p 20. 
See §§ 275 (1), 311a (1) BGB and pp 348-9 above. 
For example, where A and B in fact never even purported to conclude a contract, ie where 
the absence of a valid claim is a matter of fact and not merely a conclusion of law. 
See Van der Merwe et al Contract 137. This is analogous to the situation envisaged in § 437 
BGB (see note 76 above), i e one of the exceptional cases in which the obligationary 
agreement would have been valid even before the reform of the German law of obligations. 
It should be noted, however, that South African law requires conclusion of a warranty by the 
parties, whereas German law created a warranty of validity ex lege. 
This was also the case under the old German law of obligations: see note 76 above. 
The remedy of specific performance would obviously not be available because the 
performance in question (i e cession of the avoided claim) is impossible. 
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A similar situation, which is both more likely and more difficult than this, 
arises when the claim that B agrees to cede to C is voidable. For instance, A, the 
owner of a successful racehorse, tells a wealthy acquaintance, B, that the horse is in 
excellent health. On the strength of this, B agrees to buy the horse for a small 
fortune. He then agrees to cede his claim against A to C, in exchange for a larger 
fortune. A's statements regard ing the condition of the horse are, however, 
misrepresentations of the true facts; the horse had previously been lamed during a 
practice run and its racing days were already over when A agreed to sell it to B. 
B's contract with A would thus be voidable on the grounds of 
misrepresentation. If the contract between A and B had already been rescinded when 
B agreed to cede the claim to C, then there would have been no claim (B-A) in 
existence and hence the agreement between Band C would be void for impossibility: 
again a case of Doppelmangel. Assuming, on the other hand, that B had not yet 
rescinded his contract with A at the time when he struck his agreement with C, the 
validity of the obligationary agreement (B--C) could not be impugned on the grounds 
of impossibility; at the time of conclusion thereof, it was possible for B to make the 
agreed performance, namely to cede to C his claim against A. Assuming that the 
contract was not void for some other reason,J64 C could therefore theoretically sue B 
for breach ifB did not perform according to their agreement, provided that the 
contract A-B had not been rescinded. 165 
But what would happen ifB rescinded the contract with A after agreeing to 
cede his claim to C but before actually doing so? In other words, would rescission of 
the contract between A and B have any effect on the obligationary agreement 
between Band C? This situation is clearly not equivalent to the case where B's 
claim against A prescribed after he had concluded the obligationary agreement with 
C. That was a case concerned with the termination of an obligation (i e extinction ex 
nunc), whereas this is a matter of extinction of an obligation with retroactive effect 
(i e ex tunc). From a legal point of view, therefore, if the voidable contract between 
A and B is avoided, it is as if it had never been concluded at all. If rescission renders 
164 
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lustus error, for example. 
In other words, B would be liabJe if he did not cede the claim at al L or arguably even jf he 
ceded it: their agreement, after all, envisaged that B would cede a claim free of defects so 
cession of a voidable claim would probably also constitute breach. The issue of liability for 
latent defects should also be considered in this regard. 
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the contract between A and B a nullity, does it mean that B had no claim to cede to C 
and that his agreement with C is therefore void for impossibility? Or does the fact 
that B had a claim (albeit a voidable one) at the time when the obligationary 
agreement was concluded mean that this agreement is valid and remains valid even if 
the claim in question retroactively disappears? Could C sue B for breach if he did 
not perform according to their agreement in such circumstances? And what would 
happen if A, unaware of the rescission, performed to C? Finally, would it make any 
difference if it was A who was entitled to rescind the contract, and not B? 
Situations where the contract between A and B was voidable 
The then Appellate Division of the Supreme Court had to answer some of these 
questions in Van Zyl v Credit Corporation of South Africa Ltd. 166 In this case, the 
Tweeling Garage (B) sold a car to Van Zyl (A) in terms of a hire purchase 
agreement. In exchange, A traded in his old vehicle, and made a down-payment of 
£423. The remainder of the purchase price was to be paid off in monthly 
instalments. Having been informed that, shortly after conclusion of the agreement, B 
had ceded all its rights in terms of the contract (including the right of ownership of 
the car) to C, A paid two instalments to C. It then transpired that A had in fact been 
induced to enter into the contract on the basis of a material misrepresentation. This 
rendered the hire purchase agreement voidable at the instance of A. A claimed the 
repayment by C of the amounts paid to it. He also sought the setting aside of his 
contract with B and the return of his trade-in, or its cash equivalent, and his initial 
payment to B. 
The court, per Steyn CJ, began by holding that whether a cessionary acquires 
a right ex titulo oneroso or ex lucrativa causa, if the right came into being on the 
basis of fraud, this fraud adheres to the right itself and not merely to the cedent. 167 
The debtor is therefore entitled to raise the fraud as a defence to an action brought 
against him by the cessionary. 168 This, said the judge, is in accordance with the basic 
purpose of cession and the general principles that the cedent cannot transfer to the 
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not be disadvantaged by the cession. 169 
The judge went on, however, to hold that a debtor, in the same circumstances, 
would not be entitled to use the fraud as basis for an action (as opposed to a defence) 
against the cessionary. 170 He stated that 
[a]Jthough the cessionary takes place of the creditor, and in this sense 
is a party to the contract, that position does not arise as a consequence 
of an agreement between the cessionary and the debtor, but by 
operation of law; [on the basis of] a special legal remedy which is 
granted to the cessionary, irrespective of whether the cession did not 
take place against the wi II of the debtor. 171 
In other words, A can sue only B on the basis of the fraud. Ifhe were 
allowed to avoid the underlying contract, this would mean that both it and the rights 
arising therefrom would be retrospectively invalidated. If the cession consequently 
also fell away, with retrospective effect, C would surely therefore be liable to return 
payments to A. Indeed, the judge went on to say that A would have a claim against 
C (namely a condictio indebiti because there was an unowed payment - unowed 
because of the retrospective invalidation). In other words, A's remedies would be 
rescission and restitutio in integrum vis-a-vis B (i e B would have to return anything 
received under the contract and A would have to return the car to B) and a condictio 
against C (regarding the payments). 
The main reason why the judge came to this conclusion seems to be that he 
considered that the imposition on C of a duty to restore (in terms of restitutio in 
integrum) would mean that the cession would have not only transferred a right but 
also a duty, which would be impermissible. This does not fit very comfortably with 
his assertions that the cedent's fraud adheres to the right itself and not merely to the 
cedent172 and that the cession does not cure the ceded right of defects and thus an 
incomplete right remains incomplete after the cession. 173 It could be argued that this 






At 588H, 589B-C, 5890-E. 
At 589A: 'Hoewel die sessionaris die plek inneem van die kontraktuele skuldeiser, en in die 
sin deel het aan die kontrak, ontstaan daardie posisie nie as gevolg van 'n ooreenkoms tussen 
die sessionaris en die skuldeiser nie, maar uit hoofde van regswerking, van 'n besondere 
regsmiddel wat aan die sessionaris verleen word, onverskillig of die sessie al dan nie teen die 
skuldenaar se wil plaasgevind het'. (My translation.) 
At 588G. 
367 
misconception. The rule that only rights and not duties can be ceded 174 must surely 
only refer to duties which arise ex contractu and not to generaiiegai duties imposed 
by the law of contract. 175 
His reasoning is interesting, however, as it seems to echo the German view 
that rights of recourse arising from the defect or failure of a contract should lie 
between the ostensible contracting partners. The disadvantages that flow from the 
defect (such as exposure to an action) should only affect the parties to that defective 
contract, as each had the opportunity to assess the other's character and 
creditworthiness during the pre-contractual negotiations. It is significant, however, 
that the judge only gave expression to these policy considerations vis-a-vis restitutio 
in integrum (which he confines to the relationship A-B), and not the condictio 
(which may apparently be brought against C), probably because restitutio is 
generally seen as a contractual remedy, whereas a condictio is not. 176 
The court unfortunately did not explicitly deal with the question of the 
validity of the obligationary agreement between Band C. It therefore remains an 
open question whether C would be able to sue B for breach ifB purported to cede to 
him a voidable claim that was subsequently avoided. Similarly, it is not clear 
whether A's performance to C would extinguish any debt owed by B to C. It seems 
unlikely that this would be the case, however, as South African law generally 
requires performance that corresponds exactly to the terms of the contract. 177 In 
other words, the only performance that would extinguish B's debt to C in terms of 
their obligationary agreement - if any existed - would be cession of a valid right 
against A. 
Situations where the contract between A and B was void ab initio: 
Doppelmangel 
Let us now consider cases where the contract between A and B was void ab initio, 







And, in any case, duties may be transferred, by assignment. 
In effect, therefore, the judge decided that the duty to restore in terms of restitutio in 
integrum derives from the contract itself. 
See the discussion in Chapter One above at p 20. 
B K Tooling (Edms) Bpk v Scope Precision Engineering (Edms) Bpk 1979 (1) SA 391 (A). 
Cf datio in solutio: see note 231 below. Cfthe German law regarding Leistungen an 
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restitutio in integrum does not enter the picture. Technically, such situations would 
be classified as cases of DoppelmangeI because the non-existence of a right to be 
ceded would preclude not only a cession but also an obligationary agreement 
between Band C (as any such agreement would be void for impossibility). 
Such cases should therefore be compared with German cases of 
Doppelmangel. Most German writers do not deal with this situation as a separate 
category; 178 they seem to regard it as unimportant whether Band C were linked by an 
underlying obligationary agreement. What is most important is that there was a 
purported cession of a non-existent right. In any event, the result would be the same 
as the view of the majority: A should sue B, and B should sue C. 
Decisions dealing with analogous facts l79 are Hennie Slabbert Motors (Pty) 
Ltd v De Lange, 180 Koen v Goosen,181 and San tam Bank Ltd v VOigtl82 (in which B 
had no claim against A at all). 
The first two cases (Hennie Slabbert Motors (Pty) Ltd v De Lange and Koen v 
Goosen) have almost identical facts and identical results. They do not deal with 
situations involving insurance claims, as encountered in the leading German cases, 
but rather with cession in the context of discounting arrangements. In both cases, a 
car-dealer B sold a car to the plaintiff A in terms of a hire purchase agreement. This 





Erfollungs Statt: see Chapter One at p 37, and Flume's argument at p 354 above. 
An exception is Lieb, who says that, if the underlying contract between Band C is also 
invalid, the case will be one of Doppelmangel, and that A must sue B, and B must sue C: 
Munchener KommentarfLieb § 812 marg note l24a. 
But also see Standard General Insurance Co Ltd v SA Brake CC supra, the facts of which are 
similar to the case of GUnter M. In this case, B took out a policy (with insurer A) insuring 
premises that were secured by a mortgage bond granted to B by a bank C. B was obliged in 
terms of its agreement with C to keep the premises insured against fire at all times. Also in 
accordance with the agreement with C, B ceded all its rights under the insurance policy, 
actual and contingent, to C. The policy was amended slightly at various stages but remained 
substantially the same. The Court held that the cession of the rights had taken place valjdly 
and that B accordingly had no right to institute a claim against A when the inevitable fire 
occurred. A did not make any payment (to B or C) in terms of the policy and the question of 
enrichment therefore did not arise. The court also did not deal with the reason why the 
insurance company did not pay for the fire damage, namely that it (the insurance company) 
was of the opinion that the fire had been caused by someone acting on behalf of B. This case 
is thus distinguishable from that of Gtinter M in that the cession took place before the fire, 
the court decided that there was a valid cession of a contingent right, and the cessionary C 




the Hire Purchase Act183 that made validity of the contract dependent upon the 
payment of a deposit. After the 'conclusion' of the hire purchase contract, the 
respective sellers purportedly ceded the rights supposedly arising from the contract to 
C, in terms of discounting arrangements. A accordingly made payments to C. A 
then sued B. 
In the first case, Hennie Slabbert Motors (Pty) Ltd v De Lange, 184 A sought 
repayment of R950,60 which he had paid to C but he brought the action against B.185 
His first argument was that he had paid C because he was estopped from raising the 
invalidity of his contract with B in opposition to C's claim for payment. 186 The court 
held that there can be 'no question of an application of the principle of estoppel 
where there is in fact no obligation whatever upon a person to pay any amount 
whatsoever, but where he nevertheless chooses to do so for some reason or another' 
and therefore that he could not 'rely on estoppel to enable him to reclaim payment 
from a third party of any amount gratuitously paid by him' ,187 
Secondly the plaintiff argued that his payments should be returned by B on 
the basis of restitutio in integrum as he had no other legal remedy against c. 188 
Having pointed out that the contract in this case was void and not merely voidable,189 
the judge concluded that 
restitutio can have no application in a case where a person voluntarily 
and while being under no legal or any other obligation to pay an 
amount does pay it but thereafter, and because he regrets having paid it, 
seeks to obtain repayment, not from the person to whom he mistakenly 
or voluntarily paid the amount but from a third party.190 
The court's decision therefore seems to be based on three grounds: that the 
remedy of restitutio in integrum only applies where a contract is voidable, that it can 
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available to someone who has made a payment gratuitously,191 mistakenly or 
voluntarily. The first of these grounds seems to be correct, according to the existing 
law of contract. 192 The second is the most interesting, as the judge thus seems to 
suggest that the payment passes directly from A to C and thus that, if any action were 
to lie, it would lie against c. 193 It is unfortunate that the plaintiff had not raised the 
question of unjustified enrichment. 
Unjustified enrichment formed part of the ratio decidendi, however, in the 
next case, Koen v Goosen. 194 In this case, the pJaintiffpaid R692 to the 'cessionary' 
C. He sought a declaration that his contract with B was void ab initio and, as in the 
Hennie Slabbert Motors case, he sued B for repayment. Corbett J (as he then was) 
held that the hire purchase agreement was void for non-compliance with the statutory 
provisions. 195 He decided, further, that C, as cessionary of the rights under the 
contract, 'was a necessary party and should have been joined'. 196 He went on to hold 
that 
[t]he legal basis of plaintiffs claim for the R692 is one of the 
condictiones. Whether it be the condictio sine causa in the narrow 
sense ... or one of the other condictiones ... , it seems clear that in order 
to succeed the plaintiff must establish that the defendant was originally 
the recipient of that which is being reclaimed. 197 
The judge even explicitly stated that' [i]f the plaintiff has any claim for repayment of 
this money, then, in my view, it lies,primajacie, against the recipient thereof, [C]'. 
Having held that the payment was made not to B/98 but to C, who had not been cited 
as a party to the case, he dismissed A's appeal. 
In the more recent case of Santam Bank Ltd v Voigt,199 Mrs Voigt, a 
hairdresser, bought a car from a dealer, B, in terms of a credit agreement. B 
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In other words, corresponding to the minority opinion in German law: see pp 3S0 and 3S3 ff 
above. 





At S09H. He also considered the possibility that Band C could have had an arrangement, in 
terms of their discounting deal, that payment to C would constitute payment to B, but no 
evidence thereof had been placed before the court (see SlOB-C). 
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Santam Bank. As security for her debt to Santam Bank, Mrs Voigt ceded to it a fixed 
deposit certificate issued by her bank, First National Bank?OO In other words, Mrs 
Voigt (A) originally owed the purchase price to the cedent B, but as a consequence 
of the cession, she acquired a new creditor, Santam Bank (as cessionary C). She 
made a payment to this new creditor by ceding it her claim against First National 
Bank. Shortly thereafter, the vehicle was damaged in an accident.201 
The main problem was that the credit agreement was invalid due to non-
compliance with the requirements of the Credit Agreements Act.202 The court held, 
therefore, that Mrs Voigt 'was entitled to cancel the cession and pledge and to 
recover from [Santam] ... the First National Bank deposit certificate,,203 thus 
confirming the decision of the court a quo. It is not clear why the court used the 
word 'cancel' in this sentence, as it had been prepared to hold that the agreement was 
'invalid and of no force and effect and ... the cession and pledge was dependent 
upon the validity of the agreement,?04 There can, after all, be no cancellation of a 
transaction that does not exist. Be that as it may, what is important for our purposes 
is that the court was clearly prepared to allow Mrs Voigt to claim back the 'payment' 
she made to the supposed cessionary (C), although it did not identify this as an 
enrichment claim. 
The court focused its attention exclusively on the relationship between the 
two parties to the litigation, namely Mrs Voigt and Santam. It did not consider the 
question of the validity of B's supposed cession to Santam. It seems obvious, 
however, that if the transaction between Mrs Voigt and B was invalid, then B's 
cession to Santam205 was also void. This also seems implicit in the court's 
conclusion that Santam was not entitled to retain Mrs Voigt's payment. 
It is worth noting that the court did not say that Santam had been enriched at 









For the facts, see pp 275-6 of the judgment (per Cooper J, Kannemeyer JP and Jansen J 
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against B. It did not even consider this as a possibility. 
Unjustified enrichment was raised, not by Mrs Voigt, but by Santam. It was 
argued by Santam's advocate that 'even if the agreement was invalid the Court a quo 
should not have granted the order it did since [Mrs Voigt's] ... tender of the damaged 
vehicle (for which it was said she had to account to [Santam] ... ) was inadequate and 
she was obliged to compensate the appellant on the basis of unjust enrichment for her 
use and enjoyment of the motor vehicle ... ' .206 This argument was roundly 
dismissed by the court because it had not been alleged that Santarn owned the vehicle 
and therefore 'there was no legal ground on which [San tam ] ... could base a claim 
against [Mrs Voigt] ... for delivery to it of the motor vehicle or bring an unjust 
enrichment action against [Mrs Voigt] .... ,207 The judge added that Mrs Voigt's 
claim did not depend upon her paying any compensation or offering to return the 
vehicle, but merely upon the invalidity of the agreement.208 He also summarily 
rejected the argument raised by Santam that Mrs Voigt was 'estopped from asserting 
the invalidity of the agreement' .209 
Analysis 
To sum up, then, the Appellate Division held that where B purports to cede a right 
arising from a voidable contract, A can bring a condictio indebiti against C. In the 
first two cases dealing with the situation where B purports to cede a right arising 
from a void contract, A's claim failed because, in each case, it was directed against B 
rather than C. In the third such case, on the other hand, A succeeded in suing C. The 
cases thus suggest that our courts would prefer a claim A-C in such circumstances. 
The only case which was decided on the basis of the rules of unjustified enrichment, 
however, was Koen v Goosen? I 0 In that case, it was held that A could not sue Bas B 
was not the recipiens, but that A might have succeeded in bringing an enrichment 
action against C. 
This conclusion is supported by the application of the general principles of 
enrichment liability. As was shown in the previous chapter, the current approach of 
W6 See 2801-J. 
207 See 281C-D. 
208 At 28lD. 
209 At 281E-F. 
210 Supra. 
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our courts is to emphasise the requirement that the defendant be enriched. C would 
be the enriched party in such circumstances. B would not be enriched in any way as 
A's performance to C arguably did not extinguish any contractual liability owed by B 
to C. (In the case where the contract A-B was void, there was no valid contract 
between Band C as their agreement would be void for impossibility. In the case 
where the contract A-B was voidable, it is unclear whether an obligationary 
agreement between Band C would be valid or not. In any event, performance by A 
would not correspond exactly to the terms of any such agreement, and would 
therefore not extinguish B's liability)?ll Nor would B be impoverished; C would be 
enriched at A's expense. C's enrichment would also be sine causa as the 
performance would not have taken place in terms of a valid contractual or other legal 
obligation.2l2 In short, the general principles would clearly lead one to conclude that 
A could bring an enrichment claim directly against C. 
It also appears that A could bring one of the condictiones against C. Thus for 
example, A could argue that there was a datio between himself and C as he handed 
money or other property to C. Ifhe could show that this performance was unowed 
and that it took place as a result of an excusable error, for example, he would 
arguably be entitled to bring a condictio indebiti against c.2l3 If A were to sue C 
with a condictio sine causa specia/is, on the other hand, it would have to be with the 
'rag-picker' form of this action, as the circumstances do not match any of the other 
situations where this remedy is generally regarded as being available.214 
It should be borne in mind that the courts do not interpret the requirement that 
a condictio can only lie between the solvens and the recipiens of a datio in a literal 
way. The recipiens need not be the person who has actually received ownership of 
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solvens need not be the person who actually transfers ownership.216 It should rather 
be asked whether A's performance can be attributed to B, and whether B or C should 
be regarded legally as baving received the performance. In the circwnstances 
presently being considered, there does not appear to be any justification for regarding 
A's performance as being attributable to B. There is no relationship akin to agency 
or a fiduciary relationship217 or a delegatio solvendp18 between A and B. Koen v 
Goosen would accordingly probably still be decided the same way today. 
According to both the traditional rules and the general principles of 
enrichment liability, therefore, A should sue C. This is consistent with the solution 
suggested (in Chapter Three) for cases where A performs to C on the basis of an 
invalid instruction:19 This is the result favoured by the minority of German lawyers 
in cases where only the relationship between A and B is invalid. As mentioned 
above,22o it could be argued that the relevant South African cases are not on a par 
with that situation, because the relationship between Band C would also be void (for 
impossibility).221 This is not a valid argument, however, because at the time when 
most of the leading articles on this topic were written, a contract to cede a non-
existent right would generally have been regarded as void for impossibility in 
German law. Although, as explained above, there were exceptional circumstances in 
which such a contract would have been valid, the validity or otherwise of the 
obligationary agreement does not appear to have featured much in the discussion.222 
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At p 368. 
At least in cases where the contract between A and B was void. It seems, from Van Zyl's 
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should sue B rather than C, because he should not be required to bear the risk ofC's 
loss of the enrichment or the risk that C might go insolvent or disappear.223 This 
point of view is justified, firstly, by the general rule that a debtor's legal position 
should not be made worse by the cession and, secondly, by the argument that equity 
demands that an enrichment claim should be confined to the defective 'causal 
relationship' in question. 
Regarding the first of these justifications,224 Flume argues that having to sue 
C rather than B might be to A's advantage in that a cessionary would frequently be in 
a better fmancial position than a cedent. This would often be true. For example, ifB 
is under 'prickling creditorial pressure' ,225 and cannot perform to his creditor C, he 
might purport to cede a non-existent claim to him. In such circumstances, A would 
be better off with an enrichment claim against C rather than B. In the 'fire insurance 
case', for instance, the insurer would have preferred to have an enrichment claim 
against the supposed cessionary than one against the fraudulent GUnter M. 
As Flume concedes, however, this will not always be the case. Sometimes 
the supposed cessionary will be less solvent, or more likely to disappear, than the 
supposed cedent.226 On balance, however, the interests of A - who would generally 
be the most vulnerable party - are arguably best protected by allowing him a direct 
action against the recipient of his performance. 
This solution is also supported by the policy argument (raised in the context 
of Doppelmangel in the previous chapter)227 that a direct claim A-C is preferable in 
that it entails less litigation and consequently fewer legal expenses. 
While it can certainly be argued, on policy grounds, that directing enrichment 





See p 352 above. 
Although it is a rule of the the law of cession and there is no cession in these circumstances, 
it is correct to apply the rule in this context: if a debtor should not be disadvantaged by a 
cession, a supposed debtor should afortiori not be disadvantaged by a supposed cession. It 
is also correct to focus on the interests of the debtor, as he is in the most vulnerable position. 
To borrow a phrase used by Holmes JA in S v Graham 1975 (3) SA 569 (A) at 571. 
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other words, should the claim against C be allowed only if A's position would not be 
worsened by having to sue C? This would clearly be neither equitable nor practical. For 
example, it would make C's liability dependent on his financial situation relative to B's. 
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the interests of the parties, our legal principles do not allow this. Altogether, it seems 
that our courts would be more likely to grant A an enrichment claim against ethan 
to require A to sue B. 
2 Only the cession itself (i e the transfer agreement or Zessionsvertrag 
between B and C) is invalid or absent 
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In the situation to be dealt with here, both the claim to be ceded (A-B) and the 
obligationary agreement to cede (B-C) are valid, but the cession has not validly 
taken place.228 A nevertheless 'perfonns' to C. The situation envisaged here is 
similar to the one discussed above in that there is no valid cession. Here, however, 
its invalidity is not due to the absence of a valid claim to be ceded (i e the purported 
cession does not lack an object), but arises for some other reason. For example, B 
has a valid claim against his insurer A. B agrees to cede this claim to C (i e the 
parties have concluded a valid obligationary agreement). The cession, however, does 
not take place because B, due to a reservatio mentalis on his part, does not [onn the 
animus cedendi. Or the cession may not take place because the cedent lacks the 
capacity to act, because he had either become insolvent or insane by the time he 
purported to conclude the agreement of transfer.229 Yet another illustration might be 
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several claims against various debtors. If B intends to cede a claim against debtor A 
and C intends to acquire a claim against the more creditworthy debtor X, there will 
be no valid cession because there was no meeting of the minds of the parties. 
In certain circumstances, A's performance would extinguish B's liability to 
c.231 IfB's liability were not discharged by such performance, however, C would 
theoretically be entitled to sue B for breach of the obligationary agreement to cede. 
He could thus claim specific performance of the agreement itself. This would take 
the form of cession of the claim B-A. C has, however, received the ultimate object 
of the obligationary agreement and the envisaged cession, namely the performance of 
the debtor A (in terms of the claim held against him). The only reason why C might 
go to the trouble of claiming specific perforrnance232 in such circumstances would be 
to 'justify' his retention of the performance made to him by A. IfC were allowed to 
retain the performance without receiving cession,233 on the other hand, there would 
be no point in suing for specific performance and it would also be questionable 
whether he would have suffered any quantifiable loss, and therefore whether he 
would be entitled to claim contractual damages. Can C retain the performance, or 
will he be forced to give it up by means of an enrichment claim? 
German law 
Few German writers deal with this situation. Lieb, in the Miinchener Kommenlar, 
and Larenz and Canaris, in their textbook, state that if the cession itself is defective 
(without specifying whether the underlying obligationary contract is valid or not), 





Regarding German law, cf Chapter One at pp 37-8 concerning Leistungen erftillungshalber 
and Leistungen an Erftillungs Stall. Also see Larenz and Canaris SchuidrechtlIl2 238. As a 
general rule, South African law requires exact performance in terms of a contractual 
obligation: see, e g, B K Tooling (Edms) Bpk v Scope Precision Engineering (Edms) Bpk 
supra. The creditor may, however, accept a different performance (a datio in solutum), in 
which case the obligation will be conditionally extinguished: see Van der Merwe et al 
Contract 483. 
Bearing in mind that, in South African law at least, assuming that the party claiming 
performance has himself already performed in terms of any reciprocal obligation (and 
therefore that the exceptio non adimpleti contractus and the related principle of reciprocity 
will not provide any assistance), specific performance can only be enforced by an order of 
court. For C to claim specific performance, therefore, he would incur legal expenses, which 
could be considerable. 
In other words, were he not required to obtain specific performance in order to justify 
retention of A's performance: see note 231 above. 
Munchener KommentarfLieb § 812 marg note 124c; Larenz and Canaris Schuldrechtl/12 
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performed to a supposed cessionary would be entitled to a direct condictio against 
him.235 He would thus not be forced to proceed 'via the triangle', i e to sue B who 
would in tum have a claim against C. 
Lieb justifies this conclusion by drawing an analogy with the situation where 
an Anweisung is invalid or absent.236 If there is no valid Anweisung, the argument 
goes, there is no justification for requiring A to seek recourse from B instead of C. If 
there is no valid cession, therefore, there can similarly be no justification for bringing 
B into the picture, and A should be permitted to sue C directly. 
The justification given by Larenz and Canaris for this point of view is more 
complex. They state that allowing a direct action 'is self-evident in the case of 
defects of "attributability", but might also apply without limitation where there are 
defects in validity, because in this case - in contrast to the case of the Anweisung-
these concern a legal act between the cedent and the cessionary themselves and there 
is no protection of reliance against such "direct" defences'. (My translationi37 
What this rather cryptic sentence seems to mean, firstly, is that if, due to the nature of 
the defect in question, the performance cannot be attributed to the cedent,238 then he 
cannot be drawn into the process of 'unravelling' the enrichment. In other words, an 
action should lie against the cessionary rather than the cedent. Examples of defects 
of 'attributability' (i e Zurechenbarkeitsmiingeln) would be lack of capacity to act, 
duress or other defects of will (Willensmiingel).239 A performance can therefore not 
be attributed to a cedent who lacks the capacity to act, or who has attempted to cede 
a claim under duress. The reasoning thus seems to be that if a party (B), who is 







Munchener KommentarfLieb § 812 marg note 124c; Larenz and Canaris Schuldrechtll12 
239; Flume (1999) 199 AcP 1 at 25. The court, in BOHZ 113,62, also seems to support this 
view (at p 70). 
Munchener KommentarfLieb § 812 marg note 124c. See section 2 (c) in Chapter Three 
above. 
At 239: 'Das ist bei Zurechenbarkeitsmangeln eine Selbstverstandlichkeit, dUrfte aber auch 
bei Oilltigkeitsmangeln uneingeschrlinkt gel ten, da diese hier - anders als bei der Anweisung 
- ein Rechtsgeschaft zwischen dem Zedenten und dem Zessionar selbst betreffen und es 
gegenUber derartigen "umnittelbaren" Einwendungen keinen Rechtsscheinschutz gibt'. 
Cf discussion in Chapter One above at p 49 ff, Chapter Two at pp 153, 157 and 160, and 
Three at pp 271 and 305. 
See A Hueck and C-W Canaris Recht der Wertpapiere 11 ed (1977) 141-2. See A Hueck and 
C-W Canaris Recht der Wertpapiere 11 ed (1977) 132 fffor a more detailed explanation of 
these concepts. 
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circumstances where B's acts would be disregarded by the law in any other context 
(as he was not exercising his will freely or because his acts are legally non-existent 
as he did not have the capacity to act), B's act of 'redirection' should similarly be 
disregarded here. Consequently, the law should ignore any acts ofB, and should 
regard the situation as though A made a performance to C without reference to any 
act ofB. 
So much will be familiar from the discussion of the views of Larenz and 
Canaris in previous chapters. Here, however, they argue that a direct action against 
the cessionary should be granted to A even if the defect in question is not one which 
prevents the attribution of the performance to the cedent (i e a 
Zurechenbarkeitsmangel), but is a 'validity-defect' (Gultigkeitsmangel). Such a 
defect would imply that the cession has either not taken place at all or it is regarded 
by the law as being void (i e legally non-existent) for some reason other than legal 
incapacity, duress or another defect of will. The presence ofa validity-defect usually 
results in the application of the Rechtsscheintheorie, i e the protection of the reliance 
of the bonafide recipient.24o As was pointed out previously, this theory is of general 
application and is not limited to the law of enrichment.241 Thus, for example, if X 
borrows a horse from Z and sells it to Y, who is unaware that X has merely borrowed 
and does not own the horse, and then Z tries to claim it back from Y, Y can call upon 
the protection of the Rechtsscheintheorie and Z's claim will fail. The 
Rechtsscheintheorie only applies, however, if the relevant defect (i e the one which 
has resulted in invalidity) arises from a prior relationship and not if it arises from the 
relationship between the two parties in question. 
They therefore distinguish this case from that of an invalid or absent 
Anweisung on the grounds that, unlike an Anweisung, a cession embodies a legal act 
(Rechtsgeschafi) between the cedent and cessionary themselves and the doctrine of 
reliance (Rechtsscheinschutz) can therefore be of no assistance.242 In other words, if 
a supposed cessionary were to argue that he relied on the appearance of cession, and 
therefore that he should be entitled to retain what he has received as a consequence, 




See Chapter One at p 49 ff above. 
See Chapter One at p 49 fr. 
Larenz and Canaris Schuldrecht "12 239. 
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on the other hand, C were to say that he relied on the appearance of an Anweisung, 
his reliance might be protected and his opponent would have no countervailing 
defence. 
In a nutshell, Larenz and Canaris are of the view that the debtor A should be 
allowed a direct action against the cessionary C, regardless of the reason for the 
invalidity ofthe cession, because his (i e C's) reliance on the appearance of legal 
compliance is not worthy of protection in such circumstances. 
As a further argument in favour of the debtor's having a direct action against 
the supposed cessionary, Flume243 cites § 409 BGB.244 This provision, which is 
aimed at the protection of the debtor, lays down that if a cedent gives his debtor 
notice of the cession (or purported cession) ofa claim against him,245 the cession will 
be effective vis-a-vis the original creditor even in circumstances where it would have 
otherwise been invalid?46 In other words, once the cedent has given the debtor 
notice ofthe cession, he can no longer sue the debtor for performance of the claim. 
Effectively, therefore, once the cedent has given the debtor notice of the cession, he 
cannot expect the debtor to be satisfied with a mere enrichment claim against the 
apparent cessionary and demand that the debtor make a second payment ofthe debt, 
this time to himself (the supposed cedent)?47 Flume argues that this provision is 
aimed solely at the protection of the debtor and that he can, therefore, renounce his 
right to this protection and thus claim the payment from the pseudo-cessionary with 







AcP 199 (1999) 1 at 25. 
§ 409 BGB '[Abtretungsanzeige] (I) Zeigt der Glliubiger dem Schuldner an, daI3 er die 
Forderung abgetreten habe, so muB er dem Schuldner gegentiber die angezeigte Abtretung 
gegen sich gelten lassen, auch wenn sie nicht erfolgt oder nicht wirksam ist. Der Anzeige 
steht es gleich, wenn der Glliubiger eine Urkunde tiber die Abtretung dem in der Urkunde 
bezeichneten neuen Glliubiger ausgestellt hat und dieser sie dem Schuldner vorlegt. (2) Die 
Anzeige kann nur mit Zustimmung desjenigen zuruckgenommen werden, welcher als der 
neue GUiubiger bezeichnet worden ist.' (' [Notice of assignment] (1) If the creditor notifies 
the debtor that he has assigned the principal debt, the assignment of which he has given 
notice is effective against himself in favor of the debtor, even though the assignment was not 
made or is ineffective. It is equivalent to notice, if the creditor has delivered a document of 
assignment to the assignee named in the document, and the latter presents it to the debtor. 
(2) The notice may be revoked only with the consent of the person who has been named as 
the assignee.' (Transl Forrester et al (n 57).) 
Either directly or by means of a written document handed to the new creditor (cessionary) 
who in turn presents it to the debtor. 
Or where it did not take place at all. 
(1999) 199 AcP 1 at 25. 
Flume (1999) 199 AcP 1 at 25. 
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The view that A will have a direct enrichment claim against C has also 
received the imprimatur of the Bundesgerichtshofin an aside in the notorious case of 
BGHZ 113, 62,249 to the effect that 'where there is a cession that has been accepted 
in error, the Leistung made to a supposed cessionary can be claimed back from him 
with a condictio' .250 
In conclusion, according to the herrschende Meinung, A may bring an 
enrichment action against C in such circumstances. 
South African law 
As yet, this situation has not been the subject of an enrichment case in South Africa. 
This is, however, probably not due to the improbability of such factual constellations 
arising, but rather due to the uncertainty of the whole area of enrichment law (and 
hence the parties' willingness to settle matters rather than incur the inevitably high 
legal costs that follow legal battles that are waged all the way up the hierarchy of 
courts). There is no shortage of cases concerning invalid cessions, and a debtor 
could easily make a payment to a supposed cessionary in the absence of a valid 
cessIOn. 
The problem at hand can be illustrated by the analogous legal situation which 
gave rise to the constitutional case of Brink v KitshoffNO?51 According to certain 
provisions of the Insurance Act,252 if a husband ceded the benefits of his life 
insurance policy to his wife, she would only be entitled to R30 000 of the benefits if 
his estate were sequestrated more than two years after the cession, and if this 
happened less than two years after the cession, she would not be entitled to anything 
at all. The residue or the whole amount, as the case may be, was in such situations 




As discussed in Chapter Two above at p 154 ff. (This was the case in which a fonner 
employee of a company in liquidation claimed compensation from an architect formerly 
employed by a firm which had carried out a mandate for the liquidated company. The 
architect submitted the claim to his insurer, who paid the claimed amount to the architect's 
supposed creditor, only to find out that the claim had in fact not existed.) 
The court refers to Lieb's discussion in the Munchener Kommenlar at § 812 marg note 123 as 
authority. 
1996 (4) SA 197 (CC). 
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the envisaged result (viz entitlement of the cessionary to claim all the benefits as 
creditor) was legally either partially or totally impossible. This produced a situation 
analogous to the one we are dealing with here: B purported to cede a valid claim 
against A to C, in terms of a valid obligationary agreement, but the cession was 
practically (though here not legally) ineffective. The insurer could easily have 
mistakenly made a payment to C (the wife). Such a situation could of course not 
arise now, as the relevant provisions of the Insurance Act were declared invalid (on 
the grounds of inequality) by the Constitutional Court in this case, but it serves to 
illustrate the kind of problem that could arise. How, then, should such situations be 
approached in South Africa? 
Essentially, the difference between situations 1 and 2 is that in the first, the 
cession (B-C) is invalid because there is no valid claim (B-A) to be ceded, whereas, 
in the second situation, there is a valid claim but the cession is invalid for some other 
reason. What this means is that in one case the debtor performs where he has no 
obligation to do so, and in the other he makes a performance which he is obliged to 
make, but to the wrong person (the supposed cessionary rather than the creditor). 
Does the existence of an obligation between A and B justifY treating this case any 
differently from the situation where there is no such obligation? 
As said above, the prevailing opinion in German law is that A should be 
allowed to sue C directly in such circumstances. In my view, the most convincing 
argumenr53 in favour of this outcome is that this situation is analogous to the case of 
a defective or absent Anweisung (in which case it is agreed that A should sue C)?54 
It was argued that situation 1 (namely, cession of a non-existent right) was also 
analogous to the situation where A performs to C in the absence of a valid 
Anweisung. It was suggested that a cession is analogous to an Anweisung because 
they constitute the factors that prompt A to perform to C and not to B. A defective 
cession should therefore be analogous to a defective Anweisung. In situation 1, the 
cession was void because it had no object. In this situation, the cession is void for 




Act 27 of 1943. 
And most useful, from a South African point of view. 
See section 2 (c) in Chapter Three. 
383 
In situations where A perfonns to C thinking that he was validly instructed to 
do so by B, whereas B made no valid Anweisung, the crucial fact is that B did not 
make a valid Anweisung. The ground for its invalidity is irrelevant.255 Thus, for 
example, A is allowed to sue C directly whether B made an instruction that was void 
for non-compliance with fonnal requirements (e g he made out a cheque but did not 
sign it), or whether B made an instruction under duress, or whether B did not make 
any instruction at all but the bank acted in tenns of a forged instruction. It could thus 
be argued that what is important here is that the cession (i e the factor which 
promped A to deflect his perfonnance to C) was void; the reason why the cession 
was void should be irrelevant. 
On the grounds of consistency and therefore, I think that such cases should be 
treated in the same way as the situations in section 1 above:256 A should be able to 
bring an enrichment action against c.257 
3 All tbe legal relationsbips between A and B, and Band C are valid, but A 
bas performed more tban be was required to perform to C 
eeSS1o<" 




See the examples of invalid Anweisungen given on pp 263-4 above. 
And cases of defective instructions: see section 2 (c) in Chapter Three. 
Thus, for example, provided that A could prove that he made the performance on the basis of 
an excusable error, he could bring a condictio indebiti against C: he made a datio to C and 
that datio would be indebite vis-a-vis C. It could also be argued that the condictio sine causa 
specia/is would lie against C: see section 2 (c) in Chapter Three. In certain exceptional 
circumstances, however, A might be able to sue B. This sort of situation would arise if A's 
performance extinguished B's debt to C (e g by way of the rules concerning datio in solutum, 
or third party performance). As A's performance would arguably not be attributed to Bin 
such circumstances (as there is no relationship between A and B analogous to agency or a 
fiduciary relationship - cf p 374 above), A could only sue B if the requirements of 
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A performs to C. Instead of transferring only Rl 000 as agreed, however, he 
mistakenly transfers the same amount twice. Or, he makes a typographical error and 
Rll 000 is transferred instead of R 1 000?58 In other words, although all the relevant 
legal relationships are valid, A has performed too much to C. 
It seems to be generally accepted in German law that, in such cases, the 
debtor may sue the cessionary directly on the basis of unjustified enrichment.259 The 
main argument in favour of this solution is that it is consistent with the law regarding 
the Anweisung-situations:26o such cases are regarded as analogous to cases of a 
performance in the absence ofa valid Anweisung, where a direct action (A-C) would 
also be allowed?61 It is also consistent with Canaris's ideas on the attributability of a 
performance. Here, again, there is no ground for arguing that the debtor's 
overpayment should be attributed to the cedent: the debtor's relationship to the 
cedent is irrelevant or superfluous in these circumstances, as the defect only exists in 
the relationship between the debtor and the cessionary. 
It should be noted that Canaris himself confines this direct action to cases 
where the overpayment stemmed from a defect in the relationship between A and C, 
or where the overpayment results from the debtor's own mistake, as in the examples 
given above. Therefore, for example, he should be able to bring the condictio 
directly against C ifC told him that a cession had taken place, or showed him 
documentary evidence ofthe obligationary contract. If, on the other hand, the 
debtor's misapprehension derives from his relationship to B,262 the defect in question 
lies within this relationship and Canaris is of the view that the debtor should 
therefore be confined to bringing an enrichment claim against the cedent in such a 
case?63 This, again, would be consistent with his view that potential enrichment 
actions should be limited to the parties to a defective causal relationship and the 






negotiorum gestio (whether it its proper or its extended fonn) were met. 
Elaboration of examples mentioned by Larenz and Canaris Schuldrecht 1112 at 239. 
C-W Canaris 'Der Bereicherungsausgleich im Dreipersonenverhrutnis' in Festschrift Karl 
Larenz zum 70. Geburtstag (1973) 799 at 836; Miinchener KommentarfLieb § 812 marg note 
124c; Jauernig/Schlechtriem § 812 marg note 46; Larenz and Canaris Schuh/recht 1112239; 
StaudingerfLorenz § 812 marg note 41; Lieb (1990) 7 Jura 359 at 361. 
Canaris (n 259) 836; Larenz and Canaris Schuh/recht 1112 239. 
See section 2 (c) in Chapter Three above. 
E g if the debtor assumes from the outset that he owes the cedent more than he in fact does: 
see Larenz and Canaris Schuh/recht 1112 239. 
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That the approach of the court is consistent with Canaris's opinions264 and 
with the conclusion ofthe herrschende Meinung that A should be allowed to sue C is 
illustrated by the Share-of-profits case?65 B ceded a claim to an as yet undetermined 
share of profits to C. The debtor A paid the cessionary, due to his exerting pressure 
on him. When the share ofthe profits was subsequently established, it turned out 
that the debtor had paid more than necessary. The court, in allowing the debtor to 
sue the cessionary, was influenced by the parties' awareness of the uncertainty 
regarding the amount and by the fact that it was the cessionary rather than the cedent 
who precipitated the overpayment. 
Again, there are no South African cases that deal directly with this question. 
On the basis of consistency, however, one would have to argue that such situations 
should be dealt with in the same way as those in the two previous sections (and the 
cases where there was no valid Anweisung): A should in principle be able to sue C. 
Clearly, in such circumstances, C would be enriched by A's performance; A would 
be impoverished; and the enrichment would be sine causa?66 
4 B has a valid claim against A, which he validly cedes to C. The 
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Larenz and Canaris Schuldrecht 11/2 239. 
See Larenz and Canaris Schuldrecht 11/2 at 239: 'The decision of the BGH therefore totally 
corresponds to the line represented here, according to which it depends in which relationship 
the defect had its origin'. ('Die Entscheidung des BGH entspricht daher ganz der hier 
vertretenen Linie, wonach es darauf ankommt, in welchem Verhaltnis der Mangel seinen 
Ursprung hat'.) 
BGH NJW 1989, 161. For a summary, see Larenz and Canaris Schuldrecht IJI2 at 239. 
Although all the contracts were valid, they would not cover the excess. 
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In contrast to the first situation discussed above,267 the cedent B has a valid claim 
against A, i e there is an 'object' (res incorporales) that can be ceded. While the 
agreement to cede (i e the obligationary agreement between Band C) is defective, 
the cession itself is valid, as a consequence of the principle of abstraction, as 
explained in the introductory part of this chapter.268 For example, B owns a small 
business and wants to sell it to C. After lengthy negotiations, C agrees to buy the 
business and to pay the purchase price in three equal instalments. The parties ask a 
lawyer to reduce their agreement to writing. Embedded in the contract of sale is a 
clause saying that B agrees to cede to C any outstanding debts owed to the business 
by customers. B subsequently transfers the business, and cedes the relevant debts, to 
C. A customer, A, pays C what he owes the business. It is then discovered that the 
contract of sale was void ab initio, due to uncertainty regarding the dates of 
payment.269 Assuming that the agreement to cede was not severable from the rest of 
the contract, it would be as invalid as the contract of which it formed a part. Due to 
the operation of the principle of abstraction, however, the cession would nevertheless 
be valid. 
This rather improbable scenario has understandably received very little 
attention from German commentators. Without explaining why, Lieb states that in 
such a case the cedent should be granted a claim (a Leistungskondilaion) against the 
cessionary.27o Ifwe consider the relationship A-C, C has a valid claim against A and 
A has performed in terms thereof. C is therefore not unjustifiably enriched vis-a-vis 
A. Turning to the relationship B-C, on the other hand, C has received something 
(namely, the right against A) from B without legal ground and B should therefore be 
able to sue him for unjustified enrichment. 
One of the reasons why such cases are rare in Germany is that the principle of 
abstraction is usually of no consequence in instances offraud. 271 Cases like the 






At p 346 ff. 
See p 340 above and § 409 BGB. 
Cf, e g, Patel v Adam 1977 (2) SA 653 (A). 
Munchener KommentariLieb § 812 marg note 124. 
See. for example, Scott Cession 82n76, who says that the abstraction principle does not apply 
in German law in cases of fraud, mistake or where the underlying agreement is contra bonos 
mores. More accurately, instances of fraud or mistake may invalidate both the obligationary 
and real agreements. Also see Chapter One at p 19. 
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presently being considered: B, who has a valid claim against A arising from a 
contract of loan, fraudu lently misrepresents to the representative of C company that 
the right is worth more than it actually is, or that A is more creditworthy than he is in 
fact. On the basis of the misrepresentation, C agrees to 'buy' the right from B (i e 
they conclude an obligationary agreement to cede the right in exchange for payment). 
Band C also conclude a transfer agreement, in that B forms the intention to cede and 
C to receive the right. The underlying agreement is voidable and may be set aside on 
the basis offraud. The fraud will taint not only the obligationary agreement, 
however, but also the cession itself. If, therefore, C rescinds the contract of sale of 
the right, the cession will also be retroactively invalidated. If, in the mean time, C 
has received payment from the debtor A, such payment would clearly be sine causa 
and A could presumably claim repayment directly from C. 
In certain circumstances where the relationship between Band C is based on 
mistake, the claim will also not be transferred to c.272 For example, Bowes C 
ElOO 000. B holds two valid claims against A: the first is a claim for €90 000 as the 
purchase price in terms of a contract of sale; the second is a claim for E95 000 in 
terms of a contract of loan. B wants to cede the first claim to C, in full and final 
settlement of his debt to C. C's intention, on the other hand, was to accept cession of 
the second claim in settlement ofB's debt. A purported contract to cede 'the right 
against A' would be voidable on the basis of mistake in German la~73 and, ifit were 
rescinded, any transfer agreement (cession) would also fall away, and any payment 
by A to C could be reclaimed on the basis of the law of enrichment as in the above 
example. 
This type of situation is not generally discussed by South African writers. It 
seems that B would be entitled to an enrichment action, in accordance with the 
common law and general principles of enrichment liability: C has been enriched (by 
the cession i e the acquisition of a right, or the increase in his assets), B has been 
impoverished (by the loss of a right), the enrichment has not taken place in terms of 
any contractual or other obligation (i e it is sine causa).274 Similarly, provided that B 




Cfthe previous footnote. 
§ 119BGB. 
Cf Chapter One above. 
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would only be validly ceded to C. The second, purported cession would, in other 
words, be ineffective.278 If A perfonned to C, his perfonnance would extinguish his 
obligation. All that D could do would be to sue B for breach of their obligationary 
agreement, assuming that they had concluded one and that it was valid and 
enforceable.279 
The real problems arise where A performs to D. Gennan law draws a 
distinction between cases where A perfonns to D knowing that the claim was first 
ceded to C and those where he (A) was unaware of the first cession when he made 
the perfonnance to D. Where A acted in ignorance of the cession to C, §§ 407 (1)280 
and 408 (1)281 BGB, read together, allow A to raise his perfonnance to D against C. 
In other words, C is prevented from suing A on the original claim and A thus cannot 
be forced to perfonn to C,282 having already perfonned to D. This seems unfair to C: 
he cannot even sue B for breach of contract, because B has perfonned by ceding the 
claim to him. The BGB therefore grants C an enrichment action (in tenns of § 816 
(2) BGB)283 against D, the recipient of the perfonnance that C was legitimately 








On the other hand, if A was aware of the prior cession to C when he 
Medicus Schuldrecht 11 marg note 707. 
Cf the discussion concerning impossibility above. 
§ 407 BGB (see note 57 above for the text and a translation). For the South African 
equivalent of this rule (i e that performance to the cedent in ignorance of a cession will 
discharge the debtor's liability) see Christie Contract 542 and the references cited in note 57 
above. 
§ 408 (1) BGB: '[Mehrfache Abtretung] Wird eine abgetretene Forderung von dem 
bisherigen GHiubiger nochmals an einen Dritten abgetreten, so finden, wenn der Schuldner an 
den Dritten lei stet oder wenn zwischen dem Schuldner und dem Dritten ein Rechtsgeschiift 
vorgenommen oder ein Rechtsstreit anhangig wird., zugunsten des Schuldners die 
Vorschriften des § 407 dem frtiheren Erwerber gegenuber entsprechende Anwendung.' 
([Multiple assignment] (1) If the principal debt is reassigned by the assignor to a third party, 
and if the debtor effects the performance in favour of the third party, or if a legal transaction 
is entered into or an action is commenced between the debtor and such third party, the 
provisions of § 407 apply mutatis mutandis in favor of the debtor as against the former 
assignee.' (Trans I Forrester et al (n 57).) 
Medicus Schuldrecht 11 marg note 707: ' ... by his performance to the non-entitled second 
cessionary, the debtor is freed vis-a-vis the entitled first cessionary'. (My translation.) 
§ 816 (2) BGB: 'Wird an einen Nichtberechtigten eine Leistung bewirkt, die dem 
Berechtigten gegenuber wirksam ist, so ist der Nichtberechtigte dem Berechtigten zur 
Herausgabe des Geleisteten verpflichtet.' ('If an act of performance is done for the benefit of 
a person not entitled thereto, which is effective against the person entitled., the former is 
bound to hand over to the latter the value of such performance.' (Trans I Forrester et al (n 
57).) For the context, see Appendix A. 
This enrichment action is a special type of Eingriffskondiktion: see Medicus Schuldrecht 11 
marg notes 698 ff,707. Also cf Miinchener KommentarfLieb § 816 marg notes 2, 6 ff. 
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perfonned to D, the legitimate cessionary, C, is allowed to sue A (in tenns of the 
ceded claim). In other words, A is not allowed to raise the defence contained in 
§§ 407 and 408 BOB and would have to make the same perfonnance to C as he has 
already made to D.285 He would, however, be entitled to sue D for unjustified 
enrichment; D has received the perfonnance without a valid legal ground, as he has 
no claim against A due to the application of the priority principle. D would be able 
to sue B for breach of an underlying obligationary agreement provided that it were 
valid and enforceable?86 
Soutb African law 
How would these problems be approached in tenns of South African law? In tenns 
of our law of cession, only the first cession would be valid: not only because qui 
prior est tempore, potior est in iure,287 but also because of the rule that nemo plus 
iuris transferre potest quam ipse habet.288 Once B has ceded his claim against A to 
C, he has nothing left to cede to D?89 D's only course of action would arguably be 
to sue B for breach of contract (i e breach of the obligationary agreement underlying 
the purported cession)29o or perhaps to bring a delictual action for fraud?91 
A performs to D witb knowledge of B's prior cession to C 
What would happen if A perfonned to D, and what role does A's knowledge of the 








See Palandt § 407 marg notes 6-7. 
Cfthe discussion of impossibility above. 
Van der Merwe et al Contract 477. Cf earlier authorities which favoured notice to the debtor 
over the principle of priority: Van der Merwe et al op cit 434 ff and 478; Christie Contract 
543; Kaser Roman Private Law 272 (regarding post-classical sources): the cessionary was 
'secured ... by giving notice (denuntiatio) of the cession to the debtor ... .' 
For the same idea in German law, see Medicus Schuldrecht I marg note 740 and idem 
Schuldrecht II marg note 707. But cfthe position regarding a cession in securitatem debiti, 
where the cedent is able to re-cede a right: see Van der Merwe et al Contract 463 ff and 479. 
For this reason, such cessions will not be discussed here. 
If it was an out-and-out cession - if it was a cession in securitatem debiti, the ceded right 
may be ceded again, because the cedent in such cases remains the owner of the right: see, 
e g, Incledon (Welkom) (Pty) Ltdv Qwaqwa Development Corporation Ltd 1990 (4) SA 798 
(A) at 804; Trust Bank of Africa Ltd v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd supra; Bank of 
Lisbon and South Africa Ltd v The Master and Others 1987 (1) SA 276 (A). 
But only if this is valid: cfthe discussion above regarding the effect of impossibility of 
performance on the obJigationary agreement. 
But cf Van der Merwe el al Contract at 478, where the authors state that' [t]he second 
cessionary was never entitled to receive performance from the debtor, but in the absence of a 
proprietory remedy any possible liability on his part towards the first cessionary rests on the 
uncertain basis of either delict or unjustified emichment.' 
Queenstown Municipality and Anothe?92 concerned a double cession where the 
debtor performed to the second cessionary (0) despite being aware of the prior 
cession to C. 
391 
In this case, Ultrasonic (8) and Rane Finance (C) concluded a contract, in 
terms of which Ultrasonic ceded all its book debts to Rane Finance, in exchange for a 
loan. Ultrasonic subsequently sold and delivered two consignments of equipment to 
the Queenstown Municipality (A). The Town Treasurer issued a cheque (dated 12 
November] 979) for the first instalment ofthe purchase price, and it was collected by 
Ultrasonic. 
The Treasurer then became aware of a letter from Rane Finance's attorneys, 
dated 5 November and probably received before 12 November,293 confirming that 
one of the Municipality's employees (ajunior clerk named Pretorius) had been 
informed on 31 October that Ultrasonic had ceded all its book debts to Rane Finance. 
The letter requested payment of the full purchase price and said that 'any payment to 
Ultrasonic [would] ... not be regarded in law as a payment in discharge of [the 
Municipality's] ... obligations' .294 The Town Treasurer thereupon countermanded 
the cheque. 
He was then informed by Untiedt, sole director and shareholder of Ultrasonic, 
that the claim against the Municipality had been ceded to Paddy's Investments (D) 
and that the cheque would be passed on to this cessionary. 'At some stage' the Town 
Treasurer received a copy of this cession. Forming the opinion that the date on 
which the cheque was drawn was the date of paymenf95 and that notice ofthe 
cession to Rane Finance was only received when he became aware ofthe attorneys' 
lette?96 (i e that he had made the payment before receiving notice of the cession), the 
Town Treasurer cancelled the countermand. The cheque was apparently handed to 
Paddy's Investments, and the Municipality paid the second instalment directly to the 







See the judgment at 197E. 
See the judgment at 196A and 197H. 
See 196C-D and 197E-F. 
See 197E. 
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earlier cession, and that the payments were received bonafide.297 Some three 
months after the final payment had been made, Ultrasonic was placed in liquidation. 
Rane Finance thereafter claimed payment of the whole purchase price from 
the Municipality (i e C sued A for satisfaction of the ceded claim). Paddy's 
Investments was drawn into the litigation by the Municipality, which claimed that if 
the Municipality were obliged to pay Rane Finance, it should be allowed to recover 
the payments (as having been made in error) from Paddy's Investments?98 
The court was satisfied that the first payment took place when the cheque was 
cleared by the Municipality's bank,299 and that, at that time, the Town Treasurer was 
aware that the claim had been previously ceded to Rane Finance.30o The question 
that therefore arose for decision, according to the court, was 'whether a debtor, who 
has had notice of the cession of a debt to ... [C], and then makes payment to another 
cessionary ... [D], is, when he is called upon to pay ... [C], entitled to recover the 
earlier payment from ... [D]. ,30] The parties conceded that the relevant legal 
question was not whether the Municipality, as debtor, had to pay Rane Finance, as 
. 302 cessIOnary. 
The court held that a condictio indebiti would not be available to a party who 
acted grossly negligently or one who knew that the payment was not due?03 The 
court concluded that the Town Treasurer, an experienced administrator,304 had acted 
grossly negligently,305 and that his error, if error there was, was therefore not 
excusable. The Municipality was accordingly not entitled to recover the payments 
made to Paddy's Investments. 
The judgment implies that, as in German law, C can sue A for performance. 
















The court stated that 'even a doubt whether it is due or not would prevent its recovery': see 
199C-D. 
See, inter alia, 1961-J. 
See 199H-I. 
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succeed, however, if A's error were excusable, and a payment made with the 
knowledge of the prior cession would not be excusable.306 In effect, therefore, where 
a debtor (A) pays a second cessionary (D), he cannot use the condictio indebiti to 
claim back the payment made to 0 ifhe was aware of the prior cession. In other 
words, in effect, C can sue A but - contrary to the Gennan rule - A has no recourse 
against D. This would be unfair to A, as he would have to perfonn twice, and would 
unfairly advantage D. It seems, however, that A would be able to recover his 
perfonnance from 0 by other means, for example the condictio sine causa specialis 
or the general enrichment action:307 in such circumstances 0 would arguably be 
enriched (as the perfonnance would not have extinguished any liability owed to 
him), and this enrichment would have been sine causa. 
A performs to D in ignorance of B's prior cession to C 
Now let us consider what happens where A perfonns to 0 in ignorance of the prior 
cession to C. 
Firstly, what is C's position, if A perfonns to 0 in such circumstances? Can 
C sue A for perfonnance? Or does A's perfonnance to 0 discharge his debt to C, as 
in Gennan law? As said above, Gennan law allows this by extending the rule that a 
debt is discharged where a debtor perfonns to a cedent in ignorance of the cession 
(contained in § 407 BGB) to situations where the debtor perfonns to a second 
cessionary in ignorance of the first cession. In other words, a perfonnance A-D will 
discharge the liability A-C. The South African position is unclear. 
Van der Merwe et apos state that '[w]here the second cessionary gives notice 
of the cession to the debtor, who pays him in good faith, the debtor is presumably 
protected against further liability towards the prior cessionary as true creditor.' They 
do not cite any authority for this proposition, but say that' [a] categoric distinction 
between bonafide payment to a cedent and payment to a second cessionary seems 





Although such a case might now be approached differently, in the light of Willis Faber 
Enthoven (Pty) Ltd v Receiver of Revenue and Another 1992 (4) SA 202 (A). In this regard, 
see Eiselen and Pienaar Unjustified Enrichment 119. 





Gennans, extend the rule that protects a bona fide debtor who pays a cedent to a 
bonafide debtor who pays a second cessionary. They go on to say that 'any possible 
liability on his part towards the first cessionary rests on the uncertain bases of either 
delict or unjustified enrichment.,310 
The principle of priority, on the other hand, suggests that C can always sue A 
in tenns of the claim that he validly received by B's first cession. As implied in the 
Rane Finance decision, A can then sue D for recovery of the perfonnance, provided 
that the requirements ofthe relevant enrichment remedy (e g the condictio indebiti) 
are satisfied.311 This is contrary to the position in Gennan law, which allows Can 
enrichment claim against D in such circumstances. The general principles of 
enrichment liability also suggest that, unlike Gennan law, our law would not allow C 
an enrichment claim against D: while D has undoubtedly been enriched, one cannot 
say that C has been impoverished at his expense because he (C) still has ills claim 
against A. 
Were South African law to apply the priority principle without exception, C 
would have to proceed against A (in tenns of original claim) and A against D (for 
enrichment e g with a condictio indebiti if he acted in error) and D against B (for 
breach). The difficulty with this is that it leaves C in rather an unfortunate position if 
A is unable to make the perfonnance twice. It would also be unfair to A ifhe 
perfonned to D in the bonafide belief that he was obliged to do so; he would have to 
bear the legal costs of suing D (condictio indebiti), as well as having to make the 
same perfonnance to C as he has already made to D. In most cases, A would 
therefore have to carry the cost ofB's dishonesty or mistake. This is clearly 
inequitable, particularly since A has acted bonafide. It also has the disadvantage of 
being inefficient; whereas the case would be solved by a single direct action in 
Gennan law, South African law would require at least two (C-A and A-D). 312 
I therefore agree with Van der Merwe et al that our law should follow the 





See Rane Finance (Pty) Ltd v Queenstown Municipality and Another supra (obiter). 
D would probably be unable to sue B for breach because their obligationary agreement could 
be void for impossibility. In any event, D is only likely to sue B for breach ifhe (D) is 
successfully sued by A, which is unlikely, unless A is a wealthy debtor. 
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CONCLUSION 
Although our law reports are replete with cases concerning cession, it is remarkable 
how few deal with the problems of enrichment in that context. Similarly, academic 
writers have paid very little attention to this topic in South Africa? I 3 It is therefore 
interesting to discover that this has been the subject of such heated debate in 
Germany.314 
The most contentious issue is the question of cession of a non-existent right. 
The view that A should sue B, who should in tum sue C, has won the support of the 
majority of writers as well as the courts. This view is an attractive one, as it is 
consistent with the general pattern of liability sketched in previous chapters. It also 
seems to achieve the best balance of the relative interests of the parties, particularly 
in the context of insurance contracts. 
In the circumstances, it is not easy to reject this point of view in favour of the 
minority opinion that A should sue C directly. The view of the minority, however, 
seems to be correct, at least on rather technical grounds relating to the principle of 
abstraction. In terms of South African law, A's position is influenced by the nature 
of the defect in the relationship between A and B. If they are linked by a voidable 
contract, it appears that A has recourse against B in that he may claim restitutio in 
integrum and thus recover any performance made to B. If A has also made a 
performance to C in such circumstances, however, he may recover that performance 
directly from C via the law of enrichment. If the contract between A and B is void 
ab initio, A must similarly proceed against C. In other words, in a case of cession, 
A's performance is not imputed to B; it thus cannot extinguish B's liability to C in 
the same way that A's performance to C would extinguish the debt B-C in the case 
of an Anweisung. The only situation in which A's performance could discharge B's 
liability to C would be where C accepts it in fulfilment ofB's debt, i e as a 




Eiselen and Pienaar Unjustified Enrichment, for example, only mention one of the (few) 
cases discussed in this chapter. 
This may perhaps, in part, be attributed to the more open-ended, nonnative, approach of the 
German law of enrichment. Examples of rules that make German law relatively flexible 
include the requirement that the defendant in an enrichment claim merely 'receive 
something', and the absence of a requirement of impoverishment. 
See note 211 above. 
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Statt).316 
The second situation considered in this chapter is that where A owes a debt to 
B, B agrees to cede it to C, but the cession does not validly take place. The 
prevailing opinion in Germany is that A should sue C. 
In the next situation, the contractual relationships and the cession are all 
valid, but A makes a performance to C that exceeds what was required. The majority 
view is that A should sue C in such circumstances. Canaris, on the other hand, draws 
a distinction between cases where the problem lay in the relationship between A and 
B, and those where there was a problem in the relationship between A and C. In the 
first case, he says, A should sue B; in the second, A should sue C directly. 
Then the following situation was considered: the claim B-A is valid, and B 
validly ceded the claim to C, but the obligationary agreement between Band C was 
defective. In such circwnstances, the only enrichment claim would be brought by B 
against C. 
Finally, the case of mUltiple cessions was considered . German law 
distinguishes between situations where A performs to the second cessionary, D, 
aware ofB's prior cession to C, and those where A was ignorant thereof. In the first 
case, German law allows the frrst cessionary (C) to enforce his claim against the 
debtor. The debtor, on the other hand, is entitled to bring an enrichment claim 
against D. South African law also permits C to enforce his claim against A, but-
unlike German law - does not allow A to bring a condictio indebiti against D. The 
general principles of enrichment liability lead to a more equitable result as they 
would allow A recourse against D. If the debtor was ignorant of the prior cession to 
C, C is barred from suing A, but he can sue D for unjustified enrichment. South 
African law should follow this approach. 
316 See Chapter One at p 37 above. It would not constitute unconditional perfonnance by a third 
party, as dealt with in Chapter Two, because the obligationary agreement between Band C 
stipulates that B owes a particular perfonnance to C, namely cession of the right against A. 
Only cession of that right will discharge B's liability to C. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSION 
The introductory chapter of this thesis ended with an example: A performs to B, who 
then makes the same performance to C. The law of unjustified enrichment is applicable 
where one or both of the underlying contracts] are invalid. This case of consecutive 
perfonnances - a so-called enrichment chain - constitutes the most basic of multi-party 
enrichment situations. It was explained that, according to the German law of unjustified 
enrichment, the parties to an enrichment action are generally the parties to the defective 
relationship in question. A can only sue B; B can only sue C. The same pattern is 
followed where both underlying contracts are invalid. C can thus generally only be sued 
by B in such circumstances. B may in tum be sued by A, whose claim would be for the 
value ofB's claim against C. (This has superseded the view that A could claim cession 
ofB's claim against C: a Kondiktion der Kondiktion.) There is an exception to this 
pattern of liability, where the ultimate receipt was gratuitous. In such a situation, A may 
sue C directly. It was shown that there is support in South African law for the idea that 
enrichment claims should follow the links of the chain: A should sue B; B should sue C. 
The question posed at the end of Chapter One was therefore whether German and South 
African law follow this pattern (A-B-C) in circumstances involving not consecutive 
performances, but a performance directly from A to C: situations that the Gennans call 
'triangular' . 
In the following chapters, three such triangular situations were discussed. In 
each of them, a party (A) either hands something to or does something for another (C). 
The three situations are distinguished by the factor, ifany, that prompted A to make that 
Or other legal grounds. 
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'performance' to C. In Chapter Two, A acts sua sponte, without being instructed or 
obliged to make that performance. In Chapter Three, A 'performs' to C because he has 
been instructed to do so by B. In Chapter Four, A makes the performance to C as B has 
ceded a claim against him to C. 
Chapter Two dealt with situations where A performs in terms ofB's debt to C 
without any prompting from B or anyone else. It was shown that both German and 
South African law regard A's fulfilment ofB's obligation as amounting to the 
'administration of the affairs of another'. Provided that certain requirements are met, 
such administration will give rise to a quasi-contractual relationship between A and B, 
which provides a causa for A's performance. In terms of this relationship (negotiorum 
gestio or Geschaftsfohrung ohne Auftrag), A is entitled to claim reimbursement from B. 
Should all of the requirements for negotiorum gestio not be met, on the other hand, B 
will have been enriched sine causa and A will only be able to recover any amount by 
which B is enriched. 
Both German and South African law only allow A an enrichment claim against B 
in certain discrete sets of circumstances. These fall under the headings of quasi 
negotiorum gestio in South Mrica, and either unechte or unberechtigte 
Geschafts/uhrung ohne Au/trag in Germany. 
It was shown that both systems thus allow A to sue B for unjustified enrichment 
where A did not act with the animus negotia aliena gerendi (or 
Fremdgeschiiftsfohrungswille). Firstly, A could have intended to benefit himself by 
performing in terms ofB's obligation to C: in such a situation, A would be called a 
mala fide gestor in South Africa, and the situation would be called GeschaftsanmafJung 
(one of the two forms of unechte Geschaftsfuhrung ohne A uftrag) in Gertnany. Each 
system allows A to sue B for unjustified enrichment, but limits A's emichment claim in 
some way in order to protect B's interests. In South African law, A may thus only sue B 
ifB's emichment was 'improper or unjustified'. In German law, on the other hand, A 
may only sue B for enrichment once B has exercised all his rights against A. It was 
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suggested that South African law needs to pay more attention to B' s position, and to 
spell out any remedies to which he should be entitled. It was argued that the additional 
requirement that B's enrichment was 'improper or unjustified' serves a useful purpose in 
protecting B's interests and that it could be regarded as an expression of the requirement 
that the administration be uti/iter. In other words, when a case falls into the domain of 
quasi negotiorum gestio rather than negotiorum gestio proper, this does not mean that all 
of the requirements of negotiorum gestio should be disregarded. 
In theory, both systems also allow an enrichment claim to someone who 
administers the affairs of another in the belief that he is administering his own affairs 
(bonafide gestio or irrtiimliche Eigengeschaftsfiihrung). Whether such a situation could 
arise within the factual paradigm of Chapter Two depends whether it is possible for A to 
extinguish B' s obligation to C, thinking that he is administering his own affairs. 
According to German law, A can sue B for enrichment where A's administration 
of B' s affairs was against his express or implied wishes, or not in B' s interest 
(unberechtigte Geschaftsfiihrung ohne Auf trag). The other requirements of 
Geschiiftsfiihrung ohne Auf trag must be satisfied for A to succeed in suing B for 
unjustified enrichment in such a case. B is protected by rules borrowed from the law of 
cession. (This is justified on the grounds that B's position is similar to that of a debtor in 
a case of cession, who also suffers a change of creditors without his consent.) In South 
African law, on the other hand, A can sue B for enrichment ifhe administers B's affairs 
against B's express wishes (domino prohibente), but not if his administration is against 
B's implied wishes, or against his interests. It was suggested that this situation is 
anomalous. It was thus argued that, assuming that prevention of unjustified enrichment 
is sufficient ground to allow an action to a gestor who acts against the express wishes of 
the dominus, a gestor who acts against his implied wishes or agaihst his interests should 
also be allowed an enrichment claim against B. It was agreed that B should be afforded 
protection in such circumstances. South African law provides some protection to B by 
stating that A must prove 'circumstances that made it just' for him to intervene. This 
test has been the subject of criticism. In this thesis, I suggest that a better means of 
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protecting B's interests would be to follow the German example and develop rules 
analogous to those in our law of cession. IfB is sued for enrichment, he should thus be 
allowed to raise any defences and set off any claim that he would have had against his 
original creditor (C). 
Finally, the situation of minors was considered. If someone administers the 
affairs of a minor, South African law only allows him to sue the minor on the basis of 
unjustified enrichment. Comparison with German law, together with an analysis of the 
relative interests of the parties and the relevant policy considerations, led to the 
conclusion that this aspect of our law is unsatisfactory: the gestor should be allowed to 
claim all his expenses in such circumstances. 
The general formulation of the requirements for the extended aetio negotiorum 
gestorum, and the fact that it can be used to reclaim the value of a/aetum, have made 
this remedy an attractive alternative to a general enrichment action. It was noted in 
Chapter Two, however, that German law retains these specific instances of enrichment 
liability notwithstanding the general enrichment action contained in § 812 BGB. This 
suggests that the law already developed in this field should not be abandoned when our 
courts recognise a general enrichment action. It was thus suggested that the extra 
requirements posed by the courts in this context (for example, those concerning the mala 
fide gestor and the gestor who acts domino prohibente) should be retained, but that they 
should be given a more precise and definite content. 
The next hypothetical situation discussed in Chapter Two was the case where A 
purports to perform in terms ofB's obligation to C but such performance does not 
extinguish B's liability. In such circumstances, both German and South African law 
allow A to sue C directly on the basis of unjustified enrichment. Similarly, A may bring 
an enrichment action directly against C, in both legal systems, if A purports to perform 
in terms of B' s obligation to C, where B in fact owes nothing to C. The latter case has 
caused controversy in Germany, and it exemplifies some of the shortcomings of the 
German LeistungsbegrifJ It was thus explained why the currently prevailing opinion in 
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Gennany is that cases of multi-party enrichment should not be approached in a 
mechanical way, but that they should be analysed from the perspective of the interests of 
the parties, with a view to a fair allocation of risk. Such an interests-analysis suggests 
that A should be able to bring an enrichment claim directly against C. The fact that a 
South African court would not have any difficulty in coming to this conclusion on the 
basis of either our traditional remedies or the general principles of enrichment liability 
illustrates our courts' relative readiness to allow A a direct action against C. 
To sum up, then, A can sue B if the requirements of negotiorum gestio or quasi 
negotiorum gestio are satified. In the case of negotiorum gestio proper, A's claim is for 
all of his expenses. In the case of quasi negotiorum gestio, A's claim is limited to the 
amount ofB's enrichment. If A's perfonnance does not discharge any obligation owed 
by B to C, on the other hand, A may sue C directly. In other words, B is only drawn into 
the picture by the extinction of his liability to C. 
Chapter Three concerned cases where A was prompted to perfonn to C because 
he was instructed to do so by B. The Gennan law concerning B's instructions to a 
debtor or a third party to make a perfonnance owed by B to C (Anweisungen) was 
discussed. It was shown that this concept has its roots in the delegatio solvendi of 
Roman law, and that certain South African cases seem to support the existence of such a 
concept in our modem law. It was argued that this notion should be overtly recognised 
as part of our law, as it provides a useful means of explaining certain aspects of banking 
law and the extinction of obligations generally. 
Against this background, various factual situations that could arise in the context 
of cheque payments were examined. The first situation discussed was the one where 
there was a defect in the relationship between A and B. In other words, there was a 
valid relationship between B and C, and A perfonned to C. Three possibilities were 
considered: the situation where B instructed A to perfonn in the absence of a valid 
underlying legal relationship between A and B; the situation where A and B were linked 
by an underlying legal relationship and B instructed A to perfonn, but then revoked that 
instruction; and the situation where A and B were linked by a valid underlying 
relationship but B did not validly instruct A to perform to C. 
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Regarding the first hypothetical situation (namely, where there was no 
underlying legal relationship between A and B), it was shown that the prevailing opinion 
in Germany holds that A can bring an enrichment claim against B in such circumstances. 
A's claim would be for the value of B' s enrichment claim against C. This point of view 
is supported by an analysis of the relative interests of the parties, and the application of 
Canaris's principles. Although there are no reported South African decisions dealing 
with similar facts in the context of cheque payments, there is authority for the 
proposition that A could sue B in analogous circumstances (i e where A was an insurer 
who made a payment in accordance with an instruction by its supposed client, B). It was 
argued that the case in question (Licences and General Insurance Co v Ismay)2 is 
important because the judge effectively held that a performance made by A to C 
constituted a datio by A to B. A was thus able to bring a condictio indebiti against B. 
Regarding cases where A performs to C notwithstanding the fact that B has 
revoked his instruction (e g countermanded a cheque), German law distinguishes 
between situations where C was aware of the revocation, and those where C was 
unaware thereof. It was suggested that this distinction is a useful one, as it draws 
attention to the question ofC's reliance on the validity of the performance made to him. 
It was shown that South African law and German law agree that A can bring an 
enrichment action directly against C in situations where C was aware that B had revoked 
his instruction. Our courts, like the majority of writers and the courts in Germany, arrive 
at this conclusion via an analysis of the relative interests of the parties and the allocation 
of risk. For example, C's reliance is not considered to be worthy of protection as he 
knew that B had revoked his instruction. It is agreed that A's perfonnance to C should 
not be attributed to B in such circumstances. 
2 1951 (2) SA 456 (EDL). 
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Both Gennan law and South African law allow A an enrichment claim against B 
(rather than C) in situations where C was unaware that B had revoked his instruction. In 
Gennany, this point of view is supported by analysing the interests of the parties. The 
current approach of the South African courts also suggests that A should bring an 
enrichment claim against B. In effect our law says that B is enriched by the extinction 
of his obligation to C: A's perfonnance to C is attributed to B and thus discharges the 
liability B-C. The situation is thus distinguished from the case of perfonnance by a 
third party dealt with in Chapter Two. It was argued that extinction of liability in such 
cases can best be explained by the notion of delegatio solvendi which, like the Gennan 
Anweisung, regards A's perfonnance to C under B's instruction as two dationes: A to B, 
and B to C. It was also suggested that the most appropriate of the traditional remedies 
would be the condictio indebiti, notwithstanding the court's stated preference for the 
extended actio negotiorum gestorum contraria. 
If A perfonns to C where A has not received any valid instruction to make such 
perfonnance, A is allowed to sue C directly, according to the herrschende Meinung in 
Gennany. Again, this conclusion is based upon an analysis ofthe interests of the 
parties. In such circumstances, it is agreed that B, who did not instruct A to make this 
performance, should be left out of the picture. C will thus be liable whether or not he 
was aware of the absence of a valid instruction, and whether or not he was owed 
anything by B. It was shown that South African courts seem to regard it as obvious that 
A should not have an enrichment claim against B in such a situation. An analysis of the 
relative interests of the parties leads to the conclusion that A should sue C in 
circumstances where A was not validly instructed by B to perfonn to C. It was argued 
that A's performance to C should not be attributed to B, in the absence of a valid 
instruction B-A, and should therefore not discharge any debt owed by B to C in such 
circumstances. This point of view is supported by policy considerations. C would thus 
be the party who was enriched by A's perfonnance. Or, to use the traditional 
tenninology, A would be the recipiens of A's perfonnance. As in Gennan law, C's 
interests are sufficiently protected by the defence of loss of enrichment. In this context, 
it was also argued that the only relevant causa that could defeat A's claim in such a 
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situation would have to lie between A and C. 
The next situation discussed in Chapter Three was the controversial case of 
Doppelmangel, namely a situation where the contracts between A and B, and Band C, 
are defective. The prevailing opinion in Germany is that A should sue B, and B should 
sue C in such circumstances. In other words, A will generally not be allowed to sue C 
directly. Technically, A must sue B for the value of his claim against C (the Kondiktion 
der Kondiktion having been rejected by the writers, if not by the courts). This 
conclusion is again supported by an analysis of the interests of the parties. It is agreed, 
however, that A can sue C directly in exceptional circumstances. For example, a direct 
claim will be allowed where C received the performance gratuitously. Applying the 
general principles of South African law leads to the conclusion that A should sue C 
directly, notwithstanding the fact that comparing the interests of the parties leads to the 
conclusion that suits should be directed 'around the triangle' (i e A-B-C). It was 
shown that the traditional requirements of the condictio indebiti may be interpreted in 
such a way as to allow A to sue B. It was conceded, however, that a South African court 
faced with such a matter would be more likely to allow A to sue C directly. 
The final hypothetical situation dealt with in Chapter Three concerns a 
performance by A to C where there was no defect in the relationship between A and B, 
but the relationship between Band C was defective. In such circumstances, it seems that 
both German and South African law would allow B an enrichment claim against C. 
In Chapter Four, I discussed cases where A performs to C (rather than to B) 
because of a cession by B to C. The discussion began with the most controversial of 
factual situations viz those where B purports to cede a non-existent claim against A to C, 
and A performs to C as a consequence. According to Gennan law, the cession would be 
ineffective, although the underlying obligationary contract between B and C could be 
valid. The majority view in German law is that enrichment claims in such a situation 
(and in situations of Doppelmangel) should be directed 'via the triangle': A should sue 
B, and B should sue C. There is, however, a strong minority opinion that A should be 
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able to sue C directly in such circumstances. It was suggested, on technical grounds, 
that the minority opinion may be the more correct, even though Canaris' s interests-based 
analysis militates against such a result. 
It was shown that South African law does not generally allow a situation where 
B can conclude a valid obligationary agreement to cede a non-existent claim; such an 
agreement would be void for impossibility. Most cases of cession of a non-existent 
claim would thus amount to situations of Doppelmangel. The few South African cases 
on the topic suggest that A can bring an enrichment claim directly against C (as would 
happen in cases of Doppelmangel in the Anweisung cases). The relevant cases 
approached the matter from the perspective of the traditional remedies. The most 
apposite case3 held that A was the solvens and C the recipiens. Although our courts 
have been prepared to interpret the datio-requirement in a less literal way in other 
contexts, it does not seem that the court would yet regard a supposed contractual claim 
between A and B as sufficient reason to regard B as the recipiens. It appears that the 
court would come to the same conclusion (that the only possible enrichment claim 
would be one between A and C) if it applied the general principles of enrichment 
liability. This is mainly due to the requirement that the defendant be enriched: C was 
clearly enriched in such circumstances and, according to existing principles, B does not 
appear to have been enriched in any way.4 As in cases of Doppelmangel in Chapter 
Three, our enrichment-requirement prevents the direction of claims 'via the triangle', 
even though such an approach might be preferable from a policy perspective that takes 
into account the interests of the parties. The only circumstances in which A would have 
recourse against B would be whete the claim B-A was voidable, and the recourse would 
take the form of rescission and restitutio in integrum. 
Then the following situation was considered: A performs to C in circumstances 
where B had a valid claim against A, and B concluded a valid obligationary agreement 
Koen v Goosen 1971 (3) SA 510 (C). 
Bearing in mind the court's rejection of arguments analogous to the German Kondiktion der 
Kondiktion in the case of The Standard Bank o/South Africa Ltd v Haskins Case No 4688/90 11 
April 1991, unreported. 
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to cede this claim to C, but the cession was invalid. It appears that Gennan writers agree 
that A should be able to sue C directly in such circumstances. Although there are no 
South African cases that deal with such a matter, it appears that our courts would come 
to the same conclusion. A South African court would probably also decide that A 
should sue C, as most Gennan lawyers agree, where all the relationships were valid but 
A's perfonnance to C exceeded what was owed.5 
It appears that South African and Gennan law would agree that B should sue C 
where B has a valid claim against A, and validly cedes this to C, in a situation where the 
underlying obligationary contract between Band C is defective. 
Finally, the situation of 'double cession' was considered. It was explained that 
Gennan law draws a distinction between cases where the debtor perfonns to the second 
cessionary, D, knowing that B had previously ceded the claim to C, and those where A 
was unware of B' s prior cession. In the first case, Gennan law allows the first 
cessionary (C) to enforce his (contractual) claim against the debtor who would, in turn, 
be able to sue the ultimate recipient (D) on the basis of unjustified enrichment. South 
African law similarly allows C to proceed against A for satisfaction of the ceded claim, 
but it appears that A would not be entitled to bring a condictio indebiti against D. It was 
suggested that applying the general principles of enrichment liability would lead to a 
fairer result as they would allow A recourse against D. 
In the second situation (i e where the debtor was unaware of the prior cession), 
on the other hand, Gennan law says that C cannot sue A in tenns of the ceded claim, but 
C can bring an enrichment claim against D. It was argued that South African law should 
follow this example. 
Bearing in mind the view repeatedly expressed in Gennany that triangular cases 
of multi-party enrichment do not allow any 'schematic solution' ,6 what general points 
6 
But cfthe discussion of the distinction drawn by Canaris: see Chapter Four above. 
See, e g, BGHZ 105,365 at 369; BGHZ 50, 227 at 229; BGHZ 58, 184 at 187; BGHZ 61, 289 at 
292; BGHZ 72, 246 at 250; BGHZ 87, 393 at 396; BGHZ 88,232 at 235; BGB WM 1984,423; 
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may be deduced from the above? 
Gennan law generally prefers claims 'via the triangle', following the pattern 
typical of enrichment chains. A direct claim (A-C) is allowed in exceptional 
circumstances, such as where C's receipt was gratuitous.? In all of these exceptional 
cases, the majority opinion is that, taking into account the interests of the parties and the 
fair distribution of risk, C is less worthy of protection than B. 
The pattern of liability is remarkably similar in South African law. Our law not 
only arrives at similar results to Gennan law, but there are also similarities in approach. 
For example, it seems that our courts are now prepared to make a decision based on an 
analysis of the relative interests of the parties, taking into account relevant policy 
factors. 8 
There are basic differences in emphasis, however. Thus, South African law 
seems to start from the assumption that A can sue C directly, and special circumstances 
are necessary for A to sue B. It appears, however, that the range of circumstances in 
which A can sue B appears to be widening. For example, in the domain of our 
traditional remedies, it is stated that a condictio indebiti can only be brought by a solvens 
against the recipiens, but our courts do not interpret this requirement in a literal fashion. 
Thus it has been held in several cases that when A transfers ownership to C, he is legally 
making a datio to B: A is the solvens and B is the recipiens.9 
9 
BGHZ 122,46 at 53. 
Other exceptions allowed according to the prevailing opinion are the following: where there is 
no actual or purported legal link between A and B and A purports to perform in terms of B's 
obligation to C but does not succeed in extinguishing B's debt or B in fact owes C nothing (see 
Chapter Two); where B instructs his contract partner, A, to perform in terms of B's obligation to 
C but subsequently revokes that instruction, A may recover his performance from C only if C 
was aware of the revocation. Where A performs to C where A had not received any valid 
instruction to make that performance, A may sue C directly, whether or not C was aware of the 
lack of a valid instruction. (For these situations, see Chapter Three.) Similarly A may sue sue 
where B, who had a valid claim against A, concluded a valid obligationary agreement to cede this 
claim to C, but the purported cession was invalid and where aU the relationships were valid but 
A's performance to C exceeded what was owed. (See Chapter Four.) 
See, most notably, B & H Engineering v First National Bank of SA Ltd 1995 (2) SA 279 (A). 
See, for example, Ismay's case supra; Phillips v Hughes, Hughes v Maphumulo 1979 (1) SA 225 
(N); Bowman, De Wet and Du Plessis NNO and Others v Fidelity Bank Ltd 1997 (2) SA 35 (A). 
408 
Applying the general principles of enrichment liability also leads to the 
conclusion that A can sue B in certain circumstances, notwithstanding the fact that A 
'performed' directly to C. This conclusion is arrived at by the application of the 
requirement that the defendant be enriched. Bearing in mind that the three sets of 
situations covered by this thesis all deal with performance in terms of obligations (i e 
performances solvendi causa),IO B is regarded as the enriched party if A's handing over 
to C extinguishes an obligation owed by B to C. The question of enrichment liability 
(and the identification of the parties to an enrichment action) thus depends on the law 
concerning extinction of obligations. Some of the policies underlying discharge of 
obligations are the same as those which inform the decision as to whether someone 
should be liable for enrichment. There is also overlap between extinction of obligations 
and the requirement that enrichment be unjustified: if an obligation is extinguished, the 
performance will have been received cum causa; if no obligation was extinguished the 
receipt will be sine causa. 
The German treatment of triangular cases of enrichment has also undergone 
various shifts. The requirement of 'directness' was discarded in favour of the 
Leistungsbegriff. The herrschende Meinung rejected this concept and now espouses the 
view that cases should be decided on the basis of an analysis of the interests of the 
parties. Very often, such an analysis leads to the conclusion that enrichment claims 
should lie between the parties to the relevant Kausalverhdltnis ('causal relationship'), 
namely the relationship that would have provided a causa for the shift of assets in 
question had it been free of defects. The majority of German lawyers agree, however, 
that cases should not be resolved using a mechanical approach. Thus, if an examination 
of the relative interests of the parties and the allocation of risk leads to the conclusion 
that A should sue C directly, such a direct action will be allowed. 
10 Chapter Two dealt with performance by a third party in his own right; Chapter Three dealt with 
performance under instruction (which would be regarded as the performance of the instructing 
party himself); Chapter Three could be said to have dealt with Leistungen erfiillungshalber and 
Leistungen an Erfollungs Statt (provisional and alternative performances) by a third party: see p 
354 in Chapter Four. 
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Our law has also apparently rejected the first means of keeping mUlti-party 
enrichment within bounds (namely, the requirement of 'directness'): 11 thus a transfer of 
ownership from A to C may be regarded as a datio between A and B; the recipiens need 
not have received ownership directly from the solvens. This expansion of the notion of a 
datio raises the question whether our law has thus created a parallel to the Gennan 
LeistungsbegrifJ. 
As explained in Chapter One, Gennan law regards a Leistung as a 'conscious and 
purpose-directed increase of the assets of another' ('bewuJ3te und zweckgerichtete 
Mehrung fremden Vennogens,).12 A Leistung may accordingly lie between A and B, 
even if A handed something directly to C. The direction of the Leistung, and therefore 
the Leistungskondiktion, is detennined by the purpose of the perfonning party. This 
purpose is detennined objectively. The recipient's subjective point of view is only taken 
into account where he was aware of the actual purpose of the perfonning party. In other 
words, the Leistungsbegriffis a largely unilateral criterion. 13 The direction of a datio, on 
the other hand, is determined inter alia l4 by reference to the legal relationships between 
the parties. For example, A's 'perfonnance' to C will be regarded as a datio to B, if 
there is some sort of relationship between A and B which would justify such a 
conclusion. IS In other words, the datio differs from the Leistungsbegriffin that its 
direction is not detennined solely by the performing party's (actual or supposed) 
purpose. 
It also appears that our courts take policy considerations into account in 
detennining whether the datio should be regarded as having taken place between parties 
other than those who factually gave and received the perfonnance. Thus our approach 






See, e g, De Vos Verrykingsaanspreeklikheid p 89 ff. 
See, eg, BGHZ 58,184; BGH NJW 1999, 1393; Esser, Schuldrecht (2ed, 1960) § 189 Nr 6, 7; 
Lorenz (J 991) 191 AcP 279 at 280; Medicus Biirgerliches Recht marg note 666; idem 
Schuldrecht II marg note 634; Stolte 1990 JZ 220 at 221. Also see Chapter One at p 38 above. 
The advantage of this is that it takes into account the fact that someone may make a performance 
without intending to extinguish an obligation. 
Thus the court also takes into account the intention of the performing party, the expectations of 
the recipient, and so on. 
Such as agency or a fiduciary relationship: see Bowman's case supra. 
I 
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Gennany. It is not yet clear what sort of relationship must link A and B in order for a 
daNo to be attributed to another. In Chapter Three, it was argued that that a delegatio 
solvendi would provide a sufficient link. Judgments concerning cession of non-existent 
debts suggest, on the other hand, that our law might not yet be prepared to regard just 
any defective contract between A and B as providing a sufficient link to allow the 
attribution of A's performance to another. It was suggested that the negotium of our 
common law could provide a useful (bilateral) 'umbrella concept', analogous to the 
Gennan Kausalverhiiltnis. Such a criterion would have the advantage of flexibility: In 
each case the court would have to take into account the relevant policy factors and the 
relative interests of the parties. At the same time, it would provide a general norm 
which could be used as a starting point for the solution of practical problems and for the 
development of further nonns. 16 
16 Another advantage is that it would help to prevent confusion regarding counter-performances. 
APPENDIX A 
TEXT AND ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF THE TWENTY-
FOURTH TITLE (§ 812-22) OF THE OF THE GERMAN CIVIL 
CODE 
§ 812. [Grundsatz] 
(1) Wer durch die Leistung eines anderen oder in sonstiger Weise auf dessen Kosten 
etwas ohne rechtlichen Grund erlangt, ist ihm zur Herausgabe verpflichtet. Diese 
Verpflichtung besteht auch dann, wenn der rechtliche Grund spater wegfcillt oder der mit 
einer Leistung nach dem lnhalte des Rechtsgeschafts bezweckte Erfolg nicht eintritt. 
(2) Als Leistung gilt auch die durch Vertrag erfolgte Anerkennung des Bestehens 
oder des Nichtbestehens eines Schuldverhaltnisses. 
§ 813. [Erftillung trotz Einrede] 
(1) Das zmn Zwecke der Erfiillung einer Verbindlichkeit Geleistete kann auch dann 
zurtickgefordert werden, wenn dem Anspruch eine Einrede entgegenstand, durch welche 
die Geltendmachung des Anspruchs dauemd ausgeschlossen wurde. Die Vorschrift des 
§ 222 Abs 2 bleibt unberiihrt. 
(2) Wird eine betagte Verbindlichkeit vorzeitig erfiillt, so ist die Rtickforderung 
ausgeschlossen; die Erstattung von Zwischenzinsen kann nicht verlangt werden. 
§ 814. [Kenntnis der Nichtschuld; Anstands- und Sittenpflicht] 
Das zurn Zwecke der Erfullung einer Verbindlichkeit Geleistete kann nicht 
zurtickgefordert werden, wenn der Leistende gewu13t hat, daB er zur Leistung nicht 
verpflichtet war, oder wenn die Leistung einer sittlichen Pflicht oder einer auf den 
Anstand zu nehmended Rticksicht entsprach. 
§ 815. [Nichteintritt des Erfolges] 
Die Rtickforderung wegen Nichteintritts des mit einer Leistung bezweckten Erfolges ist 
ausgeschlossen, wenn der Eintritt des Erfolges von Anfang an unmoglich war und der 
Leistende dies gewu13t hat oder wenn der Leistende den Eintritt des Erfolges wider Treu 
und Glauben verhindert hat. 
§ 816. [Verfiigung eines Nichtberechtigten] 
(1) Trifft ein Nichtberechtigter tiber einen Gegenstand eine Verfiigung, die dem 
Berechtigten gegentiber wirksam ist, so ist er dem Berechtigten zur Herausgabe des 
durch die Verfugung Erlangten verpflichtet. Erfolgt die Verfiigung unentgeltlich, so 
trifft die gleiche Verpflichtung denjenigen, welcher auf Grund der V erfii gung 
unmittelbar einen rechtlichen Vorteil erlangt. 
(2) Wird an einen Nichtberechtigten eine Leistung bewirkt, die dem Berechtigten 
gegentiber wirksam ist, so ist der Nichtberechtigte dem Berechtigten zur Herausgabe des 
Geleisteten verpflichtet. 
§ 817. [Verston gegen Gesetz oder gute Sitten] 
War der Zweek einer Leistung in der Art bestimmt, daB der Empfanger dureh die 
Annahme gegen ein gesetzliehes Verbot oder gegen die guten Sitten verstoi3en hat, so ist 
der Empfanger zur Herausgabe verpfliehtet. Die Ruekforderung ist ausgesehlossen, 
wenn dem Leistenden gleiehfalls ein soleher Verstoi3 zur Last fallt, es sei denn, daB die 
Leistung in der Eingehung einer Verbindliehkeit bestand; das zur Erfiillung einer 
solehen Verbindliehkeit Geleistete kann Dieht zurUekgefordert werden. 
§ 818. [Umfaog des Bereicheruogsaospruchs] 
(1) Die Verpfliehtung zur Herausgabe erstreekt sieh auf die gezogenen Nutzungen 
sowie auf dasjenige, was der Empfanger auf Grund eines erlangten Reehtes oder als 
Ersatz fur die ZersWrung, Besehadigung oder Entziehung des erlangten Gegenstandes 
erwirbt. 
(2) 1st die Herausgabe wegen der Besehaffenheit des Erlangten Dieht moglieh oder 
ist der Empfanger aus einem anderen Grunde zur Herausgabe aui3erstande, so hat er den 
Wert zu ersetzen. 
(3) Die Verpfliehtung zur Herausgabe oder zum Ersatze des Wertes ist 
ausgesehlossen, soweit der Empfanger Dieht mehr bereiehert ist. 
(4) Von dem Eintritte der Reehtshangigkeit an haftet der Empfanger naeh den 
allgemeinen Vorsehriften. 
§ 819. [Verscharfte Haftung bei Bosglaubigkeit uod bei Gesetzes- oder 
Sittenversto8] 
(1) Kennt der Empfanger den Mangel des reehtliehen Grundes bei dem Empfang 
oder erfahrt er ihn spater, so ist er von dem Empfang oder der Erlangung der Kenntnis 
an zur Herausgabe verpfliehtet, wie wenn der Ansprueh auf Herausgabe zu dieser Zeit 
reehtshangig geworden ware. 
(2) VersWi3t der Empfanger dureh die Annahme der Leistung gegen ein gesetzliehes 
Verbot oder gegen die guten Sitten, so ist er von dem Empfange der Leistung an in der 
gleiehen Weise verpfliehtet. 
§ 820. [Verscharfte Haftung bei uogewissem Erfolgseintritt] 
(1) War mit der Leistung ein Erfolg bezweekt, dessen Eintritt naeh dem Inhalte des 
Reehtgesehafts als ungewii3 angesehen wurde, so ist der Empfanger, falls der Erfolg 
nieht eintritt, zur Herausgabe so verpfliehtet, wie wenn der Ansprueh auf Herausgabe 
zur Zeit des Empfanges reehtshangig geworden ware. Das gleiehe gilt, wenn die 
Leistung aus emem Reehtsgrunde, dessen Wegfall naeh dem Inhalte des Reehtsgesehaft 
als moglieh angesehen wurde, erfolgt ist und der Reehtsgrund wegfallt. 
(2) Zinsen hat der Empfanger erst von dem Zeitpunkt an zu entriehten, in welchem 
er erfahrt, daB der Erfolg Dieht eingetreten oder daB der Reehtsgrund weggefallen ist; zur 
Herausgabe von Nutzungen ist er insoweit Dieht verpfliehtet, als er zu dieser Zeit nieht 
mehr bereiehert ist. 
§ 821. [Eiorede der Bereicherung] 
Wer ohne reehtliehen Grund eine Verbindliehkeit eingeht, kann die Erfullung aueh dann 
verweigem, wenn der Ansprueh auf Befreiung von der Verbindliehkeit verjahrt ist. 
§ 822. [Herausgabepflicbt Dritter] 
Wendet der Empfanger das Erlangte unentgeltlich einem Dritten zu, so ist, soweit 
infolgedessen die Verpflichtung des Empfangers zur Herausgabe der Bereicherung 
ausgeschlossen ist, der Dritte zur Herausgabe verpflichtet, wie wenn er die Zuwendung 
von dem Glaubiger ohne rechtlichen Grund erhalten hatte. 
TRANSLATION TAKEN FROM FORRESTER, GOREN AND ILGEN THE 
GERMAN CIVIL CODE 
'§ 812. [Principle] 
(1) A person who, through an act performed by another, or in any other manner, 
acquires something at the expense of the latter without any legal ground, is bound to 
return it to him. This obligation subsists even if the legal ground subsequently 
disappears or the result intended to be produced by an act to be performed pursuant to 
the legal transaction is not produced. 
(2) Recognition of the existence or non-existence of a debt, if made under a contract, 
is also deemed to be an act of performance. 
§ 813. [Fulfilment despite defense] 
(1) What was done with the object of fulfilling an obligation may be demanded back 
even if there was a defense to the claim whereby the enforcement of the claim was 
permanently barred. The provision of222 (2) remains unaffected. 
(2) If an obligation due on a certain date is fulfilled in advance, the right to demand 
return is barred; the discounting of interim interest may not be demanded. 
§ 814. [Knowledge of debt not owed; moral duty and duty of common decency] 
What was done with the oblect of fulfilling an obligation may not be demanded back if 
the person performing knew that he was not bound to effect the performance, or if the 
performance was in compliance with a moral duty, or for the sake of common decency. 
§ 815. [Non-occurrence of result] 
The right to demand return on the grounds of the non-occurrence of the result intended 
to be produced by what was done, is barred, if the production of the result was 
impossible from the beginning, and the person performing knew this, or if he has 
prevented the occurrence of the result in bad faith. 
§ 816. [Disposition by person witbout title] 
(1) If a person without title to an object makes a disposition of it which is binding 
upon the person having title he is bound to hand over to the latter what he has obtained 
by the disposition. If the disposition is made gratuitously the same obligation is imposed 
upon the person who acquires a legal advantage directly through the dispositon. 
(2) If an act of performance is done for the benefit of a person not entitled thereto, 
which is effective against the person entitled, the former is bound to hand over to the 
latter the value of such performance. 
§ 817. [Violation of law or public policy] 
If the purpose of an act of perfonnance was specified in such a manner that its 
acceptance by the recipient constitutes an infringement of a statutory prohibition or is 
contrary to public policy, the recipient is bound to make restitution. The claim for return 
is barred if the person perfonning has committed a similar infringement, unless the 
performance consisted in entering into an obligation; what has been given for the 
performance of such an obligation may not be demanded back. 
§ 818. [Extent of claim of enrichment] 
(1) The obligation to return extends to emoluments derived, and to whatever the 
recipient acquires either by virtue of a right obtained by him, or as a compensation for 
the destruction, damage or deprivation of the object obtained. 
(2) If the return is impossible on account of the nature of the object obtained, or if 
the recipient for any other reason is not in a position to make the return, he shall make 
good the value. 
(3) The obligation to return or to make good the valueis excludedwhere the recipient 
is no longer enriched. 
(4) After the date an action is pending the recipient is liable under the general 
provisions. 
§ 819. [Increased liability in case of bad faith and infringementof law or public 
policy] 
(1) If the recipient knows ofthe absence of a legal ground at the time of the receipt, 
or if he subsequently learns of it, he is bound to return from the time of receipt or of 
acquisition of the knowledge as if an action on the claim for return were pending at the 
time. 
(2) If the recipient, by the acceptance of an act of performance, infringes a statutory 
prohibition or acts contrary to public policy, he is bound in the same manner after the 
receipt of the perfonnance. 
§ 820. [Increased liability in case of uncertainty of production of result] 
(1) If a result was intended to be produced by an act of performance, and if the 
production of such a result was, according to the contents of the legal transaction, 
regarded as doubtful, the recipient is, where the result is not produced, bound to return in 
the same manner as if an action were pending on the right to demand return at the time 
of the receipt. The same applies if the performance was made on a legal ground whose 
disappearance was regarded as possible according to the contents of the legal 
transaction, and the legal ground disappears. 
(2) The recipient is bound to pay interest only from the time at which he learns that 
the result has not been produced, or that the legal ground has disappeared; for the return 
of emoluments he is not bound insofar as he is no longer enriched at that time. 
§ 821. [Claim of enrichment] 
A person who incurs an obligation without legal ground may refuse performance, even if 
the claim for release from the obligationhas been barred by prescription. 
§ 822. [Third party's duty to return] 
lfthe recipient transfers the thing acquired gratuitously to a third party, and if in 
consequence of this the obligation of the recipient for return of the enrichment is 
excluded, the third party is bound to return the enrichment as if he had received it from 
the creditor without legal ground.' 
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